



NORMALISING HATRED

Tell MAMA Annual Report 2018

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1 PEER REVIEW

Tell MAMA's annual report on incidents reported in 2018 continues to demonstrate that anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia is a significant social and political issue in the UK. Tell MAMA have carefully collected data on anti-Muslim incidents through their different reporting mechanisms whilst also supporting victims and monitoring anti-Muslim activity online. 1072 verified incidents include a toxic mix of abusive behaviour, assault, hate speech and the distribution of anti-Muslim literature. Women remain the main victims and white men the main perpetrators. Spikes in reported incidents occurred after the distribution of the 'Punish a Muslim Day' letters and a column by Boris Johnson that referred to Muslim women as 'letterboxes' and 'bank robbers'. Action is needed to address the ongoing problems that anti-Muslim hatred generates for our communities. This report contains important recommendations for different groups and agencies; it is clear that much work needs to be done to protect people from anti-Muslim hatred and to work to prevent such incidents from happening.

Professor Peter Hopkins
Newcastle University

2 FOREWORD

We, as a nation, suffered four terrorist attacks in 2017. The nation came together and rallied at times when extremists sought to divide us and to fracture our social cohesion.

The sad reality was that even though we succeeded in coming together as communities, a small minority of people in our country targeted British Muslims, as though they were responsible for the acts of co-religionists, hell bent on destruction. This destructive and perverse set of actions, meant that 2017 saw Tell MAMA record the highest number of anti-Muslim or Islamophobic hate incidents since we started in 2011.



This report outlines the fact that there were about 3,000 anti-Muslim hate incidents that we were aware of in 2018. This included Tell MAMA data and data from over 20 police forces in England and Wales, that we have data sharing agreements with. Of these, 1,072 anti-Muslim hate incidents were verified by Tell MAMA, an 11% reduction on 2017. Yet, 2018 had no major terrorist attacks meaning that the figures for anti-Muslim hate or Islamophobia remain stubbornly high.

In 2018, we saw a rise in Islamophobic hate incidents and fear around the ‘Punish a Muslim Day’ set of letters and graphics that were sent out by David Parnham. Co-incidentally, Parnham is to be sentenced tomorrow – on the 2nd of September 2019, the day of the online launch of this report. His actions caused significant fear and distress for many Muslims, particularly Muslim women, who contacted Tell MAMA to find out whether they should stay at home and work from home on the date set for the ‘Punish a Muslim Day’. One individual managed to cause significant fear and distress which played on a growing concern within Muslim communities, that anti-Muslim hate or Islamophobia is becoming more prominent, visible and vocal.

Anti-Muslim hate is not a ‘fringe issue’ that only affects Muslims. It affects social cohesion, extremism and polarises local communities, whilst emboldening haters and extremists. In today’s day and age, tackling it means ensuring that other communities feel a sense of reassurance and thereby mobilise to assist others. This ‘self-mobilisation’ only takes places when we have Upstanders and not Bystanders in communities. This also means that it is imperative on us all, to counter and challenge anti-Muslim hate where we come across it.

We therefore hope that this report adds the volume of data that now clearly shows much more needs to be done to tackle the poison of anti-Muslim hate. The time for talking is over and the time to defend our nation’s values, based on pluralism, is here.

