



THE GEOGRAPHY OF ANTI-MUSLIM HATRED

Tell MAMA Annual Report 2015

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For further information please contact Faith Matters
+44 (0) 207 935 5573
info@faith-matters.co.uk

To report a hate crime, please contact Tell MAMA
+44 (0) 800 456 1226
info@tellmamauk.org
www.tellmamauk.org
Twitter: @TellMAMAUK
Facebook: www.facebook.com/tellmamauk

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Lead researcher: Bharath Ganesh
Editor-in-chief: Steve Rose
Researchers: Jeff Arnold, Rehman Anwer,
Ruzina Begum, and Iman Abou-Atta

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The geography of anti-Muslim hatred

Tell MAMA Annual Report 2015

29 June 2016

dedicated to the memory of Jo Cox MP

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Foreword

Today we stand in uncharted territory with a 200 per cent increase in offline Islamophobic incidents in 2015. The statistics paint a profoundly bleak picture of the explosion of anti-Muslim hate both online and on our streets with visible Muslim women being disproportionately targeted by cowardly hatemongers.

This exponential growth is testament to the fact that despite great efforts to fight anti-Muslim hatred, as a society we are still failing behing in supporting many of our citizens.

With the backdrop of the Brexit vote and the spike in racist incidents that seems to be emerging, the government should be under no illusions: things could quickly become extremely unpleasant for Britain's minorities.

So today, more than ever, we need our government, our political parties and of course our media to act with the utmost responsibility and help steer us towards a post-Brexit Britain where xenophobia and hatred are utterly rejected. Failure to demonstrate the necessary maturity in leadership at this delicate moment in our history could have some significant and far-reaching consequences for us all.

We call upon all in leadership positions, and especially politicians and the media, to rise to this new challenge and help unite our country against those who would inflame discord and incite hatred in our communities.

Shahid Malik
Chair of Tell MAMA
Former Labour Justice and Communities Minister



Founder's Statement

For five years, my colleagues have worked tirelessly day and night to make Tell MAMA the vehicle that it is today; a nationally recognised monitoring project for anti-Muslim hatred which supports victims and has helped bring about a range of national policy changes. Some of these include a greater focus for government on far-right groups promoting anti-Muslim hatred, a greater understanding of the online world, and educating police forces and central government about the varieties of Islamophobia.

We have been at the forefront of countering anti-Muslim hate and our results are testament to the determination that has been put into this work.

We have worked with the Crown Prosecution Service, numerous police forces, Police and Crime Commissioners, local authority leads, social media providers, European Union institutions and mosques and Islamic institutions, to name just a few, over the last five years. My team has worked with conviction, focus and real care for victims of anti-Muslim hatred and we have done this with a core value in our work, that of defending and protecting human rights. This means that we will defend the identities of all people within our country and within local communities. This also means that where we find anti-Muslim hatred, antisemitism, LGBT hate or disability hate for that matter, we will counter and challenge it.

This is of particular significance for me, since as a young child displaced from Africa due to political turmoil, there were occasions in my life in the early 1980s where I suffered repeated racism and hatred. Alone and away from parents in a boarding school in a very alien environment, it was young Jews who stood up for me and who wiped the mud from my face when I was beaten down. They stood with me as I promised that never again will hate beat me down. It is a promise by which I have tried to live my life and it has provided the moral compass for this work.

Over the last five years, I have been proud of my team who have stood together as a unit and a force for good. I have walked with them, step-by-step through that journey and with a vision that provides Muslim communities, government, police forces and many other bodies, with an independent project which can provide hard factual data on the state of anti-Muslim hate in the country. The journey has been tough and marred with many pitfalls, but we stand stronger than ever and with a desire to give victims a voice. It is their voice we hear on a daily basis and which we try and elevate in a turbulent and fast moving social environment with competing narratives.

Lastly, I would like to thank my team. Without them, this journey would not have been possible and they will continue in this worthwhile mission. Thank you to Steve, Iman, Ruzina, Bharath, Rehman, Jeff, Kaushal, Jatin, Aya and the many others involved in this work.”

Fiyaz Mughal OBE
Founder and Director of Tell MAMA, 2012-2016



Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to all those who provided us the possibility to complete this report. I extend a special gratitude to victims who were brave enough to report in and share their experiences with us.

I would also like to acknowledge with much appreciation the crucial role of our team, our lead researcher Bharath Ganesh whose contribution in writing this report has been invaluable, our observant editor Steve Rose, and our diligent researchers Jeff Arnold, Rehman Anwer and Ruzina Begum for their great contributions in data review. In addition, I would like to thank our caseworkers for their unconditional support to victims and to our IT team for their continued support.

Last but not least, we owe a debt of gratitude to our partners and supporters on this journey.

I look forward to continue working with you all.

Iman Abou Atta
Deputy Director of Tell MAMA



Batley and Spen is a gathering of typically independent, no-nonsense and proud Yorkshire towns and villages. Our communities have been deeply enhanced by immigration, be it of Irish Catholics across the constituency or of Muslims from Gujarat in India or from Pakistan, principally from Kashmir. While we celebrate our diversity, what surprises me time and time again as I travel around the constituency is that we are far more united and have far more in common than that which divides us.

Jo Cox MP (Batley and Spen), maiden speech in the House of Commons
3 June 2015

Executive Summary

Tell MAMA (Measuring anti-Muslim Attacks) is a confidential and independent third-party hate crime reporting service for individuals who experience anti-Muslim hate incidents and crimes. Victims can also report in through Twitter, Facebook, Whatsapp, by e-mail and through the Tell MAMA web-site itself (www.tellmamauk.org).

Tell MAMA offers an alternative place for victims to report hate crimes should they prefer not to go directly to the police. Staff can also report incidents to police on behalf of individuals.

Victims also use our service for holistic support and assistance with casework. Tell MAMA liaises with the police on victims' behalf when necessary. In addition to everyday support of victims, Tell MAMA records and analyses anti-Muslim hate incidents and crimes. This report covers verified¹ anti-Muslim hate incidents reported to Tell MAMA from 1 January to 31 December 2015.

Tell MAMA received 1,128 reports of anti-Muslim incidents from victims, witnesses and third party organisations. Each incident is added to our database as a form by a caseworker, reviewed by a senior caseworker, and analysed by a researcher. Each incident is verified as a unique, genuine anti-Muslim crime or incident by multiple members of the Tell MAMA team.

- We documented 437 anti-Muslim crimes or incidents that are classified as 'offline', meaning they happened in-person between a victim (or property) and a perpetrator.
- Police forces have begun to provide data on anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents to Tell MAMA. We document 1,494 crimes and incidents from three police forces. Merseyside Police recorded 67 crimes and incidents, Greater Manchester Police recorded 359 crimes and incidents and the Metropolitan Police Service (London) recorded 1,068 crimes and incidents.
- We documented 364 anti-Muslim crimes or incidents that are classified as 'online', meaning they occurred on social media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter, or other internet-based platforms. There was a total of 801 anti-Muslim incidents documented by Tell MAMA in 2015.
- We documented 146 offline or street based incidents in 2014/2015 (12 months to March 2015). In the calendar year 2015, our 437 incidents represent a 200 per cent increase over the previous reporting period.
- Of these offline incidents, 219 involved verbal abuse and 74 involved assault (including common assault, battery, as well as attempted and grievous bodily harm).
- 61 per cent of victims for whom we have details on gender are female. 55 per cent of all victims were visibly Muslim, but 75 per cent of all female victims were visibly Muslim. Women are more likely than men to be attacked on public transit or while shopping.
- We recorded 626 unique perpetrators. 19 per cent of perpetrators had unknown genders. Victims and witnesses were able to relay gender information for 505 perpetrators. Of these 76 per cent are men. Victims relayed ethnicity information for 366 perpetrators. Of these, 89

¹ Tell MAMA bases the perception of what is a hate incident against the characteristic of an individual on what the victim perceives. However, as part of due diligence, whilst the incident will be recorded on the basis of the perception of the victim, if corroborating secondary evidence is not available to confirm whether an incident is anti-Muslim in nature, it will not be included in the statistics in our annual reports.

per cent are white.

- Anti-Muslim hate is clearly gendered. Muslim women are more likely to be attacked than men in most settings. The largest proportion of perpetrators are white males. This means that the largest proportion of incidents involves Muslim women, usually wearing Islamic garments, facing attacks from white men.
- The three most common places where attacks occur are:
 - Public areas (111 incidents, 26 per cent of total), such as the pavement on a street, a park, or other public space in the city that is not enclosed.
 - Transport network (89 incidents, 20 per cent of total), including urban, regional, and national rail services, buses and coaches.
 - Place of business (53, 12 per cent of total), which refers to private property in which the victim is a customer.
- Geospatial analysis of hate crimes in London reveals that anti-Muslim incidents frequently occur in areas with high access to public transport and close to major roads (A roads).
- Content analysis of the online networks of perpetrators reveals that anti-Muslim hate is contextualized in broader xenophobic, racist, nationalist, and populist discourses and ideologies.

Recommendations

- Anti-Muslim hate crime relies on the misrepresentation of Muslims in Britain from certain media sources, politicians and public figures. More effort must be made to refute and challenge discursive frames that position Muslims as a monolithic bloc.
- Following major incidents of political violence, police forces should pay extra attention to the impacts it might have on Muslim communities that are wrongly held responsible for the incidents undertaken by a tiny minority of violent extremists.
- Police should be aware of the risks visibly Muslim women face as they move around the city. Hate crime policing for anti-Muslim incidents should be focused on main arteries in cities, near rail stations and bus stops.
- Training and development on understanding on spikes caused by global events, the language of anti-Muslim hatred, and the drivers of anti-Muslim hatred should be made available to police forces in the United Kingdom. Tell MAMA are uniquely placed to provide these given the data and evidence that the project has collected.
- Transport companies, including Transport for London and private rail operators (eg. Abellio, Southern Railways, Virgin Trains, etc.) should consider corporate social responsibility projects that address hate crime and signpost contact information for customer support and police support for victims. Rail operators should consider training railways staff in the types of hate crimes that occur on transport networks and the steps they can take to support victims.
- Police community liaison officers should consider training the general public in how they can safely challenge hate in all its forms in public areas and on trains.
- Numerous incidents occur in places of business. Security guards in shops and private enterprises should be trained to detect and defuse situations of verbal abuse and assault by taking swift action. Shops and private enterprises should take a zero-tolerance approach and refuse entry and service to any individuals that abuse other customers for protected characteristics (race, sexuality, religion, gender, and disability) and should report all incidents to the police. Mosques and Muslim institutions face frequent incidents. Following the security

models developed by the Jewish community, such as the Community Security Trust (CST), the Government should consider additional funding streams to help Muslim communities better organise protection and mechanisms to report incidents to the police.

- Existing counter-extremism powers to disrupt non-violent extremism online must do more to explore how xenophobic, racist, nationalist, and populist ideologies inspire forms of violent and non-violent anti-Muslim extremism. While disruption of non-violent extremism is politically controversial, it should be applied *equally* to all forms of hate.
- Social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter have been cooperative with Tell MAMA and police forces in countering hate speech, abuse, harassment, and threats made on their platforms. Within a short period of time, these social media platforms have had to introduce safety mechanisms and further ones continue to be developed. This is to be encouraged and warmly welcomed. However, there should be further discussion on how these platforms can encourage counter-narratives that challenge anti-Muslim discourse.
- We have received cases where individuals who are socially active within Muslim communities have been targeted by far right and nationalist inspired web-sites that have been written by anti-Muslim activists in the UK. We believe that Google and other search engines must work closely with specialist third party hate crime organisations to understand the online dynamics of how search engines are being manipulated to damage the credibility of social activists, divide communities and promote extremist rhetoric.

I. Introduction

Anti-Muslim and Islamophobic hate proliferated following the 9/11 attacks. As numerous commentators have argued in detail, since 9/11, a particular anxiety towards Muslim ‘others’ led to suspicion and outright hostility towards some Muslims in the West. Following the attacks on July 7, 2005, these anxieties intensified. After these horrific terrorist attacks, Muslims in Britain have faced significantly heightened levels of religious and racial hatred, manifested as crimes and hate incidents. After 7/7, the Metropolitan Police recorded a 573 per cent rise in hate crimes against Muslims (and those perceived to be Muslim), in the three weeks after the 7/7 bombings.

