BEYOND THE INCIDENT

Outcomes for Victims of Anti-Muslim Prejudice

Tell MAMA Annual Report 2017
Beyond the Incident: Outcomes for Victims of Anti-Muslim Prejudice

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Foreword

We have seen a rise in anti-Muslim hatred over the last six years and it is an area that Tell MAMA have led on both in raising awareness and in supporting the tens of thousands of victims, many of whom are women.

This rise in anti-Muslim hate affects lives, families, communities, and ultimately the safety of our country. It divides communities and leads some towards extremist groups if they feel that they have no access to justice when they are repeatedly targeted by anti-Muslim hatred.

This report looks at the outcomes for victims, and highlights those police forces which are leading the way in getting social justice outcomes for victims. It also highlights the failures of some forces, where victims have felt that their voices have not been heard, evidence collected has been haphazard, and victims have not been able to gain access to further support services. This is not acceptable.

Over the last three decades, I have repeatedly stood against racism, intolerance and prejudice. However, like many, I am deeply concerned about the rise in hate that is affecting many lives. We must now redouble our efforts collectively to push back against the hate that threatens our values based on human rights. I am determined to do so, and we ask that you stand with us at this juncture, where groups seek to foment hate and to divide our communities. This, quite simply, must not be allowed to happen.

Shahid Malik, Chair of Tell MAMA
Former Labour Communities and Local Government Minister
Tell MAMA has become the leading response and support service for victims of anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia in the UK. This report outlines a variety of cases in both online and offline (street-based) environments.

In this report we also outline, once again, the substantive numbers of cases which involve institutional prejudice against Muslims, including discrimination in the provision of goods and services, or in the workplace.

Our reports from 2012 onwards have shown a rise in anti-Muslim hate incidents and this is a combination of a rise in public awareness, partly due to our work, and because there are more anti-Muslim incidents taking place. This report looks at the outcomes for victims of anti-Muslim hate and, whilst there are more reports that are being lodged with Tell MAMA, we have real concerns as to outcomes for victims once they gain access to the police or justice service, or report discrimination issues at work.

Our quality control measures mean that we attempt to get outcomes through advocacy and detailed casework for those reporting in, but victims have repeatedly informed us that their journey with police forces has left them ill-informed about the nature of their case and, in some instances, they have felt as if they were a nuisance, which was reflected in the way that they were being treated. This is unacceptable and these experiences chime with the recent report launch\(^1\) by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS). Their findings paint a picture of structural inconsistencies between police forces in the recording of hate crimes, the support offered to victims and, worst of all, victims have been made to feel that their perceptions of why they were attacked were not fully considered.

In a climate where anti-Muslim hate and Islamophobia is being mainstreamed through political discourse, media headlines and organised far-right and so-called ‘alt-right’ groups, the fact is that manufacturing anti-Muslim hate has become a lucrative business for some, is sadly here to stay and will continue to have real-world impacts in our country. This means that more people will be affected and, if victims experience poor outcomes when they engage with statutory bodies, mistrust will continue to grow.

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Given the importance of positive outcomes, and with large gaps in good quality services for victims of hate crimes, we believe that this report is much needed to highlight these simple but vital facts. In the end, whether hate incidents lead to prosecutions or not, victims want four simple things: to be treated with dignity, to be kept informed about developments in their case, and ensure that other courses of action are made available to them if the Crown Prosecution Service chooses not to prosecute. Finally, they want to be believed when reporting discrimination to their employers, or hate crimes and incidents to the police. Without that, trust is lost.

Iman Atta OBE
Peer Review Statement

This 2017 Review by Tell MAMA documents 1,201 verified incidents of anti-Muslim hatred with 3,005 incidents reported over the last three years. This clearly demonstrates the ongoing need for action to tackle anti-Muslim hatred in the UK. Seventy per cent of incidents in 2017 took place offline and just over half of these involved incidents of abusive behaviour with physical attacks accounting for nearly 20%. It is concerning that 2017 saw a 56% increase in incidents involving discrimination and an 88% increase in vandalism. Most incidents of anti-Muslim hatred took place in public areas and transport networks; however, this year, 12% took place in or around private property or households – a 26% increase from the previous year. These incidents took place across the UK; they are not restricted to specific regions. Most victims of anti-Muslim hatred are women and most of the perpetrators are male. A clear majority (72%) of the perpetrators are white men with younger men – including teenagers – being some of the main perpetrators. The Report presents important recommendations, including those aimed at businesses, at educational institutions and at social media companies. Anti-Muslim hatred is clearly a serious issue that needs to be addressed urgently.

Professor Peter Hopkins, Newcastle University
**Executive Summary**

Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) is an independent and confidential third-party hate crime reporting service for those who have experienced Islamophobic abuse, discrimination, or violence. Our support for victims and witnesses includes emotional support, signposting, and liaising with the police and other parties on their behalf when required. We receive reports from our free and confidential helpline, over email, via our official apps on the Apple and Android stores, through social media platforms, WhatsApp, and through our online form.

When a member of the public contacts our service, either as a victim or witness, each report is followed up by caseworkers who verify the information, gain further details, and provide any relevant support or signposting. If a member of the public sends us a news story, it is logged under a separate news category, increasing our ability to monitor and map trends in incidents. Each case is entered into our database which includes detailed case notes and correspondence. Cases are categorised by location and the type of incident. Other details include information about the perpetrator, the date of the incident, and personal details of the victim regarding their ethnicity, gender identity, age, and if they wear any Islamic clothing. These are questions which caseworkers ask when corresponding with victims, which they may choose to disclose or otherwise.

Each incident is verified by several members of our team to ascertain that the incident was Islamophobic in nature and that it had occurred in the UK between January and December 2017. This includes direct contact with a victim or witness over the telephone. For online cases, part of the verification process relates to the validity of hyperlinks and ensuring that a perpetrator is UK-based. While the raw number of incidents is recorded, only incidents which have been verified by Tell MAMA appear within the quantitative breakdown of trends reported in 2017.

- Tell MAMA recorded 1,380 reports in 2017, of which 1,201 reports were verified by our staff.
- More than two thirds of verified incidents occurred ‘offline’, or at street level (70%, n=839), which represents a 30% rise in offline reports when compared with the previous reporting period (n=642).
- There has been a 13.6% rise in verified online reports (n=362) when compared with the previous reporting period (n=311). This figure, however, is still below the 2015 figure of 364. Despite this slight rise in online reports it should still be viewed as part of a wider trend in our data sets, where there has been a marked shift towards more serious offline incidents.
- Over the last three years, Tell MAMA has recorded a steady increase in offline anti-Muslim incidents year-on-year. Between 2015 and 2016 we recorded a 46.9% increase in offline incidents.
- In 2017, there were several high-profile domestic terrorist incidents in the UK. As documented within our 2016 Annual Report, events which stimulate public discourse on immigration and Islam can correspond with a demonstrable ‘spike’ in anti-Muslim hate crimes and incidents. It is vital to note, however, that these events are not the underlying cause of anti-Muslim incidents, but rather, as the term implies, act as ‘triggers’, where people with latent racial prejudices feel
emboldened to act on their views, violently or otherwise. Perpetrators often reference mainstream discourse concerning immigration and terrorism alongside broadly Islamophobic and dehumanising language to abuse their victims.

- Tell MAMA recorded a 475% increase in the number of offline anti-Muslim incidents reported in the week following the UK 2016 EU referendum. However, this spike was dwarfed by the 700% increase recorded in the week following the Manchester Arena attack on 22 May 2017, with 72 reports recorded seven days after the terror attack, compared with 9 reports in the previous week.
- The two most common forms of offline incidents in 2017 were Abusive Behaviour and Physical Attack: 70% of verified offline incidents included directly abusive, violent, or threatening behaviour (Abusive Behaviour 52%, n=441; Physical Attack 18%, n=149).
- We identified 978 victims and 1,161 perpetrators in 839 incidents in our 2017 data set. Our previous annual reports have evidenced that Islamophobia is heavily gendered, given that most victims are female (57.5%, n=562) while most perpetrators are male (64.6%, n=750). A clear majority (72%) of the perpetrators are white men (n=518).
- Over half of the victims are visibly Muslim women (53%, n=353) where data is available (n=669).
- We recorded a 56% rise in Discrimination (n=72) and an 88% increase in Vandalism (n=81) when compared with the previous reporting period.
- Incidents often occurred in busy public spaces or transport networks (Public Area 34%, n=282; Transport Networks 13%, n=107).
- Incidents which occurred around a Household or Private Property (12%, n=101) increased by 26% from the previous reporting period.
- Victims and perpetrators of Islamophobic incidents can be of any age. However, the most common age range of victims was 26–35 and the most common age range of perpetrators was 13–18 (where the data was available). Given that many cases involve low-level abuse, harassment or violence, victims understandably are sometimes unable to recall the precise age of the perpetrator. The age range of perpetrators may reflect a wider problem of Islamophobic bullying in educational institutions.

In response to rising reports to our service of structural and non-structural forms of anti-Muslim prejudice and Islamophobia (e.g. assaults or acts of abusive behaviour), we have created a series of recommendations for social media companies, businesses, educational institutions and others, to help them address these issues head-on.

**General Recommendations**

- Anti-Muslim incidents frequently occur in busy public spaces. These include shopping areas, in and around public transport networks, roads or highways, and restaurants. Perpetrators are more likely to act in spaces where they feel they can act with impunity. Therefore existing preventative measures, where appropriate, should be utilised, and where such measures are lacking or absent, steps should be taken to address such inadequacies.
High-profile events, along with associated media coverage, stimulate public discourse on issues such as terrorism, religious expression and immigration, and can legitimise racist, xenophobic and Islamophobic prejudice. Individuals with underlying prejudice may feel emboldened to victimise those they feel to be deserving of abuse so as to defend the status of the dominant ‘in-group’. The government and media outlets must consider how their choice of language influences wider public discourse.

Perpetrators often target victims who are in a vulnerable position relative to themselves, whether that be physically or socially. This may be related to age, gender, disability, class, and racial or religious identity.

Those in authority, including representatives of law enforcement agencies, and civil authorities such as teachers, council officials and employers, should be aware of any potential power imbalance when responding to a report of identity-based abuse or discrimination. Those in a privileged position due to their social status will invariably have an advantage when it comes to negotiating their case with the appropriate agencies.

Individuals with vulnerabilities may need additional support and therefore resources need to be allocated within institutions, organisations and private companies to train staff accordingly. Cultivating a better institutional knowledge of the situations in which such individuals can be scapegoated for broader social ills, and ultimately marginalised, would enable this.

We should not underestimate the power of public statements condemning and combating Islamophobia within the media. It is important that judges, politicians and representatives of law enforcement continue to convey a strong stance. Conversely, the inclusion in the media of mitigating statements from judges, excusing abusive and violent Islamophobic behaviour, undermines the impact of victimisation and sends the wrong message.

In addition to formal criminal justice and civil outcomes, informal responses to incidents are also important. Victims appreciate frequent and accurate updates from the police. However, victims are often not aware of the process for reporting to the police and what to expect. Many victims reported to Tell MAMA to share their negative (though sometimes positive) experiences of interacting with the police. An initial lack of communication is frequently compounded by unsupportive comments from officers along with lack of follow-up.

Members of the public should not underestimate their role in challenging Islamophobia and showing support for victims. If individuals can safely show solidarity with victims during or following an incident, this can create an environment in which abuse and identity-based discrimination are unacceptable.

We must not underestimate the far-reaching impact that anti-Muslim prejudice and Islamophobia has on individuals. Low-level ongoing abuse can escalate with serious consequences. Guaranteeing the safety of individuals is of paramount importance.

Recommendations for Employers and Businesses

Almost one in ten cases in 2017 concerned discrimination issues, which demonstrates that the work in countering Islamophobia and anti-Muslim prejudice goes beyond just hate crime. Often ‘low-level’ abuse can be a daily occurrence that shapes significantly
the everyday lives of victims, especially when there is a gendered dynamic to the abuse and victims are in close proximity to their abusers. In one case, a Muslim woman was persistently bullied by a male colleague who referred to her hijab as a “tea towel”. She did not report the abuse, however, out of fear that management would react negatively, and that reporting it might serve to increase the Islamophobic bullying rather than to reduce it. Our recommendations would therefore include:

- Employers have a moral obligation to ensure that all employees feel respected and that differences in belief, religious or otherwise, are welcomed and respected. Encouraging staff to embrace diversity and to learn about each other’s backgrounds can help encourage empathy, which may discourage the normalisation of Islamophobic attitudes and cultural stereotypes that are perceived to be negative.
- Employers and all members of staff should be reminded of their liability for acts of unlawful discrimination, bullying, harassment, and victimisation of their fellow employees, members of the public, or customers. Such a reminder may help to address issues concerning structural or institutional forms of Islamophobia, where the life chances of Muslims are harmed at the recruitment or career advancement stages.
- Employers should take complaints from staff seriously and create an environment where people are aware of internal grievance processes. Moreover, HR officers who are independent and, therefore, neutral about any underlying and systemic prejudicial attitudes, should be made available to employees who have grievances against other employees or management.
- Reminding staff that acts of victimisation may amount to gross misconduct and incur subsequent automatic dismissal may encourage others to come forward and report abuse and/or bullying.
- Employers should educate all staff about their rights under the Equality Act 2010 and make greater efforts to foster an environment of religious and cultural tolerance which would include reasonable adjustments to, for example, allow staff the time to pray in a multi-faith prayer room or space during work hours.
- Informing employees of their legal rights pertaining to workplace discrimination should be considered a priority, and information regarding such rights should be made more readily available, whether that be through third-party agencies or specialised services which can advocate on behalf of victims and signpost them where necessary.
- Employers should be encouraged to refer staff who are experiencing bullying or harassment to specialised services such as Tell MAMA, which may help to reduce absenteeism or presenteeism, and improve staff retention rates.

**Recommendations for Educational Institutions**

A wide-ranging study published in 2008 found that perceptions of fairness in local schools drew from personal or vicarious experiences. It found that a key driver of perceptions of discrimination concerned the mismanagement of racist and religious bullying. Some Asian parents in the study had withdrawn their children following incidents of Islamophobic bullying.¹ The disproportionate exclusion of minority ethnic

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students remains a problem, as data for 2015/16 found that ‘Black and Mixed ethnicity pupils had the highest rates of both fixed period and permanent exclusions’.\(^2\)

Parents who contact Tell MAMA have also frequently raised concerns or expressed dissatisfaction with how their child’s school dealt with complaints of bullying, especially when it involved those in authority.

The misuse of safeguarding policies in educational institutions is another point of concern for some service users; notably, there was the case of Mr Gulfruz, who suffered the indignity of having the police visit his home after his 7-year-old son expressed his happiness about a toy water pistol when at school in June 2017.\(^3\)

Given that one in three Muslim students surveyed reported living in fear of anti-Muslim attacks on university campuses, a fear which is more pronounced among those who wear Islamic clothing, anti-Muslim hate incidents in educational institutions require a robust response. This is especially true where there is a lack of trust involved in the process by which incidents are reported to university staff, given how many Muslim students admitted to censoring their views after citing concerns about the current Prevent duty.\(^4\)

Our recommendations would therefore include:

- Proactive strategies tackling discrimination and ‘casual’ abuse in educational environments require input from specialist third parties and external institutions equipped with the knowledge to educate both pupils and staff.
- Parents often mention that their complaints are undermined or dismissed. Teachers and senior members of staff should be reminded of their legal obligations to handle complaints sensitively and should do more to ensure transparency about their formal and informal complaints procedures, especially if complaints are made against staff.
- Schools and educational institutions should provide training to their staff or seek expert advice on how to deal with issues of identity-based victimisation or discrimination.
- Building trust between pupils and teachers may encourage young people to report instances of Islamophobic bullying. One way to build trust can be informal sessions where students feel safe and empowered to challenge stereotypes about Islam and Muslims amongst their peers.
- Teachers can also set an example by reminding students that bullying, racism, Islamophobia, and other forms of hatred will not be tolerated; such statements may help victims to feel less isolated.

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\(^3\) Kerbaj, R. ‘Alert over Muslim boy’s water pistol.’ The Times and The Sunday Times. Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/alert-over-muslim-boys-water-pistol-w0hmjg6b (retrieved 18/06/2018).

● Teachers should be encouraged to take more of an interest in the lives of their Muslim students given that many of the latter believe that teachers have stereotypical or low expectations of them.5

● Muslim students need guidance so schools should do more to accommodate more Muslim role models, and foster a teaching environment where students should not fear going to staff for advice and support.

● Promoting religious literacy outside formal lessons may help facilitate meaningful dialogue and constructive debate amongst students.

● Educational institutions must do more to ensure that safeguarding referrals to the police or other agencies are proportional and not misused. This would build trust and help to ensure that individuals do not feel targeted because of their Islamic identity.

● The Department for Education (DfE) should engage with specialist support agencies such as Tell MAMA to better understand issues around anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia in educational institutions.

● The Office for Students (OfS) funded eleven universities to tackle religious hate crime and improve religious literacy, to the sum of £480,000 in April 2018 which, moving forward, should be encouraged, and developed with more universities.6

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Introduction

In 2015, our report highlighted how Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred harmed the mobility of Muslims in public spaces. A year later, the focus shifted towards the intersectional nature of abuse and its disproportionate impact on Muslim women.

Now, in 2017, we expand the scope of our findings to explore the wider repercussions that Islamophobia has on victims. We, therefore, look beyond the immediacy of the abuse and violence and turn our attention to how outcomes were achieved (if at all) through formal, informal, and criminal justice mechanisms. Only by focusing on the experiences of victims can we hope to understand this issue further.

Throughout this report, we will use the terms Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred, partly for brevity because the terms are established in existing hate crime literature and used by police forces nationwide when logging Islamophobic incidents and crimes. In addition, some perpetrators in our data set demonstrate a disproportionate hatred of Islam which often has little to do with attacking or abusing Muslims directly. Freedom of expression is a vital and crucial but comes with a responsibility to not harm others or threaten or incite violence.

As with our previous report, we define Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred as:

A certain perception of Muslims, which may be expressed as hatred or outward hostility towards Muslims. Hatred may take the form of anti-Muslim rhetoric and physical manifestations that are targeted towards Muslims (or non-Muslim individuals considered to be sympathetic to Muslims) and/or their property; or towards Muslim community institutions or religious and other related social institutions.

This report further develops a wider understanding of how racism, prejudice, and discrimination against Muslims is shaped, which enables us to recognise the ways in which certain attitudes manifest in the public domain and within institutions, which can harm the aspirations and life experiences of Muslims in Britain. The findings of this report will advance the discussion and offer pathways and recommendations for best practice to ensure that Muslims feel supported when reporting a hate crime, discrimination, or racist abuse.

In 2017, there was a surge in race or faith hate crime reports following several devastating terror attacks in London and Manchester but not after Finsbury Park, according to provisional data from the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC). We also saw several spikes in Islamophobic hate reports following these major terrorist attacks. Existing literature has conceptualised hate incidents and crimes as micro-manifestations of existing national and international divisions which are then exacerbated following high-profile events and associated media coverage.7 8 Our

previous report highlighted the impact of high-profile ‘trigger’ events such as the EU referendum result and terrorist attacks which stimulated public discourse on immigration and cultural differences. This resulted in a measurable increase in overt prejudice and violence towards minority groups, often focusing primarily on Muslims.9

Typologies of hate crime can be useful in assessing the reasons as to why there are observable spikes in hate crime reports. A significant proportion of hate crime can be categorised as having ‘defensive’ or ‘reparatory’ motivations, as perpetrators believe their community to be under threat from outsiders.10 Our 2016 analysis revealed that perpetrators of Islamophobic incidents often referenced public discourse concerning immigration and terrorism alongside more generalised and racialised anti-Muslim abuse.11 These typologies are particularly relevant as they highlight the connection between politically charged events and the motives behind a significant proportion of hate crime.

Following the EU referendum result on 13 June 2016, there was a clear increase in recorded hate crime.12 13 In 2017, we saw a continuation of heightened anxiety concerning immigration and terrorism along with associated anti-Muslim sentiments and cultural racism. Provisional hate crime data from police forces revealed a clear rise in reports following the terror attacks in Westminster Bridge (22 March), Manchester (22 May) and London Bridge (3 June), which is based on initial data and may, therefore, be subject to slight fluctuations, for example through issues such as retrospective reporting.14 The baseline for hate crime has arguably increased following the rise in reports in 2016, which was at its highest following the EU referendum. In the month following the EU referendum vote, 5,468 racially and religiously aggravated hate crimes were recorded, up from 3,886 in the same period for 2015.15 In comparison, the number of racially or religiously aggravated incidents following terrorist incidents in the spring and summer of 2017 rose to 6,000 at their height.16 The same spikes were not recorded for non-aggravated offences in 2016 and 2017.17

On 19 June 2017, Darren Osborne drove a van into a group of Muslims in Finsbury Park, London. Twelve people were injured and 51-year-old Makram Ali was killed by

11 Tell MAMA. Ibid.
13 Tell MAMA. Ibid.
14 “Comparisons with the previous year should be viewed with caution, as there was a similar spike last year following the EU Referendum vote which influences the baseline statistics. There are also complications because data collection in 2016 began on different days than in 2017.” “Latest hate crime figures covering the period of 2017 UK terrorist attacks published”. NPCC. Available at: https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/latest-hate-crime-figures-covering-the-period-of-2017-uk-terrorist-attacks-published (retrieved 25.04.18).
15 Home Office. Ibid.
17 Ibid, p. 15.
the impact of the van crushing him. Osborne immersed himself in far-right content online in the fortnight before his attack, much of which was centred around the notion that Western nations are under assault by Islam, and, in a racist handwritten letter, he had declared that Islam was incompatible with the West, adding that Muslims are “raping inbred bastards & climb back on ya camels”.

Despite a 29% recorded rise in hate crime in 2016/2017, it is evident that the same trend has not been reflected in the prosecution data published by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). The latest CPS hate crime report reveals that the number of convictions for hate crime has fallen from 15,442 in the previous year to 14,480. Furthermore, the CPS recorded a decrease in police referrals for racially and religiously aggravated hate crime in 2015/2016. These trends are worrying as they indicate that, despite criminal justice agencies noting a significant increase in hate crime, we are seeing a lack of criminal justice outcomes for victims of hate crime.

There are many potential obstacles to achieving criminal justice outcomes for victims of hate crime, including institutional discrimination, widespread prejudice, and social barriers to reporting hate crime and accessing public services. However, achieving outcomes for anti-Muslim incidents should be viewed as essential for victims of such crimes. Criminal justice outcomes promote the notion that racism and victimisation will not be tolerated in our society and that victims will receive the necessary support. This, in turn, helps to increase reporting as victims can feel confident that their reports will be acted upon.

In December of 2017, the Safer Bristol Partnership group found evidence of discriminatory behaviour and institutional racism within Avon and Somerset Police in relation to the murder of Bijan Ebrahimi. Ebrahimi was beaten to death and set on fire on a Bristol housing estate in 2013. A refugee from Iran, he had been wrongly accused of being a paedophile and had been repeatedly targeted for racist abuse by some of his neighbours. Officers from Avon and Somerset Police, who were subsequently dismissed, and some of whom served a custodial sentence, consistently sided with Ebrahimi’s abusers without investigating any of the malicious accusations objectively. While this is an extreme case, the dynamic described is representative of attitudes often encountered by victims of hate crime as their claims are often dismissed by authority figures, and counter-allegations by perpetrators are sometimes taken at face value without due investigation. This form of institutional prejudice acts as a hard barrier to reporting as the very act of reporting can potentially incur more hardship for the victim.

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Previously, we have highlighted the long-term psychological impacts, along with the more practical impacts, that Islamophobic incidents have on individuals and communities.\textsuperscript{23,24}

In this context, criminal justice outcomes for hate incidents are particularly significant as they help protect both the physical and mental wellbeing, as well as the status, of minority groups given that victims of hate crime experience deeper psychological distress than victims of non-aggravated equivalent offences. A lack of follow-up from criminal justice agencies may promote the view that victimising members of a certain group are acceptable.\textsuperscript{25,26,27}

It should also be noted that criminal justice outcomes are not the only form of outcome that is significant for victims. In addition to criminal justice outcomes, civil outcomes and informal outcomes are also important. Civil outcomes refers to the result of actions taken by civil authorities (councils, educational institutions, etc.) in response to hate incidents, while informal outcomes refers to the result of actions taken by individuals such as witnesses and authority figures in response to hate incidents. These two categories, while likely to have less of a societal impact than criminal justice outcomes, are still central to the wellbeing of victims.

