



A Constructed Threat: Identity, Prejudice and the Impact of Anti-Muslim Hatred

TELL MAMA ANNUAL REPORT 2016

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Tell MAMA 2016 Annual Report
A Constructed Threat: Identity, Intolerance and the Impact
of Anti-Muslim Hatred

02 November 2017

Table of Contents

FORWARD	3
DIRECTOR’S STATEMENT	4
PEER REVIEW STATEMENT	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	6
INTRODUCTION	11
REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE	15
ABOUT TELL MAMA AND OUR METHODOLOGY	25
UNDERSTANDING ‘STREET-BASED’ ANTI-MUSLIM INCIDENTS IN 2016	27
VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS: WHO ARE THEY?	40
WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF ANTI-MUSLIM VICTIMISATION?	47
TIMELINE: HIGH PROFILE EVENTS AND ANTI-MUSLIM HATE CRIMES	55
IMMIGRATION AND ANTI-MUSLIM HATRED	57
TERRORISM AND ANTI-MUSLIM HATRED	63
UNDERSTANDING ONLINE ANTI-MUSLIM INCIDENTS	66
CONCLUSION	84
APPENDIX (I): WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP WITH POLICE FORCES	88

Forward

The substantial rise in anti-Muslim bigotry highlighted in our report is of course profoundly depressing but critically, these levels now pose a fundamental threat to our British way of life. When women feel compelled to modify their looks or clothing to remain safe on our streets, then we are well on the road to sleepwalking into a two-tier society where Muslim Britons are second-class citizens in their own country.



We need social media companies to do more work, it is obviously too little and very late in preventing their platforms from becoming conveyor belts of hate from the online world and transferring to street level attacks and abuse that we have recorded.

We now need government, social media companies, schools, religious organisations and ordinary citizens to stand up and stand together to protect British values, British freedoms and our way of life.

Shahid Malik, Chair of Tell MAMA

Former Labour Justice and Communities Minister

Director's Statement

Once again, Muslim women bore the brunt of incidents that have taken place at a street level in our country. However, we must also put things into context and remember that the United Kingdom is one of the safest places in Europe, where Muslims can practice their faith knowing that they are safe to do so. This must be celebrated and acknowledged.



The fact is that anti-Muslim hatred at a street level is a mixture of gender abuse, hatred and racism again demonstrates the intersecting nature of this problem. In 2016, we saw a 47% increase in street-level anti-Muslim incidents and whilst the majority were categorised as being 'generally abusive' in nature, we saw a rise in physical attacks in some cases. Allied to this, is the visibility of the victim which seemed to be a trigger for the perpetrator.

We know, having spoken to hundreds of Muslim women, that their levels of self-confidence and their mobility is also affected by their targeting. Some have chosen to take off their hijabs, (their religious headscarves), choosing hats as a means of 'changing their visibility'. Others refuse to go out after returning from work, as some increasingly self-limit their behaviour by relying more on their husbands and family members. None of this is encouraging for women's rights, their self-confidence and their independence, at a time when we should be re-enforcing greater mixing and integration and hate crimes therefore have significant impacts on this area.

Our data also shows that most of the street-based hate incidents take place in public areas and on public transport, further limiting the confidence of individuals in the public space. It also shows that one of the highest 'spike points' for anti-Muslim hatred, took place just after the EU referendum result. The huge increase in reported anti-Muslim hate incidents to Tell MAMA show that the referendum had become a trigger point for the actions of some which affected not just Muslims, but those of Eastern European heritage and other settled minority communities. This means that there is much work to be done with communities to build further solidarity, to counter hatred, and to ensure that the universal values of human rights that we so cherish and value, are protected.

Iman Atta OBE

Director, Tell MAMA

Peer Review Statement

Tell MAMA's 2016 report makes a highly significant set of statements about the number, nature and consequences of anti-Muslim acts in the UK. Data about anti-Muslim incidents are carefully collected by Tell MAMA through their reporting processes and via the attention they pay to news stories and online cases of Islamophobia. Victims are also offered emotional support and signposted to organisations who may be able to help them. High profile political events such as terrorist attacks and the vote to leave the European Union resulted in an increase in the number of anti-Muslim incidents. Perpetrators often drew upon racist ideas associated with immigration, terrorism and the EU referendum when attacking their victims. 1,223 cases were reported to Tell MAMA in 2016 and 64% took place offline. Most involved abusive and threatening behaviour with nearly 20% of these incidents involving physical attacks. Nearly half of the incidents were in public spaces and on public transport. 56% of the victims were women yet two-thirds of the perpetrators are men. These incidents often have very damaging consequences for the victims. Some victims feel inclined to reduce their everyday activities and geographic mobility due to their decreased confidence and worries about future incidents. Others felt held-back at work and in education. Others still work on reducing the visibility of their Muslim faith and were made to feel like they did not belong in the UK. Many of these issues have a financial impact, impeding the economic stability of the victims. These issues cannot be ignored and the significant work of Tell MAMA that is presented in this report demonstrates that a lot more needs to be done to protect Britain's Muslim communities and prevent anti-Muslim incidents from happening.

Professor Peter Hopkins, Newcastle University

Executive Summary

Tell MAMA is an independent and confidential third-party hate crime reporting service for those who have experienced anti-Muslim hate incidents and crimes. We provide an alternative place for victims or witnesses of anti-Muslim incidents to report into if they are not comfortable with going to the police. Our caseworkers provide emotional support, signposting, referrals for legal advice and one to one personal support, and liaise with the police on the victim's behalf when required. In addition to this, Tell MAMA records and analyses the anti-Muslim incidents reported to us.

We received a total of 1,223 reports of street-based (offline) and online anti-Muslim incidents during 2016. Of these reports, 953 were verified by Tell MAMA caseworkers as anti-Muslim in nature and as having occurred in the UK in 2016 (online anti-Muslim incidents were confirmed as having originated from UK-based accounts by multiple staff members). This also shows that due diligence within our work at Tell MAMA is premised on ensuring that perpetrators and victims are based in the United Kingdom and that there is some secondary corroborating evidence that indicates the targeting of the victim was motivated by anti-Muslim hatred. These are essential elements and whilst all cases will be logged, and victims supported, not all cases will end up included in the statistics of anti-Muslim hate incidents published by Tell MAMA.

Key Findings

- The majority of verified anti-Muslim incident reports received by Tell MAMA in 2016 were street-based (offline) cases (67%, n=642).
- In 2016 Tell MAMA documented 642 verified anti-Muslim crimes or incidents that are classified as 'offline', meaning that they occurred in-person between a victim (or property) and a perpetrator. Tell MAMA has recorded a 47% increase in the number of offline incidents over the previous reporting period (2015: n=437).
- We documented 340 anti-Muslim crimes or incidents that are classified as 'online', meaning they occurred on social media platforms such as Facebook or Twitter, or other Internet-based platforms. Of these, 311 were verified. This is a 15% decrease over the previous reporting period (n=364). This decline in online reports in 2016 owes to improvements in our evolving methodology and the verification of reports. The decline in online reports, when compared to our 2015 dataset, demonstrates the growing awareness of our work in Tell MAMA in Muslim communities, among key stakeholders, and partners, resulting in a greater willingness amongst victims and witnesses to report in serious offline incidents such as physical attacks, threatening behaviour and abuse more generally.

- Tell MAMA has recorded an increase in the proportion of directly abusive and violent anti-Muslim incidents which make up the majority of all street-based reports:
 - **Abusive Behaviour** made up 54% (n=349) of total incidents (verbal and non-verbal abuse), 4% more than in 2015 (50%, n=219).
 - **Physical Attacks** made up 19% (n=120) of total incidents (including common assault, battery, as well as attempted and grievous bodily harm), 2% more than in 2015 (17%, n=74).
 - **Threatening Behaviour** made up 8% (n=49) of total incidents (verbal and non-verbal threats of violence), 0.5% more than in 2015 (7.5%, n=34).
- Consistent with our previous annual report, the most common locations for offline anti-Muslim incidents to occur in 2016 are:
 - **Public Areas** (30%, n=192), which include streets, public parks and any other public space.
 - **Transport Networks** (13%, n=85), which includes all forms of public transport and extends to bus stops, coach stations, train stations and London Underground stations.
 - **Places of Business** (13%, n=81), i.e. businesses that sell goods or services where the victim does not work.
 - **Households or Private Properties** (12%, n=80), which includes private dwellings, council properties or private rentals.
- There has been a proportional increase in the number of anti-Muslim incidents occurring in **Public Areas** from 25% (n=111) in 2015 to 30% in 2016 (n=192).
- Tell MAMA also receives data on Islamophobic hate crimes and incidents from 18 police forces in the UK, thanks to our partnership agreements with said forces. We have recorded a total of 2,840 Islamophobic crimes and incidents from these police forces. The forces with the largest number of Islamophobic crimes or incidents was the Metropolitan Police Service (1,296), Greater Manchester Police (409) and the British Transport Police (230).
- High profile events that stimulate public discourse on immigration and Islam, such as terrorist attacks, can result in a corresponding 'spike' in anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents. Tell MAMA recorded a 475% increase in the number of anti-Muslim incidents in the week following the EU referendum vote (from 12 incidents in the week beginning 17 June to 69 incidents in the week beginning 24 June 2016). Perpetrators of anti-Muslim incidents often reference mainstream discourse concerning immigration and terrorism alongside broader Islamophobic and dehumanising language in order to abuse their victims.
- As discussed in our [Tell MAMA 2015 Annual report](#), anti-Muslim hatred is evidently gendered. Muslim women are still more likely to be attacked or abused than men in most settings, particularly if they are visibly Muslim (i.e. wearing Islamic clothing such as a headscarf, face veil, abaya, etc), and the largest proportion of perpetrators remain white males. Within the verified offline reports, we identified 765 victims and 874 perpetrators. The majority of victims are female (56%, n=441) and the majority of perpetrators are white males (69%, n=429), where perpetrator ethnicity data is available. More than a third of victims (38%, n=295) are Muslim women who were visibly Muslim.

- There is evidence that some perpetrators hold intersecting prejudices that motivate them to commit anti-Muslim hate crimes, which consist of prejudice towards religion, ethnicity, gender, and certain identities (particularly religious and ethnic), any of which may become interchangeable for perpetrators. In the context of anti-Muslim hatred, 'Muslim' may become synonymous with 'Asian' and the racial epithet 'P*ki' is sometimes directed at victims regardless of their actual ethnicity. Perpetrators may also select a victim they see as an 'easy target' to abuse without fear of repercussion.
- We must also acknowledge the situational dynamics governing hate incidents and hate crimes, as their behaviours will not be solely influenced by anti-Muslim prejudice but also partly by social dynamics such as 'thrill-seeking'. Existing evidence suggests that a high proportion of hate crimes occur in busy and stressful situations including in public areas, on public transportation and in shopping areas, due to the close proximity of people from different social groups to their own.
- Muslims of all ages are at risk of discrimination in educational institutions, in the workplace, and near their homes when accessing public and private services. This goes beyond being passed over for roles, and often consists of ongoing 'low-level' abuse and mistreatment met with ignorance from those in authoritative and managerial roles when these issues are highlighted.
- Anti-Muslim hatred has the effect of limiting the geographic mobility of victims, meaning that they are frequently less willing to travel around particular areas they consider risky or become anxious about leaving their own neighbourhood for fear of victimisation. This would appear to intersect with factors such as Islamic visibility (i.e. the wearing of Islamic clothing), meaning that often it is women whose geographic mobility is restricted. The impact of ongoing 'low-level' harassment and discrimination can have a serious impact on mental wellbeing as they are often less able to escape victimisation in their own neighbourhood, at school or in the workplace.
- The actions of bystanders during an anti-Muslim hate crime or incident can have a significant impact on the well-being of victims. If bystanders show no solidarity with victims, often the conclusion is drawn that the sentiment of the abuse they receive is held by most in our society. On the other hand, if a bystander gives some degree of support in a manner that is safe and non-violent, victims may feel less intimidated, helping to mitigate the psychological impact of anti-Muslim incidents.
- As with 2015 and as listed in our [Tell MAMA 2015 Annual Report](#), the context of much online abuse sits within broader xenophobic, racist, nationalist and populist ideologies, which are distributed across Europe and North America via Islamophobic networks of self-referencing websites and echo chambers.

Recommendations

- High profile events such as the EU referendum and popular debates around immigration and terrorism play into mainstream xenophobic, racist and anti-Muslim sentiment. Misleading statements about Islam and Muslims from public figures and sections of the press are, intentionally or otherwise, contributing to pre-existing anti-Muslim echo chambers online which find validation in such statements. Others may find their prejudicial views reinforced in print and broadcast media, which may, in turn, give a measure of legitimacy and justification for some to carry out pre-motivated or opportunistic forms of hate crime. Therefore, more efforts are needed to challenge such statements and counter mythologised narratives about Muslims and Islam.
- Following major political events and acts of political violence, police forces should consider how some will use such events as pretexts for ideologically-driven violence and hate speech online which targets Muslims or their institutions.
- Public spaces including public transportation, shops and roadways have been highlighted as key social spaces in which anti-Muslim incidents take place. It can be argued that greater oversight from public and private authority figures is required in such spaces, including protection for individuals working in vulnerable positions. More needs to be done by transport authorities and private companies in running pro-active campaigns countering all forms of prejudice, intolerance and hatred. When we have proposed campaigns, some have responded negatively despite their public duty in ensuring the safety of passengers.
- Public and private organisations should focus on proactively tackling discrimination and ‘casual’ abuse in the workplace and in educational environments, and managers should be better equipped to deal with sensitive identity issues. **There is a role here for the Equalities and Human Rights Commission to do more campaigning with groups such as Tell MAMA, GALOP and the Community Security Trust to help counter workplace discrimination.**
- The impact of anti-Muslim incidents, whether violent or otherwise, can be very significant to victims. Police responding to reports of anti-Muslim incidents, and indeed any hate incident, need to consider the deeper mental and emotional health impacts aggravated offences have on victims and further training in these areas may be required by forces.
- Members of the public should not underestimate their role in tackling anti-Muslim prejudice during their daily lives. If witnesses can safely show solidarity and support victims during or immediately after the incident, it can help create an environment which empowers communities to challenge all forms of hatred.
- We encourage more police forces to sign-up to our specialised training on anti-Muslim hatred, which covers both the offline and online nature of anti-Muslim prejudice.
- Social media companies have made efforts to remove and promote counter-speech, and these are welcome, but as we saw in our evidence submitted to

parliamentarians, more is needed. We will continue to work in partnership with social media companies to help them better understand anti-Muslim prejudice and to promote online counter-narratives that invest beyond advertising credits, and help build sustainable partnerships for the benefit of organisations fighting prejudice and for the communities they serve.

- We urge Google to review how far-right websites are cheating its search algorithm through Search Engine Optimisation (SEO) in order to improve their rankings on stories related to crime, sexual exploitation, and terrorism. A higher ranking not only increases their legitimacy but may draw vulnerable individuals into extreme echo chambers.

Introduction

Our 2015 annual report revealed that anti-Muslim incidents disproportionately target visible Muslim women (i.e. wearing Islamic clothing such as a headscarf, face veil, abaya, etc), with such attacks often taking place close to public transport and road networks. Fear of victimisation can limit the activity of British Muslims who may avoid using public transport, leaving home, or even leaving the neighbourhoods in which they feel safe.¹ In this report, we will provide a picture of anti-Muslim prejudice in 2016, analyse the social dynamics and potential motivations for hate incidents and explore the lived experiences of those who encounter this form of hatred.

For the purposes of this report, we define anti-Muslim prejudice, broadly known in academia as Islamophobia, in line with the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), working definition of antisemitism, which we define as:

“A certain perception of Muslims, which may be expressed as hatred or outward hostility towards Muslims. Hatred may take the form of anti-Muslim rhetoric and physical manifestations that are targeted towards Muslims (or non-Muslim individuals considered to be sympathetic to Muslims) and/or their property; or towards Muslim community institutions or religious and other related social institutions.”²

We use the term Islamophobic interchangeably partly for brevity and also because the term is established in existing hate crime literature and used by police forces nationwide when logging anti-Muslim hate crimes.

Since the 9/11 terror attacks Britain has seen a tangible increase in Islamophobia, and the concept has become a prominent subject in public discourses. Subsequent high-profile terror attacks and political events have drawn out public debate on issues such as immigration, international relations and the ‘War on Terror’, which have often centred on Muslims in the UK. Our previous report highlighted how some ‘trigger events’ correspond with a spike in the number of hate crime reports. While Islamophobia has been identified as distinct from other forms of racism due to its association with politics and ideology rather than immigration,³ this distinction may have been blurred in the wake of high-profile events such as the Brussels bombings, the EU referendum and the Syrian refugee crisis in 2016. Such events have further compounded debates around immigration and anti-Muslim prejudice.

Existing literature on the impact of anti-Muslim hatred has documented the significant psychological toll of everyday anti-Muslim incidents, whereby low-level but consistent prejudice, often not recognised within society, causes victims to

¹ Tell MAMA. *The Geography of Anti-Muslim Hatred: Tell MAMA Annual Report 2015* (2016, London).

² Tell MAMA. "A Working Definition of Anti-Muslim Prejudice." Available at: <https://tellmamauk.org/a-working-definition-of-anti-muslim-prejudice/>.

³ Cole, M. *Racism and Education in the UK and the US: towards a socialist alternative* (2011, New York)

experience considerable psychological stress.⁴ Moreover, hate crime victims are more likely to experience deeper psychological trauma due to the targeted nature of abuse and attacks. Anti-Muslim incidents can lead some to limit their activity and engagement with wider society in order to avoid situations in which they may feel at risk.⁵ Studies have documented the deeper psychological impacts hate crime has on individuals when compared to non-aggravated equivalent offences.⁶ Therefore, such prejudices have a serious and negative impact on the life chances and mobility of Muslims in the UK.⁷ However, it would also appear that for victims of anti-Muslim incidents, religion plays a significant role in their resilience to such prejudice, which may indicate the importance of promoting religious tolerance and diversity in helping to counter the negative impacts of such offences.⁸

Even though British Muslims are a heterogeneous group comprising many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, negative and salacious media coverage reduces such complexities into binaries of cultural difference.⁹ Due to this form of political rhetoric and sensational media reporting, British Muslims have emerged as a racialised threat - an 'alien other' with beliefs at odds with mainstream society and have become synonymous with 'deviance', 'un-Britishness' and terrorism.^{10 11 12} Muslim men have been constructed as 'The New Folk Devils' - aggressive hotheads who are in danger of being brainwashed into terrorists.^{13 14} This has intensified in recent years with the onset of child sexual exploitation (CSE) scandals, which have focused on the race, ethnicity and faith of organised criminal 'grooming gangs' targeting vulnerable young people across the UK. These cases have brought into question the role of the potentially 'dangerous masculinity' of British Muslim men.¹⁵ A conflation between the Pakistani community and the constructed idea of the 'Muslim fundamentalist' has seen the racial epithet 'P*k' become synonymous with British

⁴ Williams, D., Neighbours, H., & Jackson, J. 'Racial/ethnic discrimination and health: Findings for community studies'. *American Journal of Public Health* 93 (2003): pp.200-208.

⁵ Funnell, C. 'Racist hate crime and the mortified self: An ethnographic study of the impact of victimisation'. *International Review of Victimology* 21 (2015): pp.71-83.

⁶ Smith, K., Lader, D., Hoare, J., & Lau, I. Hate Crime, Cyber Security and the Experience of Crime Among Children: Findings from the 2010/11 British Crime Survey (2012), p.22.

⁷ Stevenson, J., Demack, S., Stiell, B., Abdi, M. a., Ghaffar, F., & Hassan, S. *The Social Mobility Challenges Faced by Young Muslims*. Social Mobility Commission (2017).

⁸ Abu-Ras, W., & Suarez, Z. 'Muslim Men and Women's Perception of Discrimination, Hate Crimes, and PTSD Symptoms Post 9/11'. *Traumatology* 15 (2009): pp.48-63.

⁹ Fekete, L. *A Suitable Enemy: racism, migration and Islamophobia in Europe* (2009, London).

¹⁰ Saeed, A. 'Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media'. *Sociology Compass* 1 (2007).

¹¹ Poole, E. 'Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims'. In E. Poole, & J. Richardson (Eds.), *Muslims and the News Media* (2006, London).

¹² Githens-Mazer, J, & Lambert, R. *Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime: A London case study*. European Muslim Research Centre (2010).

¹³ Shain, F. *The New Folk Devils: Muslim Boys and Education in England* (2011, Trentham Books Ltd).

¹⁴ Cohen, S. *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers* (1972, Routledge).

¹⁵ Tufail, W. 'Rotherham, Rochdale, and the Racialised Threat of the 'Muslim Grooming Gang'. *Crime Justice Journal* 4, no.3 (2015): pp.30-34.

Muslims regardless of ethnic background.¹⁶ Others use this term to group sexual deviance with Islam or Muslim identity more broadly.¹⁷

Arguably, there has been a rise in institutional discrimination against Muslims concerning the implementation of safeguarding at-risk communities against radicalisation (we will cite some case studies later in this report). Over the last few years, there has been an increasing trend of arrests and prosecutions based on 'crimes of association' with terrorists, while the Terrorism Act 2000 brought in a range of new offences which can potentially lead to imprisonment.^{18 19}

A discussion of 'trigger events' is incomplete without reference to the EU referendum vote on 23 June 2016. The National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) reported a rise in hate crime reports to the True Vision website days later. Racist or religious offences recorded by police forces in England and Wales increased by 41% in the month after the referendum vote with 5,468 hate crimes recorded in July 2016, up from 3,886 such crimes in the same period a year earlier. The same pattern was not observed for non-aggravated offences.²⁰ There is also evidence to suggest that hate crime can act as micro level manifestations of national or international conflicts where individuals are viewed in opposition to cultural norms or perceived to be acting against the national interest.²¹

John Curtice, professor of politics at the University of Strathclyde, argued that the EU referendum result revealed a toxic social and political atmosphere within the UK,²² and harsh divisions have been further exacerbated by some of the media coverage and political rhetoric surrounding the EU referendum and immigration more broadly.²³ It can be argued that international terror attacks such as the Brussels bombings (22 March 2016) and the Orlando nightclub shooting (12 June 2016) helped create an environment in which incendiary rhetoric concerning both the defence of UK citizens and wariness of immigrants became more permissible. The terrorist murder of MP Jo Cox (16 June 2016) can be seen as a symbol of the turbulent political climate surrounding the EU referendum debate. Thomas Mair, Cox's murderer, had kept newspaper printouts of her pro-Remain stance and support for refugees in his home, and witness testimonies suggested that Mair had

¹⁶ Anthias, F., Yuval-Davis, N. *Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the Anti-Racist Struggle* (1993, Taylor & Francis).