Tell MAMA (Measuring anti-Muslim Attacks) was established in February 2012 with the express intent of providing a confidential and independent third-party reporting service for Muslims in the United Kingdom who experience hate crimes and incidents, as recommended by the Macpherson report, published in 1999 following the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993.²

Since 2012, we have recorded large spikes in anti-Muslim activity following the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in May 2013,³ the attacks on the offices of Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015⁴, and the recent atrocities in Paris on November 13, 2015⁵. The un-Islamic political violence perpetrated by extremists is followed by violence, intimidation, harassment, and bullying towards Muslims in Britain, regardless of gender, age, ethnicity, and religiosity.

While it is important to note that anti-Muslim incidents are common after incidents of political violence, in 2015—ten years on from 7/7—we find that anti-Muslim hate is becoming normalised, woven into the everyday spaces that Muslims in Britain navigate and pass through. More concerning than the predictable spikes after political violence is the everyday nature of Islamophobia and the way it constricts and limits the access to security for Muslims in Britain in the cities, towns, and villages in which they reside. More than anything, our data collection and research demonstrates that Islamophobia constricts Muslim mobility: the right to move safely down a street, to sit on a bus without being shouted at or assaulted, to be served fairly and equally at places of business and the right to contribute as an employee without fear of reprisal from management because of their religious clothing. The inability to counter Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate is a failure to ensure the security and right to equal access of public spaces by Muslims in Britain due to their religion and creed. In fact, this is precisely the discord and alienation that terrorists who seek to harm the UK and her allies wish to sow; their attacks heighten anti-Muslim sentiments, constricting and alienating British Muslims, and fuel the very antagonisms that threaten the stability of our multicultural society.

By recording, analysing and acting on behalf of victims, Tell MAMA seeks to protect the security and mobility of Muslims in Britain. It also helps to develop confidence within Muslim communities and

2 Two key recommendations of the Macpherson Report for hate crime work defines a racist incident as ‘any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person.’ And a ‘racist incident’ must be understood to include crimes and non-crimes and investigated by police with equal commitment. So if a victim perceives the incident as anti-Muslim in nature, our staff will treat it as such, unless senior staff determine otherwise following investigation.

3 Feldman, M and M Littler. (2014) ‘Tell MAMA Reporting 2013/14: Anti-Muslim Overview, Analysis and “Cumulative Extremism”’. Middlesbrough: Teesside University, p. 19.

4 Milmo, C. (2015). ‘British Muslim school children suffering a backlash of abuse following Paris attacks’. *The Independent*.

5 Wright, O. (2015). ‘Paris attacks: Women targeted as hate crime against British Muslims soars following terrorist atrocity’. *The Independent*.

reduce a victim culture so that individuals can move on as best as possible from the hate incidents that they have suffered. It can also have a significant impact on the long-term mental and emotional well-being of victims and their immediate families.

This annual report is a small step toward our goal of ensuring the safety and security of Britain's Muslim communities. In elucidating and quantifying anti-Muslim hate in Britain we hope to inform police, policymakers, and civil society of the shape and scale of the problem and identify avenues to better ensure the mobility and security of Muslims.

II. Islamophobia, hate crime, and Muslim mobility

Islamophobia has been an object of extensive study through the decade following the 7/7 bombings. Islamophobia, as a term, has a long history⁶ though it refers to an ideology developed in the Runnymede Trust's landmark report *Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All*. The notion of Islamophobia is predominantly understood as an ideology that 'shapes' and 'determines' attitudes and perceptions toward Muslims.⁷ There is ample evidence to prove that Islamophobia is an ideology and disseminated through various media sources that portray Muslims in a negative light.⁸ Others have examined Islamophobia as ideological networks, involving various funding bodies, think tanks, ideologues, and policy makers that position Islam and Muslims as a whole as irremediably culturally 'other'.⁹ In particular, the media and other public figures further perpetuate anti-Muslim sentiment when they are portrayed as 'warlike', unattractive, barbaric, manipulating the West and involved in terrorism.¹⁰

Ideological theories of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate help to explain its sources and the power relations that cause it to persist. It is important to note that Islamophobic language and discourse helps to frame Muslims as threatening, impinging, culturally inferior, and violent.¹¹ While ideology is a useful theoretical basis to understand Islamophobic discourse, it does not provide sufficient resources to understand the dynamics of hate crimes in which discourse and language form part of a more complex interaction. Hate crime involves deeply emotional registers on both the part of perpetrator and victim. While attacks may be driven by ideological motives, we argue that understanding anti-Muslim hate crime requires a broader approach that considers how incidents affect victims, their ability to go about their daily lives, and the insecurity that anti-Muslim ideologies foster.

For example, a woman's hijab can become a universal symbol of 'Muslimness'.¹² Consequently, a perpetrator identifies this person as a 'Muslim' in conjunction with the notion, disseminated through Islamophobic ideology, that the person is 'oppressed', a 'terrorist', or pathological. Ideology plays a role in how a perpetrator may *interpret* the differences expressed by a Muslim and how they present themselves.¹³ Our data demands that we go a step beyond this and identify *how* Islamophobia works

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- 6 Vakili, A. (2011). 'Is the Islam in Islamophobia the Same as the Islam in Anti-Islam; Or, When is it Islamophobia Time?', in *Thinking Through Islamophobia* (eds. Sayyid, S and Vakili, A). New York: Columbia University Press.
- 7 Allen, C. (2010). *Islamophobia*. Farnham: Ashgate; and Klug, B. (2014). 'Islamophobia: A concept comes of age'. *Ethnicities* 12(5): 665-681.
- 8 See, for example, Moore, K et al. (2008). *Images of Islam in the UK*. Cardiff: Cardiff School of Journalism, Media, and Cultural Studies; and Baker, P, C Gabrielatos, C. and T McEnery. (2013). *Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 9 Mills, T, T Griffin, and D Miller. (2011). *The Cold War on British Muslims*. Spinwatch; and Griffin, T, H Aked, D Miller, and S Marusek. (2015). *The Henry Jackson Society and the Degeneration of British Neoconservatism: Liberal Interventionism, Islamophobia and the 'War on Terror'*. Spinwatch.
- 10 Perry, B. (2014). 'Gendered Islamophobia: Hate crime against Muslim women. Social Identities', *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture* 20(1): 76-77.
- 11 Said, E. (1997). *Covering Islam*. London: Vintage; Kundnani, A. (2014). *The Muslims are Coming!* London: Verso Books; and Kumar, D. (2012). *Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- 12 Allen, C. (2014). 'Exploring the Impact of Islamophobia on Visible Muslim Women Victims: A British Case Study'. *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 3: 137-159.
- 13 Garland, J, N Chakraborti, and S Hardy, (2015), 'It Felt Like a Little War: Reflections on Violence against Alternative Subcultures', *Sociology* 49(6): 1065-1080; and Chakraborti, N. (2015). 'Re-Thinking Hate Crime: Fresh Challenges for Policy and Practice', *Journal of*

in concrete encounters. Islamophobia, therefore, names the interrelated processes of ideology, amplification of Muslim differences, and lived, emotionally-charged experiences.

Islamophobia: from ideology to mobility

In order to attend to the complexities that our dataset presents, we move away from questions of discourse, language, and representation to a theoretical framework on Muslim *security* and *mobility*. This approach fits more directly with the findings of researchers on anti-Muslim hate crime and hate crime more broadly, which the section following the present one will demonstrate. Rather than focus on the ideologies that underpin anti-Muslim hate and Islamophobia, our report analyses the incidents and encounters that are anti-Muslim in nature and tries to extract key dynamics to understand how it impacts Muslims.

Islamophobia constricts the mobility of Muslims in Britain. Anti-Muslim hate has caused victims to be afraid to leave their homes, to avoid public transport, and to fear travelling beyond the neighbourhoods where they feel safe.¹⁴ The city becomes a geography of fear and risk that Muslims must negotiate. This challenges the rights of Muslims to move freely through the cities. In the face of spurious claims that parts of Britain are no-go areas for non-Muslims, the converse appears true: British Muslims face insecurity and hate crime as they move through everyday areas,¹⁵ from high streets to parks, bus stops and tube carriages, between work and home, and even online.

Instructive work on mobility has been undertaken in human geography in various contexts, though they have not dealt in particular with anti-Muslim hate. For example, in exploring the limitations to tourists of Caribbean descent, research finds that for ethnic minorities, access to cosmopolitan travel destinations are constrained by ‘racialised boundaries’ when they are searched and experience racism, affecting their choices of which European countries they feel comfortable to visit.¹⁶ In an article on veiling and Islam in Istanbul, Anna Secor describes how dress intimately relates to the spaces that an individual can access: ‘dress can act to constrain or enable physical mobility, and that dress is always subject to shifting interpretations across space and time’.¹⁷ While Secor is writing about the mobilities that women experience in Istanbul when navigating spaces of secularity, such a perspective on how dress—and more generally, how someone *looks*—as a ‘constraint’ on mobility and access to space is germane to understand the encounters and relations that we cover with regards to Islamophobia. While many studies of mobility focus on the power of the state in constraining bodies based on their differences,¹⁸ it remains important to understand how anti-Muslim tropes, ideas, and images frame the way Muslims are viewed by others and the way they are deployed by those, who, for one reason or another, abuse, assault, or even threaten Muslims simply because of their (perceived) faith. This has led Muslims in Britain to adopt certain ‘safe’

Interpersonal Violence 30(10): 1738–1754.

- 14 Awan, I and I Zempi. (2015). *We Fear for our Lives: Offline and Online Experiences of Anti-Muslim Hostility*. London: Tell MAMA.
- 15 Chakraborti, N, J Garland, and SJ Hardy. (2014). *The Leicester Hate Crime Project: Findings and Conclusions*. Leicester: University of Leicester, 34.
- 16 Stephenson, M. (2006). ‘Travel and the ‘Freedom of Movement’: Racialised Encounters and Experiences Amongst Ethnic Minority Tourists in the EU’. *Mobilities* 1(2): 302.
- 17 Secor, A. (2002). ‘The Veil and Urban Space in Istanbul: Women’s dress, mobility and Islamic knowledge’. *Gender, Place and Culture* 9(1): 8.
- 18 Bærenholdt, J. (2013). ‘Governmobility: The Powers of Mobility’. *Mobilities* 8(1): 20-34; Ahmed, S. (2015). ‘The ‘emotionalization of the “war on terror”’: Counter- terrorism, fear, risk, insecurity and helplessness’. *Criminology & Criminal Justice* 15(5): 545-560; Mythen, G and S Walklate. (2008). ‘Terrorism, Risk and International Security: The Perils of Asking “What If?”’. *Security Dialogue* 39(2-3): 221-242; and Pantazis, C and Pemberton, S. (2009). ‘From the “Old” to the “New” Suspect Community’. *British Journal of Criminology* 49: 646-666.

identities by avoiding certain forms of outward religious expression that makes the individual more vulnerable to risks.¹⁹

In a founding article for the journal *Mobilities*, authors point to the fact that mobility is constrained and afforded to different bodies based on their race, gender, class, or even religion.²⁰ Certain bodies are more mobile than others depending on multiple factors; some people are able to move about freely because they can afford it, because their skin colour is 'normal' for that society, or because they are not seen as a 'threat'. Others are less able to enjoy free movement: 'conditions of highly restricted mobility, even containment, are more common for those bodies that are criminalised, displaced, and/or construed as a security threat to the state and its citizenry'.²¹ As the War on Terror has focused on political violence inspired by extremist interpretations of Islam, Muslims have been construed as potential security threats.²² This focus has led Muslims to face frequent slurs that frame them as supporters of ISIS, terrorists, or bombers in the incidents and hate crimes we have recorded.