While outcomes for serious incidents are particularly significant for the wellbeing of victims, outcomes for cases of low-level abuse or discrimination are also important. Despite the popular conception that hate crime offences are one-off acts of violence committed by persons unknown to the victim, evidence suggests that hate-motivated victimisation often involves an ongoing process of ‘low-level’ harassment and discrimination. This type of hate incident can occur over extended periods of time and can sometimes escalate into threats and physical violence from neighbours, work colleagues, casual acquaintances and even people in positions of authority.\textsuperscript{28,29} It is in this context that civil outcomes and informal outcomes are especially significant as criminal justice agencies are less likely to become involved in low-level, non-criminal hate incidents.\textsuperscript{30,31,32} Low-level, often non-criminal Islamophobic discrimination can have serious psychological consequences for victims, manifesting largely as anxiety and stress, which often goes unreported.\textsuperscript{33} When incidents of ongoing harassment

\textsuperscript{24} Tell MAMA. \textit{Tell MAMA Annual Report 2015: The Geography of Anti-Muslim Hatred} (2016).
\textsuperscript{26} Bell, J. \textit{Policing Hatred: Law Enforcement, Civil Rights, and Hate Crime} (New York, 2002).
\textsuperscript{27} Tell MAMA. \textit{We Fear for our Lives: Offline and Online Experiences of Anti-Muslim Hostility} (2015).
\textsuperscript{28} Williams, M. and Tregidga, J. \textit{All Wales Hate Crime Research Project} (Cardiff, 2013).
\textsuperscript{30} Chakraborti, N., Garland, J. and Hardy, S. \textit{The Leicester Hate Crime Project: Findings and Conclusions}. The University of Leicester (2014).
and discrimination are reported to managers, housing authorities and criminal justice agencies, they are often handled poorly, resulting in unsatisfactory outcomes for individuals who have experienced abuse or victimisation. Without satisfactory outcomes, victims will continue to suffer and will disinclined and reluctant to report.

Outcomes for Victims of Anti-Muslim Incidents

For the purposes of this report, outcomes for incidents have been categorised as follows: Criminal Justice Outcomes, Civil Outcomes, and Informal Outcomes. These outcomes contribute to the impact an incident can have on a victim, along with the immediate effect of the incident itself.

Criminal Justice Outcomes refers to the result of actions taken by criminal justice agencies in response to anti-Muslim incidents. This includes results that arise from arrests, convictions, custodial sentences, community sentencing or inaction by the police, along with formal action taken against the victim in the form of counter-allegations.

Civil Outcomes refers to the result of actions taken by councils, educational institutions, private companies or employers in response to anti-Muslim incidents. This may include results that arise from disciplinary procedures for abusive staff, the exclusion of perpetrators of Islamophobic bullying in schools, or a penalty notice for abusive neighbours, along with formal action taken against the victim in the form of counter-allegations.

Informal Outcomes refers to the result of actions taken by witnesses in response to anti-Muslim incidents, including an intervention, along with the result of informal actions taken by individuals in positions of authority, including directing verbal warnings toward perpetrators or support toward a victim. However, this may also refer to results that arise from the inaction of witnesses or authority figures, or their support for, or defence of, a perpetrator of an Islamophobic incident.

34 Williams and Tregidga. Op cit.
In addition to the outcomes of Islamophobic incidents, this report will examine how anti-Muslim abuse or discrimination impacts on victims. It is both the initial anti-Muslim victimisation as well as the victim's experience of the criminal justice, civil and informal outcomes that contributes to the impact of the incident on the victim, illustrated by the diagram above.

**Review of Existing Literature**

**Outcomes for Hate Incidents and Crimes**

This section will summarise the existing literature regarding outcomes of hate incidents and crimes, highlighting key issues with a focus on anti-Muslim incidents. By outcomes we are referring to the effects and results of Islamophobic incidents.

**Criminal Justice Outcomes**

*Criminal justice outcomes* are important for victims of hate crime and for wider society because they lend credence to the idea that individuals from minority groups should have equal status in society and deserve protection from abuse.\(^{35}\) Unfortunately, due to a variety of material factors, this ideal often does not align with reality. On the other hand, a lack of appropriate response to hate crimes from law enforcement may signify that society rejects individuals from certain minorities. Indeed, a lack of criminal justice outcomes for hate crime offences may create an atmosphere in which individuals from minority communities feel at odds with criminal justice agencies and believe that the police side with the offenders.\(^{36}\)

It is widely acknowledged that hate crimes are slightly less likely than non-aggravated equivalent offences to result in criminal justice outcomes. In their 2014 study, Lyon and Roberts found that in general hate crimes are less likely to result in a criminal conviction than non-bias offences.\(^{37}\)

For many, a positive criminal justice outcome for a hate crime would mean a custodial sentence. However, in recent years, there has been a steady shift towards more community-oriented outcomes. The proportion of offenders who receive custodial sentences for hate crime offences has decreased, as has the length of custodial sentences. Most offenders convicted of hate crime offences are given a fine or community-based sentence, which can involve some form of unpaid work, for anything up to 300 hours, or adherence to a curfew.\(^{38}\)

In addition to a lower level of criminal justice outcomes for hate crime offences, there is also a disparity in their experience of criminal justice agencies between victims of

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hate crimes and victims of non-hate crimes. Indeed, victims of all hate crime report more emotional impact and less satisfaction with the police response than victims of equivalent non-bias crimes.39 40 41

**Barriers to Criminal Justice Outcomes**

To understand the discrepancy between the criminal justice system response to hate and non-hate offences, it is important to consider the process by which hate crimes and incidents come to the attention of authorities and are followed up by relevant agencies.

Studies have shown that the seriousness of a crime is the most significant determining factor in deciding if the crime results in a criminal justice outcome.42 43 Hate incidents involving a weapon or resulting in the need for medical attention are more likely to come to the attention of law enforcement.44 45 Evidence also suggests that law enforcement agencies are more likely to label an offence as a hate crime if they believe that it can result in a criminal justice outcome.46

Stereotypes about crime, victims and offenders remain an issue in the criminal justice process for all types of offences. Bell’s 2002 analysis of police hate crime investigations revealed that law enforcement agents rely on indicators to determine whether a crime was bias-motivated. Such indicators include the status and relationship of the victim and offender, words used during the incident, location, and whether the offenders outnumbered the victim.47 Research by Lyon and Roberts found that while hate crime has a lower conviction rate than non-hate offences. Hate crimes which align most closely with the typical ‘white on non-white’ stereotype were as likely to result in criminal convictions as non-bias offences.48 Law enforcement agencies may also ‘downplay’ some hate crimes due to the characteristics of the victim or offender. U.S studies in the 1980s and 1990s found that police officers labelled racially motivated crimes committed by groups of young people as acts of ‘juvenile irresponsibility’ rather than as hate crimes.49 50 Diminishing and failing to follow up on

40 Chakraborti et al. Op cit.
46 Bell. Op cit.
47 Ibid.
48 Lyons and Roberts. Op cit.
hate crime offences in this way may negatively affect the support victims receive and send a message to victims of hate crime, and wider society, that victimising people from certain groups is acceptable.

Understanding barriers to hate crime reporting is key to achieving better outcomes for victims of hate incidents.\(^{51}\) Existing research shows that victims may avoid reporting hate crime to law enforcement agencies to avoid further potentially stressful or humiliating experiences.\(^{52}\) A report from the Centre for Applied Human Rights at the University of York highlights the considerable practical, structural and social barriers to reporting hate crime, which includes the trauma minority groups often experience due to historical oppression. The report notes that despite advancements in the political rights of minority groups, many have not achieved such economic rights where systemic discrimination denies marginalised groups employment opportunities. A cultural barrier the report highlights is how some victims may lack the language proficiency to articulate the incident and with the confidence that the police will understand them. Moreover, the report suggests that due to historical and ongoing structural oppressions means that some marginalised groups have a lack of trust in the police.\(^{53}\) This is supported by existing evidence which suggests that a high proportion of hate crime goes unreported: The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), for example, indicates that only 48% of hate crimes are reported to the police.\(^{54}\)

There are various factors that influence decisions concerning reporting Islamophobic incidents to the police. Young people are less likely to report, women are more likely to report, and hate incidents involving a weapon or resulting in the need for medical attention are more likely to be reported. The CSEW found that the most common reason cited for why a victim of a hate crime would not report was “because the victim believed that the police would not or could not do much about it” (43%).\(^ {55}\) Further studies have found that a quarter of hate crime victims did not report an incident due to the belief that the police would not help, and almost one fifth (18%) believed that it was ‘not important enough’ to report.\(^ {56}\) Another possible cause of under-reporting may be a lack of understanding of what a hate incident is, how to report it, what will happen once a hate crime is reported, and how to communicate so that their experience is understood.\(^ {57}\)

\(^{51}\) Sandholtz et al. Op cit.


\(^{56}\) Sandholtz et al. Ibid.

\(^{57}\) Ibid.
The perception that offenders will be arrested and prosecuted is important for the general public’s perceived legitimacy of the police, which increases the likelihood of them reporting a crime and cooperating with the police. It can also reduce further social conflict which manifests itself in informal retaliation. The extent to which hate crimes are reported to the police and are appropriately followed up by criminal justice agencies can have a notable impact on a minority group’s trust in the police. This, in turn, impacts the likelihood of individuals from minority groups to report hate crime and cooperate with criminal justice agencies. It is important that people do report a hate incident even if it fails to satisfy the criminal threshold.

Considerable attention has been focused on surpassing barriers to hate crime reporting. This includes, for example, the Mayor of London’s Hate Crime Strategy (2014-2017), which aimed to boost community confidence in the police and increase hate crime reporting. The strategy highlighted that while all hate crime is under-reported, when a victim is from an ‘isolated’ identity group, such as the Traveller and Roma communities or ‘new’ migrant communities, or is disabled or transgendered, this under-reporting is worse. It set out a number of actions with the intention of enabling communities to feel emboldened enough to report hate crimes; these measures ranged from Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Safer Schools Officers being trained to talk to students specifically about hate crimes in PSHE lessons, to the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) developing a smartphone crime reporting app and piloting the use of that app for hate crime. This being said, it is not yet clear to what extent these measures have been implemented nor whether they have been effective. Moreover, there are more structural barriers which limit trust in the criminal justice service, which include institutional discrimination and the personal biases of judges. In 2015, the then President of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, said judges must be ‘sensitive’ to their own cultural and economic privileges compared with those who appear in court. Polling that year also found that just 20% of Muslims surveyed stated that they could trust legal professionals – compared with the national average of 37%. Disproportionality in the use of stop-and-search powers, and more broadly in counter-terrorism powers, also shapes the perception of law enforcement among Muslims in Britain. The Criminal Justice Outcomes section of this report will cover these issues in greater depth.


Civil Outcomes

Civil outcomes are significant for victims of hate crime and society in a similar way to that of criminal justice outcomes. However, while civil outcomes are equally as impactful for individuals, they are inherently less visible than criminal justice outcomes, and therefore may prove less effective in impacting societal attitudes. This invisibility is because data concerning civil outcomes is less available to the public, given that private companies and institutions other than criminal justice agencies are often not inclined to release data on outcomes relating to prejudice. Therefore, existing research on civil outcomes is limited.

Most literature on civil outcomes relates to discrimination cases. The Equality Act 2010 states that one must not be discriminated against due to aspects of one’s identity, including ethnicity and religious identity. Research has shown that the presence of employment non-discrimination and hate crime laws are associated with a reduced number of hate incidents. However, there is evidence to suggest that despite equality legislation, blatant forms of discrimination can still manifest while personal, group and institutional prejudices exist within our society. Unfortunately, there is only a relatively small amount of research focusing on religious, and specifically anti-Muslim, discrimination in the workplace.

Our 2016 Annual Report highlighted the prevalence and personal impact of anti-Muslim discrimination in the workplace, within educational institutions and for those accessing private and public services in the UK. Discrimination can be classified as two distinct typologies: (1) formal discrimination, which covers overt forms of discrimination such as the unambiguous refusal to hire someone from a particular group; and (2) informal discrimination, which often consists of subtle discriminatory treatment or casual racist comments. While acknowledging that overt discrimination still exists within modern workplaces, theorists have argued that more subtle forms of discrimination are more prevalent due to gaps in existing anti-discrimination legislation.

More broadly, according to the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), despite Muslims making up less than 2% of the US population, they

68 Ibid.
accounted for almost one quarter of the 3,386 religious discrimination claims filed with
the EEOC in 2009. This follows a broad trend whereby Muslims in the US have seen
an increase in instances of discrimination following the 9/11 terror attacks.

For example, the same data shows that in the year following the 9/11 attacks charges
involving religious discrimination against Muslims more than doubled. A study
published in 2017 indicated that around 40% of European Muslims have experienced
unfair treatment when seeking employment or accessing public services including
healthcare and education. The Social Mobility Commission found that transition into
the workplace is harder for those of disadvantaged backgrounds when they lack the
informal networks or social and financial capital to gain paid internships or work
experience. Many of the Muslims interviewed expected to face discrimination even
when they had the educational qualifications required. Participants believed that
discrimination would deprive them of potential interviews due to ‘ethnic-sounding’
names. Moreover, only one in five (19.8%) of the Muslim population in England and
Wales is in full-time employment, compared with more than one in three (34.9%) of
the broader population, which has dire consequences for social mobility. Muslim
women (18%) are also more likely to be economically inactive than the broader
population (6%).

More broadly, austerity and public spending cuts have also had a disproportionate
impact on minority ethnic women. Our research found evidence of a ‘Muslim penalty’
in salaried jobs as unlike Hindu Indians, who are almost 1.49 times as likely as a white
British Christian to access the salariat, Muslim Indians are 0.86 times as likely to
acquire such a job. For white female Muslims, they are 0.72 times as likely as a white
Christian or non-religious woman to access the salariat. For Bangladeshi and
Pakistani women, however, the odds are significantly worse.

We have limited data regarding civil outcomes that are non-discrimination related
and relate to racist abuse in UK schools. Statistics from the Department for Education

70 ‘Religion-Based Charges Filed from 10/01/2000 through 9/30/2011 Showing Percentage Filed on
the Basis of Religion-Muslim’. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Available at:
71 Ibid.
72 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Second European Union Minorities and
Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS II) Muslims – Selected findings. Available at:
73 ‘Young Muslims in the UK face enormous social mobility barriers’. GOV.UK. Available at:
barriers (retrieved 10/07/2018).
74 Ibid.
75 UK CEDAW Working Group, Women’s equality in the UK – A health check (2013). Available at:
Faith Matters’. Data.parliament.uk. Available at:
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/women-and-
equalities-committee/employment-opportunities-for-muslims-in-the-uk/written/32177.html (retrieved
10/07/2018).
document a total of 4,100 permanent and fixed period exclusions for racist abuse in state-funded primary, secondary and SEN (Special Educational Need) schools in England for 2015 and 2016. The majority of these took place in state-funded secondary schools (86%, n=3,525). In addition to this, data obtained via Freedom of Information requests have shown that there were 919 hate crime offences recorded in and around schools between September 2016 and July 2017, compared with 568 in the previous period of reporting, representing a 62% increase. Seventy-one per cent of these crimes were race and ethnicity related, while 9% were religion or belief-related.

**Informal Outcomes (Attitudes towards Hate Crime)**

**Informal outcomes** can be of great consequence for victims if witnesses, for example, do nothing, which risks normalising hateful or racist behaviour in the eyes of victims and the wider community. This applies even more to authority figures whose aid is sought by victims after an incident. For example, if a police officer is perceived by a victim to automatically side with the perpetrator of an incident without due investigation, the victim’s emotional wellbeing will invariably be negatively affected beyond the initial abuse.

Theorists have identified a tendency for people to blame victims of crime for the crime itself due to a belief that the world is ‘just’ and that ‘bad things’ do not happen to good people. For example, people may hold the view that the victim of a violent attack late at night outside a nightclub is partly to blame for their own victimisation due to their behaviour or ‘lifestyle choices’. In a similar vein, an individual’s social status and identity may also be a factor affecting people’s reactions to their victimisation, and attribution of blame. Evidence indicates that negative stereotypes about certain groups may discredit victims of hate crime, meaning that individuals may see them as less deserving of sympathy. Individuals from minority groups reporting a crime will also be disadvantaged by the “stigma” associated with their identity and experience further institutional and personal discrimination.

In contrast, evidence suggests that bystanders view victims of hate crime to be less at fault than victims of non-hate crime. They also view perpetrators of hate crime to be

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78 Bulman, M. ‘Hate crime numbers in and around schools and colleges up 62% in a year, figures show’. *The Independent*. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/hate-crime-schools-colleges-uk-education-rise-racism-lgbt-race-ethnicity-a8183061.html (retrieved 02/05/2018).
guiltier than perpetrators of non-hate crimes.  

However, Lyons' 2006 study of the attribution of stigma or sympathy within hate crime cases revealed that while individuals from a racial minority group were viewed sympathetically, individuals from LGBT groups were viewed with less sympathy and held more accountable for their actions than heterosexual victims of non-bias crimes. It could be argued that victims of LGBT hate crime may be more likely to be seen as deserving of victimisation due to the perception that LGBT identity is a 'lifestyle choice' rather than an innate identity. This may have parallels with the way in which Muslim identity is viewed in that it may be viewed as an elective religious identity, rather than as a cultural component of one's identity, which would necessarily impact the informal outcomes of incidents.

Impact of Hate Crime on Victims

Measuring the impact hate crimes can have on victims, as it pertains to criminal justice, civil and informal outcomes, is key to empowering relevant agencies to track progress for individual service users and monitor and improve their organisations' effectiveness. It is also vital to securing future investment for victim support services and ensuring such services are held accountable to the communities they support. Hate crime victims tend to experience deeper psychological trauma due to the targeted nature of abuse and attacks when compared to non-aggravated equivalent offences. Moreover, a University of Sussex project used a variety of methods and interviewed more than a 1,000 Muslims and 2,000 LGBT people to measure the indirect results of hate crime on communities. A vast majority of respondents knew someone who had either been assaulted (just over half) or been more broadly victimised (four out of five). The emotional responses included increased anxiety and many would take steps to improve their own personal security, or even change their routes home.

Previous studies have shown the damaging effects identity-based hate incidents have on the mental health and wellbeing of victims, affecting their daily lives, with the added

fear of potential further victimisation. Moreover, existing evidence highlights the considerably divisive impacts of hate crime on marginalised communities.\textsuperscript{89 90 91 92} A study of Muslims living in New York following the 9/11 terror attacks revealed that although none of the participants had experienced a violent personal attack, the majority (62.8\%) knew an individual who had experienced such an attack or had experienced some form of victimisation. While none of the participants had experienced personal injury, the hate crimes they had experienced still had serious long-term psychological impacts. Participants suffering from PTSD, feelings of hopelessness and anxiety reported that they had changed their behaviour and feared more for their safety because of their experiences.\textsuperscript{98} In addition to this, some have argued that amongst certain Muslim communities there is a cultural stigma attached to mental illness, with individuals often turning to religious strategies (e.g. prayer) as a coping mechanism for depression or symptoms of schizophrenia.\textsuperscript{99} This can make seeking help as regards one’s mental wellbeing harder for some Muslims, which may compound the psychological issues associated with hate crime victimisation. It should be noted that this is only one factor among many, and is likely to be less significant than socio-economic factors in deterring individuals from seeking help.

Outcomes of hate incidents are significant for victims’ psychological wellbeing, as a lack of arrests or prosecutions may lead them to feel particularly vulnerable to abuse within society.\textsuperscript{100} If minority groups feel that nothing is being done by law enforcement to protect them from hate crime, they may feel the need to further limit their geographic mobility and day-to-day activities to avoid future victimisation.\textsuperscript{101} Research suggests that, for victims, hate crimes become normalised as everyday experiences, and are often viewed as a routine aspect of being ‘different’. As such, they will often go unreported. In addition to this, victims will often find themselves on the margins of ‘mainstream society’, in a circumstance where knowledge of hate crime policy and

\textsuperscript{90} Chakraborti et al. Op cit.
\textsuperscript{92} Perry, B. and Alvi, S. ‘We are all vulnerable’: The \textit{in terrorem} effects of hate crimes’, \textit{International Review of Victimology} 18 (2012).
\textsuperscript{94} Iganski and Lagou. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Levin. Op cit.
\textsuperscript{96} Martin. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{99} Laird, L., Amer, M., Barnett, E., and Barnes, L. ‘Muslim patients and health disparities in the UK and the US’, \textit{Archives of Disease in Childhood} 92 (2007), pp. 922-926.
\textsuperscript{101} Abu-Ras and Suarez. Op cit.
associated publicity campaigns are particularly low. This adds to the sense of isolation and alienation victims of hate crime usually experience.\textsuperscript{102}

The other identities of individuals beyond their religious faith can also have an impact on an individual’s experience of victimisation. Studies of the experience of migrant women have highlighted that gender, ethnicity, religion and migrant status can lead individuals to experience multiple levels of abuse, discrimination and disadvantage.\textsuperscript{103} \textsuperscript{104} \textsuperscript{105} Indeed, aspects of a victim’s identity can have a serious impact on their experience of victimisation and their ability to report hate incidents and seek support. For example, a middle-class British Pakistani woman who has experienced racial discrimination at work, but who has a good understanding of the UK public services, may be much better equipped to access support and report the incidents to the relevant agencies when compared with a migrant recently settled in the UK with a limited support network.

Our previous annual reports have highlighted how Islamophobic incidents often cause victims to limit their geographic mobility in order to avoid further victimisation.\textsuperscript{106} Hate crime, particularly when perpetrated by someone known to the victim such as a neighbour or colleague, can often become persistent. Over time, incidents escalate from minor offences, such as intimidation, to more serious, violent offences, which can have significant implications for a victim and their community.\textsuperscript{107}

An analysis of our 2016 Report reveals that victims place considerable importance on the informal responses from witnesses, individuals and organisations. These may include fellow passengers on public transport, teachers in their school, management at work, and public or private organisations to which they report. A lack of public intervention and condemnation of a hate incident can be interpreted as being supportive, tacitly or otherwise, of the Islamophobic views expressed by the offender. Victims report that a lack of support can cause further psychological distress while support from witnesses can help mediate the negative psychological impact of anti-Muslim victimisation.\textsuperscript{108}


\textsuperscript{106} Tell MAMA. \textit{Tell MAMA Annual Report 2015} (2016).

\textsuperscript{107} Garcia, L., McDevitt, J., Gu, J. and Balboni, J. \textit{Psychological and Behavioral Effects of Bias and Non-Bias Motivated Assault, Final Report}. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice (Washington DC, 2002).

About our Methodology

Alongside the quantitative analysis, most of this report is based on a qualitative thematic analysis of case notes, including reports from members of the public, caseworker observations, and news articles. The case notes of the incidents reported to us during the year were analysed by our research team. The focus of this year’s analysis is the outcomes of incidents, how abuse and discrimination impacts on victims, and how authorities responded to the incidents reported to Tell MAMA in 2017. Alongside a summary of significant issues impacting outcomes of incidents, this report will provide recommendations.

There are, however, methodological issues associated with the use of reported hate crime or incident data. For one, there will always be a gap between the number of crimes that occur and the number that are reported, and many hate crimes go unreported for a variety of reasons. Perceptions of institutional prejudice will deter some from reporting as they do not feel anything will be done or from the added stress of reporting abuse to HR or management.109

Within our analysis, we rely heavily on the testimony of victims or witnesses. All eyewitness testimony is based on the perspective of the person reporting to our service and is redacted where necessary to protect their identities.

Our focus, however, is on supporting our service users, giving them a voice, and using first-hand accounts of their experiences to show how low-level prejudice and racism affects their daily lives.

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Anti-Muslim Incidents Reported to Tell MAMA in 2017

In this section of the report, we will provide a statistical summary of the incidents reported to Tell MAMA between January and December 2017. This will include a discussion of key trends over this 12-month period in comparison with previous years. To better understand the nature and social dynamics of anti-Muslim prejudice, we categorise incidents reported to our service into distinct typologies. For example, we distinguish between incidents which involved acts of discrimination compared with those that involved physical attacks, and between those which occurred in a place of work rather than on a transport network, etc. This section will also set out the relevant characteristics of victims and perpetrators, where information was available, to develop a better picture of the individuals who are most likely to commit or be a victim of anti-Muslim incidents.

Tell MAMA received a total of 1,380 reports of online and offline anti-Muslim incidents in 2017. Of these reports, 1,201 were verified by Tell MAMA caseworkers as anti-Muslim in nature and as having occurred in the UK (online reports were verified as having originated from UK-based accounts). A clear majority of verified incidents (70%, n=839) occurred offline or at a street-based level. In 2017, we saw a 30% (total) increase in verified offline reports compared with the previous year (2017: 839; 2016: 642), continuing an upward trend in offline reports comparable to the 23% increase between 2015 and 2016.

Definitions of Offline Anti-Muslim Incident Categories

“Abusive Behaviour” – Verbal and non-verbal abuse including comments or gestures targeting an individual due to their perceived Muslim identity or Islamic beliefs.

“Physical Attack” – A physical attack ranging from unwanted touching, spitting or throwing something so that it hits someone to a violent assault against an individual due to their perceived Muslim identity. Categorised as “Assaults” in previous reports.

“Threatening Behaviour” – Direct and indirect threats of physical violence motivated by anti-Muslim prejudice.