¹⁷ Gill, A., & Harrison, K. 'Child Grooming and Sexual Exploitation: Are South Asian Men the UK Media's New Folk Devils?' . *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social* (2015).

¹⁸ Cole, *Racism and Education in the UK and the US* (2011).

¹⁹ Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics* (1972).

²⁰ Home Office. *Hate Crime, England and Wales 2015/2016* (2016).

²¹ Mills, C. E., Freilich, J. D., & Chermak, S. M. 'Extreme Hatred: Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship to Determine Whether They are "Close Cousins" or "Distant Relatives"'. *Crime and Delinquency* (2015).

²² Curtice, J. 'Brexit: behind the Referendum'. *Political Insight* 7, no.2 (2016): pp.4-7.

²³ David, M., & Drake, H. Foreword: 'Life Is Going to Be Different in the Future'. *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 12, no.4 (2016): pp.802-808.

made reference to putting Britain 'first' during the attack.²⁴ Ultimately, however, this political climate is but one factor among many that motivate perpetrators to commit hate crimes.

²⁴ Walker, P. *'Jo Cox murder trial: Thomas Mair stashed quotes of late MP's EU support and 'Nazi eagle'*. 21 November 2016. Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/jo-cox-mptrial-thomas-mair-third-reich-eagle-remain-eu-articles-a7429911.html>

Review of Existing Literature

Hate Crime Typologies:

Potential motivations for hate crimes are complex and defining causality for one incident or a rising number of hate crime referrals is not straightforward.²⁵ In 2002 McDevitt and colleagues categorised motivations for hate offending into four distinct typologies: 'Thrill-seeking', 'Defensive', 'Retaliation' and 'Extremist'.²⁶ These typologies have been widely used by law enforcement to identify and investigate a hate crime.²⁷

'Thrill-seeking'

According to McDevitt and colleagues, 'Thrill-seeking' accounts for 66% of hate offences, in which perpetrators verbally or physically abuse people they perceive as a member of a certain group as a form of entertainment. Perpetrators of this offence category may only have a low level of prejudice towards a particular group.²⁸

'Defensive'

A quarter of hate crime offenders are motivated by defending their community or territory from perceived outsiders.²⁹ This can manifest as public concern that certain groups unfairly take jobs, housing or welfare away from their own 'in-group' and that certain groups (such as immigrants or disabled people) are perceived to be 'sponging off the state'.³⁰

'Retaliation'

Some hate crime offences can be understood as a reaction to a perceived hate crime the perpetrator feels they or their group have experienced (8% of offenders). Vicarious retribution occurs when an in-group member views an entire outgroup responsible for harm against a fellow in-group member, and thus attacks an outgroup member for retribution.³¹

'Extremists'

It is thought that around 1% of hate crime offenders are so strongly committed to their negative views of a particular group that they dedicate their lives to repeatedly

²⁵ Cuerden, G., & Rogers, C. Exploring Race Hate Crime Reporting in Wales Following Brexit. *Review of European Studies* 9 (2017): pp.158-164.

²⁶ McDevitt, J., Levin, J., & Bennett, S. 'Hate Crime Offenders: An Expanded Typology'. *Journal of Social Issues* 58, no.2 (2002): pp.303-317.

²⁷ National Institute of Justice. *What Motivates Hate Offenders* (2008). Available at: <https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/hate-crime/pages/motivation.aspx#>

²⁸ McDevitt et al. 'Hate Crime Offenders' (2002).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Chakraborti, N., Garland, J., & Hardy, S. J. *The Leicester Hate Crime Project: Findings and Conclusions* (2014, University of Leicester).

³¹ Mills et al. 'Extreme Hatred' (2015).

committing crimes against this group, developing what is referred to as a 'hate career'.³²

Terrorism, Immigration and Economic instability

All the above categories of hate crime can explain motivations for anti-Muslim incidents. However, in recent years 'Retaliation' and 'Defensive' anti-Muslim hate crimes have become the most prominent, as debates concerning Islam, terrorism and cultural identity have taken centre stage in both mainstream and social media.³³

Evidence shows that intergroup conflict can result in the dehumanisation of the 'outgroup', which facilitates vicarious retribution as outgroup members are seen "as being interchangeable and therefore equally deserving of retaliation".³⁴ For example, after a terrorist attack associated with extremists from a Muslim background, individuals may attempt to retaliate by abusing people wearing Islamic clothing or who they perceive to be Muslim, sometimes exploiting such events as a pretext for ideological violence, or from a position of blaming all Muslims for the act. It is, however, more difficult to ascertain the impact that such attacks will have abroad. Institutional attitudes towards threat is also a factor, though to what extent is debatable. Historically there have always been minority groups which have been disadvantaged due to institutional discrimination. A classic example is the botched investigation into the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993, which resulted in the watershed Macpherson report in 1999 that exposed institutional racism within policing, and made 70 key recommendations for society to counter racism. The Home Office incorporated 67 of these recommendations fully or in part. One implemented recommendation included how public authorities define racist incidents which foreground the perception of victims and witnesses. In 2009, police witnesses in evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee on the 10-year anniversary of the Macpherson report stated that the change increased hate crime reporting to around 60,000 reports a year and the doubling of the hate crime detection rate to 44%³⁵ but a broad perception that the police do not take hate crime seriously remains a significant barrier to reporting.³⁶ Nor did the report shy away from discussing concerns about the disproportionate use of stop and search on minority communities, and the failures to ensure diversity in public institutions.

Leaving aside institutional attitudes, the further mainstreaming of xenophobic narratives appears to have contributed toward problematic attitudes concerning immigrants and Muslims. The rise and decline of the radical right and far-right in the UK may demonstrate how such polarising attitudes have been absorbed into mainstream political discourses.

³² McDevitt et al. 'Hate Crime Offenders' (2002).

³³ Mills et al. 'Extreme Hatred' (2015).

³⁴ Lickel, B., Miller, N., Stenstrom, D. M., Denson, T. F., & Schmader, T. 'Vicarious retribution: The role of collective blame in intergroup aggression. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*'. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 10 (2006): pp.372-390.

³⁵ Home Affairs Committee. "The Macpherson Report—Ten Years On." London: The Stationery Office (2009).

³⁶ Chakraborti et al, *The Leicester Hate Crime Project* (2014).

Researchers have identified a link between the high volume of media coverage surrounding the EU referendum and an increase in the reporting of hate crime in the UK, which may very well be linked to public debates concerning immigration and cultural identity that risked overshadowing the debate. However, it is difficult to make claims of direct causation particularly when discussing the complexity of social interactions involved in crime and victimisation, and few studies have convincingly evidenced the association between political rhetoric and prejudicial attitudes.³⁷ Cuerden and Rogers, however, concluded that events including terror attacks and the EU referendum vote had a clear impact on the way 'non-indigenous' people were perceived, including an increase in hate crime victimisation. Following news of the UK public deciding to exit the EU, there was heightened media coverage of victimisation along with the suggestion that political rhetoric from elements of the campaign had stoked tensions. Cuerden and Rogers observed a rise in the number of race hate crime referrals that concluded within a time when public attention was fixed on topics associated with the EU referendum: including immigration, unemployment and the economic future of the UK.³⁸

Despite the significance of general prejudice, evidence indicates that emotional reactions to perceived threats such as terror attacks and economic insecurity may be a better predictor of hostility to outgroups.^{39 40} Since 2007, Europe has experienced the worst economic and social crisis since the First World War. In 2012, more people lost their jobs than in any other year in the last two decades.⁴¹ Perpetrators of racist hate crimes may very well be projecting anger or shame about their economic circumstances as rage against ethnic minority groups in the age of austerity.⁴² Hostility may be caused by the perceived economic threat of immigration rather than the actual level of deprivation. For example, Green et al. (1998) found correlations between an increase in ethnic minorities in predominantly white neighbourhoods in the United States and the number of hate crime incidents. However, hate crime incidents did not correlate with rates of deprivation, such as low-income levels and high unemployment.^{43 44}

³⁷ Walters et al. *Causes and motivations of hate crime* (2016).

³⁸ Cuerden & Rogers. 'Exploring Race Hate Crime Reporting in Wales Following Brexit' (2017).

³⁹ Cottrell, C. A., & Neuberg, S. L. 'Different emotional reactions to different groups: A sociofunctional threat-based approach to "Prejudice"'. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 88, no.5 (2005): pp.770–89.

⁴⁰ Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. 'Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context'. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 79 (2000): pp.602–16.

⁴¹ Cole, M. 'Austerity/Immiseration Capitalism and Islamophobia – or Twenty-first-century Multicultural Socialism?' *Policy Futures in Education* 12, no.1 (2014): pp.79–92.

⁴² Ray, L., & Smith, D. W. 'Shame, rage and racist violence'. *British Journal of Criminology* 44, no.3 (2004): pp.350–68.

⁴³ Green, D. P., Glaser, J., & Rich, A. 'From lynching to gay bashing: The elusive connection between economic conditions and hate crime'. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 75 (1998a): pp.82–92.

⁴⁴ Green, D. P., Strolovitch, D. Z., & Wong, J. S. 'Defended neighbourhoods, integration and racially motivated crime'. *American Journal of Sociology* 104, no.2 (1998b): pp.372–403.

Social Dynamics of Hate Incidents:

To fully understand hate crime, we need to appreciate the situational factors and victim-perpetrator relationships that may influence the motivations for the offence.⁴⁵ Of the thousands of incidents that occur each year, it is only the most extreme manifestations of hate-motivated violence that capture the attention of the media. The reports of cases that involve brutal levels of violence perpetuate an image of hate crimes as one-off acts of violence that are committed by 'hardened racists' and bigots, turning hate crime into a form of 'stranger danger', that is, random acts carried out by strangers unknown to the victim.⁴⁶ Contrary to popular belief, hate-motivated victimisation often involves 'low-level' incidents of discrimination that can escalate to acts of harassment such as verbal abuse, spitting and intimidation.^{47 48} Recent studies have also shown that many hate crime incidents form part of an ongoing process of victimisation from neighbours, work colleagues, peers and even family members that are repeated over extended periods of time, only sometimes escalating to threatening and abusive behaviour or physical violence.^{49 50 51 52}

The All Wales Hate Crime Project found that 43% of victims reported that they knew their perpetrator, and almost a third were victimised in or immediately around their homes.⁵³ Many hate crimes are perpetrated by people known to the victim, including neighbours, local community members, work colleagues, and even friends and family members.^{54 55 56 57 58} However, the relationship between the victim and perpetrator may vary depending on the type of hate crime. An analysis of the British Crime survey data by Roberts et al. found that 75% of victims of homophobic hate crime knew their assailant beforehand, compared with only 31% of race hate victims.⁵⁹ Williams and Tregidga (2013) found that 51% of victims of disability hate

⁴⁵ Walters et al. *Causes and motivations of hate crime* (2016).

⁴⁶ Mason, G. 'Hate Crime and the Image of a Stranger'. *The British Journal of Criminology* 45, no.6 (2005): pp.837-859.

⁴⁷ Chakraborti et al, *The Leicester Hate Crime Project* (2014).

⁴⁸ Williams, M., & Tregidga, J. *All Wales Hate Crime Project*. Race Equality First and Cardiff University (2013).

⁴⁹ Bowling, B. *Violent racism: Victimization, policing, and social context* (1998, Oxford).

⁵⁰ Chakraborti et al, *The Leicester Hate Crime Project* (2014).

⁵¹ Walters, M. A., & Paterson, J. *Transphobic hate crime and perceptions of the criminal justice system*,. Transgender Equality Inquiry, Women and Equalities Committee. UK Parliament (2015)

⁵² Williams & Tregidga. *All Wales Hate Crime Project* (2013).

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Chakraborti et al, *The Leicester Hate Crime Project* (2014).

⁵⁵ Mason, 'Hate crime and the image of the stranger' (2005).

⁵⁶ Quarmby, K. *Getting away with murder: Disabled people's experiences of hate crime in the UK*. UK Disabled People's Council (2008).

⁵⁷ Roxwell, L. 'Hate, threats, and violence. A register study of persons suspected of hate crime'. *Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention* 12, no.12 (2011): pp.198-215.

⁵⁸ Sibbitt, R. *The perpetrators of racial harassment and racial violence*. Home Office Research Study 176 (1997).

⁵⁹ Roberts, C., Innes, M., Williams, M., Tregidga, J., & Gadd, D. *Understanding who commits hate crime and why they do it*. Welsh Government Social Research (2013).

crime knew their perpetrator compared to 31% of anti-religious hate crime victims.⁶⁰ A wide-ranging study of Islamophobic hate crime in London between 2005 and 2012 found that a majority of suspects were not known to the victim or the information was not given in the crime report. Where applicable, suspects were identified as white males, aged 21-50, who were either neighbours or acquaintances of the victim.⁶¹

Hate incidents often occur in public spaces such as streets, city centres and public transport networks.⁶² Our 2015 report supports this notion, showing that a high proportion of anti-Muslim incidents occurred near public transport hubs.⁶³ Public transport networks can be seen as a particularly problematic social situation in which conflict is likely to occur, as trains and buses are often overcrowded and poorly staffed. In this situation passengers may feel trapped and frustrated - forced into close proximity to people from different social groups, which may quickly escalate from small, perceived grievances and underlying prejudices into violent altercations.⁶⁴

Hate crimes should not be conceptualised solely as the actions of 'violent bigots' who operate at the margins of society - we must instead examine the 'everyday' hate incidents that form a seemingly ordinary part of many individuals' daily lives.⁶⁵

Instances of racist or Islamophobic abuse may arise within everyday relationships where only a low level of prejudice is present, resulting from trivial or minor disputes to a person's short temper.⁶⁶ These actions may be linked to the social situation in which they encounter the victim – for example, a traffic altercation or ongoing neighbourly dispute.⁶⁷ These seemingly inconsequential incidents often go unreported so will not feature in any official statistics (police-recorded hate crime) or within victim surveys such as the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) or the Scottish Crime and Justice Survey (SCJS), meaning that databases on hate crime do not necessarily provide an accurate picture of the frequently routine nature of hate-motivated victimisation.⁶⁸ By understanding the situational contexts in which incidents occur we can begin to more effectively understand this form of hate crime.

Victim Selection and Vulnerability

Victimisation is a process of social interaction based on the relationship and exchanges between perpetrators and their victims.⁶⁹ Ellenberger (1954) furthered

⁶⁰ Williams & Tregidga. *All Wales Hate Crime Project* (2013).

⁶¹ Kielinger, V. and Paterson, S. *Hate Crimes Against London's Muslim Communities: An analysis of incidents recorded by the Metropolitan Police Service 2005-2012*. The Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) (2013). Available at: http://www.report-it.org.uk/files/hate_crime_against_london_highres_print_final.pdf. Pp 14.

⁶² Chakraborti et al, *The Leicester Hate Crime Project* (2014).

⁶³ Tell MAMA. *The Geography of Anti-Muslim Hatred* (2016).

⁶⁴ Chakraborti et al. *The Leicester Hate Crime Project* (2014).

⁶⁵ Iganski, P. *'Hate crime' and the city*. (2008, Bristol).

⁶⁶ Cuerden & Rogers. *Exploring Race Hate Crime Reporting in Wales Following Brexit* (2017).

⁶⁷ Walters et al. *Causes and motivations of hate crime* (2016).

⁶⁸ Mills et al. *'Extreme Hatred'* (2015).

⁶⁹ Von, H. The Criminal and His Victim. *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 31, no.3 (1948).

this notion to suggest how social, physical and occupational factors can increase the likelihood of being a victim of crime.⁷⁰ Individuals with certain characteristics may be regarded as easy targets by potential offenders as they are perceived to be biologically or socially 'weak', or vulnerable because of their occupation – for example, people with disabilities, minority groups, sex workers, etc.⁷¹ Drawing on Cohen and Felson's (1987) Routine Activities Theory, it has been observed that an offender can be motivated to commit a hate crime due to the perceived vulnerability of the victim and their lack of ability to deter an attack.^{72 73 74} Hate crimes based on the vulnerability of the victim may be motivated by other factors rather than prejudice against that specific group.⁷⁵ Reid (2004) found that individuals with a visual impairment are twice as likely to be victims of sexual assault, robbery, violence and physical assault than someone without any impairment.⁷⁶ Similarly, Scherer (2011) found that university students with a disability were one and a half times more likely to be a victim of sexual assault than non-disabled victims. Victims with a disability are viewed as more attractive victims based on the perception of vulnerability or ease of offending.⁷⁷ For example, perpetrators may target anyone they perceive to be vulnerable; a woman on their own, someone they perceive to have a disability or an older or younger person.

Perpetrators of hate incidents may have mixed motivations and hold intersecting prejudices.^{78 79} An individual may choose to victimise an individual due to their perceived ethnic or religious identity, but there may be other prejudice motivating their crime. In their 2014 study, Chakraborti et al. found that 50% of hate crime victims were targeted because of more than one of their identity characteristics. For example, a perpetrator may be motivated by a dislike of both Asians and Muslims. This may impact on how hate crimes are accurately recorded in crime data.⁸⁰

⁷⁰ Ellenberger, H. 'Relations psychologiques entre le criminel et la victime'. *Revue internationale de criminologie et de police* (1954).

⁷¹ Schafer, S. *The Victim and His Criminal* (1968, New York).

⁷² Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. 'Social Change and Crime Risk Trends: A Routine Activity Approach.' *American Sociological Review* 11, no.1 (1979).

⁷³ Allen, C. *A review of the evidence relating to the representation of Muslims and Islam in the British media*. University of Birmingham. Institute of Applied Social Studies, School of Social Policy (2012).

⁷⁴ Health Canada. *Violence against women with disabilities* (2004, Ottawa).

⁷⁵ Walters et al. *Causes and motivations of hate crime* (2016).

⁷⁶ Reid, G. "'Abuse of people with disabilities.'" Brochure d'information pour fournisseurs de services'. The People's Law School, Vancouver (2004).

⁷⁷ Scherer, H. L. 'Disability Status and Victimization Risk among a National Sample of College Students: A Lifestyles-Routine Activities Approach'. *Doctoral dissertation, University of Cincinnati* (2011).

⁷⁸ Chakraborti, N. 'Reconceptualising hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and "Difference"'. *Theoretical Criminology* 16, no.4 (2012): pp.499-514.

⁷⁹ Walters et al. *Causes and motivations of hate crime* (2016).

⁸⁰ Chakraborti et al. *The Leicester Hate Crime Project* (2014).

Coping with Prejudice: Impact of Anti-Muslim Hate on Victims

In recent years, research has shown that hate crime - motivated by racial, religious or other identity-based prejudice - can have severe psychological impacts on victims. In their analysis of British Crime Survey data from 2010/11, Smith et al. found that victims of hate crime were statistically significantly more likely than victims of non-hate crimes to say they were emotionally affected by the incident, and 21% more likely to say that they were 'very much' affected.⁸¹ If we use the vulnerability-based approach towards hate crime proposed by Chakraborti & Garland, which recognises the heightened risk posed to particular groups or individuals caused by factors including "prejudice, hostility, unfamiliarity" and "discomfort",⁸² then we may at least partly attribute this elevated impact to the relative social isolation of vulnerable, or 'different', groups or individuals. For these groups and individuals, there are fewer people they can identify with, fewer people they can rely on to be sympathetic, and fewer institutions or organisations from which they can confidently seek help. Many victims even feel unable to go to the police with their concerns because of a perception of institutional prejudice, and would rather avoid potentially stressful or humiliating experiences.⁸³ The failure of statutory agencies to take hate crime reports seriously may have created an atmosphere in which certain prejudices are normalised in wider society, which enables perpetrators to believe that they can target certain groups without consequence and dissuades victims from seeking support.⁸⁴

Unsurprisingly, the psychological distress caused by anti-Muslim hatred can have wide-ranging social impacts, negatively affecting the daily routines and mobility of victims, as well as entrenching traditional or cultural patterns, such as rates of marriage between different ethnic groups, and victims of anti-Muslim hate crime are no exception. In previous reports, we detailed many of the wide-ranging impacts of anti-Muslim hatred - *"We Fear for our Lives": Offline and Online Experiences of Anti-Muslim Hostility* discussed the psychological impact of anti-Muslim hostility, in terms of the heightened anxiety, depression and general isolation felt by victims, and briefly touched on the mobility related implications of intimidation, whereby victims often felt unable to go about their business in public or even leave their home for fear of further victimisation.⁸⁵

In our 2015 annual report, *The Geography of Anti-Muslim Hatred*, we expanded on this latter theme, detailing the factors that contribute toward the limiting of victims mobility, and mapping out the physical spaces in which attacks most often occur.⁸⁶ In

⁸¹ Smith et al. 'Hate Crime, Cyber Security and the Experience of Crime Among Children' (2012), p.22.

⁸² Chakraborti. 'Reconceptualising hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and "Difference"' (2012).

⁸³ Williams, M., & Tregidga, J. 'Hate Crime Victimization in Wales'. *British Journal of Criminology* 54 (2014): pp.946-967.

⁸⁴ Levin, J., Rabrenovic, G. *Why We Hate* (2004, Michigan).

⁸⁵ Tell MAMA. *We Fear for our Lives: Offline and Online Experiences of Anti-Muslim Hostility*. Tell MAMA UK (2015).

⁸⁶ Tell MAMA, *The Geography of Anti-Muslim Hatred* (2016).

this report we will explore similar areas of impact (psychological and mobility), but also delve further into the broader, social impacts of anti-Muslim hate crime, addressing the changes in identity and cultural practise that accompany anti-Muslim hatred.