Constructing Muslims as a security threat affects how Muslims, as a group, are viewed in the UK. Muslims in Britain are more likely to be stopped at airports, and ethnic minorities are more likely to be stopped and searched than their white counterparts (according to Home Office data, ethnic minorities that are Asian are more likely to be stopped and detained under Schedule 7 powers than their white counterparts). This is evident in public opinion as well: according to a Pew poll, 24 per cent of the British public hold 'unfavourable' views towards Islam.²³ In another poll, 36 per cent of the British public believed that Muslims are not loyal to the UK.²⁴ While these numbers are not a majority, they represent the most extreme responses available in the polls. This suggests that one in five Britons may harbor anxieties towards Islam and Muslims that are founded on media frames that continue to stress Islam's connection with violence and extremism at the expense of more balanced reporting that would include the positive contributions that Muslims in Britain make.²⁵

Understanding how mobilities afford bodies different possibilities of movement, freedom, and space in the city helps illuminate how Islamophobia operates on individuals rather than ideology alone. Turning to mobilities literature attempts to better understand the lived impacts of Islamophobia and how anti-Muslim hate affects communities. We have seen some alarming statistics from polls of British Muslims: almost one in five British Muslim women agreed that they 'do not feel safe in Britain' and 40 percent of women felt that most Britons do not trust Muslims.²⁶

These numbers are worrying because almost 19 per cent of Muslim women feel insecure in Britain.²⁷ As our section on victims will show, the majority of anti-Muslim incidents we have recorded have

19 Mythen, G, S Walklate and F Khan. (2009). "I'm a Muslim, but I'm not a terrorist": victimization, risky identities, and the performance of safety'. *British Journal of Criminology* 49: 736-754.

20 Hannam, K, M Sheller, and J Urry. (2006). 'Editorial: Mobilities, Immobilities and Moorings'. *Mobilities* 1(1): 1-22.

21 Hyndman, J. (2012). 'The Geopolitics of Migration and Mobility'. *Geopolitics* 17(2): 248.

22 Awan, I. (2012). "I Am a Muslim Not an Extremist": How the Prevent Strategy Has Constructed a "Suspect" Community'. *Politics & Policy*, 40(6): 1158-1185; Awan, I. (2012). 'The impact of policing British Muslims: a qualitative exploration'. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 7(1): 22-35.

23 Ganesh, B and I Abou-Atta. (2016). *Forgotten Women: The impact of Islamophobia on Muslim women in the United Kingdom*. Brussels: European Network Against Racism, 18.

24 *ibid.*, 17.

25 Baker P, C Gabrielatos, T McEnery. (2013). 'Sketching Muslims: A Corpus Driven Analysis of Representations Around the word "Muslim" in the British Press 1998-2009'. *Applied Linguistics* 34(3): 255-278.

26 See Table 11 in data available at http://www.comres.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/BBC-Today-Programme_British-Muslims-Poll_FINAL-Tables_Feb2015.pdf

27 See Table 22 in data available at http://www.comres.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/BBC-Today-Programme_British-Muslims-Poll_FINAL-Tables_Feb2015.pdf

female victims. This means that Muslim women have to balance work, childcare, and domestic responsibilities *in addition* to negotiating insecurity and risk as they move about the cities, towns, and villages where they reside. Further, the language used in hate crimes against Muslim women is anti-Muslim and misogynistic in nature.²⁸

We find that hate crimes are most common in public areas, on various nodes of the transport network, and in shopping districts and premises. The random nature of incidents does not appear (in most instances) to be premeditated. This suggests that hate crime can curtail the mobility of Muslim bodies, rendering, for victims of hate crimes, the city as a geography of risk and fear rather than a secure home. In our report, we explore the geography and distribution of hate crimes and detail how they may constrict and limit the mobility of Muslims in Britain and contribute to a sense of alienation and insecurity.

Anti-Muslim hate crime and mobility

The persistence of insecurity and constraints on mobility has been noted in recent hate crime literature on anti-Muslim hate. This compounds existing inequalities as Muslims are more likely to live in poorer areas with high crime rates.²⁹

Deprivation and poverty affect mobility and consequently, they affect vulnerability and resilience to hate crimes:

Hate crimes can often be triggered and exacerbated by socio-economic conditions, and some potential targets of hate crime will invariably be better placed than others to avoid persecution by virtue of living at a greater distance from prejudiced neighbours or in less overtly hostile environments.³⁰

Hate crime work also needs account for the banal and everyday nature of incidents and crimes with bias motivations. Neil Chakraborti encourages analysts and practitioners to take this into account by pointing out that hate crimes are often ‘spontaneous’ and a result of an individual’s ‘situation’ rather than ‘a result of entrenched prejudice’.³¹ The framework that Chakraborti presents relates to the mobility of Muslims in Britain. Though it depends on an ideological network and particular discourses, we are cautious to ensure that we understand that the incidents reported to Tell MAMA are ‘everyday acts of prejudice that blight victims’ lives’.³²

Work on anti-Muslim hate crime and Muslim women highlights the intersectional and overlapping forms of hate they experience.³³ For Irene Zempi and Neil Chakraborti, experiences of hate crime, particularly for veiled women, means that:

28 Chakraborti, N and I Zempi. (2012). ‘The veil under attack: Gendered dimensions of Islamophobic victimization’. *International Review of Victimology* 18(3): 269-284.

29 Ali, S. (2015). *British Muslims in Numbers*. London: Muslim Council of Britain, 46; see also Stephen, J and O Khan. (2013). *Ethnicity and deprivation in England: How likely are ethnic minorities to live in deprived neighbourhoods*. Manchester: ESRC Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity (CoDE).

30 Chakraborti, N. (2015). ‘Framing the boundaries of hate crime’, in *The Routledge International Handbook on Hate Crime* (eds. Hall, N, A Corb, P Giannasi, and J Grieve). London: Routledge, 18.

31 *ibid.*, 18.

32 *ibid.*, 19.

33 Mason-Bish, H. (2015). ‘Beyond the Silo: Rethinking hate crime and intersectionality’, in *The Routledge International Handbook on Hate Crime* (eds. Hall, N, A Corb, P Giannasi, and J Grieve). London: Routledge.

Islamophobic hostility is ‘part and parcel’ of veiled women’s everyday life, and this reinforces the sense of constant risk for actual and potential victims.... the threat of Islamophobic victimization had long-lasting effects for individual victims including making them afraid to leave their homes.³⁴

Their findings are similar to ours, noting that it is public areas and transport networks are areas of high anxiety for victims. It is the random, aleatory potential of hate crime that makes it possible for a body to be perceived as an ‘other’ (whether it be due to disability, sexuality, race, or religion) and become targeted with hate, creating the sense of fear and vulnerability that communities have to face.

A broad study of hate crime victims in Canada found that victims can easily be substituted for one another—in the mind of the perpetrator the victim can come to represent *all* members of that targeted group. The authors note that ‘young men heading out for an evening of “gay bashing” are not very concerned about *which* gay male or lesbian they assault. Any individual can play the proxy for the group’.³⁵ This is true for all targeted groups and is an important point to remember when discussing how anti-Muslim impacts the mobility of victims and potential victims. Since a hate crime can occur at random times emphasises the fact that Muslims in Britain must navigate an increasingly Islamophobic climate and the knowledge that their outward expression of faith or racial identity has risk attached to it.

A clear trend is that during times of heightened anxiety towards Muslims, hate crimes increase. This has been recorded numerous times by the Metropolitan Police in London as well as noted in previous analysis of Tell MAMA data. The spike in anti-Muslim incidents after the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich in May 2013 is a documented example. In 2015, the atrocities in Paris led to further spikes in Tell MAMA data.

While there is a certain level of randomness to the geography of hate crime, our report demystifies this random geography and argues that there are clear trends and patterns. We hope to contribute findings based on a large dataset of anti-Muslim crimes and incidents. Our statistical calculations included geographic data for more than half of our total in-person or offline (cases that did not occur on social media platforms) cases. This geographic data indicates a level of clustering in particular zones, (the topic of section 6).

Our data collection on all offline incidents demonstrates that public areas, primarily pedestrian thoroughfares, parks, and high streets, nodes of the transport network, including bus stops, train carriages, and platforms, and shopping areas are the most likely spaces for anti-Muslim hate crime to occur. These are areas most frequented by *all* residents on a daily basis. Given that these areas are primary locations of anti-Muslim incidents underscores the fact that the city, town, or village itself becomes a risky space where those expressing different forms of ‘Muslimness’ are most vulnerable.

34 Zempi, I and N Chakraborti. (2015). “‘They Make Us Feel Like We’re a Virus’: The Multiple Impacts of Islamophobic Hostility Towards Veiled Muslim Women”. *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy* 4(3): 48.

35 Perry, B and S Alvi. (2011). “‘We are all vulnerable’: The in terrorem effects of hate crimes”. *International Review of Victimology* 18(1): 65.



Our findings show that anti-Muslim hate crime disproportionately affects visibly Muslim women as they go about their everyday lives. Hate crimes and incidents are relatively more common on public streets, buses, trains, trams, and coaches, as well as shops and busy high streets. The vast majority of known perpetrators are white men.

III. Timeline: global events and anti-Muslim hate crime

Based on the arguments made about cumulative extremism in previous Tell MAMA reports provided by Teesside University, we expect that events of political violence perpetrated by extremist forms of political Islam leads to spikes in anti-Muslim hate.³⁶ These spikes tend to be short term but it is important to remember that many of these events become part of a larger anti-Muslim imagination. For example, victims were referred to as 'ISIS' and had 'Charlie' shouted at them in numerous instances *throughout* the year. This suggests that while spikes are short term, these incidents continue to influence anti-Muslim behaviour throughout the calendar year. Consequently, we have added relevant events and media stories to the timeline to provide some context on what causes a spike and what factors do not seem to have an impact on the level of hate crimes.

The timeline displays the number of incidents reported by Tell MAMA in each full week in 2015. As reported in our 2014/2015 report, in the week starting 5 January in which the attack on the offices of Charlie Hebdo took place, there were 5 incidents reported to Tell MAMA. In the following two weeks, there were 10 and 18 incidents reported to Tell MAMA, representing a 200 to 360 percent increase in the two weeks before the spike. In the following two weeks, incidents reduced to 6 and 8 respectively.


In February, there were two incidents that we expected may have had a short-term effect on hate crimes. The highly publicised story of the three girls from Bethnal Green who left to Syria and the attacks in Copenhagen did not seem to have a significant effect on the number of hate crimes in the following weeks. Similarly, the terrorist attack on holidaymakers in Tunisia in June resulted in a slightly higher than normal number of reports to Tell MAMA in the summer months (the median number of incidents is 7, the average is 8.40).

As the summer and autumn progressed, we see that anti-Muslim hate crimes continued at an average level through August and September, with a slightly elevated level of incidents reported to Tell MAMA into mid-October. In the background, debates about refugees and asylum seekers were prominent in the media and prominent European politicians made anti-Muslim statements with reference to refugees in this period. While this did not create a spike as the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and the November attacks in Paris did, it does provide some sense that xenophobia, anti-refugee sentiment, and anti-Muslim sentiment were prevalent in this period and this might be an explanatory factor for increases in the incidents reported to Tell MAMA over this period.

Finally, the largest spike that we have observed in 2015 followed the attacks across Paris on 13 November 2015. In the three weeks prior to the attacks, Tell MAMA recorded 25 anti-Muslim incidents. In the three weeks during and after the attacks (from 12 November to 2 December), there were 82 anti-Muslim incidents recorded. This is a short-term increase of 328 per cent, similar to an estimate provided by Tell MAMA to *The Independent* in 2015. This was followed by an article in the

³⁶ Littler, M and M Feldman. (2015), *op. cit.*, 16.

Chart 3.1: offline incidents by week and international events



The Sun newspaper on 23 November that published extremely misleading information that 1 in 5 British Muslims have ‘sympathy for jihadis’. This story was effectively challenged across the media and the newspaper was made to print a correction by IPSO.³⁷ There is no observable spike following this story and it is possible that the healthy criticism of the article tempered public opinion following the story.

It appears that only the most publicised stories—such as the November attacks in Paris—have the largest impact in terms of short-term spikes of anti-Muslim activity. Smaller events and some political discourse tends to have less of an impact than would be expected. This tells us that perpetrators are motivated quite often by their affective and emotional responses to front-page stories involving violence perpetrated by those who identify as Muslims. When these stories are not front-page news and not highly visible on social media, they do not have a measurable impact on anti-Muslim incidents.


37 Worley, W. (2016). ‘Sun forced to admit “1 in 5 British Muslims” story was “significantly misleading”’. *The Independent*.

IV. Anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents by monitored category

In 2015, Tell MAMA received a record number of ‘offline’ or in-person anti-Muslim incidents. This increase is owed to two factors: increased awareness among Muslims in Britain of the Tell MAMA project and the growing level of Islamophobia in mainstream discourse (as pointed out in the 2014/2015 analysis of Tell MAMA data).