“Discrimination” – Denial of access or mistreatment in a wide range of settings due to a perception of Muslim identity or Islamic beliefs.

“Vandalism” – Damage or desecration of property motivated by Islamophobic prejudice which includes Islamophobic graffiti, damage to property, or the dumping of pork products or alcohol.

“Anti-Muslim Literature” – Written or visual Islamophobic content including letters, leaflets, memes or posters publicly displayed or distributed to individuals online or offline.

“Hate Speech” – Verbal communication delivered to an audience with the purpose of stirring up anti-Muslim prejudice.
Verified Offline Anti-Muslim Incidents by Incident Category in 2017 (N=839)

The chart below provides a simplified overview of the trends observable in the anti-Muslim incidents reported to Tell MAMA in 2017. Despite an increase in the number of reports compared with previous years, the distribution of incidents is consistent. Islamophobic attacks often include multiple types of abuse. For example, a victim may experience a verbal attack followed by threats of violence and/or a physical attack. In cases involving multiple types of abuse, we would categorise the incident based on the most prominent or most serious component of the attack according to the victim’s testimony. For example, in a case reported to us in 2017, a Muslim man was shoved hard by another man in the street who called him a “P*ki b*stard” and the perpetrator then threatened to stab him. This incident involved abusive language, threats and a physical attack, and so was classified as a Physical Attack due to the assault.

Consistent with previous years, over half the incidents (52%, n=441) were categorised as Abusive Behaviour, which refers to Islamophobic verbal and/or non-verbal abuse. The second most common incident after Abusive Behaviour was Physical Attack (18%, n=149), which involves physical abuse ranging from unwanted touching or spitting to a violent physical attack.
In 2017, **Vandalism** replaced **Threatening Behaviour** as the third most common anti-Muslim incident (10%, n=81). There was a 56% increase in anti-Muslim vandalism when compared with 2016, with one in ten incidents classified as **Vandalism**. This includes Islamophobic graffiti, damage to property motivated by anti-Muslim prejudice, or the dumping of pork products at an Islamic institution or close to Muslim families or households. For example, in 2017 one town in Herefordshire experienced a spree of Islamophobic graffiti when ‘Muslim rapists out’ and ‘Islam rapists out’ was sprayed around the town and a pig’s head was left outside an Islamic Community Centre.110

**Discrimination** was the fourth most common anti-Muslim incident reported to Tell MAMA in 2017 (9%, n=72), seeing a 77% increase in incidents when compared with 2016. This category includes mistreatment, denial of opportunities, or denial of services based on Islamophobic prejudice. For example, in 2017 we received a report that a London bus driver insisted on checking a Muslim family’s pushchair for ‘explosives’ as they entered the bus. When the father challenged this behaviour, the driver replied, “This country is on a high alert for terrorism” and “Your people are killing children in our country”. We recorded two cases where Muslim women who wear the niqab were told to remove their face veils when attending school open days with their children as staff cited ‘security reasons’. Such acts of discrimination demonstrate how some view Islamic identity through the lens of security.

The increase in reports of discrimination may be attributed either to a genuine increase in Islamophobic discrimination or to the increased confidence victims feel in reporting abuse, perhaps due to an increased effort from institutions to discuss the issue. For example, the Social Mobility Commission conducted a study into workplace discrimination which received widespread coverage in the national press – studies such as this may have encouraged victims of discrimination to report their experiences.111

The fifth most reported incident was **Threatening Behaviour**, which accounted for 7% (n=57) of offline incidents. This includes direct or indirect threats of physical violence.

**Anti-Muslim Literature** accounted for 3% (n=28) of incidents reported in 2017 compared with 5% in both 2016 and 2015. Finally, just 1% (n=11) of offline incidents were classified as **Hate Speech**.

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Definitions of Offline Anti-Muslim Place Categories

“Public Area” – An incident that occurs on a pavement or pedestrianised areas, including town centres or shopping areas.

“Transport Networks” – An incident that occurs on public transport networks, including railways, buses, coaches, trams, the London Underground and stations more generally.

“Place of Business” – An incident that occurs in a shop, restaurant or other privately-owned business where the victim does not work.

“Household or Private Property” – An incident that occurs in or around the victim’s or another person’s domestic dwelling.

“Place of Work” – An incident that occurs in the victim’s workplace, including public spaces if the victim is a taxi driver or police officer, for example.

“Educational Institution” – An incident that occurs within a college, school or university that the victim attends or teaches at.

“Road or Highway” – An incident involving one or more vehicles on a roadway.

“Muslim Institutions”- An incident targeting an Islamic institution such as a mosque, cemetery, cultural centre or Islamic school.

“Public Institution” – An incident that occurs within the building of a public institution, such as a job centre or council office where the victim does not work.

“Hospital” – An incident that occurs in health service buildings including hospitals, GP surgeries or health clinics.

Further analysis of the offline incidents reported in 2017 has revealed the types of social settings in which incidents occur. Again, the distribution of incidents is comparable with previous years.

Consistent with previous years, the largest proportion of offline incidents occur within Public Areas, including pavements, shopping areas, public parks, etc. (34%, n=282). The second most common place for incidents was the Transport Networks, which includes public buses, trams, the London Underground and mainline rail services throughout the UK (13%, n=107). Our previous annual reports have highlighted how Public Areas and Transport Networks remain hotspots for abuse and Islamophobic hate crime. One factor to consider is that in busy public spaces, people from all backgrounds are in close proximity to each other, for example overcrowding on an Underground train, where a perpetrator is presented with an opportunity to be violent or abusive.112 113

113 Ibid.
Verified Offline Anti-Muslim Incidents by Place Category in 2017 (N=839)

There is often very little oversight from authority figures within busy public settings. The relative anonymity individuals possess within these types of busy social spaces may embolden them to act on feelings of anger and frustration relating to a situation, which is then fuelled by existing prejudices. The physical and psychological impact of experiencing abuse in public spaces from strangers can be significant regardless of whether the abuse is physical or verbal. As discussed in our previous reports, victims of Islamophobic abuse will often report that they limit their activity to reduce the chance that they will experience further abuse whilst out in public.

116 Ibid.
It can prove difficult to achieve satisfactory criminal justice outcomes for victims of anti-Muslim prejudice in public areas as police may struggle to identify suspects due to the high density of pedestrians. Victims reporting to Tell MAMA often express the view that an incident was not worth reporting due to this fact, or because they had been told by the police that this was the case when they did report. However, due to the prevalence of CCTV in public spaces, smartphones and the potential for witnesses to come forward, it is always worth reporting an incident to raise awareness and to prevent further victimisation. The police and private companies have a moral obligation to protect people from abuse in public spaces and to encourage members of the public to report abuse and crime which, in turn, can help improve support for victims.

Consistent with previous years, the largest proportion of offline incidents occur within Public Areas, including pavements, shopping areas, public parks, etc. (34%, n=282). The second most common place for incidents was the Transport Networks, which includes public buses, trams, the London Underground and mainline rail services throughout the UK (13%, n=107).

The third most common place for incidents was in or around a Household or Private Property (12%, n=101). This represents a 26% increase in this category of incident compared with the previous year. Many of these cases involve conflict with neighbours, culminating in Islamophobic abuse. This type of incident often includes ongoing ‘low-level’ harassment and discrimination such as abusive comments or social exclusion from neighbours which can escalate to threats or physical violence. Experiencing abuse in and around their home can have serious physical and psychological implications for victims as they are often unable to avoid their perpetrators. It can be very difficult to achieve satisfactory outcomes for victims of this type of ongoing abuse. Victims experiencing Islamophobic abuse from neighbours, who then go on to report such incidents to the police, council or housing authorities, often experience a lack of support, discrimination from authorities, and even counter-allegations from the perpetrators, which are frequently taken at face value. These issues will be discussed further in the Criminal Justice Outcomes and Civil Outcomes sections of this report.

Incidents which occurred in a Place of Work (9%, n=74) or Place of Business (9%, n=77) were also prominent within this data set. These include places in which victims of anti-Muslim abuse work, including public institutions, and spaces in which private businesses operate, such as restaurants and shops, in which the victim is a customer. The social dynamics of anti-Muslim abuse within these settings vary considerably. Incidents may include victims receiving Islamophobic abuse from strangers who are working in or visiting these settings, being discriminated against by a worker or customer, or ongoing abuse or bullying by a colleague. In addition to criminal justice agencies, private businesses, public institutions and employers have a moral obligation to appropriately respond to reports of identity-based abuse or discrimination within their organisation. However, victims reporting to Tell MAMA often report unsatisfactory outcomes of private organisations regarding reports of Islamophobic abuse (see the Civil Outcomes section of this report for examples).

There were several incidents reported to us in 2017 which involved cars or other vehicles (Road or Highway, 7%, n=58). A figure which is comparable to incidents in
other busy public spaces, particularly those that occur on public transport, such as trains or buses, or in places of business, such as shops or restaurants. Situational causes of conflict, such as traffic or parking, can result in underlying prejudice surfacing.

In 2017 there were several high-profile incidents reported in which vehicles were used in physical attacks motivated by anti-Muslim hatred. This includes the Finsbury Park terror attack and another case in which Zaynab Hussein, a visibly Muslim woman, was left with serious injuries after she was run over on two separate occasions by a racist man in Leicester.\textsuperscript{117} It should be added that these incidents were not motivated by situational conflict but were premeditated violent attacks on individuals due to their Muslim identity and Islamic beliefs.

In 2017, Tell MAMA recorded 54 (6\%) incidents within \textbf{Islamic Institutions}. These include incidents perpetrated against mosques, Islamic schools and Islamic cultural centres. They include Islamophobic graffiti, threatening letters, the dumping of pork products outside a building, or interpersonal attacks against people attending a mosque.

A sizeable number of incidents occurred within \textbf{Educational Institutions} (6\%, n=53). These include incidents in which the victim was a student at the school, university or college in which the incident occurred. Victims within educational institutions are often children, but adults also experience abuse, bullying or discrimination within universities or other adult learning institutions. Our previous report highlighted how Muslim children are vulnerable to abuse or discrimination in schools, particularly within majority homogenous white areas.\textsuperscript{118} Parents reporting to Tell MAMA on behalf of their children often report that schools do not respond appropriately to reports of racist bullying by their peers or discrimination from members of staff. Examples of this are provided within the Civil Outcomes and Informal Outcomes sections of this report.

Finally, a small proportion of incidents occurred within \textbf{Public institutions} (2\%, n=17). \textbf{Hospitals} (1\%, n=10) would be locations at which a victim accessed a service and experienced Islamophobic abuse or discrimination. In one example reported to Tell MAMA, a nurse refused to let a Muslim family visit a sick relative, stating that, “I don’t know who you are, you might plant a bomb or something here.”

Finally, the smallest proportion of incidents occurred in an \textbf{Unknown} place category (1\%, n=6). This refers to verified incidents in which information about the location was not provided by the victim, witness or news sources.

The map on the following page provides a regional breakdown of incidents reported to Tell MAMA in 2017. The highest proportion of anti-Muslim incidents occurred in London (34\%, n=274) where location data was available. North West England had the highest number of anti-Muslim incidents outside London (18\%, n=143). Yorkshire and

\textsuperscript{117} Perraudin, F. ‘Man convicted after running over Muslim woman in Leicester’. \textit{The Guardian}. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/02/paul-moore-man-convicted-running-over-muslim-woman-leicester (retrieved 12/06/2018).

\textsuperscript{118} Tell MAMA. \textit{Tell MAMA Annual Report 2016} (2017).
the Humber (12%, n=95) along with West Midlands (10%, n=81) also had a significant proportion of reports.

It could be argued that a higher number of Islamophobic incidents occur in areas with a higher population of Muslims. However, as discussed in our 2015 report, *The Geography of Anti-Muslim Hatred*, there may also be regional factors to consider when analysing hate crime trends. These may include issues relating to areas of higher population density or high levels of deprivation. These may also be impacted by local policing along with public awareness of Tell MAMA in those locations.\(^{119}\)

These trends may also relate to relatively high levels of community tensions in some areas. London and the North West are areas which were disproportionately affected by high-profile terrorist incidents in 2017.

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Verified Anti-Muslim Incidents reported to Tell MAMA in 2017 by Region (N=839) (Unknown location=25)
2017 Victims and Perpetrators: Who are they?

This section will provide a breakdown of the victims and perpetrators featured within the offline anti-Muslim incidents recorded by Tell MAMA in 2017. This analysis will help to provide an insight as to those who experience anti-Muslim victimisation and who the perpetrators are.

In 2017, Tell MAMA recorded 978 victims and 1,161 perpetrators of 839 verified offline incidents. The chart below provides a summary of the gender profile of individuals involved in anti-Muslim victimisation. A clear majority of victims in 2017, as with previous years, were Female (57.5%, n=562) while most of the perpetrators were Male (64%, n=750). Where data on the gender of the victim and perpetrator were available nearly 8 out of 10 perpetrators were Male while 6 in 10 victims were Female. This suggests that although victims are more likely to be female and perpetrators are more likely to be male, this trend is more pronounced for perpetrators.

Gender of Victims (N=978) and Perpetrators (N=1,161)
In our 2016 Report, we more thoroughly explored the gender dynamics and broader social issues pertaining to Islamophobic incidents.\textsuperscript{120} However, the trends observed in our previous report largely remain the same in 2017.

The existing body of research into hate crime victimisation indicates that perpetrators will frequently select victims they perceive to be physically or socially weak, who are, therefore, in a relatively vulnerable position, and less likely to retaliate. This can be related to age, gender, ethnicity, or disability.\textsuperscript{121} Victims of Islamophobic abuse are often outnumbered by their abusers. We recorded more perpetrators than victims in our 2017 data set. There are also more male perpetrators and more female victims. These trends support the theory that perpetrators select victims who are in a relatively vulnerable position.

### Islamic Visibility by Gender (N=978)

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Islamic Visibility by Gender (N=978)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{120} Tell MAMA. \textit{Tell MAMA Annual Report 2016} (2017).

\textsuperscript{121} Health Canada. \textit{Violence Against Women with Disabilities} (Ottawa, 2004).
The chart above provides a breakdown of victims by gender and Islamic visibility. When we remove the ‘unknown’ category from calculations, on the presumption that those victims for whom we do not have data would reflect the same rate of Islamic visibility as victims for whom we do have data, 72% of victims reporting to Tell MAMA could be identified as visibly Muslim. For Muslim women, this refers to an incident in which they were wearing Islamic clothing such as a hijab or niqab. For Muslim men, this refers to a thobe, but also facial hair which may identify them as Muslim. Many female victims (62%, n=353) were described as visibly Muslim compared with 53% (n=129) of male victims (where data was available).

Over half of victims are visibly Muslim women (53%, n=353), where data on Islamic visibility was available (N=669). However, perpetrators of Islamophobic abuse often referred to a victim’s Islamic clothing, suggesting that they had selected the victim based on their religious clothing. For example, in one case a young Muslim woman was travelling on a London bus when a man entered, grabbed her possessions and started swearing at her. When she confronted him, he replied: “I have no respect for you because you have a hijab on. Shut up, f*ck you.”

The religious visibility of Muslim women means that some view their choice of religious or cultural expression as a symbol of oppression or a politically aggressive statement which justifies, in the minds of perpetrators, abuse or possibly violence. However, arguably visibly Muslim women have become a symbol of immigration and cultural difference in the UK and other Western countries. Evidence suggests that hate incidents can often be motivated by several factors ranging from thrill-seeking, situational conflict, and intersecting identity-based prejudices. Perpetrators often use racist, misogynistic or xenophobic language, or threats of sexual violence alongside Islamophobic abuse. For example an elderly, visibly Muslim woman was targeted on the street by three men with a dog. They pushed her, threatened her with the dog and verbally abused her, calling her a "refugee b*tch", “f****** immigrant”, and threatened to “deport” her. In another incident, a man threatened a visibly Muslim woman with a bottle saying, ‘I’m going f****** hit you in the c*nt with this’ before throwing the bottle at her.

The following chart provides a summary of the ethnicity of the victims recorded within our 2017 data set. The highest proportion of victims were identified as Asian (38.8%, n=379). However, the ethnicity of over a third of victims was Unknown (37.9%, n=371) due to a lack of information provided by the victim, witness or news source. Tell MAMA caseworkers typically gather demographic information from victims who use our service. However, this is voluntary, and victims reserve the right to refuse to answer these questions. The second most frequent ethnicity was Arab or North African (7.9%, n=77) followed by White (4.9%, n=48), Mixed or Multiple ethnicities (3.8%,

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125 Chakraborti et al. Op cit.
n=37), **Black** (3.5%, n=34), **Somali** (2.8%, n=27), and finally **Any other ethnic group** (0.5%, n=5).

**Victim Ethnicity (N=978)**

British Muslims are a heterogeneous group but stereotypes about Muslim identity along with sensational, reductive and misleading media coverage reduces complexities to binary markers of difference. Muslims are often stereotyped as being of Asian or Arab descent, and a –as fundamentally ‘foreign’ and ‘un-British’, with beliefs at odds with mainstream British society; this is, a perception which has been perpetuated by sensationalist media coverage.

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The 2011 census revealed that 67.6% of British Muslims identify as Asian.\textsuperscript{130} However, stereotypes about Muslim or Asian identity play a role in perpetrator-victim selection. Often in cases reported to Tell MAMA, perpetrators will direct racialised slurs at victims, often deploying the racial slur ‘P*ki’ – irrespective of the ethnicity of the victim:\textsuperscript{131 132}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Victim Ethnicity</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab or North African</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed or multiple ethnicities</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other ethnic group</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further analysis found that 1 in 3 victims of incidents recorded by Tell MAMA in 2017 were Asian women (33%, n=201), where ethnicity and gender data was available (n=604). A further 27% (n=147) of all victims were visibly Muslim Asian women (where ethnicity, gender and Muslim visibility data was available (n=548).

\textsuperscript{131} Anthias, F. and Yuval-Davis, N. \textit{Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the Anti-Racist Struggle} (Taylor & Francis, 1993).
Perpetrator Ethnicity (N=1,161)

![Perpetrator Ethnicity Pie Chart]

For perpetrators, as with victims, the proportion of those in the category Unknown is high (37%, n=434). However, many of the offenders within the data set were identified as White (87%, n=635). The second most common ethnicity was Black (8%, n=58) followed by Asian (2%, n=16), Mixed (1.5%, n=11) and Any other ethnicity (<1%, n=5). Seventy-two per cent of all perpetrators were white men (518) where ethnicity and gender data was available (n=724):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator Ethnicity</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed or multiple ethnicities</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any other ethnic group</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab or North African</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>750</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>1161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The charts on the following pages demonstrate the age and gender of victims reporting to Tell MAMA in recent years and any perpetrator information they were able to disclose to our caseworkers. Consistent with previous reports, the data set indicates that both victims and perpetrators of anti-Muslim abuse may be of any age. This said a high proportion of victim and perpetrator data on age was unavailable. Where age group data was available the most common age range of victims was **26 to 35** (28%, n=159) while the most common age for perpetrators was **13 to 18** (22%, n=138). McDevitt suggests that the most common motivation for hate crime is in fact ‘thrill-seeking’, whereby hate crime perpetrators abuse their victim for entertainment.133 Stereotypically this type of hate crime offending is perpetrated by groups of teenagers. This type of offender may have only a very low level of prejudice against the individuals they are abusing but are motivated by the excitement derived from the incident along with encouragement from their peers.134 135

Historically this type of offending was downplayed by law enforcement agents and other authority figures as just ‘kids being kids’. However, such incidents can have a serious physical and psychological impact on victims. For example, in one case a Muslim family reported ongoing abuse from a group of young men aged 15-20 who would make abusive comments such as “Go back to Pakistan”, and eggs were thrown at their house. In one incident, the family’s teenage daughter had her hijab torn from her head and stones were thrown at her by the same group of young men. The incidents were reported to the police. The mother reported that her own health was now suffering because of the abuse, and felt that the police were not doing anything to help.

Conversely, there is a much higher proportion of victims who were **under 12** (15%, n=85) than perpetrators under 12 (4%, n=24), where age category data was available. These results support existing evidence which suggests that perpetrators of anti-Muslim abuse often target those in a more vulnerable position than themselves. Many incidents reported to Tell MAMA include the targeting of Muslims in Islamic clothing when accompanied by their young children in public spaces. They can be particularly visible targets for Islamophobic abuse and are frequently less able to defend themselves. For example, in one incident a Muslim woman who identifies as a revert (a convert to Islam), and who wears Islamic clothing, was accompanying her young child on his bicycle when she passed a group of workmen. When they saw her, one of the men shouted, “mobile bomber” at her and her child.

133 McDevitt et al. Op cit.
135 McDevitt et al. Ibid.
Victim Age and Gender (N=978) (Unknown age: 416)

Perpetrator Age and Gender (N=1,161) (Unknown age: 524)
High-Profile Events 2017: Verified Street Based Incidents by Week

22 May
A suicide bombing at the Manchester Arena killed 22 people, including the attacker, and injured over 800.

3 June
Three attackers drove a van into pedestrians at London Bridge, then three men got out and attacked people in Borough Market. Eight people died and 48 people were injured.

19 June
An attacker drove a van into pedestrians outside the Muslim Welfare House in Finsbury Park. One man was killed and 12 others were injured.

22 March
Five killed and more than 50 people injured when an attacker drove a car into pedestrians at Westminster Bridge.

15 September
A homemade bomb partially exploded on a Tube train at Parsons Green which caused numerous injuries.
Timeline 2017: High-Profile Events and Anti-Muslim Hate Incidents

In our 2016 Report, we discussed the way in which high-profile events that concern identity and immigration, such as terrorist incidents and the EU referendum vote, can act as ‘trigger events’ which result in an increase in Islamophobic hate crimes in the UK. In the month following the EU referendum vote, there was a 44% rise in the number of offline anti-Muslim incidents reported to Tell MAMA. It is important to note that these events are not the underlying cause of anti-Muslim incidents, but, as the term implies, act as triggers, where people with latent racial prejudices feel emboldened to act on their views, which may be related to the construction of a social reality born from media framing per McQuail (1994).136

The most evident underlying cause, however, concerns how Islamophobic sentiment functions within a system of knowledge which is premised on the racialisation of Muslims, and fuses with nativism (the policy of protecting the interests of native-born or established inhabitants against those of immigrants), which becomes more apparent when we examine the language of some perpetrators.137 138 We must also acknowledge that the framing of high-profile events in sections of the press and subsequent publicity around spikes in hate crime may encourage individuals who have experienced victimisation to come forward and report. Moreover, hate crimes often increase in the summer months.

McDevitt and others (2002) propose several typologies of hate crime which, in some way, help us understand some of the underlying motivations for incidents. A proportion of hate crime can be categorised as having ‘defensive’ or ‘retributive’ based motivations.139 In this context, ‘defensive’ hate crimes refers to hate crimes committed with the intention of protecting one’s own identity group from what is perceived to be an immediate threat, while ‘retribution’ based hate crimes refers to hate crimes committed in response to the perception of one’s own identity group as having been attacked in some way. During anti-Muslim attacks reported to Tell MAMA, perpetrators often allude to a belief that their identity group or community is threatened by outsiders, and that this feeling of being under threat may manifest itself as acts of aggression and violence which are intended to assert their group’s rights.

Our 2016 Report noted that perpetrators would frequently refer to public discourse relating to immigration and terrorism alongside more general Islamophobic and racist abuse.140 The ‘defensive’ typology of hate crime is, perhaps, the most easily applied to incidents triggered by events which concern immigration, given that the threat that perpetrators often feel is not immediate but rather based on a gradual change they perceive as occurring to their community. The ‘retribution’ typology, on the other hand, is more readily applied to incidents that are triggered by events concerning terrorist

137 Saeed, A. Op cit.
139 McDevitt et al. Op cit.
incidents, as they represent an immediate threat that perpetrators often feel the need to respond to specifically. This is not to say that either typology could not apply to incidents triggered by events concerning neither immigration or terrorism. Perpetrators of hate crime will often have mixed motivations for selecting and abusing their victims.

Indeed, in 2016 the most significant trigger event was, by far, the EU referendum. In 2017 we saw several domestic terrorist incidents that acted as significant trigger events. The spike in Islamophobic hate crime reports sent to Tell MAMA following the Manchester suicide bombing on 22 May 2017 was larger than the spike in reports following the EU referendum result. The spike in incidents reported to Tell MAMA that followed the EU referendum constituted a 475% rise, from 12 reports in the week prior to the referendum to 69 in the week which followed the referendum result. The spike that followed the Manchester bombing, however, constituted a 700% rise, from 9 reports in the reporting period prior to the bombing to 72 reports one week later.