Iman Atta OBE – Director of Tell MAMA

3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

3.1 KEY FINDINGS

- Tell MAMA recorded 1,282 reports in 2018, of which 1,072 were verified by our staff. Of the verified incidents, 745 occurred offline, while 327 were online. In total, Tell MAMA was contacted over 2,000 times with concerns or inquiries about anti-Muslim prejudice.
- We also received reports of 1,891 anti-Muslim crimes and incidents from 20 police forces in the UK. Although some reports in the Tell MAMA dataset were also reported to the police, the details of police data does not overlap with Tell MAMA data, thus there are no duplicated reports.
- Over the last three years, Tell MAMA has recorded a steady increase in street-based (offline) anti-Muslim incidents year-on-year. However, this year demonstrated an 11% reduction in street-based (offline) incidents compared with the previous reporting period of 2017 (N=839).
- In 2017, 52% (N=441) of street-based (offline) incidents were marked as abusive behaviour, while 18% (N=149) were physical attack/assault. In 2018, 54% (N=400) were abusive behaviour while 13% (N=98) was assault. Similarly, instances of threatening behaviour have fallen by 28% (N=57 in 2017 to N=41 in 2018). While we are relieved to see that incidents of abusive behaviour, threatening behaviour, and assault have reduced, both the rates and proportions of discrimination (N=72 in 2017, N=87 in 2018), hate speech (N=11 in 2017, N=18 in 2018), and anti-Muslim literature (N=28 in 2017 and N=58 in 2018) have increased. This indicates that although 2017 involved higher instances of face-to-face violent and abusive behaviour, there has been significant growth in the proportion of incidents in the more in-direct categories of discrimination, hate speech, and anti-Muslim literature in 2018.
- The online dataset includes 327 verified reports, down 10% from the 2017 figure of 362 verified reports. A clear majority of reported abuse occurred either on Twitter (n=175) or Facebook (n=92), with a small minority having occurred on YouTube (n=8). The 'Other' category (n=52) includes communications sent over email or posted on internet forums. As with the previous dataset, we categorised most online cases as Hate Speech (n=168) and Abusive Behaviour (n=96). Threats accounted for 12 reports, while Anti-Muslim Literature remains present in a clear minority of cases (n=50).
- The rising instances of discrimination, hate speech, and anti-Muslim literature indicate that a more general intolerance and hatred is growing. These typologies are seldom prosecutable by law and have proven more difficult to achieve satisfactory outcomes and solutions for victims. Similarly, this year we analysed the trends in verbal abuse, finding a common theme whereby perpetrators use language attacking Islam and religious practices alongside, for example, anti-Muslim attacks that range from abusive behaviour, discrimination, or threats. We, therefore, emphasise the gravity of attacks on Islam in tandem with hatred directed at individuals or

institutions. The two are interconnected, thus hatred and intolerance must both be challenged simultaneously.

- Most commonly, anti-Muslim attacks in 2018 took place in public areas (N=209). Incidents which took place within, or targeted the victim's household or private property, increased by 11% (N=101 to N=113), and those occurring in the victim's place of work have risen by 8% (N=74 to 80) since the previous year.
- We recorded the details of 1244 victims and 1196 perpetrators. Consistent with our previous reports, of the known/disclosed victims, the majority were female at 57% (N=721). The majority of known perpetrators were male (73%, N=482 of 663), and 61% were white men (N=404 in 663).
- In 2018, two significant spikes occurred. The first, in spring, reflected the 'Punish a Muslim Day' letters sent to Muslim homes, institutions, and places of work in March, followed by heightened tensions, fears, and anxieties around the proposed day in April, and the second wave of letters ('Punish a Muslim Day 2') received in May. In total, Tell MAMA received reports of 37 offline incidents which directly referenced 'Punish a Muslim Day'.
- The second and more significant spike occurred in August after the former foreign secretary Boris Johnson wrote a column referring to veiled Muslim women as 'letterboxes' and 'bank robbers'. In the week following his article, anti-Muslim attacks increased by 375% - from 8 incidents the previous week, to 38 in the following. Of the 38 anti-Muslim attacks in the first week following Mr Johnson's comments, 22 were directed at visibly Muslim women who wore the face veil (niqab) or other veiling practices. We recorded a total of 57 incidents in the three weeks following the column's publication, 32 of which were directed at visibly Muslim women. Between the 5th and 29th of August, 42% (N=24) of the street-based (offline) incidents reported to Tell MAMA directly referenced Boris Johnson and/or the language used in his column.
- Verbal abuse (abusive language) accompanied many of the anti-Muslim incidents. We analysed the trends in language, finding several themes; terrorism, paedophiles, hatred of foreigners, blame, competition, insulting/derogatory remarks about Islam, and expressions of confidence by the perpetrator that no punishment will follow.

4 INTRODUCTION

Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) is an independent, non-governmental entity which works on monitoring and tackling anti-Muslim hatred, discrimination, and Islamophobia. Primarily, our platform provides a secure and reliable way for people from across the UK to report incidents and access the support service they need. The reports can be submitted via our website, freephone, SMS, WhatsApp, Twitter, Facebook, and more.

Over recent decades, Muslim communities in the UK have suffered rising anti-Muslim incidents and Islamophobia. Tell MAMA was established in response to the need for a nationally coordinated means of reporting and monitoring incidents while supporting those affected.

We work in partnership with the police forces, charities, statutory bodies, and other third-party organisations, and our work involves research, victim support, advocacy, signposting for legal assistance, lobbying, raising awareness, and outreach activities. Our team of caseworkers assist the victims and witnesses, providing support and referrals to relevant services. Meanwhile, our research team analyse case details to create reports, lobby the government or police services, and identify trends around anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia. We protect the details of the victims and cases and, when desired, we write articles and reports to platform the testimonies of victims of hatred.