In this section, we provide key metrics on each of the categories that we use to monitor incidents. In addition, we provide some interpretation of these metrics and what it means for the broader question of how anti-Muslim hate affects the mobility of British Muslims. This section is intended to provide the reader with a quantitative overview of verified anti-Muslim incidents reported to Tell MAMA.

Chart 4.1: anti-Muslim incidents by category



We monitor incidents according to seven categories. The chart above breaks down the quantity of incidents in each category as a proportion of the entire dataset of 437 offline incidents. These categories are explained briefly, contextualised in terms of the laws that are germane to such incidents, and a brief analysis of the geography of each category is also provided. Later sections on victims and perpetrators provides metrics on the ethnicity, age, and gender of victims and perpetrators.

Abusive behaviour

Incidents of abusive behaviour are the most common to be reported to Tell MAMA. Abusive behaviour is understood as verbal abuse that is directed at a victim due to their religion. This includes the use of racist and anti-Muslim slurs such as ‘Paki,’ or ‘terrorist’. Incidents of abuse do not include threats of violence as we have another category for that (outlined in the section below). Many incidents of assault also include verbal abuse, but such incidents are absent in this category count.

Verbal abuse does not always meet a criminal threshold, therefore, such incidents often fall under the category of ‘hate incidents’ rather than ‘hate crimes’. The Public Order Act (sections 4, 4A, and 5), however, can be used to charge perpetrators in certain cases. Beyond criminal justice outcomes, verbal abuse still has long term consequences for victims. Such abuse has no place in a tolerant, democratic society. The persistence of such incidents and its significant, deep emotional impacts on victims affects will negatively impact their mobility in daily life, forcing some to withdraw further from society.

Table 4.1: count of incidents of abusive behaviour by place of incident

Place of Incident	Count
Public area	61
Transport network	51
Place of business	31
Educational institution	23
Household or private property	14
Place of work	14
Road or highway	13
Muslim institution	6
Hospital	3
Public institution	2
Other	1
Total	219

The table above reveals a few key trends about incidents categorised as abusive behaviour. It occurs most often in public areas, on the transport network, and in places of business (where the victim is a client, customer, or shopper). In fact, these three categories constitute 65 per cent of all abusive behaviour incidents, and are areas that all people (particularly those living in urban areas) frequent. This also means that incidents are occurring in areas where bystanders are also present. Many victims report that bystanders rarely challenge abusive perpetrators, which compounds the insecurity and alienation that they feel after experiencing verbal abuse.

A majority of these incidents involve some kind of slur or amalgamation of the victim with terrorism. There are, broadly, two types of incidents. First are incidents where the perpetrator sees the victim, perceives them to be Muslim, and then simply hurls abuse at them, noted slurs include 'terrorist', 'bomber', 'get out of this country', 'ISIS', or 'Paki'. There is also frequent use of profanity and aggressive language, where victims are told to 'fuck off'. Abuse can also include broad slurs against Muslim communities, one reported example included the phrase, 'Muslims are scrounging rats'.

As the victims section will show, many are women. This is an important dynamic as highly sexist and misogynistic language is used against victims, with the words 'Muslim bitch' and 'c**t' appearing frequently. These slurs and insults also occur in incidents where the victim and perpetrator are engaged in some kind of conflict or altercation, such as a road-rage incident. Anti-Muslim slurs are used in situations where the perpetrator is angry and aggressive about something else but relies on anti-Muslim and sexist tropes and insults in order to demean the victim and make their point. For example, after a visible Muslim woman who had the right of way in heavy traffic drove in front of a man at a junction, before turning right and merging onto the road, he followed her to her workplace and shouted at her, 'you cut me up, you bitch'. While no anti-Muslim language was used in this incident, the fact that the victim is visibly Muslim suggests that she was targeted for such aggressive behaviour because of how she looked. Even the relative security of the automobile and private modes of transport can be penetrated through incidents that involve minor conflicts but become exacerbated and anti-Muslim in nature due to the perpetrator's perception of the victim's faith. Even minor incidents can turn more threatening if a perpetrator perceives their victim to be Muslim.

While the majority of the incidents reported do not involve direct violence, these forms of abuse and language make victims feel insecure, meaning that some may feel they must now avoid certain areas at certain times. Victims have reported that they avoid public transport at certain times to avoid abusive behaviour. Though this does not involve direct violence and physical injury, the psychological and social effects of abusive behaviour constrict mobility by turning everyday spaces into risky ones, rendering Muslims vulnerable, and at times, fearful of others.

Anti-Muslim literature and hate speech

There are relatively few incidents of anti-Muslim literature reported to Tell MAMA which involve hate mail and the distribution of written and digital media in various places. Consequently, we have combined anti-Muslim literature and hate speech in this section. The majority of anti-Muslim literature takes place online where a more complete review of anti-Muslim discourse is presented (see section 7). Relatively few reports arrive that are categorised as 'offline'. Examples include Britain First (a well-known far-right political party and street defence movement with an immense online presence) distributing leaflets that read, 'Muslim patrols are operating in this area confiscating alcohol and harassing women' and another incident in Birmingham that described the 'Islamisation of Birmingham' as 'destroying everything it means to be English and Brummie'. Other incidents involved a sign reading 'halal is barbaric' posted in a supermarket display and an image of a bomb being passed through a Muslim family's letterbox. Other incidents were reported for being highly insulting and offensive, including caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad.

According to the Public Order Act 1986, 'a person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of an

offence if (a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or (b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby' (section 18 (1)). While some of the incidents we include below would not stir up hatred towards Muslims and are reported because they are offensive. One example includes the distribution of leaflets that pose Muslims as 'destroying what it means to be English,' which shows clear intent to encourage hatred toward Muslims. Muslims, however, are not recognised as a racial group under the law, but a religious group. Therefore, it is not illegal to insult and abuse Islam unless it *intends* to stir up religious hatred (see sections 29B-29G of the Public Order Act 1986). The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 has a freedom of expression clause, meaning that abusive or insulting behaviour intended to stir up hatred would not constitute an offence, nor would the use of threatening words. Aggravated offences, be they racial or religious, can be added to basic offences like causing people to fear violence if authorities can prove the offence was motivated by the person's perceived religion.

The challenge is that this malicious and hateful literature often treats Muslims as quasi-racial; for example, white converts to Islam that are visibly Muslim are often called 'Paki' and anti-Muslim sentiments often operate on forms of 'cultural racism' rather than skin colour. While it would be wrong for the law to treat Muslims as a racial group (thereby obscuring the intersectional forms of racism and bigotry that Muslims of various ethnicities and creeds face), it is important to understand that anti-Muslim literature needs to be challenged.

Table 4.2: count of incidents of anti-Muslim literature by place of incident

Place of incident	Count
Public area	7
Household or private property	4
Muslim institution	3
Place of business	3
Educational institution	2
Place of work	1
Total	20

Incidents of anti-Muslim literature being found or distributed are most common in public areas as well as in private property and households. A few have targeted Muslim institutions and places of business, such as a pub and a supermarket.

Table 4.3: count of incidents of hate speech by place of incident

Place of incident	Count
Public area	6
Muslim institution	3
Transport network	3
Total	12

Hate speech is similar to anti-Muslim literature and is subject to the same legal issue of, when targeted at a religious group, it must be intended to stir up hatred rather than only likely to stir up

hatred. Our category of hate speech includes threats, writings and statements that are not targeted at individuals in particular and seeks to mobilise hate or violence against Muslims. Hate speech specifically calls for violence against Muslims through highly offensive words and writings intended to make recipients fearful. Letters included statements such as ‘your religion is the cancer on the world’, a banner that bore the words, ‘Keep Calm and Hate Muslims’ and ‘Death to Islam’, and a man shouted, ‘I wish I was still in the army, so I could kill the f*cking lot of them’.

Assault and threatening behaviour

An assault is a relatively wide category defined along the lines of common assault as explained in Crown Prosecution Service guidance. All of the assaults counted below are verified to have an Islamophobic or anti-Muslim bias motivation. These incidents range from unwanted touching, attempts at removing Islamic veils, spitting, and more violent incidents involving battery, attempted and grievous bodily harm. A victim does not need to be injured in order for a perpetrator to be charged with assault. An assault is ‘any act by which a person intentionally or recklessly causes another to apprehend immediate and unlawful violence’.³⁸ This means that a threat also constitutes an assault, but for analytical purposes, we use a separate category for threatening behaviour. Threats can also be charged under the Public Order Act 1986.³⁹ While the counts are separated, the trends overlap and we discuss both assaults and threatening behaviour in this section.

Table 4.4: Assault incidents by place of incident

Place of incident	Count
Public area	23
Transport network	18
Educational institution	13
Place of work	7
Place of business	4
Muslim institution	3
Hospital	2
Household or private property	2
Road or highway	1
Public institution	1
Total	74

The previous analysis of Tell MAMA data (2014/2015) included 21 incidents of assault, which is approximately the same as the previous 2013/2014 year’s report, which documented 23 incidents. In the calendar year of 2015, we recorded 74 assaults, which is an increase of more than 252 per cent. This increase is likely in part due to an increase in reporting to Tell MAMA, but the sharp increase also suggests that assaults increased in 2015.

Once again, assaults were most frequent in public areas and on transport networks. It is disturbing that these assaults occur and only rarely do victims report that bystanders intervene in defence of

³⁸ See http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/l_to_o/offences_against_the_person/.

³⁹ See http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/.

the victim, (though it is important to note that there are a few cases where victims felt empowered by the fact that others stood up for them). What is more surprising are the reports of assaults and fights in schools where Muslim victims are being bullied due to their religion and that of their parents. This is extremely concerning because it is detrimental to students as they navigate the pressures of education. It is important that headteachers, teachers, and safeguarding leads in schools are trained to deal with Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate.

We define threatening behaviour as speech, actions, and behaviour that intimidates or scares a victim and suggests that some form of violent action or assault may follow. Threats may cause a victim to fear that violence is imminent, making threatening behaviour an offence that could possibly be charged as an assault. Often, the threats reported to Tell MAMA are violent and come in the middle of a torrent of verbal abuse. Threats are relatively less frequent than non-threatening verbal abuse, for which we recorded 219 incidents, and only 34 incidents are categorised as threats.

As with assault and abusive behaviour, all of the areas where we have recorded incidents of threatening behaviour are places that Muslims frequent everyday. The most affected areas are once again public areas and the transport network. Threats are evenly distributed across various place categories and while public areas and public transport stand out, threats have been made against homes, Muslim institutions, and to shoppers in places of business. Given that assaults and threats are concentrated in public areas, urban thoroughfares, and on public transport, it is imperative that we understand the significant and growing risk it presents to the security of Muslims in Britain.

Discrimination

Incidents of discrimination are a relatively small in proportion and are distributed more evenly across the place types monitored. Examples include individuals who are denied services due to their perceived religion as others face discrimination in the workplace.

Table 4.5: incidents of discrimination by place of incident

Place of incident	Count
Place of business	9
Place of work	6
Transport network	6
Educational institution	4
Public institution	3
Household or private property	2
Public area	2
Hospital	1
Other	1
Grand Total	34

The Equality Act 2010 sets out a number of protected characteristics for which it is illegal to discriminate against. This includes religion and race. It also lays out different forms of discrimination, such as

direct and indirect discrimination. It also stipulates that public service providers cannot discriminate against individuals on grounds of protected characteristics. Discrimination is an incident of a different character to abusive or threatening behaviour or assault. It is the denial of equal treatment due to the faith of the person being targeted. It affects mobility in different ways; from stereotypes about Muslims affecting their ability to find work and receive equal remuneration when compared to their non-Muslim counterparts and being denied service at private businesses due to their faith.⁴⁰

Vandalism and criminal damage

Incidents of vandalism and criminal damage specifically target Muslim institutions and Muslim property. Of the 44 incidents of vandalism and criminal damage reported to Tell MAMA, 25 took place against Muslim institutions. Other incidents targeted public property with anti-Muslim graffiti.

Criminal damage is governed by *The Criminal Damage Act 1971* which stipulates that any damage to private property without lawful excuse or being reckless is guilty of an offence. This is a broad category that would include graffiti, attacks on property (for example, one case had an Islamic symbol hanging from the rear view mirror of a car which was damaged), and attacks on community buildings, as well as more dangerous acts such as arson.