It is widely recognised that violent anti-Muslim hate crime can have a detrimental effect on the psychological well-being of victims. Unfortunately, the impact of the lower level, everyday anti-Muslim incidents is less well publicised. The most common forms of anti-Muslim hatred include verbal abuse, threatening behaviour and discrimination, can be either interpersonal or institutional and are often non-criminal and ambiguous in nature. Rather than just acts of interpersonal violence, it may be 'every day', often non-criminal anti-Muslim incidents that contribute to a socially adverse atmosphere in which British Muslims are negatively affected both psychologically and socially. For example, being told to 'go back home', being refused service, or even just being totally ignored in plain view. In their study of risk and resilience in British Muslim communities, Hargreaves noted that participants would rarely talk about physical abuse, but instead posit verbal abuse, non-criminal discrimination and victimisation as central to their experience of anti-Muslim hatred.⁸⁷ For participants, many of these experiences were subtle, it was noted multiple times by those who wore a headscarf that they would receive strange looks and ambiguously critical comments when going about their business in public.⁸⁸ This separation may lead to individuals becoming isolated and disenfranchised, disconnected from fellow citizens and public institutions. These factors typically compound existing prejudice toward Muslims, which in turn may lead to worsening mental health problems for victims.⁸⁹

The detrimental impacts of hate crime can go beyond the individual, and into the very heart of communities, where concerns about community safety may shift into debates about voluntary 'self-segregation', a discourse challenged by academics. As Phillips (2006) wrote, the term 'self-segregation' implies that 'ethnic minorities are choosing to opt out of British society', which from their interviews with 117 Muslim households in Bradford following the urban disturbances in 2001, was not true.⁹⁰ The study found that for many Muslims in Bradford, there was no evidence of this voluntary 'self-segregation' as much of the clustering reflected the structural inequalities reflected in the discriminatory housing policies in poorer areas of the city. Many aspired to live in mixed areas, but the fear of racial violence meant that some did not want to be the only Asian family in 'all white' areas. Other discriminatory practises in employment robbed many of the jobs necessary to move into more affluent areas.⁹¹ The clustering of communities did have value in terms of cultural identity and familiarity, and of the sanctuary it afforded. For older generations and

⁸⁷ Hargreaves, J. 'Risk and resilience in British Muslim communities'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (2016): pp.1-20.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Abu-Ras, W., & Suarez, Z. 'Muslim Men and Women's Perception of Discrimination, Hate Crimes, and PTSD Symptoms Post 9/11'. *Traumatology* 15 (2009): pp.48-63.

⁹⁰ Phillips, D. (2006). 'Parallel Lives? Challenging Discourses of British Muslim Self-Segregation'. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*. (2006) pp.31.

⁹¹ Ibid. pp 33-34.

new migrants who may have lacked English language skills, this grew in importance. Phillips also noted that much of the polarising media discussion ignored class dynamics, and how by 2000, 10% of Muslims were living in the most affluent parts of the city.⁹²

Diversity enriches society, and we do not advocate that groups arbitrarily jettison their cultural practises, which is counterproductive. The issue here is whether an ethnic or religious group feels a sense of belonging to the society, regardless of background. More to the point, the mixing of culture *in both directions* (i.e. between mainstream society and ethnic or religious minorities) is a conventional historical process and should not be demonised in and of itself, so long as it can occur over time and without coercion. The onus, however, should be placed on wider civil society to provide the conditions for integration, rather than the other way around, due to the relative lack of structural power and influence such minority groups are afforded. Some victims of anti-Muslim prejudice may retreat into their communities and strengthen their religious convictions in order to build resilience to hate incidents.⁹³

Long-term Outcomes for British Muslims

The psychological and social impacts of anti-Muslim hatred serve to create an environment in which those within Muslim communities are less likely to find full time, well-paid and secure employment, as a result of direct and indirect discrimination, as 41% of Muslims in the UK are economically inactive, compared to 21.8% of the general population;⁹⁴ only 6% of Muslims are in 'higher managerial, administrative or professional occupations', compared to 10% of the overall population; and 24% of Muslims are classified as having 'never worked/long-term unemployment', compared to 6% of the overall population.⁹⁵

Social Mobility Challenges Faced by Young Muslims, published by the Social Mobility Commission, details the discrimination faced by young Muslims in employment. Casual Islamophobia in job interviews was perceived as being commonplace by participants, in which simply being visibly Muslim garnered comments such as "he looked very Muslim" - the implication being that this would be somehow problematic.⁹⁶ Even before the interviewing process, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that those with 'white' sounding names are significantly more likely to receive a positive response to their application for a role than those with an 'ethnic' sounding name.⁹⁷ This was reflected in the experiences of participants in *Social Mobility Challenges*, including an example in which a woman with a Muslim name and degree level education applied for the same role as her housemate who

⁹² Ibid. pp 31.

⁹³ Hargreaves, 'Risk and resilience in British Muslim communities' (2016).

⁹⁴ House of Commons. *Employment opportunities for Muslims in the UK* (2016): pp.1-55.

⁹⁵ Nomis/Office for National Statistics. *2013a* (2013).

⁹⁶ Stevenson et al, *The Social Mobility Challenges Faced by Young Muslims* (2017), p.23.

⁹⁷ Wood, M., Hales, J., Purdon, S., Sejersen, T., & Oliver, H. *A test for racial discrimination in recruitment practise in British cities*. Department for Work and Pensions (2009).

had a 'white' sounding name but no university education. The role specifically asked for degree level education, and so, on a meritocratic basis, the participant felt that if she did not receive an interview, her housemate should not either. Unfortunately, the participant received a rejection for her application, while her housemate was successful in attaining an interview.⁹⁸

Moving beyond the application and interview process, there are still significant barriers to young Muslims in attaining full-time employment and many participants in *Social Mobility Challenges* felt that much of this could be attributed to discrimination – one spoke of her part-time employment, stating that, “even when I was working more hours than someone who was full-time they still said I was part-time”.⁹⁹ The Trade Unions Congress believe that racial discrimination is a significant factor in the low paid, temporary or zero-hours contract employment ethnic minorities often find themselves in:

*“...race discrimination plays a major role in explaining these inequalities, as does the lack of access to employment opportunities for BAME [Black and Minority Ethnic] workers. The growth of insecure work has exacerbated the inequalities that BAME workers already face”*¹⁰⁰

In addition to this, the geographic mobility of Muslims would appear to be a key factor in employment disadvantages. Following literature already discussed earlier in this section, participants of the *Social Mobility Challenges* had the perception that they were at greater risk of Islamophobia and discrimination further away from home, thereby restricting their job opportunities to their local area regardless of job type or wage. Participants were clear about the safety concerns they had, especially relating to their families. One participant felt that her daughter would be at risk of attacks “if she’s got her scarf on”, and that proximity to her was of the utmost concern.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Stevenson et al, *The Social Mobility Challenges Faced by Young Muslims* (2017), p.41.

⁹⁹ Stevenson et al, *The Social Mobility Challenges Faced by Young Muslims* (2017), p.40.

¹⁰⁰ Trade Unions Congress. *Insecure work and Ethnicity* (2017).

¹⁰¹ Stevenson et al, *The Social Mobility Challenges Faced by Young Muslims* (2017), p.44.

About Tell MAMA and Our Methodology

Tell MAMA is an independent and confidential third-party hate crime reporting service for those who have experienced anti-Muslim hate incidents and crimes. Members of the public report incidents to our staff via our free and confidential helpline, over email, via our official apps on the Apple and Android stores, through social media platforms, WhatsApp, or through the 'Submit a Report' page on our website.

As a third-party reporting service, individuals can circumvent the need to report incidents to police if they wish. Our aim is holistic, and the support is tailored to the needs of the person reporting to us. Be it advocacy, or offering a listening and supportive ear, our trained caseworkers can report crimes to police directly at the request of service users. Supporting the needs of individuals is at the heart of our work. The necessity of tackling all forms of hatred is paramount and underscores our ethos, which is why we work with other key hate crime partner agencies. In March 2015, we became one of only two community organisations to sign an agreement with the National Police Chiefs Council. This agreement enables police forces in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland to share sanitised anti-Muslim hate crime data with us, which helps build a more accurate national picture of incidents. We have partnership agreements in place with 18 separate UK police forces: Metropolitan, City of London, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, Cheshire, West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, Humberside, Northamptonshire, Hampshire, Kent, Surrey, Bedfordshire, Dorset, Warwickshire, West Mercia, British Transport Police and the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

When a member of the public contacts our service, either as a witness or victim, we collect details pertinent to the incident(s), and, where possible, data about the perpetrator(s) along with data about the victim(s) or individual reporting the incident to us. We also record case notes allowing analysis of other factors including the perceived characteristics of the perpetrators, who else was involved and whether or not anyone else intervened. With online cases, part of the verification process relates to the validity of hyperlinks and ensuring that the perpetrator is UK-based. If a member of the public sends us a news story, it is logged under a separate news category, increasing our ability to monitor and map hate crime trends following major political events and acts of terrorism. Our recommendations and figures inform and shape the political debate on this issue, and our training programmes have been welcomed by law enforcement, improving their understanding about the evolving nature of anti-Muslim hate crime, and how society is best equipped to respond and protect its Muslim communities.

We use both quantitative and qualitative data within this report. This includes a descriptive quantitative analysis of the number and types of incidents reported to us in 2016. However, the majority of this report is based on a qualitative thematic analysis of the case notes which include sanitised first-hand accounts of incidents,

caseworker observations, news articles and text from social media reports. The case notes of the incidents reported to us over the year were read and coded by researchers based on significant recurring themes emerging from the data. This informed the thematic analysis which focuses on an in-depth analysis of the situation, the underlying motivations behind it and the impacts of anti-Muslim incidents alongside the response from police, victims and others. We conducted a brief corpus analysis of the online incidents and a word frequency count was created to explore key issues and recurring themes within the online content reported to us in 2016.¹⁰²

There are, however, methodological issues associated with the use of reported hate crime/incident data. For one, there will always be a gap between the number of crimes that occur and the number that is reported, and many hate crimes go unreported for a variety of reasons. Perceptions of institutional prejudice will deter some from reporting as they do not feel anything will be done or to avoid potentially stressful or humiliating experiences.¹⁰³

Within our analysis, we rely heavily on the testimony of victims or witnesses for information on anti-Muslim incidents. All eyewitness testimony is based on the perspective of the person reporting to our service. Therefore, it is natural to expect some gaps in the data. Our focus, however, is about supporting our service users, giving them a voice and using first-hand accounts of their experiences to show how low-level prejudice and racism affects their daily lives. Subjectivity can be observed in how we classify incidents and reports. With the information provided to our caseworkers, we can determine the location and incident category of offences. Subjectivity also relates to the characterisation of perpetrators. For example, there are tests applied to a perpetrator to see if their views, statements or clothing suggest any far-right tendencies.

¹⁰² Baker, P. (2006) *Using Corpora in Discourse Analysis*. London: Continuum.

¹⁰³ Williams & Tregidga, 'Hate Crime Victimisation in Wales' (2014).

Understanding ‘Street-based’ Anti-Muslim Incidents in 2016

In this section, we will provide an overview of the different types of street-based anti-Muslim incidents reported to our service in 2016 and explore the dynamics of the situations in which they occur.

We received a total of 1,223 reports of street-based (offline) and online anti-Muslim incidents during 2016. Of these reports, 953 were verified by our caseworkers as anti-Muslim in nature and as having occurred in the UK (online anti-Muslim material was confirmed as having originated from UK-based accounts). Just over two-thirds of cases (n=642) of verified anti-Muslim incident reports were street-based (offline) cases. The number of verified offline reports in the 2016 calendar year was up 47% on the previous year (2015: n=437).

Definitions of Street-Based (Offline) Anti-Muslim Incident Categories used by Tell MAMA

“Abusive Behaviour” - Verbal and nonverbal abuse including comments or gestures targeting individual(s) due to their perceived Muslim identity.

“Physical Attack” - A physical attack ranging from unwanted touching, spitting or throwing something so it hits someone to a violent assault against an individual(s) due to their perceived Muslim identity. Categorised as “Assaults” in previous reports.

“Threatening Behaviour” - Direct and indirect threats of physical violence motivated by anti-Muslim hatred.

“Discrimination” - Denial of access or mistreatment in a wide range of settings ranging from the workplace, education, public or private sector services due to a perception of Muslim identity.

“Vandalism” - Damage or desecration of property motivated by anti-Muslim hatred. This may include Islamophobic graffiti, damage to property or dumping of pork products or alcohol motivated by anti-Muslim prejudice.

“Anti-Muslim Literature” - Written or visual Islamophobic content including letters, leaflets, memes, or posters displayed in public areas or distributed to individuals online or offline.


“Hate Speech” - Verbal communication delivered to an audience with the purpose of stirring up anti-Muslim hatred.

Despite an increase in the overall number of reports in general, the distribution of different types of street-based (offline) anti-Muslim incidents is comparable to 2015.

Consistent with 2015, incidents of **Abusive Behaviour** represent the largest percentage of street-based (offline) reports in 2016. Over half of all verified offline anti-Muslim reports in 2016 were classified as **Abusive Behaviour** (54%, n=349), compared to 50% in 2015 (n=219).

Physical Attacks, or ‘Assaults’ as they were categorised in the previous report, constitute the second largest incident category in both 2016 (19%, n=120) and 2015 (17%, n=74).


Verified Street-Based (Offline) Anti-Muslim Incidents by Incident Category in 2016 (N=642)



The third most common street-based (offline) incident category reported was **Threatening Behaviour** (8%, n=49) followed by **Discrimination** (7%, n=46), **Vandalism** (7%, n=43), **Anti-Muslim Literature** (5%, n=32) and **Hate Speech** (0%, n=2). In contrast, the third most common offline incident category in 2015 was **Vandalism** (10%, n=44) followed by **Threatening Behaviour** (7.5%, n=34) and **Discrimination** (7.5%, n=34). In both 2015 and 2016, **Anti-Muslim Literature** and **Hate Speech** were the least common anti-Muslim offline incident categories. **Hate Speech** accounted for less than 1% (n=2) of verified incidents in 2016 and is excluded from the offline incident category chart above.

We documented a minor increase in the proportion of incidents directly targeting individuals with interpersonal verbal abuse or physical attack due to their perceived Muslim identity. For example, we recorded a 4% rise in the proportion of **Abusive Behaviour** incidents, a 2% rise in the proportion of **Physical Attacks** and a 0.5% rise in the proportion of **Threatening Behaviour** incidents (although this increase is marginal). Meanwhile, we have seen a decrease in the proportion of more indirect incidents. There was a 3% decrease in the proportion of **Vandalism** cases and a 0.5% decrease in reports of **Discrimination**.

Street-Based (Offline) Anti-Muslim Incidents by Place Category (N=642)



Analysis of the cases reported in 2016 reveal a diverse variety of situations in which incidents occur. The social situations in which incidents take place can be immensely important in understanding anti-Muslim hate in the UK.

Definitions of Street-Based (Offline) Anti-Muslim Place Categories used by Tell MAMA

“Public Area” – An incident that occurs on a pavement or pedestrianised areas, including town centres or shopping areas.

“Transport Network” – An incident that occurs on public transport networks, including railways, buses, coaches, trams, the London Underground and stations more generally.

“Place of Business” – An incident that occurs in a shop, restaurant or other private sector building where the victim does not work.

“Household or Private Property” - An incident that occurs in or around the victims or another person’s domestic dwelling.

“Place of Work”- An incident that occurs in the victim’s workplace, including public spaces if the victim is a taxi driver or police officer, for example.

“Educational Institution” – An incident that occurs within a college, school or university setting where the victim attends or teaches at.

“Road or Highway”- An incident involving one or more vehicles on a roadway.

“Muslim Institutions”- An incident targeting a Muslim institution such as a mosque, cemetery, cultural centre or Islamic school.

“Public Institution”- An incident that occurs within a public institution, such as a job centre or council office where the victim does not work.

“Hospital”- An incident that occurs in health service buildings including hospitals, GP surgeries or health clinics.

In 2016 offences committed in **Public Areas** remain the single most common category in street-based (offline) incidents reported to our service in 2016. Nearly a third of all offline anti-Muslim incidents occurred within a **Public area** (30%, n=192), while 13% of incidents took place on **Transport Networks** (13%, n=85), a **Place of Business** (13%, n=81), and within a **Household or Private Property** (13%, n=81). The next most significant place categories were **Place of Work** (9%, n=59), **Educational Institution** (8%, n=50), **Road or Highway** (6%, n=38) and **Muslim Institution** (5%, n=34). Finally, just 1% of incidents took place within **Public Institutions** (1%, n=9), **Hospitals** (1%, n=8) and within any other type of location (**Other**: 1%, n=4). Two incidents were classified as **Unknown**, as not enough information was provided by the victim or witness to ascertain where the incident took place. Less than 1% of incidents were **Unknown** so this category does not appear in the incident place category graph.

In 2016 we have recorded a 5% increase in the proportion of incidents which occurred in **Public Areas** (30%, n=192) compared to the previous year (2015: 25%, n=111). This increase corresponds with a decrease in the proportion of incidents occurring in all other place categories. Cases on the **Transport Network** (13%, n=85) saw a decrease of 7% since 2015 (20%, n=89), making it the largest proportional decrease of all place categories. Reasons for this may include methodological limitations in defining place categories. This is because cases in and around public transport networks including trains, buses, tube networks and trams are invariably blurred with the public areas surrounding them, as people navigate these spaces every day.


‘Stranger Danger’

A thematic analysis of the anti-Muslim incidents reported to us in 2016 revealed that many of the cases occurring in publicly accessible areas, such as streets, shopping centres and on transport networks, involved a perpetrator who was unknown to the victim at the time of the incident. As discussed in our 2015 report, a high proportion of anti-Muslim incidents occurred near public transport hubs and major roads. According to existing literature, public transport can be a particularly stressful social situation in which people may feel trapped and frustrated. They are forced into close proximity with strangers, which may escalate perceived grievances and underlying prejudices into verbal disputes or even physical altercations.¹⁰⁴

It is also worth noting that the recorded proportional increase of overtly direct, verbal, and violent anti-Muslim attacks may correspond with the increase in public area based offences where the perpetrator is unknown to the victim. Perpetrators may feel more freedom to commit these types of offences against strangers they identify as Muslim in public areas. This can perhaps be attributed to the anonymity and reduced oversight from authority figures in such areas, in comparison to other social spaces such as transport networks, private property, businesses and other types of institutions which are likely to be overseen by staff or security guards.

¹⁰⁴ Chakraborti et al, *The Leicester Hate Crime Project* (2014).

Anti-Muslim Incident Type by Place Category (N=642)



Indeed, further analysis of the type of offences that took place in **Public areas, Transport Networks, Roads or Highways** demonstrates that the vast majority of incidents which occurred in these spaces were overtly abusive or violent.

A proportion of the incidents reported to us in 2016 appear to have been motivated by grievances related to the social dynamics and stressful conditions associated with navigating public transport networks. These types of incident appear to be triggered by disputes over seats, queuing, or space on busy station platforms. Casual disputes between strangers can escalate into anti-Muslim incidents when Islamophobic and racist language is introduced, even leading to physical violence on occasion. The situation itself may also be the factor that triggers the perpetrator to abuse their victim:

*“Move your f***ing bag! Does it have a bomb in it or something?!.”*

It was found that highways and surrounding public areas such as pavements are another common social setting in which anti-Muslim incidents occur. Similarly, to public transport, some anti-Muslim incidents occur after situational conflict relating to negotiating busy traffic and sharing space with other cars, bikes and pedestrians. In one of our cases, the perpetrator targeted their visible Muslim victims following a minor traffic collision:

“‘You people don’t know how to drive’; ‘You never drove in your country’; ‘You should not be driving in this country’ and ‘You don’t deserve it.’”

In situations such as this, it could be argued that the abuse was triggered by a stressful situation in which the perpetrator became legitimately upset due to the damage caused to their car. However, the language used by the perpetrator suggests a degree of prejudice and racism concerning the victim’s ethnicity and religion, alluding to deeper prejudices or anxieties tied to welfare and immigration.


Shops, restaurants, gyms and other business environments accessed by members of the public (classified as **Place of Business**), as well as surrounding public areas, were also common locations for incidents to take place. In the case below, an abusive woman, who was blocking a supermarket aisle with her pushchair, began to verbally abuse and threaten a Muslim woman when she attempted to pass:

*“‘What you gonna f***ing do? Hey, I will rip your headscarf off your f***ing head, what you gonna do? Go call your ISIS.’”*

This incident may have been partially triggered by the stress arising from negotiating a busy shop surrounded by strangers. However, the reaction of the perpetrator was unprovoked and unreasonable, escalating the confrontation with threats of violence and anti-Muslim abuse.

Although a proportion of incidents that occurred on public transport, roadways, in public areas and in shopping areas did appear to be triggered by incidental grievances, most incidents did not follow this pattern. Most incidents that occurred in these busy public spaces appear to have been unprovoked, where the perpetrator instigated the initial confrontation with the victim, wholly unrelated to any form of stress-related conflict. It can be argued that this type of attack occurs most often because of individuals with a high degree of prejudice towards Muslims are near people from different social groups.

Anti-Muslim Incidents occurring in the Victim's Place of Work (N=59)



Several incidents reported to us in 2016 occurred in the workplace which includes vandalism, verbal or physical abuse from members of the public, and incidents of abuse and discrimination from colleagues or managers.

Existing literature suggests that individuals working in certain professions are more vulnerable to hate crime than others.^{105 106} Of the incidents reported to us, certain professions stand out as having a higher rate of racial or religiously aggravated victimisation. Verbal and physical attacks against taxi drivers in which Islamophobic language is used feature prominently in our 2016 dataset.

It can be argued that taxi drivers are particularly vulnerable to attack as they work alone late into the night. While the perpetrators are acting from their own racist and Islamophobic prejudice, in many cases the trigger for such attacks appears to be financial, with many refusing to pay or disputing their fare as a pretext for abuse or violence. In one example, an eyewitness described how an angry woman had kicked the door of a taxi and verbally abused the driver after refusing to pay a fare. She is said to have shouted 'you f***ing Allah lover' at him before storming off without paying. The witness added that the incident had left the driver visibly upset.

Other professions that featured prominently include public-facing occupations, particularly those associated with the night time economy - security guards as well as late night takeaway and restaurant staff were frequent victims of attacks from drunk perpetrators, typically in groups. This case concerning a group of drunk women abusing a doorman at a Liverpool nightclub was reported by the Liverpool Echo:

"Two women who allegedly hurled a tirade of racist abuse at a doorman during a 'Mother's Day bust-up' have been charged by detectives. Footage

¹⁰⁵ Ellenberger, 'Relations psychologiques entre le criminel et la victime' (1954).

¹⁰⁶ Schafer, *The Victim and His Criminal* (1968).

widely circulated on social media showed an angry exchange between a group of women and a doorman, believed to work at the Rubber Soul on Mathew Street in Liverpool city centre. One woman can then be heard saying 'get away from the f***** ISIS man'. Then, a female is filmed while shouting a tirade of abuse. She yells: 'Move you little n*****. You little fat hairy n*****. You f***** black b*****' along with other explicit comments."¹⁰⁷

These types of cases, in which groups of drunk perpetrators victimise service staff, may arise in the context of conflict and frustration on the part of the perpetrator, for example, being refused entry into a nightclub. However, a more significant factor is likely to be a 'thrill-seeking' or peer dynamic, in which perpetrators abuse their victim to impress their friends whilst being fuelled by alcohol, which lowers inhibitions. In addition to the night-time economy, other public-facing professions could be high-risk, particularly for public transport staff as passengers may become abusive because of their frustrations with the transport system, which then compounds feelings of prejudice toward staff they perceive as Muslim. In a news article featured in the Liverpool Echo, a drunken man was jailed after he abused railway staff because they refused to let him through the barrier without a valid ticket.