A hate crime by nature attacks and harms a whole section of society and can be motivated by a person's perceived race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or gender identity.¹

Tell MAMA classifies an anti-Muslim or Islamophobic incident as any malicious act aimed at Muslim groups or individuals, private property, or Islamic organisations, where the act has biased motivation or content, or that the victim was targeted due to their being (or perceived as) Muslim. As with any other form of hate crime, the victim does not have to be Muslim to experience such prejudice or violence, as the racialised nature of this prejudice means that non-Muslims experience abuse. We also challenge any rhetoric which informs and inspires cycles of anti-Muslim hatred. Similarly, where members of Muslim communities promote prejudice themselves, we also challenge these narratives and any behaviours related to them.

We affirm the fundamental right of freedom of expression and speech, but it comes with a responsibility not to cause harm, threaten others, nor incite violence. Some perpetrators in our dataset direct offensive comments toward Islam itself, with the intention of causing harm or upset to Muslims directly. Therefore, the context of language must be examined carefully when reviewing these cases, where in some instances a hatred of Islam cannot be detached from a hatred of Muslims.

Tell MAMA has used a reworked version of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism,

¹ Crown Prosecution Service (2018) 'Hate Crime Annual Report 2017-18'

Accessed: <https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cps-hate-crime-report-2018.pdf>

‘A certain perception of Muslims, which may be expressed as hatred or outward hostility towards Muslims. Hatred may take the form of anti-Muslim rhetoric and physical manifestations that are targeted towards Muslims (or non-Muslim individuals considered to be sympathetic to Muslims) and/or their property; or towards Muslim community institutions or religious and other related social institutions.’

Having flexibility in our definition, we feel, allows for documenting anti-Muslim prejudice and Islamophobia as flexible, hateful, and structural.²

Content Warning

This report contains mention of
rape and sexual abuse, and
references to extreme violence,
racism, and crime.

² Tell MAMA (2018) ‘Tell MAMA Submission – A Working Definition of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim Hatred/Prejudice’, 23rd November 2018
Accessed: <https://tellmamauk.org/tell-mama-submission-a-working-definition-of-islamophobia-and-anti-muslim-hatred-prejudice/>

5 REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE

5.1 NARRATIVES INFORMING ANTI-MUSLIM HATRED AND ISLAMOPHOBIA

Anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia have grown and developed against a 'patchwork' of events. Researchers, journalists, and politicians have analysed Islam and Islamophobia through the lenses of British colonialism, Orientalism, the Arab Spring, terrorism, the Iranian revolution, blasphemy laws, the rise of Al Qaeda and Daesh, or more contemporary narratives of child sexual exploitation (CSE) scandals, Islam as oppressive to women, or notions of Sharia law infiltrating the nation.³⁴⁵ Others more broadly suggest that Islam has replaced communism as the 'new political enemy' or that Muslims have become the previously 'ghettoised' black and Irish communities.⁶⁷ This network of commentaries has demonstrated how the roots of anti-Muslim hatred are difficult to pin down. We can, instead, look to the effects.

Islamophobia is a parallel concept like homophobia or xenophobia, not a clinical psychological term. It, therefore, carries a broad set of negative attitudes and emotions directed at groups or individuals due to their perceived Muslim or Islamic identity, and is analogous to terms like racism, antisemitism, and sexism.⁸

Since the 1997 Runnymede Trust, which arguably re-popularised the idea of Islamophobia, research has rigorously questioned and critiqued the imbalanced negativity towards Islam and Muslims in politics, popular culture, and the news media. Gradually, Muslims have become implicated in a complicated web of political, economic, and cultural problems in European countries. In recent decades, there has since been a substantial increase in the volume and variety of publications on Muslims and Islam by non-Muslim commentators which focus on the relationship between Muslim individuals and 'Muslim issues' around the world.⁹¹⁰ Scholars have suggested that since Muslims have lived as a minority within non-

³ Asad, Talal (2009) 'Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism' in *Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech* The Townsend Papers in the Humanities, November 2009, pp.20-63

⁴ Tufail, Waqas (2015) Rotherham, Rochdale, and the Racialised Threat of the 'Muslim Grooming Gang' in *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy*, 2015 4(3) pp.30-43

⁵ Morey, P. and Yaqin, Amina. (2011) 'Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and Representation After 9/11' New York: Harvard University Press

⁶ Ahmed, Tahira Sameera (2005) 'Reading between the Lines: Muslims and the Media' in *Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure* ed. Tahir Abbas. Zed Books. pp 112

⁷ Haritaworn, Jin (2012) 'Colorful Bodies in the Multikulti Metropolis: Vitality, Victimology and Transgressive Citizenship in Berlin' In: Cotten, Trystan T. (Hrsg.) *Transgender Migrations. The Bodies, Borders, and Politics of Transition*. New York: Routledge S. 11–31.