Table 4.6: incidents of vandalism and criminal damage by place of incident


Place of incident	Count
Muslim institution	25
Public area	4
Educational institution	4
Household or private property	3
Transport network	3
Road or highway	2
Other	1
Place of work	1
Place of business	1
Grand Total	44

The pie chart below shows the distribution of vandalism incidents against certain types of Muslim institutions. The majority of incidents affect mosques. Such incidents cause congregations to feel insecure and fearful of further attacks. While these incidents do not occur in public areas, they still challenge the right that Muslims have to worship freely and in peace. We see that vandalism intends to target a whole community rather than individuals. This means that such incidents are more likely to be premeditated given the specific institutions that are targeted in most cases. They are, in effect, sending a wider message to Muslim communities who use a specific targeted mosque, that they are not wanted or safe in the area.

Since 2015, Tell MAMA has collected more extensive data on the victims and perpetrators of

⁴⁰ See Ganesh, B and I Abou-Atta. (2016), *op. cit.* and Khattab, N and R Johnston. (2015) 'Ethno-religious identities and persisting penalties in the UK labor market'. *The Social Science Journal* 52(4): 490–502.

Chart 4.2: vandalism and criminal incidents against Muslim institutions, by type of institution



V. Victims and perpetrators

incidents. Where in previous reports we were unable to disaggregate the number of victims from a particular case, starting in 2015, we are able to monitor data for multiple victims in a given incident, and the same for perpetrators.

Consequently, we provide counts of victims and perpetrators in this section, reviewing the gender, age, ethnicity, and visibility of victims. Based on this analysis, we see that anti-Muslim hate is clearly gendered. What stands out in this analysis is that women are by far the majority of victims and men are by far the majority of perpetrators.

Victims

We recorded 468 victims in 437 incidents (some of which did not include human victims as a building or property was attacked, for example). 61 per cent of victims (n=287) are female. 35 per cent of victims are male (n=162), 5 victims did not identify with male or female gender categories, and the gender of 14 victims could not be identified.

Table 5.1: Victims by Islamic visibility

	Female	Male	Other gender identity	Unknown gender	Total
Visibly Muslim	215	39	5	0	259
Not visibly identifiable as Muslim	32	73	0	6	111
Unknown	40	50	0	8	98
Total	287	162	5	14	468

The table above provides a count of victims by gender and by their visibility as Muslims. ‘Visibly Muslim’ refers to a victim wearing Islamic clothing. The most evident examples of Islamic clothing were the hijab, niqab, abaya. For men, this might include a beard, wearing a thobe or Islamic headwear. Given the popularity of certain Islamic clothing, like the hijab, it means that female victims are more identifiable as Muslim. Of 287 female victims, just under 75 per cent are visibly Muslim. The majority of these victims wore hijabs (n=165) or niqabs (n=29).

The fact that 46 per cent (n=215) of all victims are visibly Muslim women makes clear both the gendered aspects of anti-Muslim incidents presents an equal challenge to the mobility of Muslim women in Britain. First, misinformed narratives about the ‘oppression’ of veiled Muslim women are repeated in attacks on visibly Muslim women.⁴¹ Second, a visibly Muslim woman becomes an easier target for a perpetrator because her Muslim identity is more pronounced. This renders the victim into a universal signifier of ‘Muslimness’ (the victim is seen nothing other than a Muslim woman,

41 For a seminal study, see Abu-Lughod, L. (2002). ‘Do Muslim women really need saving? Anthropological reflections on cultural relativism and its others.’ *American Anthropologist* 104(3): 783-790.

rather than a mother, a doctor, a farmer, entrepreneur, or student). The victim is also perceived as irretrievably 'other' and culturally incompatible because of their religious expression. This is a curious and unique process of racialisation whereby arrangements of clothing denote 'Muslimness' and make the individual a target for racist and anti-Muslim attacks.⁴² This has a clear impact on the mobility of Muslim women. First and foremost, those women who choose to express their faith through Islamic dress face potential backlash.

Table 5.2: Victims by category

Category	Female	% of all female victims	Male	% of all male victims	Other gender identity	Unknown	Total
Abusive Behaviour	177	61.67%	86	53.09%	2	3	268
Anti-Muslim Literature	2	0.70%	1	0.62%		1	4
Assault	55	19.16%	40	24.69%		4	99
Discrimination	21	7.32%	16	9.88%	2		39
Hate Speech	5	1.74%		0.00%			5
Threatening Behaviour	27	9.41%	15	9.26%	1	6	49
Vandalism		0.00%	4	2.47%			4
Total	287		162		5	14	468

In the table above, we explore how gender of the victim is related to the category of the incident. In all categories, there are more female victims than there are male ones. In order to ascertain whether there are certain types of incidents more likely to affect women than men or vice versa, we compare (in the third and fifth columns above) the proportion of victims in each category based on gender. This allows us to control for the fact that more female victims are present in all categories (except vandalism and criminal damage). Given that approximately 62 per cent of female victims faced abusive behaviour and a smaller proportion, 53 per cent, of men faced incidents of the same category. This means that women are more likely to face abuse than men. Conversely, though more assault victims are female, men are slightly more likely to be assaulted than women. Nevertheless, the numbers for assault are quite close, with approximately one in five victims experiencing an assault. Given that this is the first set of quantitative figures calculated according to this method, it would require more time and a larger dataset in order to extract more conclusive trends.

In exploring the differences in gender with regard to the place where incidents occurred, some more interesting trends regarding mobility emerge. First, while men and women seem to experience attacks in public areas at approximately the same rate, women, in all probability, are more likely (27.5 per cent versus 13.6 per cent) to face attacks or incidents on the transport network. Women are also more likely to face incidents than men in places of business.

⁴² A number of arguments have been advanced in this vein from scholars working on critical studies of race and ethnicity. See for example, Ahmed, S. (2004). *The Cultural Politics of Emotion*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press and Puar, J. (2007). *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*. London: Duke University Press.

Table 5.3: Victims by place of incident

Place of incident	Female	% of all female victims	Male	% of all male victims	Other gender identity	Unknown	Total
Public area	81	28.22%	46	28.40%	4	2	133
Transport network	79	27.53%	22	13.58%		3	104
Place of business	49	17.07%	17	10.49%		1	67
Household or private property	25	8.71%	14	8.64%		7	46
Educational institution	18	6.27%	22	13.58%		1	41
Place of work	9	3.14%	23	14.20%			32
Road or highway	10	3.48%	9	5.56%			19
Muslim institution	5	1.74%	6	3.70%			11
Hospital	8	2.79%		0.00%			8
Public institution	2	0.70%	3	1.85%	1		6
Other	1	0.35%		0.00%			1
Total	287		162		5	14	468

We see relatively high proportions of male victims in educational institutions (where the majority are under 18 years of age). More surprising is that a significant proportion of men in the dataset (14 per cent) experience incidents at places of work. Yet there are numerous reports from other sources that suggest women experience significant levels of discrimination in the labour market.⁴³ A majority of male victims in this category work in food preparation and delivery, taxi driving, and security, so it is possible that these are segments of the labour market that employ higher proportions of men. All the same, it does demonstrate that men that work in customer service are particularly vulnerable to anti-Muslim incidents.

⁴³ Weller, P. *Religious discrimination in Britain: A review of research evidence, 2000-10*. Manchester: Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011. Wood, M, J Hales, S Purdon, T Sejersen, and O Hayllar. *A test for racial discrimination in recruitment practice in British cities*. Department for Work and Pensions, Norwich: HM Stationery Office, 2009.

Table 5.4: Victims by ethnicity


Ethnicity	Female	Male	Other gender identity	Unknown	Total
White	25	4	5	0	34
Mixed or multiple ethnicities	4	4	0	0	8
Black	9	12	0	0	21
Asian or South Asian	93	70	0	1	164
Arab or North African	21	13	0	1	35
Turkish	2	3	0	0	5
Other	3	1	0	0	4
Unknown	130	55	0	12	197
Total	287	162	5	14	468

As caseworkers collect data on individual cases, we ask victims if they are willing to provide their ethnicity for monitoring purposes. Often victims do not provide this information to maintain their own privacy or caseworkers are unable to ascertain this information from online reports and follow up conversations. This means that while our ethnicity data, where recorded, is accurate, these findings should be taken with some caution as 42 per cent of victims (n=197) do not have monitored ethnicity data. Please note that the data presented in Table 5.4 is based on a sum of more specific ethnic categories (for example, we collect data separately on Black African and Black Caribbean ethnicities and have added them together to make the table easier to interpret).

We find a few interesting trends upon looking at this data. In the United Kingdom, Asians constitute 68 per cent of the Muslim population. Based on the 271 victims for whom we have collected ethnicity data, we find that this is roughly proportional with the population as 61 per cent of victims are Asian. Similarly, about 8 per cent of victims are black (and represent 10 per cent of the British Muslim population). However, Arab and North African victims make up almost 13 per cent of victims but only represent 7 percent of the population. We observe a similar disproportionality with white Muslims as well; they account for 8 per cent of the population but add up to just under 13 per cent of victims. This suggests that compared to the constitution of the British Muslim population, Arab and white Muslims are more likely to be attacked. This finding is limited in that the sample size is relatively small and awareness of Tell MAMA may be higher among Arab and white victims.

Visibly white Muslim women experience similar slurs to those used against Asian Muslims. The slur 'Paki' is often used against white women who may never even have been to Pakistan. Frequently, Asian, Turkish, North African, and Arab Muslims are also told to 'go back to their country'. This slur is also used against white Muslim women. This phenomenon demonstrates an interesting process of how veiling enacts a certain kind of racialisation where religious differences intersect with xenophobic sentiment and perpetuates a form of anti-Muslim bigotry and racism.

Chart 5.5: Perpetrators by age and gender



Perpetrators

The perpetrators of anti-Muslim incidents are overwhelmingly male. After considering perpetrators, it becomes quite clear that anti-Muslim hate in the UK is expressed through highly masculine and aggressive frames. For Muslim women, who have to account for intersecting forms of hate and violence towards their ethnicity and religion in addition to their gender, experiencing anti-Muslim hate can become a serious strain on their confidence, independence, and sense of security.

Table 5.5: Perpetrators by age and gender

Age range	Female	Male	Unknown	Total
12 or younger	7	8	3	18
13 to 18	15	35	9	59
19 to 25	6	36	0	42
26 to 35	13	41	0	54
36 to 45	14	28	0	42
46 to 55	10	30	0	40
56 to 65	6	12	0	18
65 and older	8	12	0	20
unknown	42	182	109	333
Total	121	384	121	626

Of the perpetrators for whom victims were able to relay their gender, we find that 76 percent are male (n=384) and 24 per cent are female. 20 per cent of perpetrators had an unknown gender. This count includes perpetrators for incidents where there were no specific victims, for example in hate speech incidents or for the distribution of anti-Muslim literature or criminal damage. Incidents of criminal damage, such as the vandalism of a mosque or cemetery, often have no available information on perpetrators, so an 'unknown' perpetrator is counted given the fact that at least one person was involved. This is to maintain an approximate count of perpetrators for as many incidents as possible. We were able to confirm gender data on perpetrators for four out of five perpetrators. Therefore, we

can be confident that even in this set of ‘unknown’ perpetrators, a large proportion will be male. While we have not captured data for the age of perpetrators in 53 per cent of incidents, we do note that they are broadly distributed across age groups. It is interesting to note that the largest proportion of incidents are from the ages 13 to 18. This contradicts polling data which suggests that this age group is less likely than older people to harbor racist, xenophobic, and anti-Muslim views.⁴⁴ It also suggests that some teenagers are being radicalised and moving away from the multicultural orientation their age group, according to a report by Show Racism the Red Card. In spite of this, it is important to note that only 47 per cent of all the perpetrators in our dataset are represented in the chart above, and larger datasets may provide more clarity on the ages of perpetrators.