"After being told he could not board the train without a ticket Randall, who had been drinking, attempted to push a second worker out of the way. He called both men "F***ing Muslim P**i bearded c***s" and was arrested."¹⁰⁸

Ongoing Anti-Muslim Victimisation and Discrimination

Despite the popular perception that hate crimes are one-off acts of violence committed by persons unknown to the victim, evidence suggests that hate-motivated victimisation often involves an ongoing process of 'low-level' harassment and discrimination, often around the victim's **Household or Private Property**, in **Educational Institutions** and **Places of Work**. This includes verbal abuse and intimidation from casual acquaintances and even people in positions of authority. These type of hate incidents are often perpetrated by neighbours, work colleagues, management, classmates and even family members over extended periods of time, sometimes escalating into threats and physical violence.^{109 110 111 112 113}

¹⁰⁷ Traynor, Luke. 'Two women charged over racist rant against Liverpool bouncer'. *Liverpool Echo*, 9 March 2016. Available at: <http://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-news/two-women-charged-over-racist-11012688>

¹⁰⁸ Hughes, Lorna. 'Builder launched racist rant at Lime Street guards who wanted to see his ticket'. *Liverpool Echo*, 21 November 2016. Available at: <http://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-news/builder-launched-racist-rant-lime-12207329>

¹⁰⁹ Mason, 'Hate crime and the image of the stranger' (2005).

¹¹⁰ Bowling, *Violent racism* (1998).


¹¹¹ Chakraborti et al, *The Leicester Hate Crime Project* (2014).

¹¹² Walters & Paterson, *Transphobic hate crime and perceptions of the criminal justice system* (2015).

¹¹³ Williams & Tregidga, *All Wales Hate Crime Project* (2013).

Many cases reported to us in 2016 featured ongoing anti-Muslim abuse and discrimination. Low-level, often non-criminal anti-Muslim victimisation can have serious psychological consequences for victims, manifesting largely as anxiety and stress.¹¹⁴ Victims may adopt coping strategies in order to minimise victimisation, which in turn, limits their activity, freedom and ultimately their quality of life.¹¹⁵ Ongoing victimisation from perpetrators that the victim is familiar with may have an even greater impact than victimisation from strangers, as victims in this circumstance are often less able to escape victimisation in their own neighbourhood, at school or in the workplace. Even though instances of anti-Muslim abuse from neighbours is commonplace in our data, they can often be handled inappropriately by the police, and equated with conventional anti-social behaviour rather than treated as genuine hate crimes.¹¹⁶ Ongoing incidents of anti-Muslim abuse and discrimination feature prominently in the cases reported to us in 2016. Understandably, victims of these types of cases often require long-term support, and it can be very difficult for the victim to achieve a satisfactory resolution.

Anti-Muslim Incidents occurring in a Household or Private Property (N=80)



Reports of ongoing anti-Muslim abuse from neighbours in and around the victim's home are common - these cases include a combination of Islamophobic verbal abuse, harassment, vandalism, and do occasionally escalate into threats and physical violence. These cases sometimes result in discrimination from council workers or the police when victims report the incidents. In one case reported by a local news outlet, the words 'Muslims are scum' were painted on the front door of a refugee family's new home, knives were stabbed into their front lawn and onions were thrown at their windows. The family said that they had been racially abused for months prior to the hate crime - the father said that their son had been dragged from

¹¹⁴ Williams, Neighbours, & Jackson, 'Racial/ethnic discrimination and health' (2003).


¹¹⁵ Funnell, 'Racist hate crime and the mortified self' (2015), p.76.

¹¹⁶ Williams & Tregidga, 'Hate Crime Victimisation in Wales' (2014), p.962.

his bike and attacked in the street, while the mother had been called a 'Muslim raghead':

"We are very scared. My children are frightened of going outside. Our house is like a prison", the father, who came to Wales in 2013 before being joined by his family last year, said. 'We have reported it to the police but nothing has happened. We feel unwelcome. We thought everything was equality here. We have come as refugees and we have not found it safe.'"¹¹⁷

Anti-Muslim Discrimination by Place of Incident (N=46)




Many cases in 2016 featured anti-Muslim discrimination. These would most commonly occur within **Educational Institutions** and **Places of Work** and in locations where victims were accessing public and private services including the **Transport Network** and retail environments.

We received many reports of incidents occurring in schools. The victims can be pupils, their parents, or staff working at the school. Children may be particularly vulnerable to ongoing abuse, especially if they belong to an ethnic or religious minority living in a largely white, homogenous area. In one instance, the concerned parent of a young boy who reported ongoing Islamophobic bullying at school, claiming that he had been targeted by around six different peers because of his race and religion. He had reportedly been called a 'P*ki', a 'terrorist', and was told that 'my mother doesn't want me to play with anyone brown'. At one point two of his peers asked if his mother was from Syria, adding that 'she should die there', and then tried to follow him home.

¹¹⁷ Wightwick, Abbie. "Muslims are scum': Shocking racist graffiti scrawled on refugee family's door as thugs stab knives into front lawn.' *The Daily Mirror*, 6 July 2016. Available at: <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/muslims-scum-shocking-racist-graffiti-8365656>

Anti-Muslim Incidents occurring in an Educational Institution (N=50)



We also received accounts of teachers and school management who promoted Islamophobia in the classroom. Muslim children can be seen as vulnerable to abuse and bullying within a school in which authority figures are allowed to be overtly negative about their religious identity. In one example, a GCSE student was made to watch an 18-rated drama based on the “honour killing” of a young Asian girl by her father, as an introduction to the topic of ‘Muslim families’ in a Religious Education lesson. As the boy’s parent pointed out, honour killings are a cultural practise among several faith groups in parts of Asia and Africa and have nothing to do with religious practise. The second of these lessons about ‘Muslim families’ concerned forced marriage, displaying a concerning level of ignorance and insensitivity in defining Muslim families, given that forced marriages are, again, practised widely and across many faith groups. In the Q&A section that followed, some children mockingly asked the Muslim boys if their families were the same as these stereotypes, demonstrating the level of prejudice that can be either instilled or vindicated amongst young people if it is taught in this manner. In one such case, a teacher alleged that in one former school, their head of department had intended to teach students that Islam is a ‘religion of violence that was spread by the sword’ because it was also their view.

While we have previously explored the way in which certain professions can be vulnerable to Islamophobic abuse from strangers due to their working environment many adults are also vulnerable to Islamophobic abuse and discrimination at work from colleagues or supervisors. In one reported case, a man had brought an exercise device into work, which prompted his supervisor to ask if he intended to cause an explosion in the building. On a separate occasion, he had brought in a drinks bottle and was asked, in a similar vein, about explosives. The hostility continued and grew more racial in nature. Management later asked the victim to treat this behaviour as ‘banter’. This could be identified as a common strategy used for downplaying the significance of racist incidents.

This was an extreme example of systemic and institutional Islamophobia. However, many cases are more nuanced and involve more subtle forms of Islamophobic abuse. This type of anti-Muslim discrimination can occur during the application process for a job, in the workplace and when grievances are raised. In one example, a Muslim woman reported that management had mistreated her and told her to focus on her job after she complained that a colleague, who had previously bullied her, had suggested that she must have family in Syria despite being of a different ethnic background. She was therefore seen by management as a 'troublemaker' after raising concerns about the racist bullying against her.

We also received reports of discrimination in aspects of everyday life, particularly when accessing public services. This included overt Islamophobic abuse and the failure to meet cultural needs. In one such case, a Muslim woman was denied a service by the receptionist at her GP surgery, after insisting that she remove her niqab on several occasions just to collect her test results. This pattern repeated in a follow-up visit to the same surgery.

Victims and Perpetrators: Who are they?


This section will provide a summary and analysis of the victims and perpetrators in our 2016 dataset. We will then move on to discuss some of the factors that result in the victimisation of Muslims, including intersecting prejudices and visible religious identity.

The following chart provides a breakdown of the gender of victims and perpetrators. Of the anti-Muslim incidents reported to us in 2016, we recorded 785 individual victims and 874 individual perpetrators within 642 street-based (offline) incidents (incidents with non-human targets, including vandalism to public property, were not included in the victim count).

Victims and Perpetrators by Gender

Consistent with earlier data, over half of victims were identified as female (56%, n=441), and 40% (n=312) were identified as male. The gender of 4% (n=32) of victims was not provided. This contrasts starkly with the gender distribution of perpetrators. Just 19% (n=169) of perpetrators were classified as female, compared to 66% (n=581) who were identified as male. Details on perpetrators were often difficult for victims and witnesses to recall, and so the gender of 14% (n=124) of perpetrators was unknown.

Gender of Victims (N=785) and Perpetrators (N=874)




Social theorists have long acknowledged that in selecting a target to victimise, individuals with certain characteristics may be regarded as ‘easy prey’ by potential perpetrators, as they are perceived to be socially vulnerable or biologically ‘weak’, and therefore less able to retaliate to or fend off an attack.^{118 119 120 121 122} This may help explain the overrepresentation of male perpetrators and female victims in our datasets.

Victims by Islamic Visibility

A high proportion of female victims of anti-Muslim incidents reported to us could be described as ‘visibly Muslim’, due to the fact they were wearing Islamic clothing during the time at which the incident occurred (67%, n=295). Indeed 38% (n=295) of all victims in 2016 were Muslim women who wore some form or multiple forms of Islamic clothing. Many of the victims in 2016 appear to have been in a relatively vulnerable position compared to their perpetrators, as a result of their age, social position or physical condition, along with often being outnumbered (there is a higher number of overall perpetrators than victims in our dataset).

Victim Islamic Visibility by Gender (N=785)



¹¹⁸ Schafer, *The Victim and His Criminal* (1968).

¹¹⁹ Cohen & Felson, ‘Social Change and Crime Risk Trends’ (1979).

¹²⁰ Allen, *A review of the evidence relating to the representation of Muslims and Islam in the British media* (2012).

¹²¹ Health Canada, *Violence against women with disabilities* (2004).

¹²² Scherer, ‘Disability Status and Victimization Risk among a National Sample of College Students’ (2011).

*For the purposes of this chart percentages have been calculated for each gender category. Female (n=619), Male (n=312).

Victims and Perpetrators by Ethnicity

When speaking to victims, our caseworkers ask if they are willing to provide information on their ethnicity for monitoring purposes. Frequently victims do not provide this information in order to preserve their privacy, or caseworkers are unable to capture this information in follow up conversations or via online reports. As a result, we urge a measure of caution when interpreting these findings as 33.5% of victims (n=263) lack verified ethnicity data. This is also true for perpetrators, for whom 29% (n=255) do not have verified ethnicity data, due to the difficulty victims or witnesses may have in identifying the characteristics of perpetrators in the immediacy of an incident. This is especially in cases of vandalism, where the victims are institutions, and perpetrators may remain unknown without criminal justice outcomes.

Although there was a wide variety ethnic backgrounds to which victims belonged, the most common was by far **Asian or South Asian**, at 58%, (n=302) where ethnicity data was provided. The next two most represented victim ethnicities were **Arab or North African** (10%, n=51) and **White** (British/Irish/Other) (10%, n=51). Where data on ethnicity was available, a clear majority of victims (90%, n=471) are from minority ethnic backgrounds. This contrasts starkly with the ethnicity of perpetrators, the overwhelming majority of whom were **White** (British/Irish/Other) (88%, n=546).

When we look at both the gender and ethnicity data we see that, where ethnicity data is available, the majority of perpetrators are White men (69%, n=429), 90% (n=471) of victims are from a minority ethnic group and nearly half of all victims are minority ethnic women (48%, n=249).

Victim by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Female	Male	Unknown	Total
Asian or South Asian	153	144	5	302
Arab or North African	34	26	0	51
White	36	15	0	51
Somali	21	2	0	23
Mixed or multiple ethnicities	17	7	0	19
Black	10	8	0	18
Any other Ethnic Group	9	2	4	15
Jewish	0	15	0	15
Turkish	5	5	0	10
Unknown	156	88	19	263
Total	441	312	32	785

Perpetrator by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Female	Male	Unknown	Total
White	110	429	7	546
Black	22	24	0	46
Asian or South Asian	5	9	1	15
Mixed or multiple ethnicities	4	4	0	8
Any other Ethnic Group	0	3	0	4
Unknown	27	112	116	255
Total	169	581	124	874

Research shows that perpetrators can have mixed motivations and hold intersecting prejudices, which prompt them to abuse their victim.^{123 124} For example, offenders may target their victim based on a hatred of both Asian people and Muslims. In a sizeable number of our incidents, perpetrators allude to multiple aspects of the victim's identity interchangeably. This includes their religion, national identity and ethnicity. It could be argued that Islamophobic, racist and xenophobic ideas have the propensity to be conflated with one another.

The fact that the victims are identified as 'outsiders' due to their religious dress, skin colour or language indicates to some perpetrators that they are fair game for abuse. According to the 'Defensive' and 'Retaliation' typologies of hate crime, perpetrators may feel justified attacking anyone they perceive as being Muslim, as payback for terrorist attacks.¹²⁵ This can be understood as a reactionary impulse to defend one's own country and interests, and is bound up in a highly negative discourse on immigration. While these are often casual, verbal attacks which serve to intimidate and scare the victim, other reports detail horrific acts of violence where the perpetrators sometimes outnumber the victim. In such an example, Merseyside Police contacted us to highlight a violent and unprovoked assault on a Muslim woman. The 38-year-old woman, who wears the hijab and is of Arab descent, had passed a children's play area on route to a supermarket at around 8pm on 11 February 2016. She noticed two White men stood near the junction of Ullswater Street. One of the men shouted racist abuse at her which was anti-migrant in nature. The second man then approached the woman, grabbed her hijab and punched her repeatedly in the face. Both men then left the scene. The vicious assault left the woman with bruising and swelling to her face. Her fractured cheekbone needed surgery to repair as the attack left her dazed and in shock.¹²⁶

¹²³ Chakraborti et al, *The Leicester Hate Crime Project* (2014).

¹²⁴ Walters et al. *Causes and motivations of hate crime* (2016).

¹²⁵ McDevitt et al. 'Hate Crime Offenders' (2002).

¹²⁶ Tell MAMA. 2016. "Merseyside Police Investigate Unprovoked Racist Assault on Muslim Woman." <https://tellmamauk.org/merseyside-police-investigate-unprovoked-racist-assault-on-muslim-woman/>.

Some victims in our dataset did, on occasion, face abuse relating to other aspects of their identity. As we saw in our previous report, many of the cases reported to us in 2016 show a clear gender dynamic between victim and perpetrator. In one shocking example, a Muslim woman was verbally abused for her gender and religious identity. The perpetrator demonstrated far-right views during the abuse. His statements had xenophobic and misogynistic overtones. More concerning, however, was his threat to rape Muslim women and murder Muslim men after the UK leaves the European Union. The victim stated that she felt personally targeted by the rape threat.


Islamophobia, racism, xenophobia and other forms of prejudice can compound problems for British Muslims who may be, for example, suffering from mental health issues, long-term illnesses, physical or mental disability and/or poverty. In some cases, victims struggle to navigate the welfare system, find meaningful employment, decent quality schooling and access to healthcare. The harsh realities of Islamophobia and racism often mean that Muslims in Britain struggle to access essential services. In one such example, a healthcare professional made anti-Muslim remarks when supporting an older person in their home, which may have had serious consequences for the victim and their confidence in seeking adequate social care provisions in the future.

Victim and Perpetrators by Age


The following bar charts demonstrate the distribution of age for male and female victims and perpetrators in our 2016 dataset. Despite clear disparities in the gender of perpetrators and victims, the most common age category for both is **26-35**.

While the data indicates that perpetrators and victims of anti-Muslim incidents could be any age, victims are much more likely than perpetrators to be aged **12 and younger**. Only 2% (n=16) of perpetrators were recorded as aged **12 and younger** compared to 11% of victims (n=89). Accordingly, the qualitative analysis of reports has highlighted the fact that many cases include women out in public with young children, who are, unsurprisingly, scared, upset and sometimes traumatised by the anti-Muslim incidents they are involved in. Indeed, some of the anti-Muslim incidents reported to us in 2016 included children and young adults being abused by adult perpetrators they did not know, either alongside their parents or on their own. In one report, a woman was out with her young son when she was racially abused by a man who told her to leave the country. She told the man that was not afraid of him, and he reacted by trying to punch her son, who she was fortunately able to pull to safety. The perpetrator then fled the scene.

Victims by Age and Gender (N=785)



Perpetrators by Age and Gender (N=874)



Although it is a small number, there were proportionally more victims (2%, n=16) than perpetrators (1%, n=11) aged **over 65**. We have received several reports of vulnerable elderly people being abused with Islamophobic language. In one example picked up in a local newspaper:

“Witness described: ‘They were chasing two elderly women of our community and shouting ‘go back to your country’. ISIS was mentioned. They also said to us ‘go bomb your mosque’.”¹²⁷

Perpetrators were much more likely than victims to be aged **13-18** years old. Just 5% (n=38) of victims were aged **13-18** compared to 10% (n=84) perpetrators. Drawing on existing literature on hate crime offender motivations, many of the anti-Muslim incidents reported to us fit within the ‘Thrill-Seeking’ typology. This was identified by McDevitt and colleagues as the most common motivation for hate crime offending, reportedly accounting for 60% of all hate crime offending.¹²⁸ These attacks are typically perpetrated by groups of teenagers or even adults, who seek to obtain amusement from abusing their victims. McDevitt and colleagues argued that in these situations, perpetrators may only exhibit low-level prejudice against Muslims. The perpetrators will often be seen laughing and shouting encouragement to each other whilst using racist or Islamophobic language, or even violence, to abuse their victim. For example, a Muslim woman described the abuse she faced from teenage boys on a bus, which made explicit reference to her being a ‘ninja’ because of her niqab, laughing and encouraging each other to abuse the victim.

¹²⁷ Unknown. ‘Man told ‘go bomb your mosque’ by gang in Hull’s Pearson Park as police hunt baton attackers’. *Hull Daily Mail*, 17 June 2016. Available at: <http://www.hulldailymail.co.uk/man-told-go-bomb-your-mosque-by-gang-in-hull-s-pearson-park-as-police-hunt-baton-attackers/story-29410752-detail/story.html>

¹²⁸ McDevitt et al. ‘Hate Crime Offenders’ (2002).

What is the Impact of Anti-Muslim Victimisation?

When members of the public report anti-Muslim incidents to staff we, in turn, offer a holistic and tailored support service to meet the needs of the individual, organisation, or group. Trained caseworkers log the experiences of users in a confidential manner. This section will discuss the possible impacts such abuse has had on some of the individuals who contacted us in 2016.

Research has demonstrated that hate crime can have severe and profound impacts on victims long after the event. Although anti-Muslim incidents can take a wide variety of forms, victims of hate crime are significantly more likely than victims of non-hate crimes to be emotionally affected by the abuse.¹²⁹ It is widely recognised that violent anti-Muslim hate crime can have a detrimental effect on the psychological wellbeing of victims. Unfortunately, the impact of the lower level, everyday nature of anti-Muslim hatred does not generate the same level of attention.

Previous reports have discussed the psychological impact of anti-Muslim hostility and abuse, in terms of the heightened anxiety, depression and general isolation felt by victims, and highlighting the mobility related implications of intimidation, whereby victims often feel unable to go about their business in public or even leave their home for fear of further victimisation.^{130 131} In accordance with this, recent research conducted by the Social Mobility Commission (SMC) has highlighted the longer-term implications of anti-Muslim discrimination in terms of obstacles to education, employment opportunities, and the problems created by the perception that Islamophobia is greater the further one is from one's home.¹³² In this section, we will provide qualitative evidence, in the form of written testimony from either victims or witnesses, to give some context to the common themes that emerge from anti-Muslim incidents.

Physical Impact

A wide variety of anti-Muslim incidents are reported to us, ranging from verbal abuse to discrimination in the workplace and even violent assaults in the victim's own home. In rare, tragic examples, anti-Muslim violence can result in serious injury or even death. The violent assault on a pregnant Muslim woman which resulted in the death of her unborn child sent shockwaves throughout communities. This unprovoked act of extreme racist violence included an assault on the woman's husband at a Co-op in Bletchley, Buckinghamshire, in August. David Gallacher, 37,

¹²⁹ Smith et al, 'Hate Crime, Cyber Security and the Experience of Crime Among Children' (2012).

¹³⁰ Tell MAMA. *We Fear for our Lives*. (2015).

¹³¹ Tell MAMA, *The Geography of Anti-Muslim Hatred* (2016).

¹³² Stevenson et al, *The Social Mobility Challenges Faced by Young Muslims* (2017).

was later jailed for four years in May 2017. The judge called him a “thug and racist to boot”, adding, that in his view, the kick caused her to miscarry.¹³³

Another high-profile news story brought to our attention by members of the public included an unprovoked racist assault on a 10-year-old boy. Awais Ali, is said to have been confronted by two older boys who called him ‘P*ki’ and demanded his phone and money. News reports added that Ali was dragged to a disused building and assaulted with a plank of wood and then a metal pipe as he had no money to give them. The vicious attack caused him to have trouble sleeping and he was scared to go to school. The family released photos to raise awareness of the hate crime as police made enquiries.¹³⁴

Reduced Activity and Geographic Mobility

Victims would often report that they were afraid of future victimisation. They also spoke of the practical measures taken in their everyday lives to protect against future victimisation. This included avoiding geographical areas in which they had been previously victimised, avoiding leaving the house or even moving to a new house to escape victimisation. Victims would often talk of potentially moving to areas with a high Muslim population (i.e. ‘Muslim friendly’ areas) to protect themselves from Islamophobia. Fear of further victimisation has caused some Muslim women to change their usual routines. In one case reported to our staff, a woman who now wears the niqab (face veil), no longer frequents her local park with her young child, fearing for their safety.