⁸ Tell MAMA (2018) 'A working definition of Islamophobia or anti-Muslim Hatred/Prejudice' Tell MAMA, 16th November 2018

Accessed: https://tellmamauk.org/wp-content/uploads/resources/Tell%20MAMA%20Submission%20-%20A%20Working%20Definition%20of%20Islamophobia%20and%20anti-Muslim%20Hatred_Prejudice.pdf

⁹ Anidjar, Gil (2003) 'The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy' Stanford University Press 2003

¹⁰ Said, Edward (1997) 'Covering Islam; How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World' London: Vintage

Muslim societies, the question of 'being Muslim' has become one of politics and identity,¹¹ communities constructed as 'suspect' in the UK and imbued with immoral and criminal tendencies.¹²¹³ Along similar lines, since the War on Terror, Muslims have been 'securitized' as always potential terrorists or vulnerable to radicalisation.¹⁴ The effects of these narratives are that Muslims are all somehow connected, somewhat threatening, and something of a challenge to the modern West.

Within this, the 'othering' of Islam and Muslims has become more pervasive. The 'post-Rushdie world' has been defined by holding Islam as something external to or incompatible with Britishness, and thus the nation debates the appropriate 'nature and boundaries of Islam'.¹⁵ This can manifest, for example, in calls for banning Islamic clothing and places of worship. Beneath this lies an assumption that un-curbed, free Islam would naturally become violent and unbearable.¹⁶¹⁷ These ideas are reflected in political discourse as well as trends in attacks on Muslims.

Similarly, the process of 'othering' involves racialisation, and the overall development of perceptions of Islam cannot be removed from the history of race-relations in the UK. For example, the South Asian Muslim community who are now portrayed as potentially violent and threatening were before promoted as models of hardworking, family-oriented, 'model integrators' in contrast with the fabricated media framing and moral panics around mugging, and the criminalising of black youth which was central to 1970s racism.¹⁸¹⁹ Hall, et al. (1978) argued that the role of the media was not only to help the public understand events around them, but to 'offer powerful interpretations of how to understand these events' and, to orientate the audience understanding, 'towards the events and the people or groups involved in them'.²⁰ Therefore, news framing needed to exist within an understanding of unconscious 'maps' which formed the basis of any cultural knowledge.²¹ And, because news cycles are contingent on bringing attention to what is new or unusual, these problematising events (i.e. mugging) went against these pre-established conventions on what society was framed around: order, consensus, and routine as the news cycle looked to institutions for

¹¹ Akhtar, Shabbir (1989) 'Be careful with Muhammad!: the Salman Rushdie affair' London: Bellew. pp. 107-35

¹² Morey, P. and Yaqin, Amina. (2011) 'Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and Representation After 9/11' New York: Harvard University Press. pp.49-50

¹³ Pantazis, Christina and Pemberton, Simon (2009) 'From the 'Old' to the 'New' Suspect Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation', in *The British Journal of Criminology*, Volume 49, Issue 5, September 2009, Pages 646–666

¹⁴ Saeed, Tania (2016) 'Islamophobia and Securitization: Religion, Ethnicity and the Female Voice'. Palgrave MacMillan

¹⁵ Asad, Talal (2018) 'Secular Translations: Nation-State, Modern Self, and Calculative Reason' Columbia University Press, 2018.

¹⁶ Ameli, Saied R. (2007) 'The British Media and Muslim Representation: The Ideology of Demonisation' in *Islamic Human Rights Commission*. pp. 50

¹⁷ Mahmood, Saba (2015) 'Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report' Princeton University Press

¹⁸ Ahmed, Tahira Sameera (2005) 'Reading Between the Lines: Muslims and the Media' in *Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure* ed. Tahir Abbas. Zed Books. pp. 112

¹⁹ Hall, Stuart, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts. (1978) 'Policing the crisis: Mugging, the state and law and order' Macmillan International Higher Education, 2013

²⁰ Ibid. pp, 54-55

²¹ Ibid. pp. 54

meaning - not out of conspiratorial collusion, but to reinforce certain cultural imperatives.²² Thus, the social and violent othering of minority groups reflected a national identity crisis: a fear of economic decline and growing state intervention amidst the turmoil of growing unemployment, and a shift away from the traditional social order.