While discourse concerning immigration remains a significant motivating factor in anti-Muslim incidents, particularly when framed as an immediate security risk, a discourse concerning terrorism will be the primary focus for discussion concerning trigger events in this report. For the purposes of this report, we will only be noting terrorist incidents which had a significant impact on discourse in the UK; the increased impact that terrorist incidents in either the UK or Western states has on public discourse when compared with terrorist incidents that occur outside, say, Europe or North America. For example, there is evidence to suggest that the geographic proximity of terrorist incidents to Western nations may determine the rate of news coverage. For example, the BBC reported in 2016 that English-language Google search results for news articles concerning the Brussels attack in Belgium outnumbered those of the Istanbul bombing in Turkey significantly, despite both attacks occurring in the same month, and with roughly the same number of casualties. The term “Brussels attack” was used nearly 14 million times in articles indexed by Google News, whereas the term “Istanbul attack” was used fewer than 100,000 times. Frequency of news articles concerning, and public interest in, terrorist incidents may be partly determined by the cultural and political links between the UK and other countries; in other words, the public and national media may care about, or be more interested in, terrorist incidents that occur in places they feel connected to, regardless of distance, although this is difficult to quantify and therefore beyond the scope of this report. An analysis of 89 domestic terror attacks between 2011 and 2015 in the United States found that people from a Muslim background were responsible for 12.4% of those attacks but, on average, the media were roughly four and a half times more likely to give coverage when the attacker was of a Muslim background.

In 2017 we saw many high-profile terrorist incidents take place in Britain. The Westminster Bridge attack on 22 March resulted in 5 deaths, including the death of an unarmed police officer, and 50 injuries. The Manchester Arena attack on 22 May resulted in 23 deaths and over 800 injuries, marking it as the deadliest terrorist incident since the 7/7 bombings in 2005. The London Bridge attack on 3 June resulted in 8 deaths and 48 injuries. On 19 June, the far-right terrorist Darren Osborne targeted Muslims outside the Muslim Welfare House in an attack which killed a 51-year-old man and left 12 others injured. The failed Parsons Green bombing on 15 September 2017 thankfully resulted in no deaths but 30 people were treated for their injuries.

The case studies cited below demonstrate how some felt emboldened to attack Muslims or threaten Islamic institutions following such trigger events. But, to reiterate, the motivations are not driven solely by a response to terrorism, and often reflect how some use trigger events as a pretext to spread existing or underlying racial and religious hatred, and Islamophobic violence and threats.

**Westminster Bridge**

Following the Westminster Bridge attack, several incidents were reported to Tell MAMA that involved implicit references to the event and contained evidence of ‘defensive’ and ‘retaliatory’ typologies.

A student of Muslim background was told on the day of the attack that “Muslims are the only terrorists” and that “they only seem to be attacking us”. This bears some resemblance to another incident in which a Muslim woman, in Islamic clothing, was travelling on a bus when a fellow, female passenger asked if she was ‘carrying a bomb’. The abusive passenger then pointed at the Muslim woman’s hijab and said, ‘People like you were responsible for the Westminster Bridge attack”, adding that she was “scared” that the Muslim woman was going to “kill” her, and before leaving the bus the perpetrator spat on the victim’s hijab. Speaking to Tell MAMA, the victim described how the incident had left her shocked and humiliated, and she agreed to let us report the incident to the police on her behalf.

Hours after the terror attack, Christopher Massey, 46, dialled 999 and claimed to have left two kilograms of explosives outside the Southend Mosque and Islamic Trust. Officers attended the scene but found no explosives and traced Mr Massey from the mobile phone used to make the initial phone call. After passing sentencing, Judge Ian Graham said, “Offences such as these must inevitably attract a custodial sentence.” Massey was given a 12-month prison sentence.144

There was one particularly significant outcome derived from an Islamophobic incident following the Westminster Bridge attack, concerning a visibly Muslim woman who had been photographed and her image appropriated for racist and Islamophobic memes. She was photographed on her phone whilst passing by the scene of the attack,

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appearing to some to look unconcerned about the victims. Of course, this photo was
taken out of context, and as other photographs demonstrated, she was clearly
distressed. Thankfully, this case resulted in a positive civil outcome. The victim
approached Tell MAMA and consented to us releasing a statement on her behalf to
help combat the Islamophobic narrative which had taken hold online. As a result
several media outlets, including *The Guardian*, wrote about her circumstance
explaining the way in which her image had been misappropriated. This example is
covered in greater detail in the online section.

**Manchester**

Several cases reported to Tell MAMA made direct reference to the attack and were
couched in the language of more general Islamophobic abuse.

In one example, which took place a day after the Manchester attack, a Muslim man was
returning home after dropping his children at school when a group of women nearby
suggested that they “should shoot them all”, which left him feeling quite distressed.
Tell MAMA reported the incident to the police on the victim’s behalf.

There were several incidents in which victims were addressed in public, many of whom
were accused of being either personally or indirectly responsible for the Manchester
bombing. In one example, a perpetrator shouted at a Muslim man, “You’re Muslim,
what’s happened in Manchester is all because of you, f*** off”, days after the attack.

Naveed Yasin, a trauma and orthopaedic surgeon, was racially abused and called a
“terrorist” by a motorist, en route to work at Salford Royal Hospital where he was
treating victims of the terror attack. Tell MAMA helped get Yavin’s story into the
national press through *The Sunday Times* on 4 June 2017.\(^{145}\) In a similar case, a
Muslim man travelling on a bus in Manchester was on his way to donate blood
following the attack when he was called a “terrorist” by an abusive passenger.

In some cases, perpetrators made explicit reference to victims of the Manchester
attack. One such report came from a shop worker who was accused of being involved
in the murder of “that poor eight-year-old girl in Manchester”. The perpetrator then
went on to say that he would “happily kill” him.

A Muslim man contacted Tell MAMA after he was verbally abused by a man in a car
park who referred to the 8-year-old Saffie Roussos as the “little girl who had died”.
When the Muslim man invited the perpetrator to his local mosque to discuss the issue
further, the perpetrator said that he would rather “break down all the mosques”.

Retaliatory anti-Muslim incidents were also seen in schools following the Manchester
bombing. In one case, two boys were having an argument over a deodorant can which
had gone missing. The Muslim boy was then called a “terrorist” and told to “go blow
up another town”. This incident occurred on 25 May.

\(^{145}\) Kerbaj, R. ‘Surge in anti-Muslim hate crime after attack’. *The Times* and *The Sunday Times*.
Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/surge-in-anti-muslim-hate-crime-after-attack-p6bcv2wdw (retrieved 14/06/2018).
In terms of outcomes, there were incidents that resulted from the Manchester bombing that had both positive and negative outcomes. Most of these were informal outcomes, with two notable civil outcomes. In one incident, a perpetrator was shouting outside a mosque that Muslims ‘were not welcome’ and that they ‘were terrorists responsible for the Manchester bombing’. However, one of the victims talked to the perpetrator and managed to calm him down as well as to get an apology from him (the perpetrator went on to say that the man was just an “angry British man” who had been upset over the attack). The victim then invited the perpetrator into the mosque to learn more about Islam and to eat with them. This can be perceived as a positive informal outcome, and somewhat of a rarity. On a less positive note, however, a Muslim family had to move to a new home after a racist neighbour targeted them with abuse. The neighbour had often referred to them as “dirty Muslims”, and after the Manchester attack the abuse intensified, with the perpetrator labelling the family as the “terrorists who did the Manchester bombings”.

In the first case that resulted in a civil outcome, a Muslim woman who was trying to lay flowers and pay her respects to the victims of the attack in Manchester city centre was approached by a man who seemed intent on hovering around her. At a certain point, the man began walking rapidly toward the victim, who ran to nearby Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) and reported his behaviour. At that point the perpetrator recognised the presence of the PCSOs and left the scene. Given the victim’s Muslim identity it is likely that the perpetrator intended to commit some form of abuse, but was deterred by the authority figures, marking it as a positive civil outcome.

The second case that resulted in a civil outcome, one that was particularly negative, concerns a teenage Muslim girl who was surrounded by a group of her peers from school shouting about “ISIS” and threatening her due to her Muslim identity. Some students even asked her for her whereabouts when the Manchester attack occurred. Her mother was critical of the school’s response, which had offered either to send homework to the victim so she did not have to attend or, instead, to isolate her from other pupils. She interpreted these actions as being akin to a punishment, given that there was materially little difference between what was being offered and a form of exclusion, and was, therefore, angered by the school’s response.

London Bridge

Despite the proximity in time of the London Bridge and Manchester attacks, we still recorded a slight spike in reports in the week which followed 3 June.

There were only a few incidents that involved either implicit or explicit references to the London Bridge attack, one of which resulted in a criminal justice outcome. The first concerned a teacher who, at an adult learning centre, made several Islamophobic comments which directly referenced the Manchester bombing and London Bridge attacks which, in the perception of the victim, were directed at them since they were the only visibly Muslim student in the room.

The second example concerns a man who launched into an Islamophobic rant at a post office, stating that, “All Muslims in this country are terrorists” before asking an
Asian woman in the queue what she thought of the terrorist attack. The perpetrator was later charged with a Section Five public order offence and was convicted, and forced to pay a £240 fine, £135 in costs and a £30 victim surcharge.

A day after the London Bridge attack a man left a fake bomb outside Paisley Central Mosque. James Palmer, 31, had been drinking and watching news coverage of the attack. He constructed a fake bomb with two gas canisters, which were taped together with wire and wood, and were accompanied by a handwritten message which read: “Youse are next, defo.” Sheriff David Pender said there was “no alternative” to a custodial sentence and sentenced Palmer to 32 months in prison.  

**Parsons Green**

Compared with the other terror attacks mentioned above, we saw little to no spike in our offline data set following the failed attack in Parsons Green on 15 September 2017. The online data set, however, did see a temporary spike in reports in the immediate aftermath which is highlighted in the online section later in this report. Conversely, the terror attack in Finsbury Park saw a temporary spike in online abuse where some social media users glorified Darren Osborne, which may constitute a criminal offence under the Terrorism Act 2006. Again, examples of this appear in the online section below.

In one high-profile example of abuse following the failed attack, a Muslim woman, who wears the hijab, was called a “terrorist” and referred to as “ISIS” by a group of teenagers. Tell MAMA reported the incident to the police on her behalf and raised awareness by covering the story anonymously online with a powerful victim impact statement which can be found in the victim impact section of our report.

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Outcomes for Anti-Muslim Incidents in 2017

Tell MAMA collects data on the outcome of anti-Muslim incidents. Our caseworkers report incidents to the police (with the prior consent of victims), provide advocacy and liaise with relevant local authorities and institutions when requested.

This section of the Report will highlight significant trends in outcomes of incidents reported to us in 2017. Our analysis will focus on the outcomes categories outlined in the second section of the Report. The core outcome categories are Criminal Justice Outcomes from law enforcement agencies, Civil Outcomes from other private and public organisations, and Informal Outcomes which comprise individual responses from witnesses, employers, business owners, corporations, or civil authority figures.

These various outcomes all feed into the impact an incident can have on a victim. These impacts, along with their associated effects, will be discussed in detail later in the report.

Criminal Justice Outcomes for Anti-Muslim Incidents

As outlined in the review of existing literature, evidence highlights the importance of criminal justice outcomes for individual victims of hate crime and in protecting the status of individuals from minority groups.\(^{147}\) The failure of law enforcement agencies to follow up on hate crime reports can create an atmosphere in which individuals from minority groups believe authorities side with hate crime offenders and, therefore, become less likely to report and cooperate with police.\(^{148}\)\(^{149}\)\(^{150}\)\(^{151}\) It is generally accepted that hate crimes are less likely than non-bias crimes to be reported to the police, and if they do come to the attention of criminal justice agencies they are less likely to result in criminal prosecution.\(^{152}\) However, we must also be aware that there has been a steady shift towards community-based sentencing for all crime including hate crimes.\(^{153}\)

Data published by the Home Office last year revealed that racially or religiously aggravated offences which involve criminal damage, assault, or public order offences, are more likely than non-bias equivalent offences to result in charges or summons. However, non-bias crimes are more likely (4%) than racially or religiously aggravated offences to result in formal cautions (2%).\(^{154}\) An alternative worth acknowledging is the shift towards community-based sentencing outcomes for such criminal offences. Others seek recourse through restorative justice (RJ) outcomes. Between 2013 and

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\(^{149}\) Reisig et al. Op cit.

\(^{150}\) Levin. Op cit.


\(^{152}\) Lyons and Roberts. Op cit.


2016, the government invested £23 million in RJ programmes. Some groups, (victims of domestic violence, for example) have criticised RJ, suggesting that it may excuse the actions of domestic abusers. Gavrielides (2012) suggests that some RJ approaches would not sway racist perpetrators and that such schemes could re-victimize individuals irrespective of how remorseful a perpetrator appears in person. Furthermore, according to Acorn (2004), the social stratifications between victim and perpetrator may limit the scope of RJ outcomes due to a lack of empathy from the perpetrator regarding the loss the victim has suffered. Acorn’s point concerns a thief who feels exempt from empathy for his victim because the thief feels that they would never have enough privilege of knowing what such a loss of material goods would feel like. This empathy gap only increases if the perpetrator feels that the privileges enjoyed by their victim are unjust or unearned. Others, however, have expressed support for RJ programmes. In an interview with the BBC, a victim of sexual abuse described how RJ allowed her to get an apology from her abuser and make him aware of how the abuse impacted her.

Several cases reported to Tell MAMA in 2017 resulted in appropriate positive action from criminal justice agencies including custodial sentences, fines and community sentence orders. In February 2018, the CPS publicised information on documented cases of ‘sentence uplift’ for hate crimes - where, following a successful hate crime conviction, the CPS can request to have the sentence increased. This included a man in North Yorkshire who religiously abused a doctor whilst seeking medical treatment, and then assaulted a security guard. He received an increased custodial sentence from six months to 18 months in prison for causing religiously aggravated intentional harassment, alarm or distress, and assault by beating. More broadly, just over one third of religiously aggravated hate crimes were given sentence uplifts by the CPS in 2015/2016. This kind of criminal justice outcome is significant as it sends a message that hate crimes do incur increased prison terms. But there are still issues that need to be addressed: a freedom of information (FOI) request made by the BBC to police forces in England and Wales revealed a decline in charges related to religiously and racially aggravated offences despite a two-fold rise in reported hate crime.

Following the incarceration of far-right terrorist Darren Osborne in February 2018, it became clear that acts of racial or religious hatred can contribute to acts of terrorism.

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159 Ibid.
Darren Osborne was jailed for life with a minimum term of 43 years for the murder of 51-year-old Makram Ali and the attempted murder of nine other Muslim men. During sentencing, the judge stated that the attack reflected Osborne's "ideology of hate towards Muslims" and condemned the actions as "a terrorist attack". He also emphasised the influential role of hateful online content and said that Osborne had been "rapidly radicalised over the internet, encountering and consuming material put out ... from those determined to spread hatred of Muslims on the basis of their religion". This is a horrific case, which will have had a terrible effect on many including the victims and their families. However, this is a positive criminal justice outcome. The perpetrator of the attack was jailed for life and the judge highlighted that the incident concerned was indeed a terror attack motivated by anti-Muslim hatred.

Criminal justice outcomes are important as they highlight that hate crime against Muslims will not be tolerated and help to reaffirm the position of religious minorities within British society. However, Darren Osborne's crime is an exceptional case resulting in severe consequences for the victims and their families. Evidence has shown that the single most significant factor in a hate crime which results in a criminal justice outcome is the seriousness of the incident. Further factors which make a hate incident more likely to result in a criminal justice outcome are the use of a weapon or the need for medical attention. A lower-level incident which does not satisfy the criminal threshold but constitutes abuse and discrimination still has a significant psychological and practical impact on victims regardless of the outcome.

Perpetrators of anti-Muslim abuse will sometimes allude to the notion during their attack that law enforcement will not prosecute them for their actions. A witness, for example, observed how two Muslim women in Islamic clothing were abused on a London bus by a woman who blamed Muslims indiscriminately for terrorism. When the witness confronted the perpetrator, said perpetrator dismissed the idea that her actions constituted a hate crime. The witness told Tell MAMA: “I told her I was going to report her but she laughed and said, ‘Honey, the police won’t do anything. Islamophobia isn't real.’” In another case, a woman was being harassed by her neighbours, who had damaged her property and sent her threatening and Islamophobic notes. However, when she confronted her neighbours and told them that she would call the police, the perpetrator dismissively replied, “The police aren’t gonna do jack about no Muzzies”. This type of statement exemplifies how some perpetrators believe they have done nothing wrong and that the police are on their side. This principle must be challenged if we are to prevent perpetrators from feeling emboldened and ensure that their racist or hateful actions, whether they meet a criminal threshold or not, are challenged.

166 Harlow. Op cit.
Despite the popular perception of hate crimes as isolated incidents perpetrated by strangers unknown to the victims, studies have shown that hate incidents can form part of an ongoing process of victimisation by neighbours, work colleagues, peers and even family members, which is repeated over extended periods of time, and can escalate into more overtly threatening or physically violent behaviour.\textsuperscript{169} However, this type of abuse can often be handled inappropriately by the police and equated with conventional anti-social behaviour rather than to be conceived of as serious hate crime.\textsuperscript{170}

Our previous annual report highlighted the ongoing difficulty victims face as they seek a satisfactory outcome when reporting this abuse.\textsuperscript{171} As the next example demonstrates, some authorities will routinely ignore or discount the experiences of victims including, most notably, the tragic case of Bijan Ebrahimi, an Iranian refugee, whose body was found beaten to death and burned on a Bristol housing estate in July 2013. According to the Independent Police Complaints Committee (IPCC) Ebrahimi self-identified as a victim of hate crime but this was never acknowledged by Avon and Somerset Police.\textsuperscript{172} The Safer Bristol Partnership Independent Report concluded that the police had provided ‘poor responses’ to the 73 calls Ebrahimi had made over a seven-year period. He had reported crimes including racial abuse, criminal damage, and ‘threats to kill’ but the police had failed to record a crime on at least 40 occasions.\textsuperscript{173}

According to a statement by the IPCC Commissioner Jan Williams, Avon and Somerset Police had failed to identify Ebrahimi “as a vulnerable man in need of protection and support”. Instead, his complaints about racially abusive neighbours were dismissed and he was, instead, labelled a ‘liar, a nuisance and an attention seeker’. The report found that counter-allegations made against Mr Ebrahimi, no matter how spurious, including the false claim that he was a paedophile, were given more credence by the police.\textsuperscript{174} In due course, however, Ebrahimi’s killer, Lee James, was sentenced in 2013 to at least 18 years in prison for the murder.\textsuperscript{175} Furthermore, in December 2015, two officers involved in the case were convicted of misconduct and four officers were dismissed for gross misconduct.\textsuperscript{176} However, this case only gained media attention once it became a murder enquiry, as the systemic and institutional failures became public knowledge several years later.

\textsuperscript{169} Chakraborti et al. Op cit.
\textsuperscript{170} Williams and Tregidga. Op cit, p. 962.
\textsuperscript{172} Morris, S. ‘Police failed to protect Bijan Ebrahimi prior to his murder, IPCC says’. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jul/05/police-failure-protect-bijan-ebrahimi-murder-ipcc (retrieved 06/06/2018).
\textsuperscript{173} McCallum, D. Multi-Agency Learning Review Following The Murder of Bijan Ebrahimi. Safer Bristol Crime, Drugs and Alcohol Partnership (2017).
\textsuperscript{174} Morris. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
Indeed, a significant proportion of the incidents reported to Tell MAMA in 2017 have included ongoing victimisation motivated by anti-Muslim hatred and racial prejudice. These types of cases are often not dealt with adequately by authorities. Like Bijan Ebrahimi’s case, victims of ongoing anti-Muslim incidents from neighbours, colleagues or peers are often labelled as ‘troublemakers’ or ‘attention seekers’ and are frequently met with counter-allegations which are often given more credence due to institutional discrimination within civil society organisations or private companies.

For instance, a Muslim refugee contacted Tell MAMA following racial harassment by his neighbours. Examples of the abuse include the kicking of his front door late at night, and the shouting of expletives such as “f**king Muslim” when they could hear the victim praying. As the abuse escalated the threat of physical attack also increased, culminating in his being chased down a hallway having coffee thrown at him, which caused considerable fear and distress. However, police appeared to give more credence to counter-allegations made against the victim, who was later arrested and charged.

In another case, a Muslim family were targeted by their neighbours soon after moving into a predominantly white neighbourhood in Yorkshire. The abuse ranged from verbal abuse to harassment, threats of physical violence, and desecration of their property (pork products were left outside their home). Their teenage son was racially abused, threatened and required medical attention following a vicious and unprovoked attack. The family, however, felt that the police were not treating the incidents with the seriousness required, adding that they were made to feel like suspects from the beginning.

Both examples above demonstrate the vital importance of ensuring that victims feel supported when reporting criminal behaviour, but equally are made to feel that investigations of any counter-allegations are conducted without prejudice.

The support offered to victims by relevant authorities does not always result in positive criminal justice outcomes. In one case, a Muslim family were subject to ongoing harassment from a neighbour who had damaged their property prior to threatening them with a hammer and knives. The police response was not sufficient, according to the family, as the attending officer did not consider a hammer a weapon and there were no reported injuries. On a few occasions, other neighbours sided with the perpetrators due to existing grievances and/or cultural prejudices.

The above examples highlight some of the systemic failings of criminal justice agencies when responding to ongoing forms of Islamophobic abuse and violence. The following examples, however, focus on one-off incidents which occurred on transport networks or in public areas where the perpetrator was unknown to the victim.

A problem many police forces encounter is either a lack of witnesses or insufficient CCTV coverage to identify perpetrators. In a few instances, victims have reported that police closed cases citing ‘no lines of enquiry’ due to a lack of witnesses or adequate CCTV footage, in a manner which the victims perceived as premature. In one example a service user claimed that police informed him that there were “too many” CCTV cameras, meaning that there was too much footage to look through to identify the
perpetrator in question. Our unique partnership work has resulted in enabled some police forces to re-open closed cases on behalf of victims. Others who witness or experience attacks have also filmed abuse or violence, which is helpful from an investigative standpoint but should only be considered as a course of action when safe to do so.

Law enforcement agents that are called upon to investigate Islamophobic incidents may be affected by interpersonal bias. Individuals are often abused and discriminated against due to multiple aspects of their identity, or are targeted due to their perceived vulnerability to abuse.177 178 Individuals who experience anti-Muslim abuse have intersecting identities including ethnicity, gender, age and disability, all of which may affect their ability to negotiate with law enforcement agencies.

Victims reporting to Tell MAMA in 2017 and previous years have sometimes had mental health issues, disabilities and linguistic barriers which had an impact on their experiences in dealing with agencies which are responsible for protecting them. The impacts of personal and unconscious bias within authorities can not only adversely affect the quality of support given but risks re-victimising vulnerable individuals who may, because of such negative experiences, refuse ever to report to the police again.

Criminal justice outcomes rely on incidents coming to the attention of law enforcement agencies, being followed up on by police and, where adequate evidence for a criminal charge is found, ultimately the legal processes which result in criminal convictions and sentencing. Evidence has shown that the characteristics of perpetrators can influence the perception of victims and offenders, and to whom they allocate blame for the incident.179 Section 142(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 outlines the regard courts must give to five key areas, which range from public safety to the punishment of perpetrators (including their rehabilitation), and restitution for victims of crime. The court must pass a sentence which reflects the seriousness of the incident. It must also consider the culpability of offenders and the harm, or risk of harm, caused by the offence. For example, aggravating factors that indicate higher culpability include whether the offence targeted a minority group or person, while aggravating factors which demonstrate a ‘more than usually serious degree of harm’ include whether there were multiple victims and whether there was an especially serious physical or psychological effect on the victim/s (irrespective of intent).180

There are mitigating factors a judge will consider, for example, if a perpetrator has cooperated with the police and shown remorse for their offence, or if this was their first offence. Conversely, proving a pattern of offending is a factor which indicates higher culpability, whereas the (hypothetical) young age of an offender may lower culpability. These examples are intended to be demonstrative and not exhaustive. But other factors, which include the personal and unconscious biases of judges, can influence

177 Chakraborti et al. Op cit.
such outcomes. In 2015, the then President of the Supreme Court, Lord Neuberger, said judges must be ‘sensitive’ about their own cultural and economic privileges compared with those who appear in court.\textsuperscript{181} He added that there is a need to understand the cultural and religious background of individuals and respect, for example, that some women choose to cover their faces for religious reasons.\textsuperscript{182} In judiciary guidance published in February 2018, Tom Stafford, a senior lecturer in Psychology and Cognitive Science at the University of Sheffield, wrote that, ‘individuals often lack the perspective or resources to combat bias on their own’ and that sustainable forms of change require institutional change.\textsuperscript{183}

Another challenge the justice system faces is the negative perception of it among minority ethnic groups. Polling released in 2015 by the solicitors Hodge, Jones and Allen found that just 20% of Muslims surveyed stated that they could trust legal professionals – compared with the national average of 37%.\textsuperscript{184} Moreover, Tapley (2003) argues that the quality of service given to victims by the criminal justice service is more important than the outcome of their case.\textsuperscript{185} The Victim and Witness Satisfaction Survey, published by the CPS, is a useful measure of satisfaction with the justice system. The 2015 Survey made several recommendations including more transparency, and keeping victims, particularly those who have suffered a hate crime, better informed as to why charges are either altered, dropped, or upheld. Victims of hate crime (and witnesses) were more likely than victims of non-aggravated offences to be satisfied with the final charges given to perpetrators. The report added that ‘satisfaction with the final charges is associated with victims and witnesses feeling that the CPS helped them to cope and recover from their experience.’\textsuperscript{186} The police were also more likely to carry out needs assessments for vulnerable victims of crime and refer them to relevant third-party agencies.\textsuperscript{187}

Due to institutional discrimination and personal bias, individuals from minority ethnic groups are often disadvantaged when they engage with law enforcement agencies

\textsuperscript{182} Neuberger, D. ‘Fairness in the courts: the best we can do’. Address to the Criminal Justice Alliance (2015). Available at: https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-150410.pdf (retrieved 14/06/2018).
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid, p. 52.
and the courts. The Lammy Review, written by David Lammy MP, found that individuals from Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds make up 25% of the prison population in England and Wales and 41% of the youth justice system, despite both groups accounting for just 14% of the general population. Moreover, Muslims account for 15% of the prison population in England and Wales yet account for just 5% of the general population, for offences not linked to terrorism, and according to Lammy, this statistic risks becoming a ‘source of social division’. Furthermore, Lammy says: “These disproportionate numbers represent wasted lives, a source of anger and mistrust, and a significant cost to the taxpayer.”