Table 5.6: Perpetrators by ethnicity

Ethnicity	Female	Male	Unknown	Total
White	81	243	2	326
Mixed or multiple ethnicities	1	1	0	2
Black	14	13	1	28
Asian or South Asian	3	5	0	8
Other	1	1	0	2
Unknown	21	121	118	260
Total	121	384	121	626

When exploring ethnicity, it becomes obvious that perpetrators are overwhelmingly white. Of all the perpetrators we were able to collect ethnicity data on (366 perpetrators), 89 per cent of perpetrators are white. 66 percent of the perpetrators with ethnicity data are white men. This is unsurprising given the fact that a majority of anti-Muslim propaganda makes reference to cultural and racial difference of Muslims and other ethnic minorities based on ideologies that resonate with various forms of far-right nationalism with a particular emphasis on non-white populations putting pressure on a nation imagined by such ideologues to be a ‘white’, racially homogeneous one, and that perceives them as victims of demographic change.⁴⁵ Based on our data, we might add that the fact that the overwhelming majority of perpetrators are white men makes clear that anti-Muslim hate crime is a specific expression of whiteness that perceives Muslims as an impingement of an imagined, racially homogeneous ‘Britishness’.

44 For example, in a YouGov poll from March 2015, 34 per cent of those aged 18 to 24 felt that the statement, ‘There is a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society’ was best suited with their view, while 55 per cent of all those surveyed felt that this came closer to their view than ‘Islam is generally compatible with the values of British society’, ‘Neither’ and ‘Don’t know’ (data available at http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/ogqzisd2xq/Islam%20and%20British%20values.pdf). As the sample gets older, more and more people agree with the notion of a ‘fundamental clash’. This suggests that younger people may be less likely to feel that Islam is culturally incompatible with Britain. Findings from *The Guardian* (data available at <http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/may/19/most-children-think-immigrants-are-stealing-jobs-schools-study-shows>) and Show Racism the Red Card suggest that young people do have negative views of Islam, but they tend to be less pronounced than in older age groups. For example, 61 per cent of adults surveyed said they had a negative view of Islam or a mainly negative view of Islam with some positives (data available at http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/qpwv8pljek/InternalResults_150109_views_of_religions.pdf). 29 per cent of young people agreed or partially agreed that ‘Muslim women are oppressed’, and 31 per cent agreed or partially agreed that ‘Muslims are taking over England’. While not entirely commensurable, the study of these findings shows that younger people may be less likely than older people to harbor anti-Muslim views, but a significant proportion—almost a third—still hold very negative beliefs about Islam and Muslims.


45 These findings are found in Brindle, A. (2015). ‘*Cancer has nothing on Islam: a study of discourses by group elite and supporters of the English defence league*’. *Critical Discourse Studies* [online]: 10.1080/17405904.2016.1169196. See also Alessio, D and K Meredith. (2014). ‘Blackshirts for the twenty-first century? Fascism and the English Defence League’. *Social Identities* 20(1): 104-118; Lambert, R. (2013). ‘Anti-Muslim Violence in the UK: Extremist Nationalist Involvement and Influence’ in *Extreme Right Wing Political Violence and Extremism* (eds. Taylor, M, PM Currie, and D Holbrook). London: Bloomsbury; and Beirich, H. (2013). ‘Hate Across the Waters: The Role of American Extremists in Fostering an International White Consciousness’ in *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse* (eds. Wodak, R, M KhosraviNik, and B Mral). London: Bloomsbury;

VI. Geography of anti-Muslim hate in 2015

In the previous section, we reviewed incidents based on the seven categories that we monitor at Tell MAMA. This helps us understand where certain types of incidents happen and how Muslim mobility is constricted by different types of anti-Muslim incidents. In particular, we find that victims experience abuse, assault, and threats in public areas, while they use different modes of public transport, and as they go about other daily activities.

In this section, we compare the different types of places that we monitor and try to understand better where anti-Muslim hate crimes occur and what impact this has for the confidence, security, and mobility of British Muslims.

Chart 6.1: offline incidents by place of incident



Next, we explore our geocoded data and map anti-Muslim hate crimes across the UK. We have exact locations for approximately 55 per cent cases in our dataset.⁴⁶ At a large scale, anti-Muslim incidents are concentrated in the regions of the UK (particularly England) where there are large Muslim communities. However, at lower scales, looking at urban regions and neighbourhoods, we find that anti-Muslim hate tends to be clustered in areas of high pedestrian activity, transport terminals, high streets, and areas in proximity to main roads and bus routes rather than simply areas with high Muslim populations. This geographical analysis helps to demystify the ‘randomness’ of hate crime and attempt to build basic models as a first step to understanding and predicting areas of risk for anti-Muslim hate, helping police to better manage resources. We use London as a case study as the majority of Tell MAMA’s geocoded data is for London and because the Metropolitan Police, which records the most anti-Muslim hate crimes in the country, provides us with incident data that can be mapped accurately. While we understand that London is in many ways exceptional and not representative of other cities, we use this case study to extract certain patterns and trends that can be useful across the United Kingdom.

Locating hate

Anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents recorded by Tell MAMA occur mostly in public areas, on the transport network and in places of business where the victim is a customer or a shopper. As we have pointed out above, the fact that 58 per cent of incidents occur in such everyday places is worrying in terms of the ability of British Muslims to go about their daily lives.

Before addressing the main findings, we note that our numbers on the types of places where incidents have occurred are concentrated on abusive behaviour, assault, and threatening behaviour. First is the substantial number of incidents that have occurred in educational institutions, representing 11 per cent (n=46) of all incidents. Given that schools are an important place for educating and socialising young people in multicultural settings, the fact that there are more incidents in educational institutions than took place against Muslim institutions is troubling. It suggests that the Department for Education and Ofsted must consider anti-Muslim bullying in its evaluations of schools and ensure that teaching staff are adequately trained to identify, challenge, and combat bigotry towards Muslims in the classroom. Of the 46 incidents reported in educational institutions, 35 (76 per cent) involved abusive behaviour or physical attack.

In addition to educational institutions, we draw attention to the small but important number of incidents that have targeted households and private property. These incidents, while relatively few compared to the other incidents that we report, are extremely concerning because they affect the security that victims have in their own home. Many of these incidents involve abuse, and at times, criminal damage from neighbours in buildings and single family homes.

Incidents at places of work are also concerning considering that recent studies of equality in the workplace demonstrate that Muslims face discrimination at various stages. We find that the majority of incidents reported were not for discrimination, but for abusive behaviour (14), assault (7), and threatening behaviour (5), and when combined, constitute the overwhelming majority of anti-Muslim

⁴⁶ While we attempt to get accurate geographic data by getting the postcode or street where an incident happened, victims are often not able to remember exactly where an incident occurred or submitted an online report that is verified but accurate location information is not provided.

cases in this place category. This means that even when Muslims obtain employment, they face the prospect of abuse, harassment, and physical attacks from colleagues. It is important that employers ensure that their equalities practices include training on anti-Muslim hate and all other forms of intolerance. Management must also treat complaints with the utmost seriousness and ensure that perpetrators face swift disciplinary action. Finally, we draw attention to incidents that happen on roads and highways (where the victim is operating a motor vehicle or bicycle). We find that incidents occur during parking or in traffic. Incidents occur less frequently while the victim is driving but the perpetrator almost always aggravates a tense situation by insulting and abusing the victim due to their religion and ethnicity.

Table 6.1: abusive behaviour, assault, and threats by place of incident


Place of Incident	Abusive behaviour	Assault	Threatening behaviour	Total
Educational institution	23	13		36
Hospital	3	2		5
Household or private property	14	2	6	22
Muslim institution	6	3	5	14
Other	1			1
Place of business	31	4	5	40
Place of work	14	7	2	23
Public area	61	23	8	92
Public institution	2	1		3
Road or highway	13	1		14
Transport network	51	18	8	77
Total	219	74	34	327

The table above reveals the significant concern that anti-Muslim hate crime has on mobility. While there are certainly concentrations of these incidents in public areas, on the transport network, and places of business, there is a distribution of assaults and abusive behaviour in many other types of locations. What this means is that anti-Muslim hate—particularly in the form of abuse—can happen in almost all of the places that British Muslims tend to move through on a daily basis, from work to shopping, during commutes and even in the relative isolation of an automobile or when relaxing in a park or at school. It is important that police, frontline staff of public institutions, local authorities and schools are aware of the numerous locations in which locales where different forms of anti-Muslim hate are manifested.

Geospatial analysis of hate crimes and incidents

In collecting data on cases, Tell MAMA caseworkers attempt to provide a postcode to identify the location where an incident occurred. Frequently, victims are not able to provide this information as they often do not remember the exact location or street they were on. In this section, we provide a geographic analysis of incidents reported to Tell MAMA. In 2015, 248 incidents, or 57 per cent of all have postcode data. Below, we provide a mapping of these incidents, which provides a sense of key hotspots of anti-Muslim incidents outside of London. We note that above, major urban areas

Map 6.1: clusters of anti-Muslim incidents in the Midlands and Northwest England



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
where there are considerable Muslim populations are the most impacted, but it is important to note that numerous incidents occurred outside of these regions. The largest cluster is in London, where almost half of the British Muslim population resides, with further clusters in Birmingham, Manchester, West Yorkshire, and Merseyside. In Scotland, anti-Muslim incidents are concentrated in Edinburgh and Glasgow.

When comparing these findings with those all of our incidents (which are coded by police force area), similar patterns emerge, with incidents occurring most frequently for the police forces that cover the metropolitan regions above. At a very broad scale, it is clear that areas where there are sizable Muslim populations are where anti-Muslim hate incidents are most likely to occur.

Case study: mapping anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents in London

Working with data provided by the Metropolitan Police Service and Tell MAMA, we provide a more in-depth look at the hotspots of anti-Muslim hate crime in London and use geographical methods to uncover some of the dynamics that drive anti-Muslim hate in cities. While London is exceptional in many ways and is not necessarily representative of other British cities, it still provides a very useful case study. Further, a significant portion (about half) of Muslims in Britain reside in London, making these findings highly relevant. Given the general scope of this report, it is not possible to go into extensive detail on the geographical findings that our data can provide, (as that would require a report of this length on its own); however, we provide an overview of key hotspots and dynamics that

Map 6.2: anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents recorded in London



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affect anti-Muslim hate crime in cities. There is a statistically significant level of clustering in London based on our analysis of Tell MAMA and MPS data, means that incidents are clustered in certain areas rather than randomly distributed across the city.

In order to analyse the data, we tested the following five hypotheses. We did this by counting the number of incidents in each middle super output area (small census tracts for the entire United Kingdom) as an independent variable. This was compared with dependent variables based on the following hypotheses:

- The proportion of the Muslim population increases the risk of incidents occurring in a given area.
- Unemployment and income deprivation might increase the risk of anti-Muslim hate crime.
- Population density increases the risk of anti-Muslim hate crime.
- Areas with high levels of public transport accessibility are more likely to have anti-Muslim incidents.
- Areas with mosques (based on a comprehensive Tell MAMA database of mosques in the United Kingdom, updated in 2015) are more likely to have anti-Muslim incidents.

Data on London's Muslim population, unemployment, income deprivation and population density are available online from the London Datastore, based on the Office of National Statistics 2011 Census data.⁴⁷ Public transport accessibility level is a dataset also provided by the London Datastore⁴⁸ and the number of mosques is based on a proprietary Tell MAMA dataset.

Table 6.2: analysis of London dataset and predictive factors for anti-Muslim hate crimes

Variable	Coefficient	Probability (<i>p</i>)
Muslim population	0.022	0.000
Unemployment	0.006	0.878
Income deprivation	0.004	0.727
Population density	-0.002	0.207
Public transport accessibility level	0.408	0.000
Number of mosques in the area	0.251	0.000
R ²	0.242	
N (number of areas counted)	983	

Using an ordinary least squares regression gives us an idea of risk factors for incidents,⁴⁹ we reject the first three hypotheses based on statistical insignificance ($p > 0.05$). While some research does point to the fact that areas with greater concentrations of Muslims are more impacted by anti-Muslim hate crimes, our analysis makes clear that this is true only to a very small extent when examined at the local scale rather than London boroughs as a whole, or police forces across the UK. What this means is that at broad scales (such as counties, local authorities, boroughs or cities), there is a clear

⁴⁷ Data available at <http://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/msoa-atlas>.

⁴⁸ Data available at <http://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/public-transport-accessibility-levels>.