Each year, we receive reports of anti-Muslim incidents faced by non-Muslims; Sikh, Hindu or others who are perceived to 'look Muslim'. Furthermore, the use of the term 'P**i' has become synonymous with 'Muslim' in incidents involving verbal abuse or hate speech, ethno-religious conflations have resulted in 'P*kophobia' informing a lot of Islamophobia.²³

A further effect of the homogenisation of Muslims around the world leaves those perceived to be Muslim to represent and answer for complex social and political problems, for example, immigration, refugees, and asylum seekers. On this theme, Muller (2018) has looked at the media's portrayal of refugees and Islam as interconnected. Observing Britain and Germany, he concludes that both nations have constructed Muslim refugees as the culturally inferior 'other' to an exclusive 'European Christian Culture'.²⁴ Similarly, Roy (2013) refers to the simultaneous writing of refugees and Muslims as 'Europe's identity crisis', a misguided approach based upon the 'othering' of both groups as 'not European'.²⁵

The effects of 'othering' leave Muslims in Britain as the litmus test for the success of multiculturalism.²⁶ Until accepted as part of Britain itself, Muslim communities will be constructed as less deserving of what most British citizens ought to be guaranteed. What Gilroy (2004) refers to as 'armoured cosmopolitanism' falsely blames minority groups for a wealth of social and political problems, such as poverty, unemployment, or crime.²⁷

Muslim individuals and institutions are pre-determined as sites for critique and competition, as a result, anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia have become normalised and accepted. This manifests in online and street-based (offline) acts of anti-Muslim hatred.

5.2 REFLECTIONS IN HATE CRIME

As anti-Muslim incidents and Islamophobic rhetoric have continued to grow, so has the body of research on hate crimes against Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim.

Classifications of hate crime can be useful in questioning the causes and trends behind the data. A significant proportion of hate crime can be categorised 'defensive' or 'retributive', prompted by the perpetrators feeling that their culture or community is under threat from outsiders.²⁸ This can most plainly be observed through the spikes in anti-Muslim hatred after

²² Ibid. pp, 56-57

²³ Saeed, Tania (2016) 'Islamophobia and Securitization: Religion, Ethnicity and the Female Voice' Palgrave

²⁴ Muller, Tobias (2018) 'Constructing cultural borders: depictions of Muslim refugees in British and German media' in *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* March 2018 12 (1) pp.263-277

²⁵ Roy, Olivier. (2013) 'Holy ignorance: When religion and culture part ways' Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.61-65

²⁶ Asad, Talal (2009) 'Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism' in *Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech* The Townsend Papers in the Humanities, November 2009, pp.21-22

²⁷ Gilroy, Paul (2004) 'After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?' Abingdon: Routledge, 2004

²⁸ McDevitt, J., Levin, J., Bennett, S., 'Hate Crime Offenders: An Expanded Typology', *Journal of Social Issues* 58 (2002).

terrorist attacks by those associated with Islam, extensively documented within the Tell MAMA Annual Report for 2017: 'Beyond the Incident, Outcomes for Victims of Anti-Muslim Prejudice'.²⁹

Another typology of anti-Muslim hatred is that which references public discourse concerning immigration and terrorism alongside more generalised and racialised anti-Muslim abuse, upon which our 2016 report was focused.³⁰ Through broader, popular debates, for example, on feminism, free speech, or immigration, Muslim people in public have become vulnerable targets for a wide range of harmful opinions. These typologies are particularly relevant as they highlight the specific connections between politically charged events or discussions with the motivations behind a significant proportion of hate crime.

Many factors influence anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia, therefore, scholars and commentators have analysed relevant hate crime data along intersectional lines.