Victims of repeat Islamophobic incidents occasionally express feelings of hopelessness along with the fear of future victimisation. Repeat victimisation also stops some from speaking out entirely. A Muslim woman who contacted us after suffering abuse in a supermarket, only to be told to leave by management. In conversation with our staff, she outlined how the repeated incidents made her fearful that someone may one day attack her in the street. She expressed regret that she had moved away from her family to attend university, as she is now further away from her support network and feels less safe as a result. This may support the theory posited by the SMC that young Muslims’ social mobility may be limited as a result of their desire to remain near the family home for fear of anti-Muslim victimisation, rather than moving away for higher education or job opportunities.¹³⁵

In some cases, victims reported that they had experienced repeated Islamophobic abuse from multiple sources within their everyday lives. One victim spoke of how a local man came to her door and asked her husband if he supported ISIS and then

¹³³ Dodd, Virkam & Gayle, Damien. ‘Man arrested over assault on pregnant woman who lost baby’. *The Guardian*, 14 September 2016. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/14/man-arrested-over-assault-on-pregnant-woman-who-lost-unborn-child>

¹³⁴ Morris, Steven. ‘Mother of boy allegedly beaten in racist attack releases images of injuries’ *The Guardian*, 7 September 2016. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/07/mother-of-boy-allegedly-beaten-in-racist-attack-releases-images-of-his-injuries>

¹³⁵ Stevenson et al. *The Social Mobility Challenges Faced by Young Muslims*. (2017).

gave them an Islamophobic leaflet. Her family were subject to numerous intrusive questions and consistent defamation from multiple sources - her daughter, who wore the hijab, was called a 'terrorist' at school, while her husband was called a 'terrorist' when accessing public services. As a result of this abuse, the family wished to move closer to a Muslim community but couldn't for practical reasons. The victims in these cases would report Islamophobic, racist and xenophobic abuse from neighbours, work colleagues, teachers and classmates. These incidents seem to disproportionately affect Muslims living in less densely populated areas, outside of major cities and within communities with limited ethnic or religious diversity.

Reduced Islamic Visibility

Many Muslim women reported that they had made the decision to stop wearing Islamic clothing such as the hijab, as they felt this made them a target for Islamophobic and racist abuse. In one instance, a victim who wore a headscarf informed us that she had been abused, threatened and attacked by her neighbours for up to one year. After having reported the abuse to the police, who were unable to take any action against the perpetrators, she stopped wearing her headscarf for fear of further discrimination.

A convert, who wears the hijab, described having to remove her hijab in the workplace, fearing that she would lose her job if she did not comply, as she was still in her probationary period. This caused her obvious distress as her hijab was, for her, the outward expression of her new, deeply held religious belief. It left her no choice but to comply in order to continue earning a wage.

Impact on Work and Education Participation

Cases of abuse and discrimination in the workplace harm the health, wellbeing and confidence of individuals affected inside and outside of the workplace. In one case, a Muslim man sought permission to leave work from management due to the bullying he perceived was motivated by Islamophobic attitudes. The bullying had lasting health implications for the victim that he left his employer but was worried about his future job prospects.

The institutionalisation of Islamophobia in one college forced out a Muslim student who was subject to jokes about 'P*ki's' and Muslim people which was not sufficiently challenged by management who could not understand her complaint as she 'looked White'. Leaving a job or educational establishment because of this prejudice can have serious implications for the future, potentially limiting the life chances of Muslims in Britain. The failure of management to acknowledge how the racial epithet 'P*ki' is now almost synonymous with the word 'Muslim' demonstrates how this may erode confidence in educative authority figures.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ Anthias & Yuval-Davis, *Racialized Boundaries* (1993).

Financial Impact

Anti-Muslim incidents reported to us sometimes interfere with the victim's ability to earn a living and support their families. A Muslim taxi driver contacted us to report several incidents, which included threats, racial abuse, and an attempted arson on his taxi. He spoke of his fear that the same group may not target his family home, fearing that his children may again witness abuse. This added financial burden increased when the man reported that he had to cover the repair costs himself.

Impact on Identity

Many victims, during their abuse, were told to 'go back to where you come from', and that they were not either British or English, in a verbally abusive form of 'othering'. This only serves to antagonise and undermine the agency of Muslims in the UK. For example, a Scottish victim reported being told to 'f*** off' back to his own country despite having spent most of his life in the UK.

Frequently this assertion would be premised solely on the perceived Muslim identity of the victim, but occasionally it would be premised on the belief that only people born in the UK could be considered British or English, which is, again, incorrect. For some 'Britishness' is associated with 'Whiteness' and not with ethnic or religious diversity. This would carry the implicit suggestion that the perpetrators viewed themselves as the 'true native'. Of course, many of the victims were born in the UK, making this argument disingenuous and suggesting that many assertions of 'Britishness' and 'Englishness' in this context are in fact based on criteria that shift depending on how it suits the perpetrator. The Islamophobic roots of such sentiments are evident in this case study when a victim reported being abused by a racist man in a shop. He added that the abusive male asked if he was a 'f***king Muslim' and referred to Muslims possessing explosives. During the abuse, the perpetrator is said to have referenced his British identity, and when the victim tried to explain that he was also British, the perpetrator ignored it.

Often, having one's identity challenged on false premises can cause great distress. The following case shows the negative emotional impact associated with the false dichotomy between 'British' and 'Muslim' (in this instance the word 'P*ki' was used):

*"A man shouted 'P*ki, we won now get out' at me. I felt like someone had shot me in the gut. I was speechless."*

To have one's identity rejected on the grounds of faith or ethnicity in this manner can arguably have a detrimental effect on one's mental wellbeing. In a society, where cultural diversity is perceived to be undervalued, those from immigrant communities often experience discrimination, negative stereotypes based on assumptions placed upon cultural identity and norms. The discriminatory rejection of a victim's national identity, whether they were born in the UK or otherwise, can be viewed as an expression of such discrimination, which has been shown to cause victims to

potentially disassociate with the national identity.¹³⁷ This can cause the victim to become isolated from social institutions and other citizens, and compounds existing psychological issues associated with discrimination, such as stress, anxiety and poor mental health.^{138 139}

The victim, having suffered an Islamophobic attack, spoke of her sense of vulnerability, and loss of confidence, following the incident. Creating a feeling that all her efforts to build a stronger sense of community in young people had been undermined by this violent experience.

Occasionally, victims will observe that an anti-Muslim incident was motivated by a conscious rejection on the perpetrator's part of the victim's British identity. This is representative of the 'Defensive' typology of hate crime (i.e. protecting the privilege of the in-group against attempts of integration from the outgroup). Perpetrators will sometimes go to great lengths to abuse their victims and make them question their national identity, reminding them, in some examples, that they can 'never' be British. As mentioned earlier, this attitude may lead some victims to become more isolated, as their confidence in British institutions and the wider public is eroded through such negative experiences.

Police Response to Anti-Muslim Incidents

Individuals affected by hate crime and discrimination may feel unable to go to authorities with their concerns because of the perception of institutional prejudice, and would rather avoid potentially stressful or humiliating experiences.¹⁴⁰ Research conducted into hate crime victimisation found that the most common reason victims of hate crime do not report experiences of hate crime in the past is that they did not feel the police would take their report seriously.¹⁴¹

Victims would often report that they did not feel the police were doing enough to protect them from future victimisation. This may be because officers did not perceive genuine anti-Muslim hate crimes as being any different to typical anti-social behaviour, and therefore, not afforded the support. In one case, a Muslim woman and her husband were verbally abused whilst shopping. They were called 'terrorists' and the perpetrator threatened to report them to the police for terror offences. More significantly, the husband was threatened with violence. After police had arrested the perpetrator, he was released on bail on the condition that he did not return to the shop where the abuse took place. Sometime later, the woman saw the perpetrator

¹³⁷ Kunst, J., Tajamal, H., Sam, D., & Ulleberg, P. 'Coping with Islamophobia'. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 36 (2012): pp.518-532.

¹³⁸ Rippy, A., & Newman, E. 'Perceived Religious Discrimination and its Relationship to Anxiety and Paranoia Among Muslim Americans'. *Journal of Muslim Mental Health* 1 (2006) pp.5-20.

¹³⁹ Sellers, R., & Shelton, J. 'The role of racial identity in perceived racial discrimination'. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 84 (2003) pp.1079-1092.

¹⁴⁰ Williams & Tregidga. *All Wales Hate Crime Project* (2013).

¹⁴¹ Chakraborti et al. *The Leicester Hate Crime Project* (2014).

later, but the police informed her that they could do nothing as the perpetrator had not breached his bail conditions, adding to their perception that the police were not taking their concerns seriously, long after the initial hate crime took place. To be clear, this may very well be more an issue with the law rather than the fault of this police force, nevertheless, there is clearly a need for more to be done to protect vulnerable communities.

In a similar vein, some victims feared that informing the police would put them at greater risk of further victimisation or violence, especially in cases that involve abusive and racist neighbours. One victim felt more anxiety about leaving the safety of her home after reporting to police.

Other examples have included victims informing our staff that the police, at the initial point of contact were not the most helpful or receptive. One victim, who requested that we chase the police for information, was initially told that his case would be logged, but not to expect any outcome and to not waste police time. The victim was called a 'terrorist c***' by an abusive man on a London bus. In another case, an officer from Leicestershire Police is alleged to have told a victim, following an incident with a racist neighbour, to 'move or cope with it'.

With our partnership work with various police forces, we can assist and intervene to ensure accountability, and if necessary, help victims with complaints. This extends to the Victims' Right to Review (VRR), which allows victims to request a review in proceedings in cases where the police have authority to charge, this also extends to the Crown Prosecution Service. In rare cases, we can assist with complaints to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC).

Third-party reporting services like ourselves also serve an important function in reporting hate crimes to the police on behalf of victims. This helps to streamline the process, potentially reducing the risk of repeat victimisation, when police have the details of the case, before taking any formal statement. A lack of awareness around what is a hate crime and hate incident is a barrier to reporting a crime, and our function as a confidential support service helps to plug this gap when requested to do so. Our partnership work also allows forces to refer victims of anti-Muslim hate crime directly to our service for more specialised and holistic support.

Bystanders Response to Anti-Muslim Incidents

Victims often talk about witnesses and express gratitude if a bystander comes to their aid during an attack, verbal or otherwise, and place great significance on the reaction from the people around them, be it positive or negative. A Muslim woman, when travelling on the London Underground, was threatened by an aggressive male on several occasions during the journey, but no passenger had intervened or offered her support. This lack of support caused her great upset and she said this hurt more than the threat of violence against her.

In contrast to this, victims report that it makes a significant difference when witnesses speak up and condemn the perpetrators. It can be argued that this may protect them from further harm during the incident and may also provide emotional support, in terms of validating their feeling of victimisation and demonstrating that not everyone in British society shares this kind of prejudice. A study into the effect that bystanders' presence and actions have on victims of violent crime in rural areas found that in all forms of victimisation studied, the victim's level of fear was 'significantly lower during the incident' when a bystander intervened in a helpful manner.¹⁴² This supports the personal accounts of many of the victims that contacted us. According to this study, there was no notable difference in the mental health of victims as a result of bystander intervention.¹⁴³ This study, however, may not have factored in the impacts such crimes have on the mental health of hate crime victims, who are more at risk of social isolation and other factors that contribute to worsening mental health than victims of more conventional crimes.


Other examples in our dataset include a man who tried to prevent an abusive man from boarding a bus as he was abusing a Muslim woman, requesting that the driver not allow them on. This request, however, was ignored, but the victim took comfort in the fact that this kind stranger had also entered the bus. In another positive example of passenger intervention, passengers actively challenged two women who were racially abusing a Muslim woman and a friend on a bus.

This sort of solidarity can empower victims and help restore a sense of security in their daily lives. Even in the above examples, where victims were not always aware of their victimisation, creating an environment where Islamophobic abuse is challenged and not allowed to be normalised can help prevent abuse but also encourage members of the public to stand up to hatred and support victims.

¹⁴² Hamby, S, Weber, M, Grych, J & Banyard, V. 'What Difference Do Bystanders Make? The Association of Bystander Involvement With Victim Outcomes in a Community Sample'. *Psychology of Violence* (2016) pp. 91-102.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

High Profile Events: Verified Street Based Incidents by Week



Timeline: High Profile Events and Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes

As with previous reports, we have recorded spikes in the number of anti-Muslim incidents reported to us following high profile terrorist incidents and related media coverage. This trend continued in 2016 following high profile events with political implications, such as the EU referendum and some international terror attacks. Again, we have found that there is typically a corresponding rise in the frequency of anti-Muslim hate crimes. The size of the spike may be influenced by several factors: the nature of the event, the geographical proximity of the event to the UK, and the coverage the event receives in the national press, to name but a few.

It appears clear that high profile political events that stimulate discourses on immigration and cultural identity can result in spikes in hate crime reports. A clear example followed the EU referendum on 23 June. The accompanying graph shows that incidents reported to our service jumped to 69 between 24 June and 30 June, compared to 12 reports in the week before the vote, an increase of 475% over the previous period. This correlates with existing evidence that shows the number of hate crime referrals had increased in the build-up to the EU referendum and the immediate aftermath, although the causality is still difficult to define.¹⁴⁴ It also conforms to the police data we analysed from the eighteen forces we have partnership agreements with (see appendix i). Our analysis of this data saw a 44% rise in offline Islamophobic hate crimes in the month following the referendum result, with 241 incidents recorded in July, up from 190 incidents a month earlier. These attacks can be understood primarily as 'Defensive' hate crimes, whereby perpetrators belonging to the in-group seek to defend their community from outsiders.¹⁴⁵ They may feel that their interests, such as priority over resources, are threatened by those belonging to an outgroup (such as Muslims) and respond to this by attacking those they feel to be representative of such groups.¹⁴⁶ As a result, those who are visibly Muslim are taken to be symbolic of this perceived threat and are at serious risk of becoming victims of hate crime.¹⁴⁷

If we look at the accompanying graph, the period beginning the 1 July through to 22 July, had an average of 24.25 anti-Muslim incidents, compared to an overall average of 12.57 anti-Muslim hate crimes for the whole year. This was a period in which there were two high profile terrorist attacks in Germany (the Wurzburg axe attack on 18 July, and the Breivik-inspired murder of nine teenagers, some of whom were of Turkish, Kosovan, and Greek heritage by 18-year-old Ali Sonboly in a popular shopping mall) and one high profile terrorist attack in Nice, France on 14 July. This also correlates with existing evidence that shows hate crime referrals as having

¹⁴⁴ Cuerden & Rogers. 'Exploring Race Hate Crime Reporting in Wales Following Brexit' (2017).

¹⁴⁵ McDevitt et al. 'Hate Crime Offenders' (2002).

¹⁴⁶ Black, D. 'Crime as Social Control'. *American Sociological Review* 48, no.1 (1983): pp.34-45.

¹⁴⁷ Mills et al. 'Extreme Hatred' (2015).

increased in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist incident.¹⁴⁸ This higher baseline figure may also be influenced by the fallout of the EU referendum result.

As well as recorded spikes in the number anti-Muslim incidents reported to us following high-profile events, including the EU referendum vote and terrorist attacks, the thematic analysis of the cases has revealed a high frequency of references to terrorism, immigration and the EU referendum specifically. The following two sections will explore the incidents experienced by victims to assess the significance of these high-profile events and the relevance of the 'Retribution' and 'Defensive' typologies¹⁴⁹ in our 2016 dataset.

¹⁴⁸ Cuerden & Rogers. 'Exploring Race Hate Crime Reporting in Wales Following Brexit' (2017).

¹⁴⁹ McDevitt et al. 'Hate Crime Offenders' (2002).

Immigration and Anti-Muslim Hatred

Within the anti-Muslim incidents reported to us in 2016, British identity was a theme that featured prominently. Perpetrators would often refer to the fact they did not view the victims as British and often told them they were not welcome in the UK. Existing literature suggests that the image of a visually identifiable Muslim has become synonymous with 'unBritishness', but also with the perceived threat of mass immigration, terrorism and the sexual exploitation of vulnerable 'British' children.¹⁵⁰
151 152 153

Drawing on the 'Defensive' typology of hate crime outlined by McDevitt, it can be argued that racist and xenophobic hate crime may be triggered by the perception of conflict for jobs opportunities and public spending which should 'rightfully' be prioritised for 'real' British people.¹⁵⁴ In addition, perpetrators would also voice the fear that immigrants would alter the existing British 'way of life' and change culturally significant norms and values.^{155 156 157}

The xenophobic cliché, 'go back where you came from', proved a popular slur, in addition to broader Islamophobic statements. For example, a Muslim woman reported to us that her new neighbour had told her to 'f*** off back to your own country' and referred to her clothing as a 'tent'.

Perpetrators often articulate the view that Muslims, and by association non-whites, are 'taking over' their country, as seen in this case study below:

*"F***ing P*kis everywhere these days...f***ing P*kis on this road"*

In some of the incidents reported to our service, perpetrators would also refer to contemporary high-profile events including the EU referendum, the Syrian refugee crisis, and immigration. For some members of the public, the stereotype of a visibly Muslim person evokes a largely negative emotional response which may outwardly manifest into abuse along racial and religious lines.

¹⁵⁰ Saeed, A. 'Media, Racism and Islamophobia: The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media'. *Sociology Compass* 1 (2007): pp.443-462.

¹⁵¹ Poole, E. 'Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims'. In E. Poole, & J. Richardson (Eds), *Muslims and the News Media* (2006, London).

¹⁵² Githens-Mazer, J, & Lambert, R. *Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime: A London Case Study*. European Muslim Research Centre (2010).

¹⁵³ Tufail, 'Rotherham, Rochdale, and the Racialised Threat of the 'Muslim Grooming Gang' (2015).

¹⁵⁴ McDevitt, J, & Bennett, S. 'Hate Crime Offenders: An Expanded Typology'. *Journal of Social Issues* 58, no.2 (2002): pp.303-317.

¹⁵⁵ Escandell, X, & Ceobanu, A. 'When contact with immigrants matters: Threat, interethnic attitudes and foreigner exclusionism in Spain's *Comunidades Autonomas*'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32, no.1 (2009): pp.44-69.

¹⁵⁶ Gadd, D. 'Aggravating racism and elusive motivation'. *British Journal of Criminology* 49 (2009): pp.755-71.

¹⁵⁷ Ray, L, & Smith, D. 'The Hate Debate: Should hate be punished as a crime?' In P. Iganski (Ed), *Hate crime, violence and cultures of racism* (2002, Profile Books): pp.88-102.

Within many reports to our service following the EU referendum perpetrators made explicit reference to the result, showing how some felt emboldened enough to express anti-Muslim sentiments with strangers, abuse Muslims in public or even among children in schools.

*“(I was) at a traffic light when a white male looked up saw me at the wheel (I wear a headscarf) and shouted, ‘you f***ing Muslim, f***ing EU out!’ This was the night that the Brexit vote happened, so he clearly felt empowered to behave like this. I was fuming inside but chose not to respond to his ignorant comments.”*

“Days after the EU referendum vote, a Muslim woman described being in a supermarket when two women told her to ‘leave the UK’ and move to the EU instead as ‘we have left the EU now’.”

“Non-Muslim woman reported being upset following the referendum result when a delivery driver boasted about voting Leave. In her words, he said ‘Now we are in control. We can get rid of those Muslims raping children, we couldn’t stop them before because of the Human Rights Act.’”

*“A man in a petrol station shouted: ‘You’re an Arabic c**t’, ‘You’re a terrorist’, and ‘I voted them out’ in a road-rage incident.”*

“This evening my daughter left work in Birmingham and saw a group of lads corner a Muslim girl shouting: ‘Get out, we voted leave’. Awful times”

“My 13-year-old brother had chants of ‘bye bye you’re going home’ at school today. He insisted that it was ‘a joke’ but it worries me.”

“Last night a Sikh radiographer colleague of mine was told by a patient: ‘Shouldn’t you be on a plane back to Pakistan? We voted you out.’”¹⁵⁸

*“(A) woman witnessed a man shout at taxi driver ‘Brexit, you P*ki.’ He was then allegedly assaulted by (the) abusive male.”*

Within these Islamophobic verbal and physical attacks, the perpetrators seem to be using the EU referendum result to legitimise their racism and xenophobia, despite the result having no impact on the immigration status of many Muslims in the UK. During the referendum campaign, elements of the unofficial Vote Leave campaign were condemned for utilising ‘Nazi-era’ propaganda about refugees.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ Sherwood, Harriet. ‘UK faith leaders unite in condemning post-referendum rise in xenophobic abuse’. The Guardian, 28 June 2016. Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/nigel-farage-brexit-poster-vans-eu-referendum-london-remain-breaking-point-a7085396.html>

¹⁵⁹ Wright, Oliver. ‘Nigel Farage accused of deploying Nazi-style propaganda as Remain crash poster unveiling with rival vans’. The Guardian, 16 June 2016. Available at:

In many of the cases reported to us in 2016, perpetrators expressed anger over the perception that immigrants were using resources that should 'rightfully' have been reserved for 'real' British people:

*"Muslim driver verbally abused by a driver in the next lane who opened his window and shouted 'you stupid P*ki, go back to where you came from. You are stealing our homes and jobs.'"*

"Muslim father out with his children was abused by a male who shouted racial abuse and suggested that they were 'scroungers' living off his taxes and they did not belong in this country. When challenged, the abusive man threatened to assault him."

*"A Muslim woman, who wears the niqab, reported the racial abuse she suffered from an abusive neighbour. Statements included 'ninja', 'b*tch', and 'Go back to where you f***** came from' as it was 'their' fault that the country was in such a state."*

In these cases, perpetrators made specific reference to housing, jobs and the allocation of public spending from tax money. Similarly, in some cases they would also go on to blame immigration for the 'current state' the country is in. In many of the incidents reported to us in 2016, perpetrators expressed anger that their victims were not conforming to perceived standards of behaviour. These comments would often focus on Islamic clothing and the use of foreign languages in public spaces:

*"An aggressive man told a Muslim woman in Islamic clothing, 'you can f***ing do one you P*ki c**t'. When challenged, he made threats to assault her despite the presence of the woman's young child."*

"A Muslim woman, who wears the niqab, when out walking alone one evening, was confronted by an aggressive male who said, 'You shouldn't be wearing that here. We don't like it'."

*"A Muslim woman, who wears the hijab, was told, 'Foreigner, learn to speak English, go back to where you came from, Muslim c**t.'"*

The notion that perpetrators find Islamic clothing at odds with 'British identity', and even threatening, is a recurring theme in our data. In the total number of cases reported to us in 2016, a disproportionately high number of victims (38%, n=295) were Muslim women wearing Islamic clothing who were sometimes actively intimidated, and even physically attacked, in public.

Women would often be targeted when alone, even in the presence of their young children. The perpetrators would often perceive the image of a woman in Islamic

clothing as symbolic of the threats they associate with Islam, whether it be terrorism or cultural norms. Local press reported the following case:

*“A woman from Bexhill-on-Sea who on two occasions racially abused a woman wearing a hijab has been given a 12-month conditional discharge following conviction... The victim was with two of her children at the time. The court heard how Blauvelt had said to her: “Women in Britain don’t cover up. You should not cover up. If you are going to live in Britain, you should live by British rules. You look like you’re about to bomb the place.”*¹⁶⁰

The following case was reported by a victim:

“Service user was wearing a hijab and jilbāb and was walking with her friends down the main high street when two white males white shouted, ‘Terrorists, oppressed women’, while passing by them, hitting the shoulder of one of the women.”