⁴⁹ For details on this method, see Caplan, J, L Kennedy, and J Miller. 'Risk Terrain Modeling: Brokering Criminological Theory and GIS Methods for Crime Forecasting'. *Justice Quarterly* 28(2): 360-381.

relationship between Muslims as a proportion of the population and the likelihood of anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents. When we drill down further comparing small portions of London with others, we find that Muslim areas themselves do not have a strong relationship with the incidence of hate crime. According to the Crime Survey of England and Wales, areas with high unemployment and high income deprivation are more susceptible to personal crime and hate crime. Our analysis finds that unemployment and income deprivation have almost no impact on anti-Muslim hate crime. Population density has also been related to the occurrence of hate crimes.⁵⁰ Another study, however, found that population density is statistically insignificant.⁵¹

We note a moderate but statistically significant effect on the number of mosques and the likelihood of anti-Muslim hate and the level of public transport accessibility. We observe that for each increase in the number of anti-Muslim incidents in an area, there will be an increase by 0.408 in the public transport accessibility score, measured on a scale between zero and 8.⁵² This means that the more accessible a given area is by public transport, the risk of an anti-Muslim incident increases. Finally, there is a smaller, but still significant direct relationship between the number of mosques in an area and the likelihood of an incident.

Two further metrics provide some useful insight on the spaces where incidents that are coded as 'public area' occur. First, 207 of 312 (66 per cent) anti-Muslim incidents that occurred in public areas, (on the street, in a park, or in a public space in the city), occurred within 200 metres of a major road. This lends credence to the idea that accessibility to area by public or private transport impacts anti-Muslim hate incidents.

It appears that areas near arterial roads in metropolitan areas experience a relatively higher level of anti-Muslim hate crime. Similarly, 84 per cent of all incidents in London recorded by Tell MAMA and the MPS occurred within 200 metres of a bus stop and 48 per cent of all incidents occurred within 100 metres of a bus stop.

Central London


As the map 6.3 shows, anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents are distributed across the cities with significant clusters in a number of areas. In central London, there is a relatively even distribution of incidents south of Regent's Park, north of the Thames, and east of Hyde Park. This is an area characterised by a significant amount of movement and transport, as well as numerous places of employment, shopping, and study. In central London, anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents are located on or near main transport routes and areas with high pedestrian traffic. In particular, incidents are located near Tottenham Court Road, a major artery between central and north London; Euston station, a major National Rail and London Underground hub; and the busy Oxford Street shopping district. What is most interesting about the incidents in central London is that they exhibit a much lower level of clustering than what we have observed in London as a whole. The main clusters are

50 Stotzer, R. (2010). 'Seeking Solace in West Hollywood: Sexual Orientation-Based Hate Crimes in Los Angeles County'. *Journal of Homosexuality* 57(8): 987-1003 and Tseloni, A and K Pease. (2015). 'Area and individual differences in personal crime victimization incidence: The role of individual, lifestyle/routine activities and contextual predictors'. *International Review of Victimology* 21(1): 17.

51 Trickett, A, D Osborn, and D Ellingworth. (1995). 'Property crime and victimisation: the roles of individual and area influences'. *International Review of Victimology* 3: 284.

52 According to Transport for London, 'PTALS [Public transport accessibility levels] are a detailed and accurate measure of the accessibility of a point to the public transport network, taking into account walk access time and service availability. The method is essentially a way of measuring the density of the public transport network at any location within Greater London.' Find more at <http://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/public-transport-accessibility-levels>.

Map 6.3: crimes and incidents in Central London



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LEGEND				
Household and private property	Place of business	Public area	Road/highway	Other
Muslim institution	Place of work	Transport network	School	


near train stations, shopping districts, and tourist areas close to major roads.

Clusters in East London


East London has four major clusters of anti-Muslim incidents. First, there is a significant cluster of incidents on Whitechapel Road in the northern part of the London Borough of Tower Hamlets and northwest into the southern parts of Hackney, near the Old Street roundabout. Whitechapel Road has a busy daily street market and the area boasts one of the highest concentrations of Bangladeshi and Pakistani people in Britain. The East London Mosque (ELM) and London Muslim Centre is located prominently near the high street. There is a significant cluster of crimes and incidents that affected victims in public areas, places of business, and one incident that targeted ELM itself. This cluster is particularly interesting because it is frequently represented in the media as a 'Muslim' area in London. It is also a major artery in and out of London's central business districts with numerous bus lines, road traffic, and pedestrians.

We see a similar pattern in northeast London, in the Finsbury Park district, another highly multicultural area with a prominent Muslim presence. The Finsbury Park Mosque (FPM) has been made infamous

Map 6.4: East London clusters with detail on Walthamstow and Leyton



Map 6.5: Whitechapel and Shoreditch clusters



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


in the media for Abu Hamza's leadership in the 1990s and early 2000s, though the congregation today has no connection with of extremism; indeed, the mosque's current leadership has been recognised by the Islington borough council for its important contributions to the area. However, FPM is still represented in the media and imagined in the far-right as a hub for 'extremist' activity. Consequently, like ELM, we see that the mosque and its immediate surroundings have been targeted frequently. Unlike in Whitechapel, the mosque itself has been most frequently targeted, though there are seven incidents that occurred in the vicinity.

Following Hoe Street (A112) in Waltham Forest, which cuts north and south through the borough, we see a small cluster of incidents distributed along the road and in the residential and commercial areas parallel to the road. South along Hoe Street where the A112 becomes High Road Leyton, there is a small cluster of incidents near the Noor-UI-Islam mosque. Three incidents involved vandalism, criminal damage and two assaults occurred in that vicinity.

The final cluster we observe is in the London Borough of Newham, another area with a high

Map 6.6: cluster of anti-Muslim crimes and incidents in Hounslow



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LEGEND

	Household and private property		Place of business		Public area		Road/highway		Other
	Muslim institution		Place of work		Transport network		School		


Muslim population. Incidents are distributed throughout the borough with clusters on main roads and shopping districts. Newham, like other parts of London, experienced anti-Muslim hate crimes around Muslim institutions, but they are more concentrated in areas with good transport links and not specifically around Islamic institutions.

Clusters in West London

There are two clusters of crimes and incidents near the western borders of central London. In the Shepherd's Bush, there is a cluster of incidents that have occurred in and around the major shopping area, nine incidents occurred against shoppers or individuals walking in public areas. In the southern parts of the London borough of Brent and northern parts of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea there are small clusters near train stations. These stations are close to areas where more than one fifth of the population self-define as Muslim.

There are numerous incidents along Harrow road on the A404, an artery from northwestern boroughs including Brent, which has a very high concentration of Muslims, into central London. In

Map 6.7: Crime and incident clusters in West London



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LEGEND

Household and private property	Place of business	Public area	Road/highway	Other
Muslim institution	Place of work	Transport network	School	

the Wembley area in northwest London in the borough of Brent, we see a cluster of incidents around the main shopping and commercial districts between Wembley Central station, (close to residential areas), and north towards Wembley Park station, past the stadium. The clusters around the stadium, Wembley central station and the distribution of further incidents along Harrow road occur due to its transport links to cenral London and arterial roads between residential areas with concentrations of Muslims.

This lends further credence to the notion that hate crime reduces the security and mobility that Muslims enjoy as they move through the city. There is a further small cluster of incidents in Kilburn, where the al-Khoei Foundation, an Islamic institution, and a nearby Muslim school were subjected to a spate of graffiti incidents in 2015.

The final major cluster in western London is in central Hounslow, an outer borough in Greater London. The incidents are clustered around the main roads in central Hounslow that connect the borough to central London. There are areas with approximately 20 per cent or more Muslims in the vicinity, however the incidents do not occur in areas with large concentrations of Muslims; rather, the incidents are concentrated around busy streets and areas with public transit access.

Map 6.8: cluster of anti-Muslim crimes and incidents in Brixton (left) and Croydon (right)



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Household and private property	Place of business	Public area	Road/highway	Other
Muslim institution	Place of work	Transport network	School	

Clusters in South London

There are two major clusters of incidents in south London: Brixton and central Croydon. The incidents in Brixton are primarily clustered around the busy shopping area on Brixton Road near the underground station. This cluster is interesting because there are very few areas nearby with large proportions of Muslims; most geographic areas near the station have lower than 12 per cent (and most of these are lower than 6 per cent), as the proportion of Muslims in the area. Brixton's station is a major area for shopping with a large street market nearby, numerous bus routes, and has many clubs, pubs, and entertainment venues.

Croydon, a district in the southernmost London borough of the same name, has also seen numerous anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents. In the busy central area between West Croydon station and south to Church Street and George Street tram stops, we document 13 crimes and incidents. The area, like Shepherd's Bush, is mostly occupied by department stores and shopping options. Given the close proximity to multiple tram stops, bus and rail connections, it is likely that this is an area that attracts many individuals for commuting, work, leisure, and shopping. As a dense suburban district, it is the high levels of pedestrian and public transport accessibility in the area that likely makes it riskier for anti-Muslim hate crimes to occur. Once again, there is a relatively lower Muslim population in this area as compared to the clusters we observed in East and West London.

VII. Anti-Muslim hate and Islamophobia online

Tell MAMA collects data on online anti-Muslim incidents. We classify ‘online’ incidents as those which occur on social media platforms on internet forums, and websites like YouTube. In recent years, the majority of the cases reported to Tell MAMA came from online sources, though we do not trawl for incidents on the internet. This year, we have fewer online reports than in previous years. A factor behind this drop is how social media platforms better police hate speech, abuse and trolling. There are still issues to address to ensure users are safe from threats, abuse and harassment but it remains an encouraging development.

For the purposes of this report, we have focused on documenting flagrant forms of hate speech, abuse, harassment, and threats. Of the 364 incidents documented in 2015, we provide only a small fraction of the anti-Muslim hate on social media platforms used by victims and perpetrators based in the United Kingdom.

Online incidents reported to Tell MAMA

The majority of online incidents occurred either on Facebook or Twitter, as the table below demonstrates. There are relatively few incidents listed as ‘Other’, which accounts for incidents on YouTube, internet forums, and websites. Of these, 57 per cent occurred on Twitter and 37 per cent occurred on Facebook.

Table 7.1: online incidents reported to Tell MAMA by platform

Online platform	Count
Facebook	136
Other	21
Twitter	207
Total	364

Of the incidents on Twitter, 88 per cent of incidents involved abusive language and/or harassment. We use this code as it corresponds with the categories that violate Twitter’s code of conduct and users can be reported for such behavior, behavioural breaches.⁵³ This means that trolling and direct abuse were the most common incident types reported to Tell MAMA last year. This also includes non-targeted abuse concerning Islam and Muslims in general as well as hate speech that is not threatening and non-direct. Many of these incidents also involve visual memes which are derogatory towards Islam and Muslims, 11 per cent of incidents on Twitter involved violent threats either directed at an individual or institution (such as a mosque) or indirect threats that refer to Islam and Muslims in general.

⁵³ Details available at <https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311#>.

On Facebook, the vast majority (87 per cent) of incidents are listed as hate speech, which is a behaviour that Facebook users can be reprimanded or even suspended for.

In the word cloud above, we can see that the language used against Muslims online is overwhelmingly negative. This word cloud is based on text of Facebook posts, tweets, and memes that have been reported to Tell MAMA. The most common 'lexical' words include—or words that have contextual meaning in the sample, as opposed to articles such as 'the' or conjunctions like 'and'—are 'muslim', 'you', 'fuck', 'country', 'Islam', 'mosque', and 'rape'. These are words used to demonise Muslim communities. The word country is particularly interesting when explored in context. This text is a good example of how the word 'country' is used: 'Islam is a vicious cult. Mudlums have no place in any civilized country! Deport and kill them before they kill you!'. In the text, Islam is positioned as uncivilised and incompatible with the West, which leads to the highly offensive and xenophobic call to 'deport and kill' Muslims. This trope is repeated numerous times with reference to 'Pakis' replacing 'Muslims', consistently stressing cultural difference: 'we need all these scum and vernim removed from our country'; 'UKIP has enough followers though .and when the civil war comes. We will defeat the muslim fascists and take our country back'. In this quotes, we see that Muslims are constantly presented as an impinging threat on the United Kingdom, following closely with far-right rhetoric.