Concerning the use of stop–and-search powers, data published last year exposed a wide racial gap, where individuals classed as black were eight times more likely to be stopped than white people, while those classed as being from other minority ethnic groups were four times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people. The use of stop and search however fell by 21%, its lowest overall use since 2002, but for minority ethnic groups the use of this power only fell by 11% compared with a 31% drop for white people. Amber Rudd, the former Home Secretary, has said that such misuse of powers undermines confidence in policing, adding that no person should be stopped on the basis of their race or ethnicity. Research published in 2016 found that ‘all minority ethnic communities are affected by disproportionality but we see that people belonging to the category “Asian” and “Chinese and “Other” – which includes Arabs – are the most likely to be affected by anti-terrorism powers.’

Keeping victims and witnesses informed and supported throughout the legal process and addressing concerns about the impacts of disproportionality are practical steps in rebuilding trust in the justice system. The examples cited above are not intended to be exhaustive but rather indicative of why many Muslims and other minority ethnic groups express dissatisfaction and distrust in such public institutions and authorities. Outcomes of trials, can, in some regard, influence the perception of the justice system. Our understanding is so often shaped by how newspapers, both local and national, highlight the sentencing remarks of judges which are, so often, not published online.

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190 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
unless the case is of significant public interest, according to the Sentencing Council. 194

A news article which generated some discussion last year was the conviction of Joseph Breslin, who, in July, vandalised an airline armrest using the hateful phrase “Death to Allah”, targeted an Arab couple with an Islamophobic note, and avoided prison. He admitted to two counts of racially or religiously aggravated harassment and one count of racially aggravated criminal damage. Mr Breslin was given a large fine because he had pled guilty and showed remorse. 195

Breslin received a community order, 160 hours of unpaid work, and was ordered to pay £3,604 in damages and £300 in prosecution fees for two counts of religiously aggravated harassment and one count of religiously aggravated criminal damage. However, he was spared a custodial sentence by the judge who cited his previous good character and other mitigating factors:

“I have no doubt that you have been of immense benefit to your local community. I accept too that you are remorseful. It is clear that you had just got married, you were bringing your wife back to the country. She was pregnant. Your business was under strain. And that was something that was very much on your mind. And you had recently given up smoking. For a number of other reasons, you were under considerable stress.”197

It is worth adding that the note, which was translated for the victims, read, “Death to Allah. F*** the rag-heads.” The content of the note terrified fellow passengers Muneera Al-Gahtari and Salem Omar Shamlam. Mr Breslin targeted the pair because he believed one of them had been deliberately spraying perfume to “annoy” him. News articles published a month before his sentencing suggested that prison was a possibility and were shared by Robert Spencer, an American author who is banned from entering the UK due to his Islamophobic views which demonstrates how foreign websites seek out content which conforms to an ideologically-driven form of Islamophobia. 198

In the same way in which sentence uplift for anti-Muslim hate crime is ideologically significant, statements from judges in courtrooms send a clear message about how hate crime offenders are dealt with by criminal justice agencies. Statements made by

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196 Nagesh, A. ‘Passenger scrawled “death to Allah” on the plane armrest “because he was tired”.’ Metro. Available at: http://metro.co.uk/2017/10/04/passenger-scrawled-death-to-allah-on-plane-armrest-because-he-was-tired-6977428/ (retrieved 07/06/2018).

197 Ibid.

judges help to convey the message that hate crimes are treated very seriously by the courts.

Civil Outcomes for Anti-Muslim Incidents

It is not just the role of law enforcement agencies to respond to Islamophobic abuse and discrimination. Private companies, employers and civil authorities also have a role to play in responding to and protecting Muslims from abuse and discrimination. Neither should this preclude any discussion about systemic and institutional forms of discrimination within workplace hierarchies and institutional structures. Our previous report highlighted the psychological significance of police and bystander responses to hate crime and discrimination.\(^{199}\) Civil outcomes may include disciplinary procedures against abusive colleagues, unfair dismissal from work, or a lack of action from housing authorities or councils when abusive behaviour is reported.

When members of the public report an incident of abuse or discrimination our caseworkers can liaise with civil authority figures where appropriate. This may include writing letters of complaint, arranging meetings with the management of educational institutions, or assisting with the preparation of employment cases going to tribunal. However, our analysis also indicates that victims often experience unsatisfactory responses when reporting discrimination or abuse to civil authorities. Civil outcomes can be very significant for victims due to the potential impact they have on their everyday lives, employment, housing, and education.

Housing Authorities

A high proportion of incidents occurred in and around victims’ homes (12%, n=101), often because of abusive neighbours. In addition to action by the police, in cases where the victims and/or perpetrators of anti-Muslim abuse are tenants of a council or housing association, organisations may act to support and protect victims of abuse. This can include a Community Protection Warning (CPW), a Community Protection Notice (CPN), or eviction for serious anti-social behaviour. However, as highlighted in the Criminal Justice Outcomes section, such cases are often complex, routinely involve counter-allegations which can be mishandled by authorities, and very rarely result in positive outcomes for victims. Therefore, in addition to holistic support, Tell MAMA provides victim advocacy, which includes advice and signposting on housing cases, letters to housing authorities, and accompanying victims to meetings with housing authorities.

In one case, a Muslim family informed Tell MAMA that they were experiencing ongoing racial abuse from their neighbours, including threats of violence, being chased with weapons, and suffering criminal damage. The family called the police numerous times and contacted their housing association for help. However, in their communication with the housing association, they felt that they were perceived to be “causing trouble” for raising grievances against their neighbours. This, along with a poor response and a lack of protection from police, has left them feeling abandoned:

“I have provided the housing association...with plenty of evidence but they are calling me the offender and her the victim. Please help us as we feel no one is bothered about us.”

In many cases where Islamophobic victimisation is perpetrated by neighbours, victims often feel they are discriminated against and labelled as the perpetrators of a conflict by authorities. For example, a Muslim refugee was experiencing ongoing abuse from his neighbours which included physical assault, threatening behaviour and Islamophobic insults. The victim called the police on numerous occasions but he was then arrested and charged due to counter-allegations from his neighbours. Due to the lack of support and protection he received from the police, as well as the local housing authority, he is now seeking to relocate. To do so, the victim put in an application with the council to be added to the transfer list to be moved to a different area. Unfortunately, his application was refused. The rejection letter sent to the victim had effectively blamed the victim for the noise nuisance, not the perpetrators. In such cases, victims can feel compelled to leave their homes and live elsewhere to escape victimisation, if they are not evicted by housing authorities due to counter-allegations. It can be very difficult for victims to find alternative social housing. In these circumstances, Tell MAMA will signpost victims to housing charities such as Shelter.

**Employers**

In 2017, 9% (n=74) of anti-Muslim incidents reported to Tell MAMA occurred within the workplace. These ranged from discrimination on the part of employers, to verbal or physical abuse from colleagues, customers or service users. It can be very daunting for individuals to raise a grievance with their employer due to fear of negative repercussions. For anti-Muslim incidents relating to employment, in a similar manner to cases relating to housing, it is unlikely that there will be a positive outcome for victims. Individuals who do report abuse or discrimination in the workplace rarely have their complaints upheld, often resulting in the victim feeling unhappy at work due to their treatment by management, and in some cases, leaving their job.

In one case, a teacher at an adult college was verbally abused by a student who, apropos of nothing, made Islamophobic remarks about Muslims and Islam in her classroom. His comments included, “Don’t you think your Qur’an is full of crap?”, “Why did your prophet get married to a nine-year-old?” and “Why didn’t your community members (protest) against the Muslim child groomers in Rotherham?” These questions were not put forward in the context of a lesson on theology and were clearly intended to antagonise the victim. What’s more, the perpetrator consciously associated the Rotherham child sexual abuse scandal with the teacher premised on her Muslim identity, the implication of their question being that only Muslims are culpable for paedophilia and should therefore apologise en masse. The perpetrator became aggressive during the lesson and the victim responded by telling him these views were uneducated and racist. However, when she reported the incident to college management she was suspended from her role and was told she ‘should not have retaliated’, while the student received only a warning for his behaviour. Tell MAMA reported the student to the police, whereupon the student was questioned. It was ultimately decided that there was not enough evidence to proceed. Due to the incident,
combined with the response from management, the victim became very unhappy in her job and considered seeking constructive dismissal due to her manager’s conduct.

In another case, a Muslim man was experiencing abuse from a colleague at work. At one point, the victim’s colleague prevented him from praying in a break room and subsequently assaulted him when he tried to alert management to the abuse. The on-duty manager was supportive and told him to leave if he felt threatened, and to call the police. Yet when he filed a complaint against his abusive colleague with his employer, the victim was told there was not enough evidence to uphold his complaint. The victim felt that he was being blamed for what had happened. He felt forced to resign from his job due to his employer’s inaction.

Occasionally cases of workplace discrimination against Muslims are reported in the UK press, forcing employers to respond. In one case, Samira, a young Muslim woman, was told by a restaurant manager in south-west London that she could not wear her hijab while working in a branch of McDonald’s restaurants. McDonald’s then apologised and released a statement saying that their workers are indeed welcome to wear a hijab and that Samira had been offered an interview at another nearby McDonald’s.200 This can be viewed as a positive outcome given that a public apology was issued and the victim was offered an interview at a different branch of the fast-food chain. However, it should not undermine the incredibly negative experience for the victim. Nor do we know whether the original restaurant manager has been reprimanded, leaving the possibility that they may continue to discriminate against workers in this manner.

**Educational Institutions**

Incidents of Islamophobic discrimination or abuse within educational institutions totalled (6%, n=53) in this data set. These include incidents within schools, universities and colleges. Educational institutions have an obligation to ensure a strong response to anti-Muslim abuse and discrimination against their pupils. This could include disciplinary action against abusive pupils or staff, and an adequate review of practices or policies which may discriminate on the grounds of religious identity.

In one case reported in the national press, a Muslim schoolgirl was targeted by a mob of pupils outside her school in Stockport. Her mother, Farrah Aftab, filmed the incident, which occurred as she was picking up her daughter from school. During the incident, which followed the terror attack in Manchester, schoolchildren shouted “ISIS” and asked where the victim had been during the Manchester attack. Aftab told the *Metro* that the school had handled the case “very badly”. In the aftermath, the school sent her an email stating that if her daughter wished to return to school then it would be in her ‘best interests’ to be placed in an isolated study centre. Understandably, the victim’s mother felt that this response indicated that her daughter was “being punished

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200 Dahir, I. ‘McDonalds Has Apologised After A Young Woman Was Told She Couldn’t Wear Her Headscarf While Working’. *BuzzFeed News*. Available at: https://www.buzzfeed.com/ikrd/a-woman-was-told-she-couldnt-wear-her-headscarf-while?utm_term=.droGw4gLLE#.dsJ0Z1M2o (retrieved 03/05/2018).
for being a victim of bullying” and was upset that teachers present during the incident failed to act:

“When it’s happening in front of you with a teacher watching and they say I don’t wish to speak to you (it’s) disgusting. I’m afraid I just don’t trust the teachers with my children now – they have breached the duty of care.”

In addition to circumstances where school authorities failed to challenge abuse, there were also several cases of Islamophobic discrimination perpetrated by such authorities. In one such case, the family of an 11-year-old girl sought support when they were told that their daughter could not wear her hijab when she started secondary school in September 2017. The Sunday Times reported that Iman Altay, who was due to attend St Saviour’s and St Olave’s School in South London, was told that she could not attend if she wore her hijab. Tell MAMA reviewed the school’s uniform policy and ascertained that it did not articulate a no-hijab policy. The school’s management had not communicated their uniform policy regarding religious clothing, nor had it provided an appropriate process for any appeals process. As a result, Iman’s family were not aware of any issue until close to the start of term. Iman’s family appealed the decision but were ultimately forced to find her a place at a new school at late notice, which resulted in considerable disruption for Iman and her family. Her father told the newspaper: “She is now, in the UK, being exposed to a gross injustice, to prejudice, and she is old enough to be hurt and disturbed by this.”

Such cases highlight significant failings in the way in which schools tackle Islamophobic bullying as well as discriminatory practices, which can go on unchecked within schools. Ultimately, the outcomes for pupils who were victimised by these anti-Muslim incidents are poor. The psychological impact of anti-Muslim abuse and discrimination is significant for adults and it is likely that children are even more vulnerable in this regard. Furthermore, the frequently inadequate responses of schools to these incidents potentially causes further distress to victims and their families.

Tell MAMA offers workshops in schools to raise awareness of Islamophobia amongst pupils and staff. In certain circumstances, where it is either necessary or desired by victims, Tell MAMA can liaise with senior school staff to provide advocacy on behalf of victims. They can also advise school staff on the correct way to respond to incidents of bullying, abuse or discrimination, as well as how to support pupils or staff who experience identity-based abuse or discrimination within institutions.

201 Smith, A. ‘Teenage mob surround girl and shout “Isis” at her as she’s picked up from school’. Metro. Available at: http://metro.co.uk/2017/07/12/muslim-schoolgirl-surrounded-by-mob-of-teens-shouting-isis-6772796/ (retrieved 08/05/2018).
204 Griffiths and Kerbaj. Ibid.
Public and Private Services

Tell MAMA frequently receives reports of anti-Muslim abuse and discrimination from people accessing public and private services. This includes abuse while accessing public transport, in a restaurant, or when accessing medical treatment. The negative psychological impact of victimisation may be mitigated somewhat if the victim of anti-Muslim abuse feels that they have received a degree of support at the scene of the incident.²⁰⁵

Following the criminal conviction of a woman who verbally abused a tram inspector in Nottingham, a representative from Nottingham Express Transit released a comment to the *Nottingham Post* which condemned discrimination and racism. The spokesperson also provided some details of the strategies which the organisation had taken to tackle identity-based abuse and discrimination:

“We’ve also joined other local transport providers in signing up to the ‘No to Hate’ pledge and we’re working with a Basford-based charity, Communities Inc., to promote awareness of issues arising from hate crime and to train staff on how to spot, prevent and report discriminatory behaviour across the network.”²⁰⁶

This can be considered a positive outcome as the incident resulted in new measures which were put in place to tackle anti-Muslim victimisation. The criminal conviction and media coverage of this case may very well have compelled the transport company to release a statement.

However, incidents which occur in privately owned public spaces do not always result in decisive action from businesses. For instance, in November 2017, a Muslim woman and her five children were abused by a woman whilst shopping at the Manchester Trafford Centre.²⁰⁷ The perpetrator spat in the face of the former’s 11-year-old child and shouted, “black scumbag”, “people like you shouldn’t be here”, and “look at you with that thing on”, in reference to the victim’s hijab. The victim’s son managed to take a picture of the perpetrator. The victim told Tell MAMA that the incident took place in a busy area of the shopping centre and that the victim had screamed for help before approaching staff at a nearby shop. However, the response from staff in the shopping centre was “slow or non-existent”, in her words. Once the police arrived at the scene the perpetrator was untraceable. Understandably, the victim was unhappy with the response from the security workers. She particularly objected to the fact that a camera had been placed in front of her while she was crying and distraught after the attack. Tell MAMA liaised with Greater Manchester Police to reopen the investigation and raise a complaint with the Trafford Centre. A representative from the Trafford Centre

²⁰⁷ Tell MAMA. ‘Woman spat “in the face” of Muslim boy at the Trafford Centre’. *Tell MAMA*. Available at: https://tellmamauk.org/woman-spat-in-the-face-of-muslim-boy-at-the-trafford-centre/ (retrieved 08/05/2018).
did eventually approach the victim to offer minor financial compensation which the victim did not feel was an appropriate response.

It can be particularly difficult to achieve a satisfactory civil outcome for victims of discrimination cases. In 2017, we received a report from a Muslim woman who claimed to have experienced discrimination following a trip to A&E with her young child. During this trip, she had informed a doctor that she would be travelling to Turkey on a family holiday and had asked if her young child would be well enough to travel. Once on holiday, she received a phone call from social services who accused her of travelling to Turkey for ‘political reasons’, indicating that the doctor had raised concerns with authorities about her child through safeguarding channels. The victim perceived that she had been discriminated against based on her and her family’s Muslim identity. Now, whenever she takes her child to a medical appointment, this issue appears as flagged on the practice’s database and the general practitioner will question her about it. She has complained numerous times to have these ‘safeguarding’ concerns removed from her child’s medical record but to no avail. The victim is experiencing considerable stress and anxiety because of this incident and worries about the implications of these unfounded ‘concerns’ remaining on her child’s medical records. Indeed, a study from academics at Warwick University found that most NHS staff (70%) surveyed confirmed that they were likely or very likely to make a Prevent referral if a patient owned any anarchist or Islamic philosophy books. In one example, cited in the report, a member of NHS staff referred an ‘Asian’ man to Prevent after he expressed a desire to visit Mecca to perform Hajj, the fifth and final pillar of Islam.

This is not, however, to say that all discrimination cases result in a negative outcome. In one high-profile case which generated national media attention, a third-party security guard working at a Holloway branch of McDonald’s in North London was reportedly suspended following an incident in which a Muslim woman was ordered to remove her hijab before being served. A spokesperson released the following statement:

“We welcome customers of all faiths and sincerely apologise for this situation. McDonald’s has no policy which restricts or prevents anyone wearing a hijab, or any other religious attire, from entering our restaurants.”

This is a positive civil outcome. It is likely that the combination of media attention, video evidence and the public setting of the incident made it untenable for McDonald’s not to address what had happened, making a positive civil outcome far more probable in this circumstance than in other, less public cases. Although the fast-food chain did not indicate how they would prevent future incidents of discrimination. It should be


209 Ibid.

210 Agerholm, H. ‘McDonald’s “refuses to serve woman because she’s wearing a hijab”’. *The Independent*. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/mcdonalds-hijab-refuses-london-holloway-road-service-muslim-woman-burqa-islamophobia-a8088386.html (retrieved 08/05/2018).
noted that there remains the possibility that the security guard had been instructed by management to make this demand (although there is no firm evidence to support this assertion), which, if this was the case, would make his suspension irrelevant. Public and private services have an obligation to be proactive in making meaningful changes within their organisations, which serve to tackle potential prejudice from management or staff, rather than merely taking reactionary measures and making public apologies with little to no evidence of structural change.

Informal Outcomes for Anti-Muslim Incidents

The reaction of witnesses, law enforcement agencies and civil authority figures to anti-Muslim incidents are significant for victims. Our previous report highlighted the importance victims place on support from witnesses at the scene of an incident, along with the ways in which they are treated by authority figures during any contact with law enforcement agencies. This principle also applies to informal comments made by peers, colleagues and civil authority figures, including employers, teachers, public and private sector workers. If witnesses can safely show solidarity with a victim it can, up to a point, help mitigate any negative psychological impact the incident may have on the victim. However, if bystanders ignore an incident, make negative comments which blame the victim, or fail to acknowledge the seriousness of an incident when it is reported, this can cause further psychological harm to victims. How an incident is informally responded to in any setting may influence the likelihood (or not) of repeated incidents. For example, if an individual can racially abuse someone unchallenged in their workplace, it would communicate that this is an accepted behaviour, normalising prejudicial and racist attitudes. Conversely, an immediate and strong response from colleagues and/or management would confirm that this behaviour is unacceptable.

Indeed, we should not lose sight of how institutional forms of racism and Islamophobia may prevent positive informal outcomes. The concept of institutional racism arguably entered the public consciousness after the term was used in 1999 by Sir William Macpherson in his report into the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993. In the report, Macpherson highlighted institutional racism within the Metropolitan Police and policing more broadly. He defined this form of racism as ‘the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin’. Ambalavaner Sivanandan, the then Director of the Institute for Race Relations, argued in 1999 that institutional racism “resides in the policies, procedures, operations and culture of public or private institutions – reinforcing individual prejudices and being reinforced by them in turn.”

For Phillips (2011), any understanding of institutional racism must be situated within a wider framework which accounts for how racialisation operates at various levels – miso, micro, and macro. Racialisation, as Silverstein (2005) argues, is the ‘historical

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212 Lawrence, S. ‘What is institutional racism?’ *The Guardian.* Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/feb/24/lawrence.ukcrime7 (retrieved 13/06/2018).
transformation of fluid categories of difference into fixed species of otherness.’

Whereas, Rattansi (2005) takes this concept further and argues that institutional racialisation should replace the term racism as it ‘opens up the investigation to articulations and complexity, rather than being nudged to closure by a focus on a singular disadvantaging operational feature.’

Such an approach would, therefore, for Rattansi, explain how racism exists in ‘a complex imbrication with nation, class, gender, and sexuality’ and places it within broader analytical frameworks.

At a micro level, to return to Phillips, racialisation takes influence from ‘familial socialisation and shared cultural values’ amongst individuals positioned in groups composed of various ethnicities, classes, and genders which are reactive, not static, and shaped by environmental conditions.

Moreover, this framework recognises how some individuals may simultaneously hold positive and negative attitudes about minority ethnic groups which may help to explain the difference between prejudicial behaviours and racist attitudes.

**Law Enforcement**

As with criminal justice outcomes, negative interactions with the police and justice system can exacerbate or mitigate the cumulative impacts hate crime and abuse has on victims, witnesses, and their families. In one incident, following the Manchester attack, the staff at a takeaway shop were threatened and abused by a knife-wielding drunken man who said, “P*ks, I’ll kill you… do you find it funny what happened in Manchester?”

The police subsequently attended the scene and arrested the perpetrator. However, the owner of the shop revealed that while on the scene attending officers were disinterested and unhelpful, as one officer reportedly said, “What would you like us to do about it?”, in a dismissive manner. When the police followed up with the victim they were reportedly sympathetic in tone about the perpetrator as he was very ‘apologetic’, had no prior convictions, was ‘drunk at the time’ and was an expectant father. Moreover, when the victim requested to see the CPS report on the incident his request was denied. We spoke with the Detective Chief Inspector (DCI) overseeing this case on behalf of the victim. He confirmed to Tell MAMA that the perpetrator had, in fact, been charged with a racially aggravated public order offence and for the possession of a bladed article. The DCI added that officers would rectify their previous miscommunication with the victim. This positive intervention demonstrates the importance of clear communication between the police and victims. Given the deeper psychological traumas that hate crime victims face, it is, therefore, imperative that police officers, when attending crimes or following up with victims, measure the expectations of victims in more sensitive language.

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216 Ibid, p. 296.

217 Ibid.

Given the chronic problem of under-reporting of hate crime across all hate crime strands, a lack of effective response from the police can serve to intensify feelings of isolation amid a wider climate of fear. The public nature of the racist threats of violence go beyond the immediate victims and probably intend to send a ‘message crime’ to other Muslims in the area, in what Noelle (2002) describes as ‘vicarious traumatisation’—where the crime is intended to create added fear amongst the wider community to which the victim belongs.219

Thankfully, victims and witnesses do also report positive interactions with police officers and call handlers when they have felt supported and protected. In one case, a young boy was intimidated and verbally abused by two men on his way home from a madrasa (Islamic school) whilst wearing his thobe and topi (cap). The incident left him upset and made him reluctant to wear Islamic clothing outside in the future (unless when travelling by car). The boy’s parents were very satisfied with the manner of the police investigation, citing regular updates from officers as evidence of their satisfaction with the support. In a separate case, a Muslim family were concerned because neighbours had left a pig’s hoof outside their home, and after reporting the hate crime to the police, stated that officers were very supportive, including visiting their home on three occasions and increasing local patrols. Both examples demonstrate how satisfaction was linked to the levels of clear communication and direct support offered by the police.