Islam has become heavily associated with strict gender norms, the oppression of women and homophobia. Despite misogyny and homophobia being entirely present in many facets of British society, perpetrators have been known to construct Muslims as a specific threat to liberal British values. The clothing some Muslim women wear is constructed as an oppressive form of dress at odds with British identity, while Muslim men in some regards have been mythologised as misogynistic. A witness contacted our service after overhearing anti-Muslim remarks in the workplace.

“A new Muslim manager was about to join, and her white colleagues started making fun (of) him, making comments like, ‘He will force us all to wear hijabs’ and similar derogatory anti-Muslim comments.”

Some victims reported that the verbal abuse directed at them referred to ‘grooming’ and child sexual exploitation. This issue has grown in prominence following high profile criminal convictions of men in Rotherham in 2010 and onwards, bringing into question the ‘dangerous masculinity’ of British Muslim men.¹⁶¹ A year earlier, in August 2015, 81-year-old Muslim pensioner Muhsin Ahmed was murdered in a race hate attack in Rotherham, South Yorkshire. His killer, Dale Jones, was jailed for life, with a minimum term of 32 years on 29 February 2016.¹⁶² He attacked Mr Ahmed after accusing him of being a ‘groomer’ – a clear reference to the child exploitation scandals highlighted in the Jay Report in 2014¹⁶³. This is an extreme and tragic example, but it shows how racialised attitudes on this sensitive issue are not backed by evidence nationally. The government does not routinely publish ethnicity data on people convicted of sexual offences, and where possible, the data does show many

¹⁶⁰ Sussex Police. ‘Bexhill-on-Sea woman convicted of racial abuse’. 29 April, 2016. Available at: <https://sussex.police.uk/news/bexhill-on-sea-woman-convicted-of-racial-abuse/>

¹⁶¹ Tufail, ‘Rotherham, Rochdale, and the Racialised Threat of the ‘Muslim Grooming Gang’ (2015).

¹⁶² ‘Mushin Ahmed death: Two men jailed over racist Rotherham killing’ *BBC News*, 29 February 2016. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-south-yorkshire-35688543>

¹⁶³ Jay, A. *Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation in Rotherham: 1997-2013* (2014)

perpetrators were white males.¹⁶⁴ The apparent overrepresentation of Asian men in gang-related crimes relates to several factors, including smaller sample sizes, and bias in data collection. The Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) analysed possible offender data concerning 'street grooming and child sexual exploitation' in 2011.¹⁶⁵ The overrepresentation of Asian offenders appears clear, but CEOP stated that the data collection methods were too inconsistent to draw national conclusions. A later study, published in 2013, resulted in similar findings but stressed that the sample size was too small to draw national conclusions.¹⁶⁶

In a comparable manner to Muslim women being attacked for their Islamic clothing, Muslim men have been singled out as having an ethnic or religious identity similar to men convicted in high-profile child sexual exploitation scandals. Furthermore, attacks on unaccompanied Muslim women or Muslim women with their young children, the perpetrators of attacks against Muslim men appear to have targeted victims that were perceived as being 'vulnerable' and unlikely to retaliate:

*"My father was returning from the local shops. A couple in their car drove by and called him a 'bearded paedo'. The man threatened my father saying he would 'knock him out' and then called him a 'P*ki bastard' and 'f***ing terrorist'. My dad is a pensioner with a heart condition."*

"My teenage son was coming home from school with a female friend. He is very tall, and a woman approached him and called him a 'paedophile'.... These are just kids, and nothing to do with any grooming scandal."

Incidents referencing sexual offences and terrorism may fit under the 'Retaliation' and 'Defensive' typologies of hate crime, as the perpetrators perceive that their own group is 'under attack' and they wish to defend them.¹⁶⁷ There have been many cases in which perpetrators referenced criminal incidents involving the alleged sexual assault of women by migrants and refugees in Europe. This is not to say that sexual assaults have not been committed by migrants, but there are good reasons to avoid comparing rates of sexual offences and rape in other European countries because of the differences in the efficiency of the criminal justice organisations, different legal structures, and the collation and categorisation of crime statistics. Therefore Eurostat advises against such comparisons.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁴ Ministry of Justice, Home Office & the Office for National Statistics. *An Overview of Sexual Offending in England and Wales* (2013), p.30.

¹⁶⁵ Child Exploitation and On-line Protection (CEOP). "Out of Mind, Out of Sight: Breaking Down the Barriers to Understanding Child Sexual Exploitation." *London: CEOP* (2011): p.9.

¹⁶⁶ Exploitation, Child. "Online Protection Centre (CEOPC)(2013) Threat Assessment of Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse." *CEOP, London*. p.21.

¹⁶⁷ McDevitt et al. 'Hate Crime Offenders' (2002).

¹⁶⁸ See point 15. Coherence and Comparability. Crime and Criminal Justice (crim). *European Commission*. Available at:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/crim_esms.htm#coher_compar1476271302942

We received several reports about anti-Muslim materials featuring the offensive slogan 'Rapeugees' including the following news article:

*"A racist poster with the offensive slogans 'Attention! Rapeugees not welcome' and 'Stay away' on it has caused horror after being spotted outside a hospital. The A5 sticker, which depicts a woman running from a mob armed with knives, seems to insinuate that refugees are rapists. Police have removed one of the posters, created by a group called the Northern Patriotic Front, which was branded 'disgusting' and 'scaremongering' by concerned residents in South Shields, Tyne and Wear."*¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁹ Karasin, Ekin. "Police are investigating after poster with the slogan 'Attention! Rapeugees not welcome' appears outside a hospital." *MailOnline*, 27 March 2016. Available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3511282/Police-investigating-poster-slogan-Attention-Rapeugees-not-welcome-appears-outside-hospital.html?ITO=1490&ns_mchannel=rss&ns_campaign=1490

Terrorism and Anti-Muslim Hatred

In many of the anti-Muslim incidents reported to us in 2016, perpetrators referred to terrorism, bombs and high-profile international events associated with extremism, terror attacks or crimes in which they attribute blame to Muslims in general. These types of cases, despite taking place in very different circumstances, conform to the popular rhetoric which portray Muslims as an existential threat. This conforms to the 'Retaliation' and 'Defensive' typologies for hate crime identified by McDevitt et al. According to this model, some hate crime offenders are motivated to offend as a reaction to a perceived grievance they feel that they themselves or their group has experienced, or to defend their community from outsiders they see as a threat to their way of life.¹⁷⁰ Further evidence suggests that in the aftermath of certain terror attacks, and subsequent media coverage, individuals may attempt to retaliate by abusing people they identify as Muslim, usually through their clothing or ethnicity. This occurs because intergroup conflict, in this instance between the 'in-group' of people considered legitimately 'British', and the 'outgroup' of Muslims, who are constructed as 'being interchangeable and therefore equally deserving of retaliation' for the crimes of a tiny and unrepresentative minority.^{171 172}

In accordance with many of our 2016 cases, Muslim's were collectively held responsible for terror attacks. For example, in the case below, two men were verbally abused on a London bus and the perpetrator referenced the 7/7 terror attacks:

*"People like you are coming here bombing buses and trains'. As the offender was getting off the bus he then shouted, 'Terrorist c**ts.'"*

In a similar manner to the case above, a Muslim woman reported the uncomfortable stares from a woman when out shopping, who went on to verbally abuse her despite her efforts to reassure her about her Islamic clothing. The perpetrator stated that there is "something fundamentally wrong" with Muslim beliefs and that people who dress 'this way' are to be blamed for supporting 'what the nutheads are doing around the world', which including a reference to the murder of Father Jacques Hamel, in Normandy, France, in July 2016.

In another case, a Muslim man contacted us after being rejected by a potential employer due to his religion. The employer is then said to have sent a highly offensive text message which advocated violence against Muslims following the Nice terror attack, and expressed anti-immigrant sentiments. However, in most cases perpetrators only make casual reference to terrorism, bombs or extremist groups. Some of these offences appear to be influenced by other factors, such as thrill-seeking or situational causes arising from road rage or opportunistic encounters on

¹⁷⁰ McDevitt et al. 'Hate Crime Offenders' (2002).

¹⁷¹ Lickel et al, 'Vicarious retribution: The role of collective blame in intergroup aggression. Personality and Social Psychology Review' (2006), p.378.

¹⁷² Hanes, E, Machin, S. 'Hate Crime in the Wake of Terror Attacks: Evidence from 7/7 and 9/11'. *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 30, no.3 (2014), pp.247-267.

public transport. In these cases, perpetrators are likely to hold at least low-level prejudice against Muslims.

Perpetrators sometimes referenced bombs and explosions during incidents. A key motivating factor in these attacks appears to be thrill-seeking, as often the perpetrators were said to be performing for a group and laughing during attacks:

“Abusive men shouted at me ‘ALLAHU AKBAR, BOOM!’ As they got off the bus they laughed. When the bus passed them, they looked at me laughing.”

In similar cases perpetrated by adults working in professional occupations, victims often noted that the perpetrators did not seem aware that they had made abusive comments:

“A Muslim couple (both visibly Muslim) was approached by a nurse who (asked) them about their bottle of water placed on the floor. The victim replied and confirmed that it was his bottle. In response, the nurse said, ‘I thought it was a bomb.’”

“Muslim boy was in class when a teacher looked at his broken watch and said: ‘Is that a bomb?!’ and carried on without an apology.”

‘Safeguarding Concerns’

Existing literature has highlighted the fact that British Muslims have been constructed as a ‘suspect community’ in response to terror attacks.^{173 174 175} Potential hate crime perpetrators may pick up on this and act on it, due to their perception that they are ‘protecting’ British society, by abusing or assaulting Muslims, whom they associate directly with extremism.

There is evidence within our dataset to show how a casual reference to terrorism directed at Muslims can, on occasion, escalate to more serious, false and sometimes malicious accusations of extremism, which could have potentially serious repercussions for the individuals they are directed at. While there have been many cases in which young people needed safeguarding from extremist views, we have received numerous accounts of Muslim individuals being disingenuously reported as ‘suspected terrorists’ as a form of Islamophobic abuse. For example, the following incident on a train was reported in a local newspaper:

*“A ranting racist on the Metro activated the emergency brake after branding an innocent passenger an ISIS terrorist... The 33-year-old fairground worker pressed an emergency stop button at **** as he made wild claims about the*

¹⁷³ Awan, I. “‘I’m a Muslim not an Extremist:’ How the Prevent Strategy has constructed a “Suspect” Community’. *Politics & Policy* 40, no.6 (2012) pp.1158-85.

¹⁷⁴ Cole, ‘Austerity/Immiseration Capitalism and Islamophobia – or Twenty-first-century Multicultural Socialism?’ (2014).

¹⁷⁵ Mills et al. ‘Extreme Hatred’ (2015).

*man having a knife or a needle. Police were called and the victim, who spoke very little English, ended up being handcuffed after he answered every question with 'yes' including when asked if he had a knife. However a search of the 25-year-old and the carriage revealed he was unarmed and it became clear **** prejudice was behind the claims.”¹⁷⁶*

The victim, in this case, was subject to false accusations that he was a terrorist threat based on the misguided perception of the perpetrator.

These cases appeared to occur most frequently in schools but also featured significantly in universities and the workplace. Such cases may be escalated to a safeguarding referral unit or the police. Young children from Muslim families seem to be particularly vulnerable to this form of accusation from teachers and other school or nursery staff:

“A Muslim mother contacted us after uniformed police officers attended their house to speak with her about her young son after he allegedly mentioned Syria to a member of staff. She added that her son has learning difficulties and the staff know him well. So, the idea of such a referral caused great distress. The police were satisfied that no further action was required. The mother added that she felt that the report was motivated by their Muslim identity.”

Both the parents and children that are victimised by this misapplication of safeguarding procedures are understandably shocked and upset when they are contacted by external agencies, or even the police. The impact goes beyond the victim, as parents are often terrified of the long-term repercussions for their children:

“It began in the summertime after returning from a family trip to Pakistan when nursery staff became ‘concerned’ that their son was playing with a slingshot and made a toy ‘gun’ out of Lego and expressed interest in certain cartoon characters. The parents were informed that their son had been referred to the local safeguarding unit who found no evidence to substantiate the concerns raised by staff.”


British Muslims are also vulnerable to the misapplication of safeguarding procedures at work when disingenuous or spurious complaints are made against them. In one cases, a Muslim woman reported that she had been discriminated against due to her Islamic clothing and that malicious accusations were made against her because of a disagreement she had had with a colleague. Understandably, the victim now feels unhappy at work and wishes to seek employment elsewhere.

¹⁷⁶ Kenney, Rob. ‘Metro racist hit emergency brake after branding innocent passenger an ISIS terrorist’. *Chronical Live*, 27 October 2016. Available at: <http://www.chroniclive.co.uk/news/north-east-news/metro-racist-hit-emergency-brake-12089427>

Understanding Online Anti-Muslim Incidents

We have collected data on online anti-Muslim incidents since we launched in 2012. An 'online' incident often occurs on social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram) and other internet platforms – including forum posts and comments from newspaper readers. This year also sees a continuing trend of declining online reports, showing how the concentration of incidents reported to us is shifting more toward abusive behaviour and assault categories offline. Analysis featured in our previous reports had a sharp focus on the overwhelming number of online cases. For example, in the 2013/2014 reporting period, academics at Teesside University analysed 734 verified reports, of which 81% occurred online.¹⁷⁷


Platform of Online Anti-Muslim Incidents Recorded to Tell MAMA in 2016 (N=311)



Compared with the 2015 dataset, online reports declined by almost 15%. As with our 2015 data, a clear majority of cases occurred either on **Twitter** (n=159) or **Facebook** (n=103), with a minority of reports falling into the '**Other**' category, i.e. other platforms (n=29), **Email** (n=14), and **YouTube** (n=7).

¹⁷⁷ Feldman, M & Littler, M. *Tell MAMA Reporting 2013/14: Anti-Muslim Overview, Analysis and 'Cumulative Extremism'* (2014). Available at: <https://www.tellmamauk.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/finalreport.pdf>

Online Anti-Muslim Incidents by Category Recorded to Tell MAMA in 2016 (N=311)



Most of our online reports fall under **Abusive Behaviour** 84% (n=261), with some falling under the category of **Threats** 9% (n=29) and **Anti-Muslim literature** 7% (n=21) – a term which broadly includes racialised memes in the online sphere.

Most Facebook reports constitute ‘hate speech’ as outlined in their Community Standards policy. With Twitter most cases fall under the umbrella of **Abusive Behaviour**. Twitter, did, however, update and expand its hateful conduct policy in November 2016, adding that its staff now receive ‘cultural and historical contextualization of hateful conduct’ training.¹⁷⁸ Therefore, we urge caution when interpreting our data on Twitter cases, as most of the reports came into our service before this policy change.

Our previous report found that almost half of social media users demonstrated far-right views. Defining ‘support’ involves various analytical factors - from their use of language and hashtags to their choice of avatars and the accounts they ‘like’ or ‘follow’. This landscape offers users a measure of ideological fluidity, and, given that many groups operate without formal membership structures, social media presents new avenues in which to engage with extreme politics without ever attending political rallies. Others seek out the views of ideologues, who exist outside of traditional political parties and extreme political circles. A network analysis of Twitter accounts in our 2015 report found that perpetrators also followed mainstream accounts and personalities, including ex-EDL leader and founder Tommy Robinson, *MailOnline* columnist Katie Hopkins and former UKIP leader Nigel Farage. This demonstrates how the rhetoric of some mainstream figures resonates with online perpetrators. A

¹⁷⁸ Twitter Inc. “Progress on addressing online abuse.” Twitter. Available at: https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/a/2016/progress-on-addressing-online-abuse.html

further counterpoint to consider is why some seek out this content. However, as Soloman and Westwood (2014) argue, social media privileges a form of news consumption which puts social value above partisan leanings.¹⁷⁹ Therefore, fluidity alone does not explain this pattern of behaviour but may sit within broader political polarisation. This pattern of polarisation predates the internet, as new media had simply found the means to 'exacerbate already rising tensions' by exposing partisan minds to inaccurate blogs.¹⁸⁰ With Donald Trump's election victory came a renewed interest in the echo chambers which promoted hyper-partisan and often inaccurate news articles. The term 'fake news' is now synonymous with partisan political rhetoric designed to undermine trust in critical mainstream news coverage. Scholars did, at one point, consider the genre of 'fake news' a form of news programming dedicated to political satire.¹⁸¹ In the United States, for example, shows like *The Daily Show* and *The Colbert Report* lampoon and invert the idiosyncrasies and norms of traditional news media to highlight the faults of politicians much more than policy issues.¹⁸² The function of this form of 'fake news' is still, despite its cynicism, grounded in an altruistic desire to educate the public. It sticks to traditional journalistic moral commitments that adhere to our democratic values.¹⁸³ In short, the intention is not to deceive or lie to the audience, but use comedy as a vehicle to encourage critical thought and promote civic participation.

Other research, however, points to the positive impacts of social media. If social media can intensify the negative, it can also help puncture perceived filter bubbles and narrow echo chambers, since the diversification of Twitter networks can moderate the heterogeneity of personal social networks.¹⁸⁴

Throughout late 2016 and into 2017, a focus fell upon the role of Facebook, and how its algorithm may have influenced the presidential electoral result in the United States, as 62% of Americans had admitted using social media as an occasional source of news.¹⁸⁵ Welded to this growth is a distrust of mainstream media, which may help explain why some obvious fake output gained such traction online. BuzzFeed News analysed twenty of the most popular viral fake stories of the US

¹⁷⁹ Messing, Solomon & Westwood. "Selective exposure in the age of social media: Endorsements trump partisan source affiliation when selecting news online." *Communication Research* 41, no. 8 (2014): p.1043.

¹⁸⁰ Lelkes, Sood, & Iyengar. "The hostile audience: The effect of access to broadband internet on partisan affect." *American Journal of Political Science* 61, no. 1 (2017): pp.5-20.

¹⁸¹ Holbert, R. L. *A typology for the study of entertainment television politics*. *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 49, (2005a): pp.436-453.

¹⁸² Hess, V. *The role of political comedy in 2000 election campaign: Examining content and third-person effects*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA (2001, August 30-September 2).

¹⁸³ Sandra L. Borden & Chad Tew. *The Role of Journalist and the Performance of Journalism: Ethical Lessons From "Fake" News (Seriously)*, *Journal of Mass Media Ethics* 22, no.4 (2007): pp. 300-314, DOI: 10.1080/08900520701583586

¹⁸⁴ Barberá, Pablo. "How social media reduces mass political polarization. Evidence from Germany, Spain, and the US." *Job Market Paper, New York University* 46 (2014). Available at: http://pablobarbera.com/static/barbera_polarization_APSA.pdf

¹⁸⁵ Pew Research Center's Journalism Project. "News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016" (2016). Available at: <http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016/>

election cycle, concluding that a clear majority were pro-Trump, reinforcing the notion that Republican distrust of mainstream news has intensified.¹⁸⁶ Others counter that the growth of online echo chambers is self-inflicted since Facebook provides the means to filter news feeds, but it still requires that conscious action to edit, which may limit the exposure to alternative political views from extended family members or colleagues.¹⁸⁷ As for many in Britain, Facebook is changing the way many consume news online, with 41% of Brits under the age of 35 now using Facebook as a source of news on a daily basis, according to the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Among younger users, the popularity increases further, with 28% of 18 to 24-year-olds citing Facebook as a primary source of news.¹⁸⁸

It could be argued that mistrust of media is bad for our shared values, bad for democracy, and bad for civic participation, as Jonathan M. Ladd posits in *Why Americans Hate the News Media and How It Matters* (2011):

*“Those who distrust the press are more resistant to new information about the state of the country in major policy areas. This occurs through two different mechanisms. These individuals are both less influenced by the informative messages they receive from the mainstream press and more likely to augment these sources using less conventional, more opinionated sources of news. As a consequence, they are not simply less informed, but less informed in systematic ways that reflect and reinforce their partisan predispositions.”*¹⁸⁹

Not all content, however, is sensitive to ever-changing news cycles. The most ideologically-driven accounts in our dataset sustain narrow echo chambers which selectively seek out news content, from mainstream and non-mainstream news sources that posit Muslims as collectively responsible for crimes and acts of terrorism. This dehumanisation serves a secondary function as it attacks the fundamental identity of Muslims in Britain while demonstrated a disproportionate interest in halal meat and the inner workings of Islamic institutions. This cultivation of content may allow flagrant falsehoods to pass as accepted truths, or the normalisation of graphically racialised cartoons. In one example, a horrific cartoon depicting the rape of a white woman (or child) on the so-called ‘altar of multiculturalism’ by Muslim men was reported by our team to Twitter, who did not consider it a breach of its conduct. The Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry cited Twitter’s failure to remove this very cartoon in their final report. It also outlined how Twitter did not remove a user with the name @gasmuslims despite our initial

¹⁸⁶ Gallup. “Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low” (2016). Available at: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx>

¹⁸⁷ Seargeant, P, Tagg, C. “The Filter Bubble Isn’t Just Facebook’s Fault – It’s Yours.” 5 December 2016. Available at: <https://theconversation.com/the-filter-bubble-isnt-just-facebooks-fault-its-yours-69664>

¹⁸⁸ Newman, N., Fletcher, R., Levy, D., Nielson, R. *Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2016*. Available at: <http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Digital%20News%20Report%202016.pdf>

¹⁸⁹ Ladd, Jonathan M. *Why Americans hate the media and how it matters*. (2011, Princeton University Press): p.218.

report.¹⁹⁰ Furthermore, it took the efforts of the committee to remove the anti-Muslim @Fahrenheit211 account.¹⁹¹ In earlier evidence, we added that this Twitter account often deployed hateful, racialised, and dehumanising language about Muslims – including the use of the terms ‘Muzzies’ and ‘Paedo Prophet’. When challenged in his evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee, Nick Pickles, Twitter's UK head of policy, cited positive examples of counter speech within two prominent anti-Muslim hashtags.¹⁹² Subsequent analysis from the BBC drew similar conclusions when analysing the #KillAllMuslims hashtag after the Paris terror attacks in January 2015.¹⁹³

Academics have also documented how the far-right have exploited the popularity of hashtags to spread hateful neologisms (a term used to describe the invention of new words). In one study, German academics examined the growth of three related neologisms (rapefugee, rapeugee, and rapugee) in a web and Twitter corpus analysis over a 22-week period.¹⁹⁴ They concluded that right-wing extremists helped spread the use of these terms following the sexual assaults of women in Cologne, Germany on December 31, 2015.