The word 'you' is particularly interesting because it is used to refer to Muslims as a monolithic

bloc, furthering the xenophobic-nationalist sentiment that many of these posts display. This is used specifically to insult Muslims as a whole as well as individuals as they are being abused by trolls on social media platforms as well as playing a role in threats. One user that was supportive of Muslims and immigrants was told, ‘You paki loving tramp’. Another user said, ‘You muslim people when you come to non-muslim countries, you should learn to respect the host country and follow their traditions’; this quote makes clear that ‘you’ is used frequently in order to identify Muslims as specifically ‘other’, as a monolithic bloc, and then used to denigrate them. In fewer instances, ‘you’ is also used to appeal to the ‘British’ (imagined as a white, English-speaking European) user to amplify the threat that Muslims present to ‘British people’ based on fallacious, xenophobic and anti-Muslim arguments. In speaking about so-called ‘Muslim rape gangs’, one user wrote: ‘This could be your daughter, your sister end [sic] your wife!!!! Is this the future you really want from them???? JOIN PEGIDA’.

The use of the word ‘burn’ is particularly disturbing, which refers to direct and indirect threats and calls for attacks specifically on mosques. Of the 32 times the word appears, at least 20 instances are burn used as a verb in reference to mosques or the Qur’an. This is particularly concerning considering that these calls for violence are frequent on the far-right.⁵⁴ The use of the words ‘ISIS’, ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ are common slurs used to amalgamate Muslims with terrorism and violence.

Finally, the use of the word ‘rape’ refers to the accusation that has been spread by the far-right, particularly the organisation Britain First, on Facebook since 2014 after the story of child sexual exploitation in Rotherham broke. Tell MAMA produced a report on far-right discourse on Facebook following this story and it is clear that the notion that Muslims are ‘rapists’ and ‘paedophiles’ continues to be amplified. ‘Rape’ is seen as a characteristic of the monolithic bloc of Muslims according to our findings. For example, one user wrote, ‘All muslim people burn others alive, behead, rape girls, stone women to death, or push gays off buildings’ and another said, ‘Muslims can’t change, the killing, rape and mutilation will never change. #Islam #edl #pegida’.

The reader may note that two far-right groups have been mentioned in the discussion of content so far. Often, users do not reference the far-right in their status updates or tweets, though on occasion, we can see direct references. Tell MAMA caseworkers are trained to identify if a user supports the far-right and we use any information available on public profiles to determine this, (such as expressed support for the English Defence League, British National Party, National Action, Pegida, or Britain First). The table below provides information on connection of online perpetrators to the far-right.

Table 7.2: users reported to Tell MAMA by support for far-right extremism

Far-right affiliation	Count of users
Verified support of the far-right	165
No verified support of the far-right	199
Total	364

Consistent with previous years, 45 per cent of perpetrators (n=165) of online incidents are verifiably

⁵⁴ Tell MAMA. (2014). *Facebook Report: Rotherham, hate, and the far-right online*. London: Tell MAMA.

supportive of the far-right. Caseworkers were unsure about 137 incidents; while they felt that these users may have had links to the far-right, they were unable to prove it. Finally, 62 users had no links to the far-right that we could verify.

The fact that almost 50 per cent of perpetrators of online incidents are supportive of the far-right is extremely alarming. It clearly demonstrates that social media platforms are being used to radicalise users and encourage them to support forms of neo-Nazism, nativism, virulent anti-Muslim ideals, and extreme xenophobia. This is an extremism predicated on the notion of a racially-pure, *white* Britain where any minorities are fully integrated into a Christian, English way of life. This utopian fantasy drives the far-right's anti-Muslim hatred which stipulates that Muslims—more than any other group—are currently the biggest threat to an imagined Britishness. For that reason, we refer to this as a form of extremism that has particular salience among the communities that are supportive of white nationalism and clearly willing to engage in political violence to further its own goals.

Network analysis of perpetrators on Twitter

The network chart overleaf is based on Twitter profiles of the 207 perpetrators of anti-Muslim hate incidents reported to Tell MAMA in 2015. It is based on active user profiles as of June 13, 2015. The nodes in the chart represent Twitter users, by their user name (for example, you can find the user 'realDonaldTrump' tweeting under @realDonaldTrump). The nodes in green are perpetrators that were reported to Tell MAMA. To make this graph, we collected data on all of the Twitter users that each perpetrator followed on Twitter.⁵⁵ By collecting data on who our perpetrators follow, we map who they are influenced by. The nodes in beige represent Twitter user that are followed by 12 or more perpetrators. It helps to illuminate the discursive communities in which anti-Muslim hate speech festers. The size of every node is based on the number of incoming connections from the 207 perpetrators. That means the bigger the node, the more mutual followers each user has. This chart provides us with an understanding of the most important nodes in the network that inspired 207 anti-Muslim hate incidents.

Key details

- There are 967 nodes visible, which is 4.07 per cent of the network. The entire network is based on 23,752 unique Twitter accounts, which is the total number of people followed by two or more of the perpetrators of documented incidents on Twitter. There are 28 perpetrators visible, but the sizes are based on the entire dataset. This is required to make the chart readable by focusing on the centre of the network.
- Nodes are sized based on the number of incoming connections from the perpetrators' user accounts. The minimum is 12 and the maximum is 63.
- Many of the main nodes in this network are mainstream personalities and brands, including Nigel Farage and Donald Trump, the writer Peter Townsend who critical of Islam, *Daily Mail* columnist Katie Hopkins, Richard Dawkins, founder and former leader of the EDL and now Pegida UK leader Tommy Robinson, the political party Ukip and the political commentator and author Douglas Murray. Nigel Farage (Nigel_Farage) has the maximum number of mutual followers, at 63. That means 63 out of the 207 perpetrators all followed Nigel Farage's Twitter account.

⁵⁵ Perpetrators whose user profiles are 'protected' on Twitter do not have public profiles and were excluded from the dataset.

Networks of anti-Muslim hate on Twitter

- Smaller nodes include @MailOnline, @BBCBreaking, @FoxNews, and @SkyNewsBreak. The positioning of these mainstream brands stresses the responsibility they have to challenge hate speech. The fact that many of these are mainstream news organisations suggests that biased and unbalanced reporting can be used to justify extremist beliefs. Fox News reporting on ‘no-go areas’ for non-Muslims in Birmingham feeds the echo chamber that these perpetrators draw their views from.
- Mainstream personalities have a high level of influence in this network and at times, justify far-right and extremist beliefs. They are positioned to be able to challenge such rhetoric, but the likes of Donald Trump and Nigel Farage often frame the position of Muslims as a monolithic bloc, through statements such as, ‘We do have, I’m afraid, I’m sad to say, a fifth column that is living within our own countries, that is utterly opposed to our values’.⁵⁶
- Perpetrator accounts, such as @Death2RapeGangs, @JihadistJoe, and @BadSwearyFrog have are as popular in the network as mainstream personalities.
- There are a number of accounts that are explicitly anti-EU, ranging including numerous accounts with names along the lines of @Nationalist_UK, @Stop_The_EU, @NoThanksEU, @BetterOffOut, and @WantEnglandBack.
- There are numerous ideologically anti-Muslim accounts in the network, including @BanningTheBurka, the highly offensive name, @BrainlessMuzzos, @PamelaGeller, a well-known Islamophobic author in the United States, @Death2RapeGangs, and @creepingsharia.

Most of the activity represented in this network is not illegal, though there have been arrests made over threats posted on social media, as well as harassment and disclosure of private information. What this chart demonstrates is that there are numerous mainstream personalities that espouse populist and nativist ideas which resonate with users that have been reported to Tell MAMA for hate speech, abuse, harassment or threats made on Twitter.

Given that the current Counter-Extremism Strategy includes far-right extremism in its remit, this chart opens up the question about the lines that might be drawn around non-violent extremism that conflicts with British values and legitimate forms of radical right-wing populism.⁵⁷ More importantly, it demands that political leaders and media outlets encourage a healthy debate about Islam and Muslims that represents the diversity of opinion in Muslim communities rather than preconceived ideas of Muslims as a unitary, homogeneous bloc which represents an existential threat to the West. Finally, it demonstrates that anti-Muslim hate is intertwined with racist, xenophobic, and populist ideologies. While these are unfortunate, but permissible ideologies, we might conceive of the nodes in this network that express anti-Muslim hate—perpetrators as well as mainstream personalities—as conducive to networks of non-violent extremism based upon racist, xenophobic, and populist ideology. Much like the non-violent extremism expressed by groups that are inspired by their faith, we should understand that the racist, xenophobic and often Islamophobic ideologies expressed by users in this network may justify non-violent extremism, and consequently, must be subject to challenge and where appropriate, censure, as determined by the Government’s Counter-Extremism Strategy:

Using the internet – both to confront extremist views and limit access to extremist content – is

⁵⁶ Quoted in *BBC News*. ‘UKIP’s Nigel Farage urges “Judeo-Christian” defence after Paris attacks’. 12 January 2015.

⁵⁷ See HM Government. (2015). *Counter-Extremism Strategy*. London: HM Stationery Office. The Counter-Extremism strategy notes that some forms of ‘neo-Nazi’ extremism ‘are careful to avoid directly supporting violence [but] nevertheless create an environment in which division and hatred is propagated’, see page 16. It is important to understand that this kind of extremism is often explicitly anti-Muslim and takes nationalist, xenophobic, and racist ideology to an extreme.

crucial if we are to challenge extremist ideologies in our modern society. Alongside this is a need to promote the positive message that it is possible to reconcile your faith identity and national identity. By contesting the online space and presenting compelling alternatives to the extremist worldview, we will work in partnership with others to keep pace with the extremists' use of the internet.⁵⁸

In its call to limit access to extremist content, it would have been worth mentioning that not only does faith identity need to be reconciled with national identity—and one would imagine that this refers to Muslim faith and British national identity—but also the importance of challenging those narratives that refuse to reconcile national identity with the reality of multicultural Britain.

58 HM Government. (2015). *op. cit.*, 25.

VIII. Conclusion

In this section, we provide a brief summary of the findings detailed in this report with a focus on three issues: Muslim mobility, perpetrators, and online, non-violent extremism. In the background section, we described Islamophobia as a problem of mobility in urban spaces and of one of ideology and hate. Our findings thoroughly support this argument. Our analysis of places in which incidents occur demonstrates that anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents are most likely to occur in public areas, on the transport network, and in shopping areas. These are areas that every citizen tends to move through on an everyday daily basis. We find that anti-Muslim hate affects women particularly as they move through the city: walking, commuting, and shopping. This limits the security and confidence that Muslims in Britain have when navigating everyday spaces.

The main variable that had a positive correlation with anti-Muslim incidents is access to public transport. Improved access to public transport increases the risk of an Islamophobic hate crime occurring in that area. Two-thirds of coded incidents in a public area happened within 200 metres of a major road. Qualitative analysis of hate crime clusters also demonstrates that crimes and incidents trace arterial roads between Muslim areas, central businesses and commerce. This is a significant concern for Muslims as they go about their daily lives.

The perpetrators of incidents are predominantly white men. While we do note that a significant proportion of ethnicity information in our perpetrator dataset is unknown, (for those that we do have details), 89 per cent of perpetrators are white, as 66 per cent of all perpetrators are white men and 23 per cent are white women. There are very few perpetrators, (40, or 11 per cent), that are from non-white backgrounds. This signifies that there is a specific racial dynamic to anti-Muslim hate crime which is overwhelmingly perpetrated by white individuals. Similarly, there is a gendered dynamic in which males—mostly white—target, abuse, and even assault Muslim women. Consequently, the racial and gendered dynamics of anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents should force us to ensure that responses and future analyses of anti-Muslim hate acknowledge the intersectional, overlapping forms of insecurity that affect victims, who are predominantly female, visibly Muslim, and non-white.

Non-violent extremism characterises the networks that influence perpetrators of anti-Muslim hate incidents online. Extremist speech is defined in the Prevent strategy as ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’.⁵⁹ This has been applied to Muslim groups, but the speech that we have encountered on Facebook and Twitter that treats Muslims as a monolithic bloc and consistently makes the accusation that they are ‘scum’, ‘terrorists’, ‘ISIS’, ‘barbaric’, and ‘backward’, and calls for violence against Muslims communities and Islamic institutions does not demonstrate ‘mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’. It is paramount that the xenophobic, racist, and anti-Muslim rhetoric used by the far-right and some mainstream right-wing populists be scrutinised for encouraging intolerance towards Muslims and Islam, with both subjects being conduit research areas through which far-right and extremist sympathisers may be identified through their deep-rooted hatred of Muslims, migrants and Islam.

59 HM Government. (2011). *Prevent Strategy*. London: The Stationery Office, 107.

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#LoveLikeJo.

*Far more unites us
than divides us
— Jo Cox
1974-2016*



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