Civil Authority

There are a variety of civil authority figures who have the responsibility to provide an adequate response to victims of anti-Muslim abuse and discrimination, in addition to preventing future incidents from occurring. In the cases reported to Tell MAMA in 2017, victims often mentioned the informal reaction of individuals to whom they had reported incidents, in addition to civil outcomes at other institutions.

In a negative example, a London bus driver told a Muslim family to vacate a bus moments after they had reported the racist abuse they had suffered from other passengers. The driver was insistent and told the family that they were “holding up his bus”. His language and lack of support compelled the family to alight the vehicle. Arguably, the lack of positive intervention from the bus driver helped embolden the racist passengers, who were said to have been shouting abuse throughout the incident. The family then formally complained to Transport for London (TfL) who launched an investigation and soon apologised to the family for the poor conduct of the driver. Nonetheless, the family felt incredibly let down by the driver’s response as the failure to intervene left a deeper impact on one of the victims: “The worst part was that the bus driver, rather than taking the incident seriously, said, ‘Stop wasting my time and holding the bus up’; he then tried to shut the door in our face [sic].”

In a similar case, a delivery driver for a major supermarket had called a Muslim woman a “f**king P*ki” in a racist voicemail after he had attempted to re-arrange her delivery. She only became aware of the abuse days later when checking her messages. After

contacting the Customer Service Complaints team, however, she felt that the company had provided her with contradictory and inconsistent information. For example, members of the complaints team would not disclose to her whether or not the driver had been fired or had resigned from his role, which left her fearful that future employers may be unaware of his misconduct. The company also offered the victim a £50 credit. The victim felt that the offer was not an appropriate response as the incident had caused her deep psychological distress which had also impacted her working life. She now worries about ordering groceries online again and so does not in order to avoid further racial abuse:

“It has distressed me, impeded my work and left me feeling wary about ordering any goods to my home. I would be completely horrified if any racist abuse was directed at myself again or my family in future.”

But when there are positive informal outcomes they can, in some respects, have a wider impact which goes beyond the immediacy of an incident. At a school in the Midlands, a male student had thrown an object against a wall and shouted “Allahu Akbar”, and when a female Muslim student challenged him, he refused to apologise, citing that that was the language of “Muslim terrorists” which upset her greatly. In Islam, the phrase ‘Allahu Akbar’, known as the *takbir*, seeks to allude to the greatness of God. Moreover, it forms part of the call to prayer and is a phrase that is of intrinsic importance to Muslims. As Arsalan Iftikhar has argued, the phrase ‘is the rhetorical equivalent of the English phrase “Hallelujah” for many Westerners today.’

He adds that for many Muslims, the phrase takes on a more everyday quality to celebrate positive events – like the birth of a child or a successful marriage proposal. Therefore, where some have misused the term, a clear majority of Muslims are enriched by its usage, and therefore, to link it with terrorism in the context of this incident was intended to cause great offence to the victim, knowing that she was one of the few Muslims in the classroom.

After confiding in her parents about the incident, the student’s mother praised the proactive response of the school. Beyond the immediacy of responding to the incident and punishing the perpetrator, the staff took it further. Her teacher helped to facilitate a wider classroom discussion about the impact(s) of Islamophobia. The victim and her voice were central to this discussion, where she could highlight the role of negative media representations of Muslims and Islam, which she believed had partly motivated the incident.

This positive response, though perhaps an outlier, is an example of putting the voices of Muslims forward when so often discussions around Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred speak of Muslims but overlook direct dialogue with them. One marker of hostility may stem in a Western context from a lack of interaction or knowledge about Islam and Muslims. For example, YouGov polled 1,000 US adults and found that a clear majority have no Muslim colleagues at work (74%), have any Muslim friends (68%),

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221 Ibid.
or have visited a mosque (87%). Further analysis of the data revealed a clear partisan split as self-identified Democrats and younger Americans were more likely to express positive sentiments about Islam and an interest in learning more about the religion. The poll found that people under 29 were more likely to have Muslim friends, and a dislike of Islam was more pronounced among older demographics of people (40% of 18 to 29-year-olds had a negative view of Islam compared with 63% of those categorised as 45 to 64). Moreover, across all religions, a correlation was proven between those who claim to know a person of faith and a more favourable attitude towards that faith group in general.

But what of attitudes in Britain? A wider analysis of polling data carried out by IPSOS Mori found a similar generational divide in positive attitudes towards Muslims. Again, familiarity with Muslims, be it through social or familial bonds, is profoundly important. A ComRes poll in 2016 found that individuals who have Muslim friends, acquaintances or family members were less likely to agree that Islam promotes acts of violence in the UK (25% vs 41%), and a clear majority rejected the notion that Islam is a violent religion (71%). Again, the poll found that young people were more inclined to state that Islam promotes peace in the UK. A lack of knowledge about Islam also correlated with a lack of personal or familial ties to Muslims. This knowledge gap around Islam, particularly among older demographics, due to a lack of personal ties, can be filled by the media, where a quantitative analysis of 200,037 articles in the British press between 1998 and 2009 found that Muslims were often ‘constructed in terms of homogeneity and connected to conflict’. In addition, with more older generations embracing social media platforms, according to research by Ofcom, there is scope to increase engagement and dialogue, particularly on Facebook, as 87% of those over the age of 65 now have a profile. Schools also face a wider problem, as research suggests that a motivating factor in withdrawing children from religious education is a reluctance of some parents to let their children learn about Islam, with more than 10% of respondents stating that it was down to racism. Encouraging dialogue, therefore, in a less rigid but structured environment, can help to ensure that informal outcomes,

224 Chalabi, M. ‘Americans Are More Likely To Like Muslims If They Know One’. FiveThirtyEight. Available at: https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-are-more-likely-to-like-muslims-if-they-know-one/ (retrieved 10/07/2018).
where needed, may help prevent racist attitudes and prejudices from becoming normalised among some students.

Community Support

Interventions or support from witnesses during or after Islamophobic incidents can have a profound impact on victims, especially when incidents occur in public spaces or on transport networks. This was a key theme in what many victims spoke of in our previous report. Acts of solidarity can help mitigate the deeper psychological traumas victims of hate crime experience. It is why, when we issue safety tips, we provide members of the public with practical advice which includes speaking to victims, providing reassurance, offering to call the police (if required), and challenging or photographing the perpetrator when safe to do so.

The online section covers the monstering of a Muslim woman by the extreme-right online following the Westminster Bridge terror attack on 22 March but messages of solidarity extended beyond social media. An archive of the original contemptible tweet reveals that some of the most popular reply tweets sought to counter the racialised trolling. For example, in a reply tweet, the user @vickyyf wrote, “you are a complete embarrassing mess of a person.” A Muslim user then replied to her tweet, “thx for defending us.” Neither user is based in London, or even in the UK. The profiles of @vickyyf and the Muslim woman list their locations as Canada and Morocco respectively, thus demonstrating that social media also allows genuine acts of solidarity to extend beyond national borders, despite the clear imbalance between the reach of racialised hate and counter-speech in this globalised example.

After reaching out to Tell MAMA, we worked closely with Twitter to remove the hateful and racist memes directed at the Muslim woman in question. We also kept her anonymous throughout any media coverage. She did eventually consent for Tell MAMA to publicise a statement on her behalf. We have re-published her statement in full below:

“I’m shocked and totally dismayed at how a picture of me is being circulated on social media. To those individuals who have interpreted and commented on what my thoughts were in that horrific and distressful [sic] moment, I would like to say not only have I been devastated by witnessing the aftermath of a shocking and numbing terror attack, I’ve also had to deal with the shock of finding my picture plastered all over social media by those who could not look beyond my attire, who draw conclusions based on hate and xenophobia.”


The positive counter-narrative soon went viral in the press and helped to galvanise messages of support amid renewed calls for tolerance. Tell MAMA was flooded with supportive emails, messages on social media, and even phone calls from members of the public wishing to express their outrage at the monstering of this woman and to offer their support. We then passed on the good wishes to the victim, who was touched by the response.

What is the Impact of Anti-Muslim Victimisation?

Members of the public report anti-Muslim incidents to our confidential third-party hate crime reporting service. The primary function of this service is to provide tailored, holistic support for the victims of anti-Muslim hatred, which is largely comprised of emotional support, advocacy, and signposting to external support agencies. This section will discuss anonymised experiences of individuals who contacted Tell MAMA in 2017 and will highlight the impact that racism, abuse and discrimination have had on the personal lives of victims, their families, and the wider Muslim community.

Anti-Muslim incidents take a wide variety of forms, ranging from overt physical attacks in public to subtle forms of discrimination or derogatory comments in schools or in the workplace. Hate crime can have major consequences for victims and their families, both physically and psychologically. Existing research has documented how such identity-based victimisation harms the overall mental health and personal wellbeing of individuals.233 234 235 236

Some may alter their social life or even their educational or work aspirations due to experiences of discrimination or fear of being persecuted due to their religious or ethnic background. In terms of education, the Social Mobility Council (SMC) found that many young Muslims report self-esteem issues due to a failure of institutions to support isolated minority students, to recognise Muslim identity, or to promote integration. Instances of racism and anti-Muslim prejudice further damage the confidence and self-esteem of young Muslims. As a result, some Muslims are leaving university early, or not gaining good grades. Misconceptions about cultural differences and false assumptions that Muslim women prioritise family over work lead to significant discrimination in the recruitment and career advancement stages.237 A BBC investigation reflected existing research which found that Muslims in Britain are underrepresented in professional and managerial roles when compared with other religious groups.238

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236 Perry, B. and Alvi, S. “We are all vulnerable”: The in terrorem effects of hate crimes’, International Review of Victimology 18 (2012).


238 Adesina, Z. and Marocico, O. ‘Is it easier to get a job if you’re Adam or Mohamed?’. BBC News. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-38751307 (retrieved 16/05/2018).
Physical Impact

In 2017 there were multiple high-profile violent attacks in the UK motivated by anti-Muslim prejudice and Islamophobia. The murder of 51-year-old Makram Ali and the attempted murder of nine other men outside the Muslim Welfare House in Finsbury Park, London, by the terrorist Darren Osborne in June 2017, had a devastating impact on the victims, their families, and the wider community.

Similarly, another case reported to Tell MAMA, which also received a great deal of press coverage, was the attempted murder of Zaynab Hussein in Leicester. on 20 September 2017 she suffered several fractures to her pelvis and spine, and was left with a broken leg after Paul Moore, 22, attempted to run her over with a car on two separate occasions. He was jailed for life on 27 March 2018 and will serve a minimum term of 20 years. Due to her injuries, Mrs Hussein was hospitalised for three months and was confined to her bed following her release from hospital. Her husband told the press: “Our family has been heartbroken by the attack. Whatever sentence Paul Moore receives will be less than the life sentence that my wife will have to live with.”

Mrs Hussein was targeted because she is a Somali Muslim woman who wears the hijab. The racist and anti-Muslim nature of the attack on Mrs Hussein has left her with life-changing injuries. Tell MAMA support one of the family members, including a supporting impact statement for the courts, and working with Leicestershire Police to ensure the attack was investigated as a hate crime.

Moore exercised his right not to give evidence to the police, or in court, so we are reliant on the evidence given by others, including by his half-brother, Lewis Welsh. Mr Welsh told the court that Moore had used the racial slur “P*ki” when describing his actions, and had alluded to the 7/7 terror attacks, and his “pride” in doing his country a “favour”. The prosecution argued that it was ‘no coincidence’ that Moore’s violent actions occurred days after the failed terror attack in Parsons Green, but it would be incorrect, as with the Darren Osborne case, to frame Moore’s actions solely as a response to terrorism. He had racialised Mrs Hussein as Pakistani, which perhaps demonstrates a deeper ideological curve in his thinking given that Moore was under the age of 10 when the 7/7 attacks occurred. He had also attempted to run over a 12-year-old Somali girl, who also wears the hijab, shortly after attacking Mrs Hussein. As Mr Justice Soole remarked, “You ultimately launched your assault on those who were in Islamic clothing”. Following the guilty verdict, it emerged that Moore was already on bail for a charge of causing grievous bodily harm when Leicestershire Police arrested him for the attack on Mrs Hussein.

In a victim impact statement, Mrs Hussein said: “My younger children come into the room and ask, ‘When are you going to start walking again?’”. She has limited mobility and can only use the bathroom with the assistance of a walking stick. She added that the upsetting event has caused her much unhappiness and that she now fears going outside. Moreover, she added that: “I feel I have lost my independence. It is not something I am used to and I do not want to be dependent on others.”

Tell MAMA, however, receives many reports of physical attacks every year which do not necessarily receive similar levels of press coverage, or even result in any criminal convictions. For example, a Muslim man was assaulted in the presence of his children by a racist neighbour. During the assault, the perpetrator referred to the man as a “*khead”, adding that he was going to “kill him” before head-butting him. The victim’s injuries required surgery and dental treatment to repair a loose tooth. He struggled financially to cover this unexpected dental bill. The perpetrator was arrested for the offence but never charged. Nor has the abuse stopped as the victim has reported that the perpetrator continues to intimidate and harass his family. In addition, the trauma of the incident has meant that one of the victim’s young children is now fearful of leaving the house. The police informed the victim that they could only press charges against the perpetrator if he gave them medical documentation to ‘prove’ his injuries.

In another case reported to Tell MAMA, a Muslim woman was attacked by a stranger from behind. Two blows to the back of her head resulted in her falling to the ground. Due to the pain and swelling from her injuries, she has been unable to sleep and feels too anxious to leave the house alone following the attack.

**Fear and Safety**

Those who experience anti-Muslim abuse will often report that they have altered their behaviour out of fear of further victimisation. For example, a Muslim family reported that they were being racially abused by a group of young people in their local area. As a result, the family remain fearful of an attack and have now installed CCTV cameras to the exterior of their home, and their children now avoid playing outside in certain areas. The anxiety has had a financial impact on the family as one parent reduced their working hours once the abuse began in order to help reassure their young children.

Victims of anti-Muslim abuse may also avoid going out alone or wearing Islamic clothing. For example, a schoolboy was called a “Muslim b*tch” and intimidated by two men on the way home from a madrasa. After the incident “he came home shaking and scared of ever wearing a thobe outside again”, according to one of his parents. Similarly, a visibly Muslim woman travelling on a London bus was abused by a man who said that he had no respect for her because of her hijab, and she is now afraid to be outside alone in case of further abuse.

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Media coverage of hate crime and associated informal commentary can also influence individual and community perceptions of hate crime and fears of victimisation. For example, a Muslim woman who was physically attacked on the London Underground by two white men who pulled her hijab feared the attack would escalate further. She told the *Ilford Recorder* that the incident made her feel violated and unsafe, adding: “At the time, all I could think was what if he throws acid at me?”  

The fear of becoming a victim of an acid attack also appeared in our data set, which is likely owing to the unprovoked attack on Resham Khan and Jameel Muhktar on 21 June 2017. Both individuals suffered life-changing injuries after John Tomlin threw acid at them in an incident which the Metropolitan Police categorised as a hate crime. The attack also left both victims with profound emotional and psychological traumas. In an impact statement read out in court, Mr Mukhtar said that ‘[I am] constantly looking over my right shoulder for other attacks’ and is fearful of leaving his house. He had also attempted to kill himself at Manchester Piccadilly station some time after the attack. For Ms Khan, she developed suicidal thoughts after the attack and had attempted to overdose eight times, adding [in her statement that her face had been ‘taken away’ from her. Tomlin was given a 16-year prison sentence on 20 April 2018. Despite the Metropolitan Police treating the attack as a hate crime, the judge in the trial however, did not, suggesting that she ‘had seen no evidence’ that the attack was racially motivated.

The use of acid in a hate crime attack is very rare as the Metropolitan Police had only recorded two such cases (which include the above attack), between July 2016 and July 2017. This should not, however, undermine the genuine and understandable fears many Muslims have felt. Tell MAMA worked with some police forces during this time to dispel social media speculation that some reported acid attacks were hate crime related. Yet, conversely, perpetrators have used the fear of an acid attack to

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246 Ibid.

247 Ibid.

248 CPS. ‘Man jailed for acid attack on two people as they sat in their car’. *Crown Prosecution Service*. Available at: https://www.cps.gov.uk/london-north/news/man-jailed-acid-attack-two-people-they-sat-their-car-0 (retrieved 16/05/2018).

249 Mercer D. Ibid.

cause further alarm and distress to victims. The fear of an acid attack in hate crime occurred before and after the attack on Resham Khan and Jameel Muhktar. In Birmingham, a man threw water in the face of a Muslim woman who had stopped at traffic lights with her car windows rolled down; he racially abused her and then punched her in the face. Water was thrown over two women as they stood outside a mosque in Southampton in a fake acid attack which Hampshire Police investigated as a hate crime. A message that the mosque said had come from one of the women read: “Sisters, just to warn you to be careful when u are out and about, you all know about the recent acid attacks in London,” One victim told Tell MAMA in July 2017 that her sibling had shut the windows of her car out of fear that the men who were racially abusing them had acid with them. She added that the fear of an acid attack made her unwilling to leave the safety of her home.

Victims report considerable psychological distress because of their experiences of anti-Muslim abuse and discrimination. In 2017, a Muslim woman reported to Tell MAMA that her family have been abused by their neighbours, who made racist comments about them to their other neighbours. According to the victim, her neighbour would call them “P*ks” and say they “stink of curries”. They would laugh at her daughter if she wore the hijab and called her a “terrorist”. The abuse escalated to threats of violence, including her neighbour’s family chasing them with weapons. A consequence of the abuse means that the family now avoid their home and report feeling unsafe: “I am desperate for help. I have nowhere to go all day and feel homeless. My kids are having nightmares. I can’t sleep at night, I am so afraid”.

The family are seeking to move to a new house due to the levels of abuse. This form of racial prejudice and abuse, especially when it involves neighbours, is a depleting day-to-day experience. The home, which should serve as a place of safety and refuge, can, in fact, become the opposite – a place from where victims seek to escape and take refuge, knowing that abusive neighbours will target them there.

A desire to make the home safe again can carry, and often carries, an additional financial cost. As our examples have shown, some people have purchased CCTV cameras or even decreased their incomes in order to spend more time at home to reassure their children. The emotional costs weigh heavily on victims, with some feeling that they are unable to escape the abuse. Some may even feel ostracised by neighbours because of their race and Islamic identity, which may intensify their sense of isolation. This sense of marginalisation and loss of security and safety increases when institutions (housing associations, local authorities, or the police) fail to act on the behaviour of abusive neighbours. This failure risks re-victimising families and decreasing trust in such institutions. Hence third-party services such as Tell MAMA

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work in tandem with such agencies to help ensure accountability and to give a voice to victims.

In a broader sense, existing research points to the psychological demands adapting to or living in a cultural sphere, which may differ from a heritage culture, places upon those from minority ethnic backgrounds (Walsh, Shulman, & Maurer, 2008). Therefore, a sense of stigma born from prejudicial attitudes in wider society can make such adaptations harder. Some define this stigma as the co-occurrence of stereotyping and discrimination in spaces where power exists. If a strong sense of religious identity helps some to cope with stigma, for others it can increase stress in certain situations. Others may seek to deflect stigma by reducing it to situational cues. Major (et al, 2002), however, accepts that this strategy is harder to deploy when stigma is ongoing. Moreover, stigma operates in multiple ways, which in turn, impact at a structural and individual level.

Furthermore, studies have often focused on the impacts of racial rather than religious discrimination on mental health, but as Sheridan (2006) and others assert, there is a blurring or overlap between racial and religious discrimination in the context of Islamophobia. Racial discrimination, however, is linked to increased psychological distress, and poorer general health. A UK study of 7,318 participants, including 3,873 (52.4 %) who identify as having a religious belief, found that younger people (aged 19 to 44) were more likely to report examples of religious discrimination. People who identified as Muslim, Jewish and from South Asian backgrounds were more likely to report perceived discrimination and were more likely to associate it with anxiety rather than depression. Such experiences of discrimination create reactions

259 Ibid.
characterised by fear, distress and negative anticipation which may encourage an increased vulnerability to mental health issues. Moreover, the perception of belonging to a group feared by society harms the wellbeing of Muslims, irrespective of whether or not they have suffered direct forms of discrimination. Some may even withdraw from seeking healthcare due to the perceptions of discriminatory attitudes from practitioners. In the UK, the Race Disparity Audit found that patients from Asian backgrounds (Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian and Chinese) were more likely to express dissatisfaction with the experience of getting a GP appointment and with the quality of service from their GP. Black people are also more likely than white people to be in contact with mental health services. Yet structural racism, according to Mental Health Today, means that black and Asian people struggle to access talking therapies or treatments for mental or emotional problems.

Indeed, a lack of trust in public institutions can help to explain why a high proportion of hate crime goes unreported. Research suggests that the most common reason for this is the belief that the police will do little to help. Victims will often tell us that they do not feel supported by the police, which can have serious consequences for their wellbeing, particularly in the context of having reported a hate incident. Our 2016 Report highlighted the fear, often felt by victims, that reporting an incident of Islamophobic abuse would put them at risk of further abuse or retaliation from the perpetrator. In addition to this, officers attending a scene and call handlers dealing with victims will sometimes make comments that effectively diminish the seriousness of an incident, and make victims feel that they have wasted police resources. These issues arise in the Criminal Justice Outcomes section of this report. A lack of action from law enforcement agencies along with poor interpersonal communication with victims seriously damages trust in the police and other authority figures, as well as affecting the psychological wellbeing of victims. In contrast, positive action from the police, including formal criminal justice outcomes as well as informal support, can help mitigate the negative psychological impact of such victimisation.

269 ‘The number of detentions under the Mental Health Act is rising’. Full Fact. Available at: https://fullfact.org/health/number-detentions-under-mental-health-act-rising/ (retrieved 14/06/2018).
274 See sections on Criminal Justice Outcomes, Civil Outcomes and Informal Outcomes.
Opportunities and Financial Costs

In 2017, Tell MAMA received 74 (9%) reports of incidents which had occurred in the workplace. Victimisation at work often means that individuals require sick leave to recover both physically and psychologically, and will often consider leaving their job due to stress. For example, local press reported on a case where a taxi driver had been assaulted by a customer. The perpetrator, Claire Brooks, racially abused the driver before putting a plastic bag over his head to try and suffocate him. She was given a 12-month community sentence and ordered to pay £250 to the victim, £250 in court costs and a £85 victim surcharge to go towards victim services. While justice was served, the incident had a severe psychological impact on the victim, who was left “shaken” and “traumatised”. He told the press: “I have been a taxi driver for about 20 years and I can honestly say this is the worst thing that has happened to me. It will take me a long time to get back to a level where I feel comfortable like I used to.”

Tell MAMA also received a report of a Muslim cashier who had been abused by a racist customer. The abuse started when he refused to accept a £50 note as he did not have enough change in his till. During the incident, the perpetrator called him a “f***ing Muslim”, said he would “p*** on the Qur’an”, and threatened to punch the victim. Due to the attack, he is contemplating resigning from his job due to the impact the abuse has had on his mental wellbeing. In another case, a tram inspector who was abused by a passenger on a Nottingham train told local press that this was the third such occurrence in a month and that he was considering giving up his job: “I have suffered racism all my life and I have had enough of it. I feel like throwing my hands up and walking away from the job”.

Individuals who have experienced Islamophobic abuse or discrimination at work will often state that they are afraid to report such abuse or discrimination for fear of negative repercussions. Existing research suggests that victims of identity-based abuse will often be reluctant to report instances of discrimination or abuse to authorities to avoid potentially stressful or humiliating experiences. For example, a Muslim woman reported to Tell MAMA that she had been bullied by a colleague, who would, on multiple occasions, refer to her hijab as a “tea towel”. She also reported abusive comments from customers, which denigrated her race and Islamic beliefs. However, she felt that if she reported the bullying to her employers it would affect her job and may cause further negative behaviour towards her: “I am afraid to report it within the workplace as it would impact my job and cause too much stress.”

Understandably, it can often be difficult to report abuse or discrimination in the workplace, particularly if the perpetrator is a colleague or even a superior. As discussed in our 2016 Report, a Muslim woman was labelled as a “troublemaker” by

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management for reporting Islamophobic comments and bullying within her workplace.²⁷⁸

Many victims of workplace bullying or discrimination report suffering from depression and anxiety following their experiences at work. In one case a Muslim man, who works as an engineer, was suffering from discrimination in his workplace. In his opinion, his employer used other excuses to demote him, alongside making informal comments about his Islamic appearance. The management, in no uncertain terms, informed him that if he intended to continue working for them, he would need to shave his beard. His contract was subsequently terminated and he is now seeking treatment for depression.

In addition, victims often report that experiencing anti-Muslim abuse outside the workplace can impact their work life. Victims often report being unable to focus or concentrate at work and needing to leave work early, or take days off, to recover from the trauma of being victimised for their Islamic identity. Similarly, they may also feel the need to reduce their hours or leave their job to avoid going out in public where they may be at risk of further victimisation. This impacts the financial security of the victim and their family, which may further impact their psychological wellbeing.