Several reports in our dataset did use such hashtags to spread hatred, with the most extreme rhetoric coming from neo-Nazi accounts. A post attributed to the neo-Nazi group the North West Infidels read:

“The Germans who planted two bombs in two Mosques in Germany we salute you. Freedom fighters that's what you are. This is to the British establishment you go against the will of the people and this is what will happen. Tick Tock!!! #Nomorerapefugees #rapefugeesnotwelcome #defendeurope #europeforeuropeans”

In late September 2016, a bomb detonated outside of a mosque in the German city of Dresden, leaving the police to suspect a far-right motive. The above comment shows how the extreme right will not only seek to dehumanise Muslims but will celebrate when they are victims of political violence and terrorism. In short, this form of dehumanisation robs Muslims of the ability to be viewed as genuine victims, inverting their pain and anguish into a form of victim blaming.

¹⁹⁰ House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee. *Hate crime: abuse, hate and extremism online* (2017). Available at: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/609/609.pdf>

¹⁹¹ For more on the Fahrenheit211 website see Dominic Kennedy, Investigations Editor. "Google Rejected Pleas to Silence Racist Campaign." *The Times & The Sunday Times*. Available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/web-giants-allow-anti-muslim-sites-racist-campaign-jqrtbhb7g>

¹⁹² Home Affairs Committee. *Oral evidence: Hate Crime and its Violent Consequences, HC 609* (2017). Available at: <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/hate-crime-and-its-violent-consequences/oral/48836.pdf>. Q438.

¹⁹³ Wendling, Mike. "Why the popularity of #killallmuslims is not all it seems". *BBC*, 8 January 2015. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-30728491>

¹⁹⁴ Wurschinger, Q, Elahi, M, Zhekova, D, Schmid, H. "Using the Web and Social Media as Corpora for Monitoring the Spread of Neologisms. The Case of rapefugee, rapeugee, and rapugee." *The 54th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Proceedings of the 10th Web as Corpus Workshop (WAC-X) and the EmpiriST Shared Task* (2016) pp.35-43.

Social media accounts in this dataset with identifiable far-right views did, on occasion, incorporate existing anti-Muslim hashtags to promote racialised ideas about Muslim communities. For accounts with such far-right views, this inflammatory rhetoric is applied equally to the Prophet Muhammad. Several tweets in our dataset group him with the terms rapist, warlord, and paedophile. One such hashtag bizarrely called for the deportation of Islam itself.

While in the absolute minority of our dataset, two reports included accusations that the terrorist murder of Labour MP Jo Cox was part of a wider conspiracy to prevent Brexit, with one tweet implying that Muslims were behind her murder. Twitter then promptly suspended the account. One tweet even incorporated the hateful '#RapefugeesWelcome' hashtag.

In the online dataset, discussions around the EU referendum, when compared to the offline dataset, are very rare. One factor that may explain this anomaly concerns how immigration and racialised language is featured heavily throughout the 2016 dataset, a pattern consistent with earlier reports.

Social media was, of course, a key battleground during the EU referendum. This is not to say that all the major hashtags in this campaign were designed to malign, but it does demonstrate how crucial this form of communication is in conveying key political ideas.¹⁹⁵ Howard and Kollanyi (2016) analysed more than 1.5 million tweets between June 5-12, 2016, using pro-Leave, pro-Remain, and neutral referendum hashtags. From the 313,832 unique Twitter users, they found that on both sides of the debate, accounts used some form of automation. Furthermore, the paper defines accounts that tweet more than 50 times a day as 'heavy automation' in nature.¹⁹⁶ This is nothing new or controversial in modern democratic elections,¹⁹⁷ but the use of automation or the aggressive retweeting of content is relevant to the broader discussion of online abuse in our dataset. In supplementary evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry into hate crime, we highlighted the Twitter user @DowHeater and their prolific volume of tweets. After Twitter removed one account, the user had soon returned with a second account. In three days, this new account had generated 1,115 tweets (both original and retweets), amounting to almost 370 tweets per day. A later iteration of the @DowHeater account had generated over 1,200 tweets in 8 days.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ Brophy, Z. "Is it 'workin'? Social media playing key role in referendum battle". *BBC*, 26 May 2016. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36380007>

¹⁹⁶ Howard, Philip & Bence, Kollanyi. "Bots, #strongerin, and #brexit: Computational propaganda during the uk-eu referendum." *Browser Download This Paper* (2016).

¹⁹⁷ Woolley, S & Howard, P. "Bots Unite to Automate the Presidential Election". *Wired*, 15 May 2016. Available at: <https://www.wired.com/2016/05/twitterbots-2/>

¹⁹⁸ *Supplementary written evidence submitted by Tell MAMA*. See point 21: <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/hate-crime-and-its-violent-consequences/written/48199.pdf>

Anecdotally, more extreme anti-Muslim accounts in our 2016 dataset mimic this behaviour. In one example, we analysed a neo-Nazi account named @uk_disgrace. Over the course of 3 to 4 days, the @uk_disgrace account had made 158 tweets. Of that figure, 96% were retweets, while six tweets came from the account holder directly. The high-level of activity may reflect the use of automation scripts or software. However, we cannot dismiss human activity alone given their extreme ideological views.

The section below will move this discussion in a different direction and outline how the online and offline intersect through a small selection of case studies drawn from incidents reported to us and reported in the press.

Case Study: The ‘Pakemon’ campaign

The ‘Pakemon’ sticker campaign is emblematic of how social media was used not only to publicise a racist hate campaign but also to help encourage the distribution of stickers on the streets of London in November 2016. The genesis of the campaign owes to a tweet made on 14 November 2016, which requested support from ‘patriots’ in London and the South East of England to get involved with an upcoming sticker campaign, ending the tweet with the ‘#Pakemon’ hashtag. A day later, a Twitter user claimed to be part of this campaign, and within three days, photos from their account depicted stickers on bus stops, the inside of an Underground station, and on lampposts in the Croydon area, and in Kingston, south-west London. Although there is no direct evidence to suggest the person behind this account had distributed such stickers, their far-right views suggest an ideological desire to help the ‘#Pakemon’ campaign grow. Our analysis revealed that 450 unique Twitter accounts had engaged with this hashtag in just one week.

Other far-right Twitter accounts then joined the campaign. One user wrote, ‘Let’s catch and deport these filthy MUZZRATS!’, on 18 November.¹⁹⁹ The use of the term ‘Muzzrat’ demonstrates the unique vernacular of dehumanising language when discussing Muslims in online spaces, and remains a rhetoric that does not always translate into street-based abuse.

By 19 November, a Twitter account used the live streaming application Periscope to promote the stickers. During the broadcast, a male voice tells viewers off-camera: “I need people to meet up in London and give these cards to them, so you can put them up over London and then we can tweet the f**k out of it.” A spattering of tweets in the ensuing days suggested that some had heard the call, and acted upon it. The Reddit user ‘godito’ then uploaded photos of the sticker in a thread titled ‘Racist stickers in Borough tube station’ on 24 November.²⁰⁰ The Evening Standard then headlined their coverage, ‘Police probe racist mock Pokémon stickers featuring

¹⁹⁹ Available at: <https://twitter.com/VxSpook/status/799574208527286272>

²⁰⁰ “Racist stickers in Borough tube station.” *Reddit*. Available at: https://www.reddit.com/r/london/comments/5enigh/racist_stickers_in_borough_tube_station/

Sadiq Khan found in Tube station' a day later,²⁰¹ as coverage in the Metro newspaper followed two days later.²⁰²

During the 'Pakemon' campaign, members of the public did send our staff pertinent information relating to the alleged suspect, and other account holders who may have distributed the stickers, which we then passed to the police. The British Transport Police then arrested a 46-year-old man in connection with the campaign on 1 December.²⁰³ Politicians soon entered the debate and the '#Pakemon' campaign as it appeared in the Home Affairs Select Committee report on hate crime which was published on 1 May 2017. It outlined how the committee had reported several anti-Muslim tweets to the platform, including from '#Pakemon' campaign itself, and Twitter did act accordingly, removing most of the reported content and suspending various account holders. The report did, however, criticise Twitter after some reported content remained on the platform weeks later.²⁰⁴

Case Study: The English Defence League Lincolnshire Division

On 16 March 2016, the then leader of the English Defence League's Lincolnshire Division, Paul Whiteside, is alleged to have uploaded photos of the anti-Muslim literature he claimed to have attached to the gate of a mosque under construction. Hours after the hate crime, he uploaded a photo of himself to a personal Facebook page at 2:03 pm, updating his cover photo. Approving comments from supporters included 'NS' – shorthand for the EDL's official 'No Surrender' slogan. Whiteside then uploaded photos of the posters with the caption 'On the gates of the mosque, f**k Islam!' minutes later.²⁰⁵ One design plagiarised a front page from the tabloid newspaper *The Mirror*, who on 27 August 2014, headlined their Wednesday edition with 'Horrific Betrayal of 1,400 Children',²⁰⁶ which referenced the Jay Report into child sexual exploitation in Rotherham. The lengthy report detailed the failures of public bodies to protect vulnerable girls from sexual exploitation and criminal enterprise.²⁰⁷ Officers from Lincolnshire Police visited the site two days later, and Tanweer Ahmed, who chairs the Islamic Association of Lincoln, spoke of his hurt but

²⁰¹ Simpson, Fiona. "Police probe racist mock Pokemon stickers featuring Sadiq Khan found in Tube station". *The London Evening Standard*, 25 November 2016. Available at: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/probe-launched-over-racist-mock-pok-mon-stickers-featuring-sadiq-khan-found-in-tube-station-a3405196.html>

²⁰² Mills, J. "Racist 'Pakemon' stickers appear around London". *Metro*, 26 November 2016. Available at: <http://metro.co.uk/2016/11/26/racist-pakemon-stickers-put-up-around-london-6284255/>

²⁰³ Simpson, Fiona. "Man arrested over racist 'P***mon' stickers found on Tube network." *The London Evening Standard*, 1 December 2016. Available at: <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/man-arrested-over-racist-pmon-stickers-found-on-tube-network-a3409901.html>

²⁰⁴ Hate Crime: Abuse, Hate and Extremism Online — Home Affairs Committee — House of Commons," Home Affairs Select Committee (House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, May 2017). pp.5-6.

²⁰⁵ Tell MAMA. "Police probe far-right vandalism at proposed mosque in Lincoln". Tell MAMA, 18 March 2016. Available at: <https://tellmamauk.org/police-probe-far-right-vandalism-at-proposed-mosque-in-lincoln/>

²⁰⁶ *Daily Mirror* Facebook page. 26 August 2014. Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/dailymirror/photos/a.394365354161.172272.6149699161/10152655595639162/?type=1&theater>

²⁰⁷ Jay, A. *Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Exploitation in Rotherham: 1997-2013*. Available at: http://www.rotherham.gov.uk/download/downloads/id/1407/independent_inquiry_cse_in_rotherham.pdf

added that “Lincoln Muslims know that they do not represent the views of people of Lincoln or the vast majority of our fellow British citizens,” in a statement.²⁰⁸

Case Study: False far-right story linking Muslim men to gang-rape in Kent

The shocking gang-rape of a woman in Kent energised the so-called ‘alt-right’ and the broader far-right in April 2016, after news of the crime on March 6 was picked up by various national and local media.²⁰⁹ Kent Police then faced a barrage of social media abuse, with some suggesting that the perpetrators were Muslim, with the subtext suggesting a ‘politically correct’ cover-up. In an unusual response, Kent Police issued an updated statement on 22 April confirming that all the suspects were white, English, and non-Muslim. Adding, that at the point of the investigation, despite the severity of the crime, it was an isolated incident, and the police were not pursuing other suspects.²¹⁰ But the story did not end there, as some on the far-right continued to push an anti-Muslim narrative. One tweet in our dataset linked to a far-right blog suggesting that Muslim men were responsible despite the clarification from Kent Police. Twitter did not remove the offensive tweet despite our report.

Case Study: The John Nimmo conviction

A racist troll who sent antisemitic death threats to Labour MP Luciana Berger also threatened to burn down a mosque and sent death threats to Fiyaz Mughal OBE, founder of Tell MAMA. John Nimmo, 28, sent several threatening antisemitic messages to the Labour MP, which included a picture of a knife with a threat that ‘she would get it like Jo Cox’ shortly after her murder.²¹¹ Nimmo referred to Berger as ‘Jewish scum’ and signed off his threats with the words ‘your friend the Nazi’, which left the MP fearing for her personal safety. During the trial, it emerged that Nimmo had been on bail at the time after sending our staff an emailing threatening to burn down a mosque.²¹² Other messages sent to our staff included the words ‘death to Muslims’ juxtaposed with images of dead bodies. The judge jailed him for 27 months in July 2017.²¹³

Case Study: The Jamia Mosque hate crime

²⁰⁸ “Police probe after Lincoln mosque site plastered with “hurtful” anti-Islam posters.” *The Lincolnite*, 18 March 2016: <http://thelincolnite.co.uk/2016/03/police-probe-after-lincoln-mosque-site-plastered-with-hurtful-anti-islam-posters/>


²⁰⁹ “Kent Police reveal more information on the alleged gang rape of a young woman in Bluewater and reassure people their major crime team are on it”. *Kent Online*, 21 April 2016. Available at: <http://www.kentonline.co.uk/dartford/news/police-reassure-alleged-gang-rape-94623/>

²¹⁰ Kent Police Facebook page. 12 April 2016. Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/kentpolice/posts/10156703362215161>

²¹¹ Press Association. “Internet troll facing jail after violent antisemitic threats to Labour MP”. *The Guardian*, 27 July 2016. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/27/internet-troll-jail-violent-antisemitic-threats-labour-mp-luciana-berger>

²¹² Laville, Sandra. “Internet troll who sent Labour MP antisemitic messages is jailed”. *The Guardian*, 10 February 2017. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/feb/10/internet-troll-who-sent-labour-mp-antisemitic-messages-is-jailed>

²¹³ “MP death threat troll John Nimmo is jailed”. *BBC*, 10 February 2017. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-tyne-38934379>

The targeting of the Jamia Mosque in Bristol resulted in the jailing of two men and suspended sentences for two women in July 2016.²¹⁴ On January 17, the group shouted racial abuse at a member of the mosque, tied a St. George's flag to the fence of the mosque and hurled bacon sandwiches at the building. Rashers of bacon were found on the door handles of the mosque. Kevin Crehan, 34, was jailed for 12 months and Mark Bennett, 48, for nine months. Social media may have helped bring the perpetrators to justice following a CCTV appeal from Avon and Somerset Police. We became aware of a far-right Twitter account having made a potentially incriminating tweet hours after the hate crime. The tweet read, 'Fair play to the lads today on take a bacon sandwich to a mosque day, if u haven't done yours yet theres still time!'.


A subsequent investigation of the account helped us connect it to one of the main suspects. The information was then passed to police. Locals rallied to support the local Muslim community with cards filled with messages of goodwill.²¹⁵ A decade-long restraining order prevents the group from going within 100m of any mosque in England and Wales.


The Language of Anti-Muslim Hate Online

The language of anti-Muslim hatred in this dataset, as we have seen before, does reflect the major political events of the reporting year. As with the offline data, we saw how language from online perpetrators included discussions of the EU referendum, the refugee crisis, and terrorism. Part of this language will be explored

²¹⁴ "Men jailed over bacon tied to Bristol mosque door handles". *BBC*, 20 July 2016. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-bristol-36846555>

²¹⁵ "'Vile' bacon sandwich attack Bristol mosque condemned." *BBC*, 18 January 2016. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-bristol-35341669>

in the section below, as we see how the language of the far-right seeps into the word cloud below.



To help understand this further, we grouped the words into three categories below.

Identity: language that discusses identity, nationality, culture and a rejection of, or anxiety over, multiculturalism or immigration.	Dehumanisation: Abusive or hateful language.	Action: words designed to encourage violence, or direct action against Muslims.
Asian, Islam, woman*, people, mosque*, British	Rape, f**k*, terrorist, paedophile*, cult, dirty, filthy, evil, c*nts	Kill, death, burn

The above shows the most popular examples in our word frequency count. The asterisk allows us to group terms together. For example, the word woman is merged with women (n=26), because the instances draw a common thread, as the role of women, both Muslim and non-Muslim, function in a broader dehumanising discourse.

For the latter, Muslim men are painted as culturally threatening – either violently or as sexual predators. And, with an emphasis on white women as victims, more extreme rhetoric frames criminality in racialised terminology. For example, this tweet from Katie Hopkins (@KTHopkins), “Muslim men raping white women is consistent with the teaching of Islam. Revoke their citizenship and deport the bastards. Asian my arse”, on 26 February, was reported to our service, but Twitter did not remove the content, despite high-profile condemnation of her comment, which was also passed to Metropolitan Police to investigate.²¹⁶ Furthermore, a broadly hateful message about Muslims which made implicit reference to the treatment of women, including female genital mutilation (FGM) and acid attacks, appears in this dataset.

An extreme example of dehumanising language came from a Facebook post reported in October. It began, ‘Hitler had the right idea, just the wrong religion targeted’, adding that the world would be a better place without Islam. The hate speech continued as the individual then referenced how Islam treats women and the LGBT community. Twitter suspended an account which told a user they assumed to be Muslim, “Better that than letting your wife get raped by Muzzies like you cha”, in December 2016.

In another example, of how news stories of street-based violence against Muslim women inspired hate speech online, a Twitter user with identifiable far-right views wrote “Witch hunt! He did the right thing!” after sharing a BBC News article about an unprovoked racist assault on a Muslim woman. This woman, who was out with her son, had her niqab ripped off and thrown to the ground by Peter Scotter, 56, who shouted, “You are in our country now” during the attack. Following a lengthy trial, he received a 15-month prison sentence. His defence solicitor acknowledged that the timing of the attack and the EU referendum vote was no coincidence.²¹⁷

Xenophobia, chauvinism, and anti-immigrant sentiment populated some of the social media rhetoric following acts of terrorism in our dataset. A Facebook post claimed that Islam is not a religion of peace, concluding that, “We need to get every single one out of Europe”, hours after the suicide bombings in Brussels took place.

The term mosque(s) (n=30) ranked in the top 10 of weighted terms, suggesting that the themes around this discussion again frame Muslims through the lens of securitisation, terrorism, and welfare. The most extreme and overtly violent rhetoric came, almost exclusively, from neo-Nazis:

*‘It’s about time we started blowing mosques up on Fridays when the f**kers are full that will stop the bastards for every one person killed by them we need to blow a mosque full up’*

²¹⁶ Tell MAMA. “Katie Hopkins Suggests that Islam Teaches Muslim Men to Rape White Woman”. *Tell MAMA*, 27 February 2016. Available at: <https://tellmamauk.org/katie-hopkins-suggests-islam-teaches-muslim-men-rape-white-women/>

²¹⁷ “Peter Scotter jailed over Sunderland niqab attack”. *BBC*, 3 July 2017. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-tyne-39343630>

Facebook acted quickly to remove the above comment from a man in the Yorkshire area who had 'liked' far-right Facebook content including the National Front.

The above examples help demonstrate how for some, prejudicial and racist attitudes slowly calcify until an individual allows such views to surface, sometimes in response to perceived cultural shifts. This is highlighted in the 'Defensive' typology, but often, it may fall under the 'Thrill-seeking' typology.²¹⁸ To better understand how this latter typology may surface online, it is useful to consider Suler's notion of *toxic disinhibition*.²¹⁹ In short, the ability of some to construct feedback loops or echo chambers presents a means for individuals to subvert traditional social norms in the absence of face-to-face interaction, meaning that some may act out their aggressive tendencies online. Be it forms of trolling or direct abuse, on social media platforms where the traditional authority figure (e.g. parent, teacher, law enforcement) is absent, individuals are more willing to misbehave.²²⁰ Others will create 'characters' or use the relative anonymity of the platforms to express ideas more freely, not fearing the consequences of more extreme behaviour if they perceive it as being disassociated from the 'real-world' self.

Online networks also create the space for the types of socialisation that may encourage such behaviours, discussed in Suler's idea of *solipsistic introjection*, where the words of an online companion, real or self-designed, becomes a voice in the mind of that person. This online behaviour, according to Suler, fuses online disinhibition with the fantasies some would dare not act upon, be it arguing with their boss or vocalising their disdain or hatred of a minority group, in a form of online theatre.²²¹ For more vulnerable or impressionable individuals, the danger is that the ideologies of their peers, real-world or otherwise, are absorbed and regurgitated, often verbatim, as they may lack the critical thinking skills needed to build a resilience to extreme ideologies.

In reply to a news article about the Cologne attacks, one reported Facebook comment suggested that if Muslims wanted to practise their religion, they should move to a 'Muslim country', adding that his father did not fight in the Second World War to see 'his' country invaded by so-called 'devil worshippers'. This rhetorical sleight of hand ignores how India's army of 2.5 million men fought against Nazi tyranny under the yolk of the British Empire, with Muslims making up about a third of the numbers at any one time.²²²

The language directed at Muslim individuals – either in public posts or private messages – carried a similar tone. In a broader Facebook discussion, found in our dataset, a Muslim woman was called a 'raghead' and told to get out of the country.

²¹⁸ McDevitt et al. 'Hate Crime Offenders' (2002).

²¹⁹ Suler, John. "The online disinhibition effect." *Cyberpsychology & Behavior* 7, no. 3 (2004): pp.321-326.


²²⁰ Ibid, p.323.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Maclean, William. ""Untold" Story of WW2 Stirs Muslim Youth Pride." *Reuters*, 3 July 2009. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-security-muslims/untold-story-of-ww2-stirs-muslim-youth-pride-idUSTRE5621PL20090703>.

Another report concerned a threatening message where an individual with far-right views accused the person of stealing benefits, adding that he hoped that they would be 'blown up' by their fictitious suicide vest. Such language again demonstrates how the process of dehumanisation posits Muslims as a cultural 'other'. In contrast with previous reports, the online analysis for 2016 has factored in how social media platforms dealt with hateful content reported to their platforms. Screenshots of content not removed from Twitter and Facebook will appear further down in the section.

Social Media Outcome for online anti-Muslim content reported to Tell MAMA in 2016 (N=311)




A third of reports (n=93) saw no action from the social media or online platform to remove the hateful or discriminatory content (see above chart). More than half of our online cases needed no action given issues of verification in some cases. Or, simply put, the content was removed before we received some reports. The failure to remove harmful content is too big to ignore in the online dataset. Therefore, we give a snapshot of some of the content not removed from online platforms, which includes the use of racialised language and securitised narratives.