In 2017 we recorded 53 (6%) incidents of anti-Muslim abuse or discrimination which took place in an educational institution. Adults or children who experience Islamophobic abuse or discrimination often take time off or seek to change schools to avoid further victimisation. For example, a Muslim schoolgirl who was called a “bomber” and had bacon thrown on her lunch by her peers asked her parents if she could be moved to an Islamic school where she would not be the only student who wears the hijab.

**Self-Esteem and Identity**

In addition to the severe physical and psychological impact of discrimination, anti-Muslim victimisation can have a detrimental impact on the general self-esteem of victims.

A Muslim woman in Lancashire reported to Tell MAMA that on 15 September 2017, hours after the attempted terror attack on a Tube train at Parsons Green, she was attacked by a large group of teenagers. The victim, a university student, was wearing a hijab when she was attacked. The perpetrators accused her of being a “terrorist”, a “member of ISIS” and a “murderer”. She made clear that she had been significantly impacted psychologically by the attack which had affected her confidence, along with her ability to study effectively:

“It took me a full week to feel like I can function normally again. Other than that, now I notice how wary I am in large crowds. I like socialising, and this has certainly affected me in the way I connect with other people…This event has

certainly added stress to my mental wellbeing and affected my study progress.”

In Manchester, the local press reported on a trial which had taken place at Salford Magistrates’ Court. A 12-year-old boy was convicted for stamping on a young Muslim boy’s head. As a result of the attack, the victim incurred bruising and swelling to his head and was left in a lot of pain. The victim also reported that the incident has affected his feelings about his Muslim identity:

“The pain was unbearable. I just wanted them to stop. They all just attacked me at once. I was so upset I started to cry. It has made me feel second class, like being a Muslim is something to be ashamed of.”

In another case, reported in the national press, Umair Ghafoor, a 21-year-old radiography student, was verbally abused on the train home from work. He has now changed his route home and is now cleanly shaven to avoid future abuse. The attack has also resulted in him questioning his identity. He told the local press: “It has left me questioning my real identity. It’s made me feel empty inside.”

Young Muslims may be particularly vulnerable to Islamophobic abuse from those in authority, which may have a serious psychological impact on their self-esteem and their conception of their identity. For example, a Muslim student who experienced Islamophobic comments made by a teacher recounted how hearing hatred from someone in authority made him feel powerless:

“I felt like I was to blame for everything that was happening in the world because he was attacking me. And I wasn’t in the right environment to say anything back. I feel vulnerable because I can get attacked like that anywhere.”

Many individuals report feeling unwanted in the UK and that their experiences have negatively affected their sense of belonging: “I have not been myself since either attack, as I feel as though I don’t belong or (am) not wanted in this country despite having lived here for almost 30 years”.

Others express a desire to move to another country where they would be less likely to be victimised due to their religious background. For example, a Muslim man who was assaulted and called a “P*ki” by a man outside a train station, informed us that he was

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279 Tell MAMA. ‘Muslim woman called “terrorist” and “ISIS” hours after Parsons Green attack.’ Tell MAMA. Available at: https://tellmamauk.org/muslim-woman-called-terrorist-and-isis-hours-after-parsons-green-attack/ (retrieved 23/05/2018).

280 Britton, P. ‘Boy, 12, who stamped on Muslim schoolboy’s head in race hate gang attack warned he could be locked up’. Manchester Evening News. Available at: https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/boy-12-who-stamped-muslim-13743762 (retrieved 23/05/2018).

so traumatised by the attack that he is considering moving to a Muslim-majority country to avoid future abuse.

On occasion we receive reports from victims of anti-Muslim abuse and discrimination to the effect that such victimisation has had a detrimental effect on their relationships. One victim had to be moved due to an arson attack on his home, which has left him in temporary accommodation some distance from where his children live, while he waits to be rehoused. As such, he now cannot see his children as frequently, which, as one can imagine, has affected their relationship. A loss of self-esteem following incidents of Islamophobic abuse can also undermine familial and personal relationships. For example, a Muslim man told us that the abuse he endured at work made him feel ashamed to the extent that he felt unable to look his family in the eye, adding that he has avoided talking to his children due to feelings of shame.

Anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia can have long-lasting and far-reaching implications for individuals, be they physical, psychological or practical. An individual’s experience of victimisation can impact their physical and psychological wellbeing, affecting their actions, interactions and choices. It is vital that those who encounter victims of anti-Muslim abuse and discrimination in a professional capacity are aware of the harmful effect such prejudice can have on their personal lives, and accordingly tailor their response to the victimisation in such a manner that they do not compound these issues. This extends to those in law enforcement, civil authorities, and members of the public.
Analysis of Online Anti-Muslim Incidents in 2017

Our online data collection requires members of the public to report hateful or abusive content they find in each reporting year. Most of the reported abuse continues to occur on social media platforms (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) but also on internet forums, in newspaper comments, and on alternative social media platforms such as GAB. As with the 2016 reporting year, most of the verified cases reported to Tell MAMA occurred offline, on the streets of the UK; in public spaces, in schools, at work, within neighbourhoods, and on transport networks.

This year’s data set bucks the trend in declining online reports with 362 verified reports, up 16% from the 2016 figure of 311 verified reports. A clear majority of reported abuse occurred either on Twitter (n=188) or Facebook (n=133), with a small minority having occurred on YouTube (n=6). The ‘Other’ category (n=35) includes communications sent via email or posted on internet forums.

Verified Online Incidents by Online Platform (N=362)
As with the previous data set, we categorised most online cases as **Abusive Behaviour** (n=291, 80%), with **Threats** accounting for 20 reports (6%), a slight decline from 2016. However, we saw a 143% rise in **Anti-Muslim Literature** cases with 51 reports (14%), up from 21 reports (7%) in the previous reporting period. Caution is needed when interpreting this rise though, due to methodological revisions and a rise in the use of racist and hateful memes online.

**Verified Online Incidents by Incident Category (N=362)**

![Pie chart showing the distribution of incidents: Abusive Behaviour 291 (80%), Anti-Muslim Literature 51 (14%), Threats 20 (6%)]

A clear majority of abuse on Facebook falls under the ‘hate speech’ category as per the terms of its Community Standards policy. Twitter cases fall under ‘abusive or harmful content’, which the platform is taking steps to address. Twitter adapted its algorithms in 2017 to proactively remove abusive accounts without the need for others to report such behaviour.²⁸²

Since November 2016 users have been able to report hateful content which directly and indirectly targets protected characteristics such as faith, race and gender.

 orientation. But the platform is not without criticism from third-party services, NGOs and politicians here and in other parts of Europe.

**Far-Right and Islamophobic Networks**

Our previous report detailed the ideological fluidity of far-right networks online and the importance of entrenched echo chambers which draw succour from mainstream figures. This fluidity does not require formal membership structures to flourish as the internet allows members of the far right to be part of a racist subculture which reinforces their fears, values, and most importantly, their ideology. Some scholars, however, challenge the notion of audience fragmentation, noting little evidence of ideological segmentation in media consumption patterns in the United States. Garret (2009) argues that audiences do increase their exposure to opinion-reinforcing information but not at the expense of other opinions. However there is an acceptance that exposure to hate speech, even in mild amounts, can have a substantial impact on those who are exposed to it (directly or indirectly). For the individual the risk, according to Sunstein (2009), concerns what happens when like-minded individuals share ideas. He argues that 'group polarisation' exists beyond borders and is an everyday occurrence. In its extreme form, such thinking among like-minded individuals moves them towards more extreme versions of previously held beliefs and can extend to violence through acts of self-segregation and a suspicion of others. This act of self-segregation extends to the cultivation of echo chambers, which, following trigger events, such as acts of terrorism, are framed within a wider

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286 Mughal, F. ‘Social Media Companies Are Finally Held To Account For Their Inaction On Removing Illegal, Extremist And Hate Material.’ HuffPost UK. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/fiyaz-mughal/social-media-hate-crime_b_16355696.html (retrieved 14/06/2018).
292 Sunstein, C. Going to extremes: How like minds unite and divide (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 3.
293 Ibid, pp. 3-5.
294 Ibid, pp. 3-4.
ideological narrative, with the most recent event used to justify generalisations that attribute blame to Muslims more broadly.\textsuperscript{296} A study of social media responses to the terror attack in Woolwich, London, in May 2013, found that a small contingent of far-right groups and individuals continued to seek out each other’s messages.\textsuperscript{297} More important, however, is how social media creates an amplified space in which audiences can consume and spread social reactions to trigger events.\textsuperscript{298} Williams and Burnap (2015) analysed 210,807 tweets posted in the 15 days that followed the terror attack in Woolwich and found that 1\% (n=1,878) of tweets contained moderate to extreme forms of race hate, which made direct reference to Woolwich and galvanised sentiments against those perceived to share the same faith as the perpetrators.\textsuperscript{299} They found, however, that the biggest drivers of ‘moderate’ xenophobic, racist and anti-Muslim comments came not from far-right organisations but from individuals who more broadly identified with such ideologies, as examples of more extreme speech increased marginally in response to added press coverage – but this remains a tenuous claim.\textsuperscript{300} Some of the most extreme examples of anti-Muslim literature and hate speech in our data set appeared in the first 24 to 48 hours following the terror attacks in Manchester and London. Some tweets reported to our service sought to glorify the terroristic violence of Darren Osborne, which could be considered offences under the Terrorism Act 2006.\textsuperscript{301} This trajectory is consistent with Williams and Burnap’s theorisation that such speech has a half-life, as extreme forms of speech die out within 20 to 24 hours following an event, while ‘moderate’ forms of hate speech have a half-life of around 36 to 42 hours after an event.\textsuperscript{302} With this in mind, and with over 30 verified online reports sent to our service within 24 hours, some of the most extreme examples of hate speech included calls for retaliatory violence against Muslims and the destruction of mosques. Within hours of the Manchester attack, a Facebook post linked to an individual with far-right views had called for the ‘gassing’ of all Muslims:

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{298} Ibid, p. 234.
\textsuperscript{299} Ibid, p. 223.
\textsuperscript{300} Ibid, pp. 226-227.
\end{flushleft}
A Neo-Nazi sympathiser also called for the petrol bombing of mosques and the removal of Muslim ‘rats’ on Facebook:

Twitter suspended an account which, in response to the Manchester attack, had posted extreme statements suggesting that the far-right terrorist Anders Breivik had ‘the right idea’. A Twitter account which featured the flag of the Protestant loyalist paramilitary group the Ulster Volunteer Force, a group responsible for over 500 sectarian murders during the Troubles in Northern Ireland, had posted that ‘revenge is coming’ and that Muslim blood would ‘pour down the sewers’ nationwide. The content was removed soon after we reported the account to Twitter.

Against this backdrop of extreme hate speech online was the attempted arson of a mosque in Oldham, Greater Manchester. This extreme form of online hate crime demonstrates how such acts have their own reactive and short lifespan offline as well. This event even became a point of celebration for some in our online data set with others further using this crime to call for the destruction of all mosques.

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304 Tell MAMA. ‘Arsonists target Oldham Islamic Centre hours after Manchester terror attack.’ Tell MAMA. Available at: https://tellmamauk.org/arsonists-target-oldham-islamic-centre-hours-after-manchester-terror-attack/ (14/06/2018).
An analysis of the 207 online perpetrators reported to Tell MAMA in 2015 formed part of a wider network analysis in order to understand the discursive nature of anti-Muslim speech online.306 In short, the larger the node is, the more mutual followers each account has which, in turn, may increase the reach of their online output.307 One popular node identified in the Report was the Twitter user ‘@DavidJo52951945’. A tweet sent by this user on 23 May 2017 discussed the mosque arson, adding that there was only ‘so much’ people would put up with before they ‘snap’. Such language clearly elicited calls for further violence. In one example a user replied, ‘torch them all & roast some pork,’ a remark later removed by Twitter following our report. An archive of @DavidJo52951945’s tweet reveals that it was retweeted almost 200 times and gained over 200 ‘likes’.308 This reach points to an enduring legacy in such online spaces as some of the responses captured in the archive called for further arsons or celebrated the actions of the arsonist. Others did, however, challenge hateful statements in the replies. In August 2017, a data scientist who tweets from the ‘@conspirator0’ account, alleged that the ‘@DavidJo52951945’ account was, in fact, a Russian bot.309 The allegations then appeared in The Times on 30 August.310

Further calls for arson attacks on mosques came in response to the changing news cycle in our data set, all within a 24-hour window. At 5:56am on 23 May, a Twitter user wrote, “Good. Torch every single one to the ground”, in response to a tweet about the mosque arson in Oldham. We observed similar tweets in our data set, all within a 24-hour period. One such tweet read, “Burn them down to the ground with they b******* in it” as another user tweeted that, “We need to burn more”:

307 Ibid.
308 Jones, D. Twitter post. 24 May 2017, 06:38 Available at: http://archive.is/vpzac (retrieved 14/06/2018).
309 Norteño, C. Twitter post. 23 August 2017, 01:51. Available at: https://twitter.com/conspirator0/status/900158639884955648 (retrieved 14/06/2018).
The above tweet called for the destruction of mosques and the pouring of pig’s blood over the ground; to combine the text with an anti-Islam meme points to deeper ideological extremes. The reply to this tweet is equally disturbing, as it read: “We all talking and not doing much about it. When are we going to be brave and take matters into our own hands? Let’s’ act now before it’s late.” Twitter soon acted and suspended both accounts.

By 24 May 2017, tweets reported to Tell MAMA were following the model outlined by Williams and Burnap, with comments becoming less extreme and focused more on framing an incident in the context of wider grievances. The outlier by far, however, is a tweet which called on the army to go door-to-door and to shoot Muslims, which was in reply to a tweet from the then MailOnline columnist Katie Hopkins:
Hours earlier, this same Twitter account had called for the destruction of all mosques in the UK. Again, following our report Twitter acted to suspend the account holder.

Further to this, on the morning of 27 May 2017, the founder and ex-leader of the English Defence League (EDL), Tommy Robinson, tweeted: “Manchester chief of police accepting & posing with the Koran after the Manchester attack. This book is the reason there was an attack ffs.” The tweet went viral, gaining thousands of retweets and ‘likes’, a process of ‘reheating’ events in order to connect them to other, previously held grievances of the ideologically inclined, in what Innes and others (2016) identify as an ‘evidential warrant’ to justify and reinforce their values. The truth emerged three days later when the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, Ian Hopkins, confirmed via Twitter that the photo dated from an event held in June 2016. This tweet, however, gained just 108 retweets in comparison. Furthermore, the photo had appeared on the Flickr account of Greater Manchester Police on 23 June 2016, during Greater Manchester’s Muslim Police Association’s annual iftar event, held that year at the European Islamic Centre in Oldham.

So why the disparity? One factor concerns the nature of the Twitter platform. Twitter states that a reply tweet is viewable by “Anyone following the sender and the recipient of a reply will see it in their Home timeline.” This disparity is a thread in a larger narrative: where social media is exploited to amplify falsehoods and when the truth emerges it gains a fraction of the online traction. Therefore, it is no surprise that Islamophobic websites in the United States amplified this falsehood. Nor has the problem of debunking falsehoods on Facebook proven to be any easier. A BuzzFeed News investigation in December 2017 revealed that Facebook’s efforts to counter its 50 biggest ‘fake news’ hits that year had had a negligible engagement rate of just 0.5% of what the original hoaxes generated.

Online hate speech has also resulted in positive civil and criminal justice outcomes however. In a positive civil outcome Katie Hopkins had mutually agreed to leave the LBC radio station following her ‘final solution’ tweet posted hours after the Manchester attack. Her deleted tweet read: “22 dead – number rising. Schofield. Don’t you even

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313 Hopkins, CC I. Twitter Post. 30 May 2017, 15:04. Available at: https://twitter.com/CCIanHopkins/status/869555136892370944 (retrieved 14/06/2018).
dare. Do not be a part of the problem. We need a final solution #Manchester [sic].”

Holocaust educators condemned her divisive language which explicitly evoked the Nazi plan for a ‘final solution’ to the ‘Jewish question’, while others reported the tweet to the Metropolitan Police. Hopkins, however, soon found a platform on the far-right Canadian outlet Rebel Media.

Some members of the public found themselves in court for their anti-Muslim comments made online following the Manchester attack. Ryan Burgess, 22, was found guilty of sending a malicious tweet in August after tweeting about ‘slapping a p*ki/Muslim today’ as the attack had been ‘their fault’ on 23 May. He had tagged Merseyside Police into his original tweet before deleting it. Mr Burgess had thirteen previous convictions, which included a similar offence. Despite this fact, he was still described as ‘immature’ when the judge gave him a six-week prison sentence suspended for 12 months. On 12 December, the Gazette & Essex County Standard revealed that a 53-year-old former soldier had been given a suspended sentence after targeting Muslims on Twitter. He had sent the tweets five days after the Manchester attack and had included a statement to the effect that he was ‘trained and ready’ to fight Muslims. Another tweet sent from his account included a photo depicting a copy of the Qur’an in a toilet. Other cases cited in the press did make headlines when the trials began but they did not report on any outcomes. In one example, a 50-year-old man from Paisley, Scotland, appeared in court accused of posting anti-Muslim comments online which also allegedly praised Hitler, hours after the Manchester attack. The outcome of the trial, however, has not been published online.

The online response to the Westminster Bridge attack was short-lived but had real-world consequences for a Muslim woman photographed on the bridge in the aftermath

318 Ibid.
322 Ibid.
323 ‘Former soldier fined after tweeting he was “trained and ready” after Manchester bombing.’ Daily Gazette & Essex County Standard. Available at: http://www.gazette-news.co.uk/news/15771283.Former_soldier_fined_after_tweeting_he_was__trained_and_ready__after_Manchester_bombing/ (retrieved 14/06/2018).
324 Daily Gazette & Essex County Standard, op cit.
325 Ibid.
326 ‘Man denies posting racist Facebook comments about Muslims after suicide bombing.’ The Gazette. Available at: http://www.the-gazette.co.uk/news/15321526.Man_denies_posting_racist_Facebook_comments_about_Muslims_after_suicide_bombing/#comments-anchor (retrieved 14/06/2018).
of the attack. Following our report Twitter removed a tweet which had called for a two-week window for revenge attacks on Muslims. The platform also removed a tweet which had used the anti-Muslim slur ‘Muzzie’, a term popularised by far-right networks online. A Facebook user was reported to Tell MAMA after having written ‘Kill All Muslims’ on their Facebook wall hours after the attack. Due to the privacy settings of the account holder, we were unable to verify whether Facebook had removed the content or not.

An abjectly clear failure to remove hate speech and incitement to violence following the Westminster Bridge terror attack, included a tweet which called for the murder of London Mayor Sadiq Khan, whom the user described as a ‘filthy Musrat’ in a tweet posted two hours after Khalid Masood began his 82-second assault which killed 5 people and left 50 injured. The Twitter account had an EDL avatar and often used scabrous, racialised language in tweets. This account, however, was not a real person but rather reflective of a trend for fake far-right accounts appearing on the platform. In one example that we highlighted in February 2017, the individual(s) behind one such account had stolen photos from an unsuspecting man in the U.S. The account, like many other offensive parodies, was soon suspended from the platform:

The above comment came from an account with overt far-right views and was removed by Facebook following our report.

The Westminster Bridge story shifted again in November 2017 when several media outlets reported that one account which had posted the innocent Muslim woman’s

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328 Tell MAMA. ‘How fake far-right accounts spread hate on Twitter.’ Tell MAMA. Available at: https://tellmamauk.org/how-fake-far-right-accounts-spread-hate-on-twitter/ (retrieved 14/06/2018).
photo was related either to a ‘Russian troll’ or a ‘Russian bot’. Not all bot accounts are intrinsically harmful, as some function as legitimate means to engage audiences, or are known more broadly as ‘social bots’. This type of bot relies upon an algorithm to produce ‘content’ and ‘interact’ with human accounts; spam is a good example of automation (Chu et al., 2010). A cyborg account, by contrast, will demonstrate elements of human thought and algorithmic text.

Despite this obvious form of spam, celebrities and politicians across political divides have purchased bot accounts to improve their following counts. For years, media outlets such as the *New York Times* have documented the rise in the use of social bots, which has included auto-generated tweets to counter climate change denial and more banal practices, like flirting. In more recent years, researchers such as Woolley (2016) have documented the use of bots in elections abroad, and in 2018, a *New York Times* investigation profiled a US-based company which sold bots to individuals and companies. The use of bots for nefarious political engineering, therefore, is not new but much interest surrounds how such ‘troll farms’ in Russia may...

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330 Burgess, M. ‘Here’s the first evidence Russia used Twitter to influence Brexit.’ *WIRED UK*. Available at: http://www.wired.co.uk/article/brexit-russia-influence-twitter-bots-internet-research-agency (retrieved 14/06/2018).

331 Wills, E. ‘Muslim woman pictured “ignoring victims of London terror attack” was fake news tweet created by Russians.’ *The Evening Standard*. Available at: https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/russian-bot-account-claimed-muslim-woman-ignored-westminster-attack-victims-a3689751.html (retrieved 14/06/2018).


334 Ibid.


336 Ibid, p. 22.

337 Ibid, pp. 811-824.


have attempted to influence the US election and the EU referendum vote in 2016.341 Damian Collins, the Conservative MP, who chairs the Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee which investigates fake news, has said:

“What is at stake is whether Russia has constructed an architecture which means they have thousands of accounts with which they can bombard [us] with fake news and hyper-partisan content.”343

Researchers at the Oxford Internet Institute found scant evidence of Russian involvement in the lead-up to the EU referendum vote but did express concern about the large number of human and automated accounts which had spread highly polarising content.344 The ‘@SouthLoneStar’ Twitter account is just one example of a polarising troll, which at its height had amassed 16,500 followers. It was an account known for its anti-Muslim and pro-Trump content, and was only removed by Twitter after it had been linked to the wider propaganda campaign to influence the last US election.345 It makes for useful shorthand to refer to @SouthLoneStar as a bot account but there is evidence of human activity in other tweets which suggests the account was, in fact, a ‘cyborg’. For example, archives of this account show how it mocked sections of the British press following coverage of its Westminster Bridge tweet. In one example, the user tweeted: “Wow … I’m on the Daily Mail front page! Thank you British libs! You’re making me famous,”346 and a day later: “I’m on The Sun! Thank you again, British libs! Now I’m even more famous!”.347

The @SouthLoneStar account posted several tweets about the terror attack on Westminster Bridge before sharing the photo of the Muslim woman. It used the major hashtags (#PrayForLondon and #Westminster) to post tweets which described Islam as a ‘cult of death’ and added the #BanIslam hashtag. An earlier tweet called for Islam to be ‘outlawed’.348 An archive of the @SouthLoneStar account in January 2017 reveals many pro-Trump tweets and how the account had followed a far-right account named ‘@pepepethetroll’, which remains active on the platform.349 Neither was the anti-Muslim content specific to the U.S or even Britain. Further archive research of the

342 Smith, S. ‘Russia used hundreds of fake accounts to tweet about Brexit, data shows.’ The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/14/how-400-russia-run-fake-accounts-posted-bogus-brexit-tweets (retrieved 18/06/2018).
343 Ibid.
347 Ibid.
348 Ibid.
account reveals that @SouthLoneStar had attempted to stir up anti-Muslim views in other European countries too. For example, on 11 March 2017, @SouthLoneStar used the ‘#BanIslam’ and ‘#Rotterdam’ hashtags in a tweet which shared an image of Muslim conquests and the Crusades.\(^{350}\) The geo-specific hashtag may have come in response to news of a diplomatic incident in the Dutch city after protesters had prevented Turkey’s family minister from entering the Turkish consulate.\(^{351}\) In essence, the account holder behaved like many drawn into such anti-Muslim discourses connecting narrative threads with like-minded individuals across Europe and North America. It might be why the initial press coverage of the Westminster Bridge tweet referred to the user as nothing more than a vile anti-Muslim troll,\(^{352}\) and again raises questions as to why Twitter had not suspended the account before 22 March 2017 for breaching its abusive content rules.

Tell MAMA was contacted by the Muslim woman photographed on the bridge to report several menacing and offensive tweets about her. Fearing for her safety, we worked with Twitter to get much of the content removed, and put out a statement on her behalf on 23 March requesting media agencies not to further disseminate the photo.\(^{353}\) Some media outlets did indeed blur her face whereas others did not.\(^{354}\) A day later, Tell MAMA published a full statement made by the woman, which was picked up by major media outlets within the UK and abroad, demonstrating the desire of many to counter the hatred which had occurred online a day or so earlier.\(^{355, 356}\) The Guardian article which featured her quote, for example, incurred 42,655 online shares.\(^{357}\)

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\(^{353}\) ‘Hijabi Victim Requests Media Agencies to Stop Circulating Picture of Her Walking on Westminster Bridge.’ TELL MAMA. Available at: https://tellmamauk.org/request-media-agencies-stop-circulating-picture-muslim-woman-walking-westminster-bridge/ (retrieved 18/06/2018).

\(^{354}\) For an example of the former see Mulroy, Z. ‘People are making alarming assumptions about this photo of “woman in headscarf walking by dying man”.’ Mirror Online. Available at: https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/people-making-alarming-assumptions-photo-10081905 (retrieved 18/06/2018).

\(^{355}\) ‘The truth behind the photo of the Muslim woman on Westminster Bridge.’ TELL MAMA. Available at: https://tellmamauk.org/the-truth-behind-the-photo-of-the-muslim-woman-on-westminster-bridge/ (retrieved 18/06/2018).

\(^{356}\) Sieczkowski, C. ‘Muslim Woman Targeted By Twitter Trolls After London Attack Speaks Out.’ HuffPost. Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/muslim-woman-bridge-photo-london-attack_us_58d5429be4b03692bea538a8 (retrieved 18/06/2018).

\(^{357}\) Pegg, D. ‘Woman photographed in hijab on Westminster Bridge responds to online abuse.’ The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/24/woman-hijab-westminster-bridge-attack-victim-photo-misappropriated (retrieved 18/06/2018).
There are now emerging technologies which spot bots on Twitter including BotOrNot, which evaluates the likelihood of a Twitter account exhibiting behaviours consistent with social bots. To help members of the public to spot bots on social media, The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRL), published a blog titled ‘Twelve Ways to Spot a Bot’. Examples of these include the level of anonymity, as “the less personal information it gives, the more likely it is to be a bot,” and how bots amplify through the retweeting of other content, with little original output. Aggressive retweeting is a form of spam which Twitter defines as the ‘bulk or aggressive activity that attempts to manipulate or disrupt Twitter’. Moreover, Twitter ‘Automation rules’ state that: “Automated Retweets often lead to negative user experiences, and bulk, aggressive, or spammy Retweeting is a violation of the Twitter Rules.” In our previous report we called on Twitter to better enforce its policy on aggressive retweeting yet these examples further demonstrate how Twitter is often inconsistent in enforcing its own rules.

Following the London Bridge terror attack on 3 June, Tell MAMA verified 29 online reports in just 48 hours. In one example, a man posting at 16:02 GMT on 4 June, on the Facebook wall of a local English Defence League group, wrote: “Let me know when we are gonna drive a truck into a mosque n I’ll drive it for ya”. Following our report Facebook removed the content. At 10:55 GMT on 4 June a tweet was reported to Tell MAMA which called for the eradication of all mosques, with the account holder emphasising that the mosques should be full ‘if possible’, within hours of the attack.

Hate comments and direct or indirect calls for attacks against mosques also appeared in videos reported to Tell MAMA in the immediate aftermath of the attack. In one popular video uploaded then removed from Facebook, a person tells the camera: “Go through every single one [mosque] in the country with a fine-tooth comb and if there’s the slightest link to terrorism, don’t just close it down...burn it down.” On 4 June, Paul Hepplestall, 40, from Liverpool, also uploaded a threatening video to Facebook. Hepplestall said: “Let me tell you, I will get people to run in your mosques with pineapples, blow your mosques off this f***ing planet.” He was jailed for 20 months in October 2017 for sending racially aggravated malicious communications. Nor were threats directed at Islamic institutions alone – some social media posts

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358 OSoMe. Botometer. Available at: https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu (retrieved 18/06/2018).
359 Davis et al. Op cit, pp. 273-274.
361 Ibid.
364 Docking, N. ‘Racist rant thug with ‘grenade’ and sword who pledged to slash Muslims in viral video is jailed.’ Liverpool Echo. Available at: https://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-news/racist-rant-thug-grenade-sword-13817639 (retrieved 18/06/2018).
365 Ibid.
threatened Muslims directly or Muslims as a collective. A racist and hate-filled Instagram message referred to Muslims as ‘braindead freeloading f*****s’ who ‘breed like rabbits’ in a rant which linked Islam to terrorism. The long message included the racial epithet ‘sand n*****’ in a tirade which called for the burning of mosques and the destruction of the Qur’an. Andrew Littlefair, 50, was jailed for 20 months in February 2018 after threatening to ‘kill all Muslims’ in a series of hateful and racist Facebook posts hours after the London Bridge attack. Littlefair wrote, “It’s time to fight bk kill them all dirty stinkin Muslim b*******”, and “Give me bullets for my gun I’ll shoot every b***** one.” Despite being sent to prison in February 2018, the Facebook account of Mr Littlefair remains active, including some of his incendiary comments, which include, “Kick um out wipe them out kill them all”. The failure to remove this content risks repeated victimisation for Muslims who may come across such incendiary comments online. Other examples of people being processed through the criminal justice system include the 19-year-old Taylor Horrigan, who was given a 12-month community order after posting racist and anti-Muslim comments online in response to an article about the vandalism of a mosque in Thornaby, North Yorkshire. Despite a previous conviction for a racially aggravated assault in 2015, his defence attempted to argue that Mr Horrigan was motivated not out of racial hatred but acted in this way due to ‘a lack of education’.

On her Facebook wall in a series of posts in 2015 and 2016, a former soldier called for the hanging of Muslims, the destruction of mosques, and the death of refugees, and was given a suspended prison sentence last year. The account, however, while inactive, remains online where racist content is still accessible, includes a statement linking Pakistani men to paedophilia. One comment refers to Muslims in dehumanising language, deploying the slur ‘Mudslump’, which serves two distinct functions: to avoid censure by the platform moderators and to engage ideological fellows. Academics have observed this behaviour before, among far-right extremists. Warner and Hirschberg (2012) analysed text from Yahoo newsgroups and 452 antisemitic websites to test how to automate classifications of text. The academics found that such racial stereotyping ‘has a language of its own’ that extends to one-word slurs, metaphors and phrases, all designed to spread racial hatred.

Facebook, did, however, remove the profile of Craig Burgin, an EDL supporter, who appeared at Sheffield Magistrates Court on 8 June after uploading a video of himself

367 Herbert, T. ‘Racist jailed for threat to kill all Muslims after UK terror attacks.’ Metro. Available at: http://metro.co.uk/2018/02/19/racist-jailed-threat-kill-muslims-uk-terror-attacks-7325169/ (retrieved 18/06/2018).


369 Guillot, T. ‘”Dad, 19, launched racist rant on Facebook appeal after Thornaby mosque was defaced with graffiti.” Gazette Live. Available at: https://www.gazettelive.co.uk/news/teesside-news/dad-19-launched-racist-rant-13512763 (retrieved 18/06/2018).

370 Ibid.

threatening Muslims with a large knife.\textsuperscript{372} Burgin, after referring to his knife as his “bad boy”, told the camera: “I’m ready for you, scum b****** muzzy c****.” Again, “muzzy” is derogatory phraseology that we often find among far-right networks online.

The murder of 51-year-old Makram Ali outside the Muslim Welfare House in Finsbury Park, London, by the far-right terrorist Darren Osborne, and the attempted murder of 9 others, did result in several offensive tweets about Muslims, with some glorifying Osborne’s terrorist violence. Such reports, while small, appeared within hours of the attack; one tweet later removed by Twitter read, “The only sympathy I have is for the van driver. #Revenge”. A far-right inspired Facebook page used the popular ‘#FinsburyPark’ hashtag to spread a meme which read, “Is this the month of Ramadan or Ramavan?” on 19 June. A Facebook post reported to Tell MAMA heaped praise on Mr Osborne, adding that “it's about time someone started exterminating them”:

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{Tweet depicting Mr Osborne ‘crushing’ Islam.}
\end{figure}

On the morning of 23 June, a tweet depicting Mr Osborne ‘crushing’ Islam appeared online. Twitter did not remove the offending tweet despite our report, which is concerning given that the material in question arguably glorifies terrorism. The image juxtaposes Osborne’s name with the Cross of St James of Compostela, a reference to James the Apostle, the ‘Moorslayer’. Spanish historiography asserts that James the Apostle played a central role in the ninth-century \textit{Reconquista} against Islamic Spain, which is contested by other historians.\textsuperscript{373} Centuries later, such mythologised


\textsuperscript{373} Elliott van Liere, K. ‘The Missionary and the Moorslayer: James the Apostle in Spanish Historiography from Isidore of Seville to Ambrosio de Morales,’ \textit{Viator} 37 (2006), pp. 519-543.
narratives have become popular among Catholic nationalists. The Order of Santiago (Orden de Santiago), founded in twelfth-century Spain, adopted this cross when the Knights of the Order of Santiago were charged with ‘making war’ with Muslims. The forced expulsion of Jews by the Spanish Crown in 1492 was repeated centuries later with the expulsion of 300,000 Moriscos, Muslims who had nominally converted to Christianity after the surrender of Granada in 1492 after more than a century of discrimination and marginalisation. The mass movement of people was traumatic but resulted in little violence. It did, however, leave a deep impression in the collective memory of both faith groups.

In a wider context, some historians connect this event to the conquest of Constantinople (1493) and with the Siege of Vienna (1683), drawing clear distinctions between how competing empires treated their religious minorities. The shift in how Europe came to view Islam as an immutable force came from the essentialism of European thought in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries where old stereotypes, which had reframed Islam as culturally inferior centuries earlier, fused with the racial pseudo-science of the time to justify colonial rule in Muslim-majority lands.

The use of this cross created fresh controversy when a 2,000-strong Spanish brigade, deployed to Iraq in 2003, wore patches on their shoulders bearing the Cross of St James; the decision was condemned by the Spanish press whilst politicians avoided the issue. This emphasis on the past through a narrow reading of history is a popular tactic found today among some of the most prominent populist right-wing and far-right parties in Europe. Wodak and Forchtner (2014) analysed a comic produced by the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in a 2010 election, pointing out how the party fused history with modernity by linking the Battle of Vienna (1683) with Turkey’s pursuit of EU membership. They argue that such imagery and language appeals to a chauvinistic form of identity politics which taps into ‘group-specific collective memories’

378 Carr, M. ‘Spain’s Moriscos: a 400 year old Muslim tragedy is a story for today.’ The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/mar/14/spains-moriscos-a-400-year-old-muslim-tragedy-is-a-story-for-today (retrieved 18/06/2018).
that are always hinted at and occasionally directly addressed. A desire to view history through this narrow interpretive lens creates, as Halbachs (1992) argues, a collective way for individuals to recall and localise their memories away from wider society for the purposes of appealing to certain demographics. Therefore, given the use of a comic book for political propaganda, it is therefore fair to draw some comparison of sorts with the cartoonish propaganda used to lionise Darren Osborne, which seeks to frame him within a wider historical narrative that aims to appeal to the collective memories of those drawn to wider anti-Muslim ideological networks. Moreover, individuals who lack the resilience to resist such extremist narratives may seek to justify an attack as a form of revenge or to celebrate the terrorist in question. The former sit within Levin and McDevitt’s study, which found that 8% of perpetrators commit a hate crime in situations where they believe that the ingroup is under attack by an ‘outgroup’.

After a homemade bomb partially exploded on a train at Parsons Green Tube station on 15 September, Tell MAMA logged several tweets which were extreme in their racial hatred, with one post calling for the eradication of Islam and Muslims. The device partially exploded at 08:20 BST and within 40 minutes Tell MAMA had received a report from a member of the public, who had sent a racist tweet they had found which blamed Muslims for the incident:

Similar rhetoric appeared in a tweet reported to Tell MAMA which read: “When are we gonna put an end to these Muslim nonces and their evil religion.” Both tweets used the trending hashtag ‘#ParsonsGreen’ to communicate their hatred. This tweet was made at 10:29 BST but was deleted by the user shortly afterwards. Other tweets followed the pattern of ‘remembrance and reheating’ outlined by Innes et al. (2016) to further justify previously-held grievances against their established outgroup.

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386 For clarity, the screenshot is taken from an archive where the timestamp of the tweet is inaccurate; the accurate time of the tweet was provided when reported to Tell MAMA and verified by caseworkers.
Another tweet posted at 15:20 BST had crudely photoshopped a Lidl carrier bag into the hand of London Mayor Sadiq Khan. The user captioned their tweet: “Police have released pictures of the #ParsonsGreen bomber suspect & ask members of the public for assistance in identifying him...”:

![Tweet](image)

The meme removes a photo of the Mayor of London riding the subway in New York from its original context. Khan was, in fact, on his way to visit the official 9/11 Memorial where he laid flowers to remember those killed in the terror attacks.388

As the news cycle around the Parsons Green attack evolved, some of the hateful social media content reported to Tell MAMA reflected this change and began to profile a suspect named in the media as 21-year-old Yahyah Farroukh, a Syrian refugee living in London since 2013. In one example reported to Tell MAMA on 15 September, a far-right Facebook group blamed the Conservative Party, adding that he was an ‘example’ of the ‘bearded’ child refugees allowed into Britain. Mr Farroukh was arrested on 16 September outside Aladdins Fried Chicken in Hounslow, south-west, where he had been working for nine months. He was detained by counter-terror police for five days before being released without charge.389

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It was the press, not the police, who revealed Mr Farroukh’s name two days after his arrest. A plethora of photos lifted from his personal Facebook and Instagram accounts were used to form a wider narrative and, naturally, to try to make sense of the terrifying events and uncover any possible motives. Photos of a family member appeared in the Scottish press after locals contacted the Daily Record newspaper. Statements in support of Mr Farroukh, made by family members and his employer, and which spoke of his good character and his rejection of extremism, were contrasted against the narrative of a ‘party-loving Syrian refugee’.

As discussed earlier, we expressed a concern that hateful content remained accessible on Facebook long after the people responsible were convicted. Despite the high-profile and sensitive nature of the investigation, the Facebook profile of Mr Farroukh remained accessible to members of the public during the police investigation. Consequently, as a Faith Matters investigation revealed, various threats and anti-Muslim comments were posted to the Facebook wall of Mr Farroukh. Some comments included: “Rot in hell!!! No virgins for you boy, just a arse raping every day for the rest of your days!!!”. Others spammed his profile with pig emojis while another user posted a cartoon meme linking Muslims to terrorism and bestiality.

The shock of Mr Farroukh’s arrest caused his mother to have a heart attack, according to his employer. The management of Aladdins Fried Chicken received threats but also demanded an apology from the Metropolitan Police, accusing the force of labelling Mr Farroukh a ‘terrorist’. A cousin of Mr Farroukh named Abo Ziad, who lives in Scotland, was placed for a brief time in protective custody alongside his wife after threats against them were made online. Mr Ziad told STV News that the trauma of the threats created a sense of confusion, anxiety and fear. One abusive message referred to Mr Ziad as ‘scum’ who posed a ‘threat’ to Scotland who should, therefore, leave. The extent of the threats and abuse online resulted in Mr Ziad and his wife seeking treatment for depression.

Criminal justice outcomes can be prolonged, especially online. It took over two years to bring Andrew Pelham to justice. The unemployed 49-year-old from Sussex was jailed for 20 months in June 2017 for attempting to stir up hatred against Muslims online in 2015. He pleaded guilty to eight counts of publishing threatening material


392 Dearden, L, op cit.


395 Ibid.

396 Diebelius, G. ‘Online troll jailed for suggesting Britain should introduce “bomb a Mosque Day”’. 
online which included the suggestion that Britain should introduce ‘bomb a mosque day’ and an invitation to his Facebook followers to place a Muslim on a bonfire. The successful conviction of Pelham also saw some duplicate his hateful rhetoric. A far-right user on the alternative social media platform Gab, wrote: “I agree with the British patriot #NigelPelham, ‘bomb a mosque day’ and putting Muslims on top of bonfires are great ideas.” Tell MAMA reported the content to the relevant police force after being alerted to the comments by a member of the public. This repurposing and endorsement of criminal language demonstrates how some on the far right target Muslims online through acts of hate speech and incitement to violence, even when the original content has resulted in a custodial sentence for the offender.

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Metro. Available at: http://metro.co.uk/2017/06/20/online-troll-jailed-for-suggesting-britain-should-introduce-a-bomb-a-mosque-day-6723292/ (retrieved 18/06/2018).

James, B. “Nigel Pelham jailed for nearly two years for posting racial hatred on Facebook.” The Argus. Available at (PTO): http://www.theargus.co.uk/news/15358854.___Bomb_a_mosque_____man_jailed_for_web_race_hate/ (retrieved 18/06/2018).

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Conclusion

This report has sought to examine not only the personal impact of anti-Muslim incidents on victims but also the variety of factors that work to create this impact. These factors can be best understood as a series of outcomes that result from the response that institutions, organisations and individuals have to the victimisation of Muslims. Perhaps the most notable such are criminal justice outcomes, which concern the reaction of criminal justice agencies, such as the police or courts, to an individual who has been victimised due to their Muslim identity. Given that these institutions are the arbiters of law in society, their reactions can have a significant impact on the wellbeing of victims.

But criminal justice outcomes are not the only determinant of victim impact; civil outcomes and informal outcomes also play a large role. Reactions to anti-Muslim incidents from civil institutions, organisations and private companies would appear to greatly impact victims, as their day-to-day will ultimately be bound up in the environment in which they work, or shop. Informal outcomes are perhaps the hardest to quantify as they are not always the result of the procedural outcomes but rather the result of individual action. This said, some of the most impactful outcomes arise from the actions of individuals who are party or witness to an anti-Muslim incident.

Criminal justice outcomes for victims are immediately significant and can make the difference between life and death. The case of Bijan Ebrahimi, who was beaten to death and whose body was set alight in Bristol in 2013, is instructive in this regard. Officers from Avon and Somerset Police routinely ignored Ebrahimi’s reports of racial abuse, criminal damage and ‘threats to kill’ from local perpetrators, while giving credence to counter-allegations made by the perpetrators, including unfounded allegations of paedophilia. It is imperative that the concerns of people who can be considered vulnerable, such as Ebrahimi, who was a disabled refugee from a religious minority background, are taken seriously and that institutional prejudice be exposed and addressed, lest their relative vulnerability lead them to come to great harm.

Taking seriously the claims of potential victims and keeping them informed of the legal process through which they are going will go a long way to building trust in the police among religious minority groups such as Muslims, along with improving their quality of life. Sentence uplifting, whereby a sentence is made more punitive based on the circumstance of a case, is an instance of this. This is a particularly useful tool of the courts as it sends the message that hate crime offences will not be tolerated. The statements made by judges when passing sentence on a perpetrator are also important as too often the perpetrators of anti-Muslim incidents are partially excused by way of reference to their life circumstances, in a manner that does not reflect the true nature of the respective incident.

Civil outcomes, typically involving housing authorities, employers, educational institutions, and public and private services, clearly have a great effect on the day-to-day existence of victims of anti-Muslim incidents. Victims have often reported that they have been perceived as troublemakers by housing authorities for reporting grievances with their neighbours (involving racial and religious abuse etc.), leaving them feeling isolated within their own homes. In regard to employers, victims’ complaints to
management concerning the Islamophobic conduct of colleagues (or in the case of teachers, students) would very frequently be disregarded on the basis of there not being enough evidence to proceed. It is imperative, of course, that evidence be provided prior to disciplinary action being taken, but more often than not it is the word of the victim against the perpetrator, with, for obvious reasons, the word of the religious minority member often being outweighed by those who very frequently have no direct experience of religious or racial discrimination.

There is a clear issue of bias that relates to the relative isolation of many Muslims in the workplace. The very fact that it appears to be incredibly difficult to resolve any instance of anti-Muslim prejudice satisfactorily speaks to a systemic problem within organisations, institutions and private companies, whereby Islamophobes and racists are effectively given free rein to abuse Muslims with relative impunity. When it comes to Muslims experiencing discrimination or abuse whilst receiving a private service, a lack of response from staff or security workers in the surrounding environment was a pervasive problem, pointing to the need for better education of both management and workers on the seriousness of anti-Muslim prejudice.

Public services have similar problems (perhaps not to the same magnitude), but compounding this is the drafting of public servants, such as doctors and teachers, into the PREVENT strand of CONTEST as an attempt to spot signs of terrorism in the workplace. As such workers are not trained in counter-terrorism but are still obliged to report anything which they would consider to be potentially related to terrorism; thus many victims would be referred to PREVENT on a spurious basis. The experiences of many of our service users would suggest that such public servants are not best placed to carry out such work, and are in fact contributing to discrimination against Muslims without any apparent benefit to counter-terrorism as a whole.

By their very nature, informal outcomes are difficult to quantify, but this does not mean that they do not greatly impact victims of anti-Muslim incidents. Due to criminal justice agencies often being the first responders to anti-Muslim incidents, the informal response of individual police officers featured prominently in our data set. It has often been reported that individual officers were dismissive of victims’ claims of abuse or discrimination, either in their choice of language or tone of voice, occasionally to the point of being obstructive. Victims also reported that officers showed a remarkable level of sympathy towards the perpetrators of serious hate crimes, on occasion even advocating on their behalf toward the victims (e.g. seeking to dissuade victims from pressing charges on the basis that the perpetrator was ‘basically a good person’). This goes against the principles of justice and fairness, and reinforces the perception of institutional racism within criminal justice agencies that many Muslims understandably have.

Service users pointed to instances where civil authority figures, such as teachers or bus drivers would, for no apparent reason, come down on the side of perpetrators who were very obviously abusing Muslims. In pressurised environments such as on public transport networks, where a timetable is expected to be followed and many different people are in close proximity to one another, a certain level of leeway is expected to be given to such authority figures as it can be difficult to ascertain the exact cause of an incident. However, there have been many examples reported to us of civil authority
figures using their authority to caution or punish those who had just been victimised, often with no consequence for the perpetrator. This speaks to a broader culture of apathy within institutions over the seriousness of Islamophobia and racism directed toward Muslims.

Finally, acts of compassion of witnesses to anti-Muslim incidents are evidently greatly appreciated by victims, with the psychological impact of such incidents often being mitigated by the solidarity shown by members of the public or civil authority figures. Conversely, a lack of solidarity can impact victims’ wellbeing even more significantly than the anti-Muslim incident itself, as some of our service users directly expressed.

The banning under UK terror laws of National Action in December 2016, and its aliases NS131 and Scottish Dawn in September 2017, was a welcome and important move by the government in dealing with far-right extremism. In previous years, we had verified reports from accounts linked to this group, and in 2017 we received but did not verify reports that were from neo-Nazi or extreme right-wing accounts which were not overtly Islamophobic or seeking to promote such banned groups.

For online reports, however, the terroristic murder of Makram Ali in Finsbury Park by Darren Osborne poses pressing questions about when hate speech falls into the realm of anti-terrorism powers. Weeks before Osborne’s attack, a Facebook user wrote on the wall of a local EDL group that he was willing to drive a van at a mosque, suggesting that such acts of violence, or the idea of them, do not exist in vacuums. Similarly violent rhetoric came from ideologically-motivated accounts following major trigger events, which included someone calling for the ‘gassing’ of Muslim ‘scum’ hours after the Manchester Arena attack. Facebook removed the content, but the police response was less pronounced, which may be owing to a broader spike in Islamophobic hate crime reports in the immediate aftermath of the attack. We verified over 30 social media posts within a 24-hour window, which conforms to the ideas of Williams and Burnap, where the most hateful comments and comments which constitute incitement to violence have a short online half-life.

The ideological positions of perpetrators, however, were less opaque, with several accounts using the attempted arson of a mosque in Oldham to call for further attacks on Islamic institutions. But, in some of the examples cited in the report, the perpetrators had no clear ideological leanings as the accounts were broadly ethnocentric, anti-EU, and Islamophobic in outlook. Again, this demonstrates how racialised ideas about Muslims are more latent in society, and manifest outwardly over time, with major trigger events confirming for some the deeply-held belief that Islam is intrinsically violent, further demonstrating how ethnonationalist discourses are expanding to incorporate such anti-Muslim views.

Several high-profile examples of criminal justice outcomes were found to be more prevalent in local, rather than national, news outlets. Again, such examples should be widely publicised, as a deterrent but also to reassure Muslim communities that hate speech and incitement are taken seriously by law enforcement. Perception does matter, and there is room for improvement and the sharing of best practice to help ensure such stories do get the attention they deserve.
With more high-profile account holders, it has proven harder to get Twitter to remove hateful content which is in clear violation of the platform’s rules. It took the platform until 28 March 2018 to suspend Tommy Robinson from the platform. But on 27 May 2017, his viral tweet attempted to link Islam with the Manchester Arena bombing. He falsely claimed that the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police was posing with a copy of the Qur'an days after the attack. It gained several thousand retweets, and as the report highlighted, the truth of the matter received a fraction of the response.

The failed attack at the Tube station in Parsons Green demonstrated how ideologically-conditioned accounts took less than an hour to blame Muslims for the attack. Whilst there was a spike offline, there was a short-lived spike online, and Twitter again failed to remove a grotesque meme which suggested that London Mayor Sadiq Khan was the failed bomber.

Given the rise of alternative social media platforms, we are seeing a convergence of extremists online where Islamophobic views, alongside other racialised hate speech, are unfiltered. In order for the work being done by the major platforms (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) to successfully combat hate speech and racist abuse, members of the public must have the necessary awareness and nous in order to report objectionable content where they find it, regardless of the platform.