In one example, a user called for a ban on halal meat, suggesting that Islam was a 'satanic political cult'. Other messages framed Muslims as paedophiles, where one tweet adopted a racialised neologism. Twitter did not consider a tweet that called for the segregation of Muslims for monitoring purposes abusive.


 **[Name]** Blocked ▼

now is the time to send any muslim home
deport them if they carry out paedophilia this
has to stop muslims do not run the uk




8:24 AM - 24 Jun 2016

2 Retweets 4 Likes 



  2  4 


 **[Name]** Blocked ▼


Replying to 

  paedostani scum
should be deported back to sandland minus
their b  s [#islamistheproblem](#)

5:07 PM - 17 Oct 2016





   

 **[Name]** Follow ▼

Replying to 

Moslems should be segregated so we can
monitor them properly. Integration?, no
thanks.

2:54 PM - 2 Nov 2016

 5   

 **[Name]** Follow ▼

No. [#halal](#) needs to be [#BANNED](#) It is a
satanic ritual. FACT. 'Islam' is NOT a religion.
FACT. It is a satanic political cult. [#banhalal](#)
[#UK](#)



9:34 AM - 5 Nov 2016

3 Retweets 2 Likes 

 3  3  2 

 **[Name]** Follow ▼

No. [#halal](#) needs to be [#BANNED](#) It is a
satanic ritual. FACT. 'Islam' is NOT a religion.
FACT. It is a satanic political cult. [#banhalal](#)
[#UK](#)



9:34 AM - 5 Nov 2016

3 Retweets 2 Likes 

 3  3  2 

Partnerships work and recommendations

The necessity of countering and challenging extremism online shifted in 2017 with announcements from the social media platforms and the government. In February, a £60 million battle to counter the narratives of far-right groups was launched by advertising giants M&S Saatchi. Concerns about the nature and scale of the problem of far-right extremism in Europe seeping into Britain are being investigated with by a secretive anti-subversion unit in Whitehall, according to *The Times* newspaper.²²³ According to insiders quoted by *The Times*, the funding would challenge the conspiratorial narratives put out by *Breitbart* and other online platforms. The 'Extremism Analysis Unit' is said to have produced a briefing paper on the nature of the far-right in Europe which has extended to contacting the British embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria, to raise concerns about vigilante groups targeting refugees.²²⁴

As highlighted earlier in this section, the criticisms directed at Twitter, Google, and Facebook from the Home Affairs Select Committee included the hosting and potential profits gained from terrorist materials on their respective platforms. Concerning the former, they criticised Google for its failure to initially region block content from the proscribed terrorist group National Action and for its failure to initially remove content glorifying the terror group, adding that some flagged content remained accessible during the drafting of the final report.²²⁵ Moreover, the report criticised the ease with which such content remains on YouTube, adding that if not illegal, it was both indefensible and irresponsible that a platform which so readily removes copyrighted materials is unable to do so with illegal terrorist content.²²⁶ In evidence, Google proposed alternatives to improving the monitoring and removal of terrorist materials on its platform, including expanding its 'trusted flagger' programme.²²⁷

Renewed criticism saw a plethora of announcements from Facebook regarding how it will deal with hate speech and terrorist material. Changes include an improved recruitment drive of 3,000 new employees to check flagged content by users.²²⁸ A detailed blog outlined how the company deploys software to detect and remove fake

²²³ Kennedy, Dominic. "Saatchi agency to lead £60m war on far-right lies". *The Times*, 6 February 2017. Available at: <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/saatchi-agency-to-lead-60m-war-on-far-right-lies-50xgg3gmn>

²²⁴ Khomami, Nadia. "UK government hires M&C Saatchi to fight far-right threat". *The Guardian*, 6 February 2017. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/06/uks-government-hires-advertising-giant-as-it-fights-far-right-threat>

²²⁵ See point 22 <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/609/609.pdf>

²²⁶ Bowcott, Owen. "Social media firm must face heavy fines over extremist content - MPs". *The Guardian*, 1 May 2017. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/may/01/social-media-firms-should-be-fined-for-extremist-content-say-mps-google-youtube-facebook>

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Corera, Gordon. "Facebook reveals measures to remove terrorist content". *BBC*, 15 June 2017. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-40290258>

bot accounts and its technological improvements in detecting terrorist materials.²²⁹ Facebook then announced the launch of the UK Online Civil Courage Initiative (OCCI) in June with Tell MAMA and others as founding partners. The OCCI will provide UK NGOs countering extremism and hate speech with financial and marketing support, supplementing it further with the sharing of best practise from organisations like ourselves. This encouraging development will hopefully grow as we push for sustainable support from organisations like ourselves with the expert knowledge to help social media firms understand the local, national, and international dimensions associated with anti-Muslim hate speech and anti-Muslim hate crime.

There has also been positive a development in how police deal with online hate crime, with more funding in place to expand the capacity of London's Online Hate Crime Hub, which has five dedicated Met Police officers, and a Detective Inspector, to improve how police gather intelligence on online hate crime.²³⁰ Our work was cited in a press release during the launch of this much-needed service, alongside the work of the antisemitism monitor, the Community Security Trust. Our Director also spoke at the launch event to discuss the very real problem of abuse on social media. For Londoners of all backgrounds, this service should still be a key tool in helping police investigate if online hate speech does meet the criminal threshold, and if so, working with the CPS and other entities to pursue other legal avenues. Organisations like ourselves and our hate crime partners will continue to inform the Met and the Mayor's Office about the changing face of anti-Muslim hatred both online and offline.

Sustainability and sharing best practise go together, and we invite social media companies to continue this relationship in the years ahead. Investing in the expertise of organisations with proven experience in countering hatred will continue to help both parties in this way, and for users of the platforms, give a sense that their safety is indeed important. The debate is changing for the better, as social media companies are showing more of a willingness to tackle the problem, but a lot more is needed, including stricter guidelines for repeat social media offenders, and the proactive means with which to monitor known far-right accounts, especially during times of heightened community tensions. It is imperative that for-profit multinational corporations invest back into the communities affected by hate crime on their platforms, not just in giving advertising revenue or providing counter-speech, but in the resource-intensive time it takes NGOs and police forces to investigate hateful content on their respective platforms.

We value the commitment of social media companies to streamline how our project can flag anti-Muslim content with staff directly and hope to build on this in the future. For police forces nationwide, we continue to offer specialised training on anti-Muslim hate issues and will expand sections on social media abuse. We have previously

²²⁹ Bickert, Monia & Fishman, Brian. 'Hard Questions: How We Counter Terrorism.' *Newsroom.fb*, 15 June 2017. Available at: <https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism/>

²³⁰ Press release. "Mayor launches new unit to tackle online hate crime". 24 April 2017. Available at: <https://www.london.gov.uk/press-releases/mayoral/mayor-launches-unit-to-tackle-online-hate-crime>

delivered such training sessions with Greater Manchester Police and Dorset Police (among others).

We will continue to work in tandem with the Crown Prosecution Service to advocate on behalf of victims, to push for restorative justice, and to keep their staff informed on issues alongside other hate crime partner agencies.

Facebook has made strides in shutting down many antisemitic, homophobic, and racist neo-Nazi accounts, with many migrating to alternative platforms like VK (a Russian social media platform), or migrated to so-called free-speech platforms like Gab and Minds. Some are using photo-sharing platforms like Instagram and Pinterest, or exploiting free and anonymised message board platforms. The largest challenge is still to get Facebook, Google and Twitter to remove hate materials, but we should not ignore these alternative platforms, and the ability of extremists to peddle hate on other developing platforms.

Conclusion

This report has focused on attempting to understand how anti-Muslim prejudice impacts on victims, through analysis of anti-Muslim incidents reported to us in 2016. Anti-Muslim prejudice, like any identity-based prejudice, can be understood in terms of broad hate crime typologies. However, the social context of these incidents is important. In recent years 'Retaliation' and 'Defensive' anti-Muslim hate crimes have become the most prominent, as debates concerning terrorism, immigration, and cultural identity have increasingly become a focal point in public discourses, particularly in 2016. Our previous reports have highlighted the relationship between trigger events such as terror attacks, media headlines and spikes in hate crime reports. This trend continued in 2016, following high-profile political events, such as the EU referendum and terrorist attacks more generally. Again, we have found surges in incident reports following such events, in line with findings from the National Police Chiefs Council, who acknowledge that the surge in hate crime reports following the EU referendum may have shifted the baseline of reports.

Our findings suggest that perpetrators exploit such events as a pretext to inflict 'Defensive' or 'Retribution' forms of typologies on behalf of the majority group (in this instance the 'White British' ethnic group), for whom they feel their cultural identity is 'under threat' from minority communities.

Anti-Muslim incidents should be seen as complex social situations governed by multiple factors. It is important to take into account the situational dynamics of hate incidents. Our findings suggest there has been a rise in the number of more serious abusive and violent incidents which disproportionately occur on UK streets, close to public transport hubs, in shopping centres and roadways when compared to the 2015 dataset. Indeed, these types of social spaces can be seen as key environments in which such incidents occur due to the close proximity of people from different social backgrounds in busy and stressful environments, in which there is less possibility of oversight from authority figures. The 'Thrill-seeking' typology may help to explain the situational nature of public area offences where the perpetrator is unknown to the victim at the time of the incident.

Despite the fact that British Muslims are a heterogeneous group comprising of many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, the stereotype of a visibly Muslim person can evoke a largely negative emotional response from perpetrators who display a predilection for reducing Muslim communities into simplistic binaries of immigration, cultural difference, and terrorism, topics which are sometimes distorted by sections of the UK press. This process of 'othering', be it over religious clothing or skin colour serves to dehumanise Muslims to the point where perpetrators view them as 'fair game' for abuse or violence.

Perpetrators target victims based on their perceived vulnerabilities, be it gender or age, and will consider the risks associated with the location of the incident. Both points concern how perpetrators operate without fear of repercussion. For example, a male perpetrator targeting a female victim in a public area, where the situational

context allows for abusive or violent behaviour to take place. Individuals working in the night-time economy are exposed to greater risk of attack or abuse, such as taxi drivers, security personnel, given the situational factors listed above and the proximity between perpetrator and victim. Other public-facing professions, such as transport workers and shopkeepers, that are not often associated with the night time economy, face similar risks. Our findings also reveal that a high number of victims were targeted and outnumbered by a group of perpetrators.

Perpetrators can have mixed motivations and hold intersecting prejudices motivating them to abuse their victim. Our findings show that a high proportion of perpetrators abuse their victims on the basis of multiple aspects of their identity interchangeably, as Islamophobic, racist and xenophobic prejudice coalesce. Intersectionality, as a concept, is key in identifying how anti-Muslim prejudice can compound other types of identity-based discrimination to disadvantage some of the most vulnerable within our society.

The gender dynamics in incidents remain similar to our 2015 annual report, where again, a majority of victims are women, who face abuse based on their religious and gender identity. Abusive language carries misogynistic and racist overtones. Often male perpetrators target female victims within the 'Defensive' or 'Retribution' typologies due to the perceived vulnerabilities of Muslim women. The irony, of course, is that the rhetoric used to disingenuously defame Muslim communities, and by extension, their faith, as culturally oppressive, is used to justify the abuse and violence enacted upon Muslim women.

The impact of violent attacks can be extreme. However, we must not underestimate the psychological impact of casual, 'everyday' abuse. Muslims of all ages are vulnerable to abuse and discrimination within their everyday lives. Ongoing incidents of anti-Muslim abuse and discrimination feature prominently in the cases reported to us in 2016. Ongoing 'low-level' harassment and discrimination can have a significant impact on victims as they are often less able to escape victimisation in their own neighbourhood, at school or in the workplace. Abuse in the workplace and educational environments can profoundly harm the prospects of Muslims in Britain in terms of employment and their educational aspirations. Managers, teachers and others in positions of tangible authority in such environments have a significant role to play in countering this prejudice, abuse and discrimination, and encourage young minds to prosper and realise their potential. This, however, is not always the case, as management was frequently found to dismiss reports of workplace discrimination, downplaying it as office 'banter' or branding victims as 'troublemakers'.

Victims would often communicate their fear of future victimisation alongside the practical measures they took in order to protect against future victimisation. This may include avoiding specific areas where they had been abused previously, choosing to stop wearing visibly Islamic clothing, not leaving the areas in which they feel safe, not leaving the house, or even moving to a new geographic area. Members of minority ethnic groups living in less densely populated areas with lower levels of cultural and religious diversity reported experiencing racist or Islamophobic abuse in multiple areas of their lives, and some expressed the wish to move to more diverse

urban areas where they would feel less vulnerable to abuse and discrimination. Victims would report feeling isolated, having their trust in British institutions eroded, and their identification with people of the UK somewhat diminished.

It is widely acknowledged that victims often do not report hate crimes due to the perception that the police would not take their report seriously. Many victims in our dataset did not feel that their interactions with some police officers in their local areas were always positive. Key themes drawn from these testimonies concern how officers had not done enough to give victims a sense that they could be protected from future victimisation. Indeed, in some cases, victims reported negative experiences when they did report an incident to the police, including being told not to 'waste police resources'. This type of response will almost certainly damage trust and the willingness to report future incidents. These examples may well prove to be outliers, but there are opportunities for police forces to deliver a more rounded, victim-orientated service, encouraging reporting and regaining the trust of communities, and building on their excellent work in raising awareness about the necessity of reporting hate crimes in outreach work.

Members of the public have a role to play in countering anti-Muslim prejudice. Victims of abuse or violence on public transport often cite a lack of public intervention, which in some cases caused deeper emotional trauma, and some may interpret inaction as a reflection of the normalisation of this form of prejudice. There are safe and practical ways for members of the public to intervene and support victims. By encouraging acts of solidarity, it may help blunt some of the worst consequences of anti-Muslim prejudice and help victims feel supported.

If the *Geography of Anti-Muslim Hatred* outlined the interconnectivity between online far-right networks and how they take inspiration from the mainstream in 2015, then 2016 sees a continuation and consolidation of such networks. A major theme that underscores this section of the report concerns the intersection between the online and offline worlds. Social media became the tools to not only encourage hate speech but potentially encouraged criminal activity on a street level, as we saw with the racist 'Pakemon' campaign. The Twitter account linked to this campaign was a popular node in our 2015 online network map, meaning that many perpetrators in the previous dataset followed this account. At the height of its popularity, the account had over 20,000 followers. Now, while it remains easy to purchase followers and boost retweets, this user often generated broadly 'popular' tweets within these networks. Arguably, the failure of Twitter to remove this account, despite previous reports for breaches of Twitter's terms of service, could have limited its appeal online. A person this ideologically motivated, however, would likely find the means to have exploited Twitter's platform for this campaign, but a prior account suspension had the potential to minimise its reach, given its established popularity in such networks. Twitter has, to its credit, been quick to take down another extreme anti-Muslim account after we raised it directly with their staff.

How other far-right inspired accounts used social media platforms to promote street-based hate crime demonstrates how proactive monitoring and sharing best practise can lead to criminal justice outcomes, as with the hate crime at the Jamia Mosque in

Bristol. There is little evidence to suggest the networks exposed in 2015 have greatly increased, but it should be noted that it took the efforts of the Home Affairs Select Committee to remove some hateful content and extreme anti-Muslim accounts.

The rhetoric of major political events in 2016 was not always reflected in the online data when compared to the behaviours of perpetrators at a street level. As we hinted at earlier, in established online echo chambers, such narratives were not as focused on the EU referendum or terrorism as in the offline data. If anything, it supplemented such narratives, emboldening their perception that the mainstream had finally accepted their arguments on immigration and national and cultural identity. We will continue to monitor such trends in order to ascertain to what degree narratives in these far-right networks and online echo chambers seep into the offline world.

Appendix (i): Working in Partnership with Police Forces

We have working partnerships with 18 police forces across the UK. Our relationship with these police forces provides an invaluable opportunity to raise awareness for Islamophobic hate crime throughout the UK as we continue to support victims, advocate for their rights and ensure that their voices are heard. This data sharing agreement means that we can analyse the sanitised Islamophobic hate crime of partner forces.

The table below lists the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes recorded by each police force in 2016. The data from Police Scotland (n=217) is the only dataset that was acquired through Freedom of Information requests.


Police Force Area	Anti-Muslim Hate Crime Reports in 2016
Metropolitan	1,296
Greater Manchester	409
British Transport Police	230
Police Scotland	217
West Yorkshire	170
Merseyside	102
Hampshire	90
Kent	73
Surrey	47
Bedfordshire	41
Cheshire	31
Northamptonshire	29
South Yorkshire	22
Northern Ireland Police Service	21
Warwickshire & West Mercia	19
Humberside	18
City of London	13
Dorset	12
Total	2840

In this section, we will provide a brief quantitative summary of the police data shared with us by our police force partners. This data has been triangulated with the data on anti-Muslim incidents collected by us in 2016 in order to help build a complete picture

of the current state of anti-Muslim hate crime in the UK. For the purpose of our analysis, we have categorised recorded police crimes into the number of incidents, the category of the incident, and category of place in which the incident occurred, in accordance with our own methodology for measuring anti-Muslim incidents and crimes.

We received the details of 2,840 anti-Muslim crimes from our partnership police forces in 2016. This amounted to 2,741 individual anti-Muslim incidents when multiple crimes that had occurred within the same incident were removed (where this information was identifiable). For example, in a situation where multiple perpetrators had assaulted an individual victim, there would technically be two recorded crimes, one for each perpetrator. For all intents and purposes, however, this is still representative of a single instance of anti-Muslim hate crime, and as such we would remove duplications. Of the incidents reported to the police, the vast majority occurred offline (94%, n=2,330) where this information was verifiable, compared to only 6% of cases that took place online (n=137). From the data available we could not clarify if 274 reports from the police occurred online or offline.


‘Street-Based’ (Offline) Anti-Muslim incidents reported to the Police by Incident Category (N=2,330)



Police Data by Incident Category

Of the street-based (offline) incidents reported to our partnership police forces in 2016, over half (51%, n=1,201) were **Abusive Behaviour** cases. This includes verbal abuse and harassment cases that were considered to be Islamophobic in nature by police forces. Anti-Muslim **Physical Attacks** were the second most common (20%, n=459). These cases cover incidents ranging from common assault to more serious violent crimes, including one case of murder. Additionally, there were 254 recorded incidents of **Threatening Behaviour** (accounting for 11% of recorded incidents) followed by 226 incidents of **Vandalism** (10%) and 160 recorded incidents of **Anti-Muslim Literature** (7%). A minority of cases incidents (1%, n=30) were classified as 'unknown' or 'other'. This included 24 anti-Muslim incidents that were classified as offline but did not include enough information to categorise. Additionally, there were three incidents of **Discrimination**, two incidents of **Hate Speech** and one anti-Muslim motivated theft.

Offline Anti-Muslim incidents reported to the Police by Place Category (N=2,330)




Police Data by Place Category

Just over a fifth, or 23% of street-based (offline) crimes and incidents reported to our partner police forces occurred in a **Public Area**, with 18% (n=424) having occurred in a **Household or Private Property**, and 13% (317) on **Public Transport Networks**. A sizeable minority of cases (12%, n=281) took place in the **Place of Work** of victims, with 96 (4%) incidents having taken place in a **Place of Business** where the victim was visiting. Incidents flagged as having taken place on the **Road**

or Highway totalled 73 (3%). A further 3% of anti-Muslim incidents (n=61) occurred within a **Muslim Institution**, which may include the vandalism of a mosque or an attack on worshipers attending a mosque. Incidents and crimes that occurred in an Educational Institution, be it a school, college or university totalled 3% or 63 reports. Incidents or crimes reported in Public Institutions, defined as public sector buildings or hospitals total just 2% of cases. Almost a fifth of offline (street-based) cases (19%, n=434) lacked the required data to classify a location of incident or crime.

Number of 'Street-Based' (Offline) Anti-Muslim Incidents Reported to The Police by Month in 2016 (N=2278)




The line graph above provides a monthly breakdown of the number of offline anti-Muslim incidents and crimes recorded by police partners in 2016. This visualisation clearly demonstrates that there was a sharp spike in the number of incidents and crimes between June 2016 (190 incidents) and July 2016 (241 incidents). This represents a 44% increase in the number of street-based (offline) anti-Muslim incidents over a one-month period. The number of incidents reported to police then dropped to 241 in August and continued to fall to 166 for September. It would seem clear that this spike corresponds with the EU Referendum vote that took place on 23 June 2016. This evidence suggests that there was a significant increase in the number of Islamophobic hate crimes around the time of the EU referendum vote, correlating with personal accounts and media reporting at the time. This trend supports the data provided by the Home Office that reported the number of racially or religiously aggravated offences recorded by the police in July 2016 as being 41% higher than in July 2015.²³¹

²³¹ Home Office, *Hate Crime, England and Wales 2015/2016* (2016).

Online Anti-Muslim Incidents Recorded by Tell MAMA Police Partnership Forces

Of the 137-verifiable online reports logged by police partners the vast majority (75%, n=102) could be classified as **Abusive Behaviour** cases, including social media posts featuring anti-Muslim language and Islamophobic harassment via an instant messenger or email. The remaining incidents were cases of **Threatening Behaviour** (13%, n=18) and **Anti-Muslim Literature** (12%, n=17).



The most commonly specified platform for online anti-Muslim incidents was Facebook, which accounted for 42% (n=57) of cases, while Twitter accounted for 19% of online anti-Muslim incidents or crimes. Just 10% of online incidents (n=14) occurred via email. However, 13% of incidents (n=18) took place on a social media platform unspecified by the incident case notes. Similarly, a further 22 online anti-Muslim incidents (16%) lacked details of which online platform the abuse took place.

Triangulation: Comparing Police and Tell MAMA Data

Similar hate crime trends emerge when our dataset is compared against the data collected by police partners. For example, there is a significant increase in the number of Islamophobic hate crimes and incidents reported to our service and the police following the EU referendum result.

The top three most common categories for offline incidents reported to police force partners are consistent with our dataset (**Abusive Behaviour**, **Physical Attacks** and **Threatening Behaviour**) as are the categories of online incidents (**Abusive Behaviour**, **Threatening Behaviour** and **Anti-Muslim Literature**). However, while the fourth most common category for an offline incident reported to us in 2016 was **Discrimination** this category did not feature prominently within the police data. This may be due to the fact victims may be reluctant to report discrimination cases to the

police particularly if they are perceived as non-criminal in nature. **Public Area** was the most common place for anti-Muslim incidents reported to take place. Although the distribution over the other categories is different **Transport Network, Place of Business, Household or Private Property, Place of Work** and **Place of Business** remained prominent categories. Variation may be due to the type of cases reported to us which perhaps would not be reported to the police including anti-Muslim **Discrimination** cases within **Educational Institutions** which may not be viewed as a police matter by the victim or their families.



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