Earlier this year, Najib and Hopkins (2019) released a comparative analysis of the social and geographical effects of Islamophobia in Paris and London to highlight the unique problems within urban multicultural cities. For example, class distinctions are evident in both Paris and London, where higher levels of anti-Muslim incidents are concentrated in marginalised enclaves such as the banlieues and Tower Hamlets respectively, while more privileged groups who can 'enjoy the dynamism of the centre' are less likely to face Islamophobia. Furthermore, they found that in Paris and London, there is little correlation between areas with high levels of Muslim residents and high levels of anti-Muslim acts, while in London, anti-Muslim incidents are more likely to occur in areas with 'good transport links and high pedestrian activity'.³¹

Also following an intersectional approach, Mason-Bish and Zempi (2018) provided a detailed analysis of the impact of street-based harassment in the UK through conducting interviews with female Muslim victims who wear the face veil (niqab). Throughout, they note the theoretical benefits of an intersectional approach to analysing crimes against the 'simultaneous victims' from religious and ethnic minorities, women and children, and those facing class-based discriminations. This concludes that both street harassment and the consistent threat of street harassment produce a hostile environment for veiled Muslim women which can have a terrorizing effect, limiting their full participation in the public sphere.³² Similarly, Khan and Mythen (2018) argue that intersecting discourses and assumptions based on gender, identity, and faith present Muslim women as both victims of gendered oppression and the active agents of cultural tensions.³³ Not only does this viewpoint contain a lack of empathy for female Muslim victims of hate crime, but it suggests

²⁹ Tell MAMA (2018) 'Beyond the Incident: Outcomes for Victims of Anti-Muslim Prejudice - Tell MAMA Annual Report 2017'

³⁰ Tell MAMA (2017) 'A Constructed Threat: Identity, Tolerance and the Impact of Anti-Muslim Hatred - Tell MAMA Annual Report 2016'

³¹ Najib, Kawtar and Hopkins, Peter (2019) 'Where does Islamophobia take place and who is involved? Reflections from Paris and London' *Social and Cultural Geography*
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14649365.2018.1563800>

³² Mason-Bish, H., and Zempi, I. (2018) 'Misogyny, Racism, and Islamophobia: Street Harassment at the Intersections in Feminist Criminology' 7th May 2018

³³ Khan, Fatima and Mythen, Gabe (2018) 'Culture, Media and Everyday Practices: Unveiling and Challenging Islamophobia' in: Bhatia M., Poynting S., Tufail W. (eds) *Media, Crime and Racism*. Palgrave Studies in Crime, Media and Culture. Palgrave Macmillan

that Muslim women are the initiators of tensions and invite attacks upon themselves. The significant prevalence of Islamophobic attacks against Muslim women therefore results from their being 'scapegoated' as the cause of society's ills and the perceived failures of multiculturalism.

In anti-Muslim hatred directed at men and women, this trend can also be seen most evidently in the rhetoric of a 'crisis' of refugees entering Europe, and the ways this has informed Islamophobia.³⁴ By analysing discursive patterns in the countries' most-read newspapers, Muller questions the connection between Muslim refugees and settled British or German Muslims in the news media. The piece concludes that Muslims and refugees have been written as the 'culturally inferior other' within a 'European Christian Culture', and that this can have potentially 'disastrous effects' for new and settled Muslims in Europe.³⁵

Media discourses play a crucial role in shaping people's attitudes toward political rhetoric on refugees and Islam,³⁶ and further research has found that news-based media more often depicts Muslims negatively.³⁷ More generally, Bleich, Nisar, and Vazquez conducted a comparative investigation into the coverage of Muslims, Jews, and Catholics in The New York Times and The Guardian headlines between 1985 and 2014. They found that Muslims are more often associated with negative views and events than other religious groups.³⁸ Also looking to popular and media representation, Zunes observed that the victims of hatred or attacks by Muslims are often venerated and extensively covered. He compares this with the lack of empathy shown by European media and citizens to terror attacks abroad (for example, in Pakistan, Nigeria, and Iraq) which yielded much higher casualty rates. What he calls a 'disparate response' comprises racism, identifying with 'your own' victims, and seeing Muslims in Europe as outsiders.³⁹ Interestingly, Ahmed and Matthes instead turned to the themes chosen by those researching the media's portrayal of Muslims. Their research found that 'most studies' investigated themes of 'migration, terrorism, and war'. Nonetheless, they re-iterate that the media first frames Muslims negatively, via the continuous portrayal of Islam alongside violence.⁴⁰ Morey, Yaqin, and Forte also evaluate contemporary Islamophobia in political discourse and popular culture. In a series of essays, they address the ways in which international 'Muslim Problems' inspire individual acts of hatred, discussing issues such as the foreign policy of the United States, the notion of 'British Values' as a measure of terrorist sympathies, and the moral panic surrounding crimes committed by those associated with Islam. They also assess the media's portrayal of Islam following 9/11, looking at the effects of headlines such as 'Don't Look for Moderates in the Islamic Revolution', 'A Holy War Heads Our Way', 'Prince Charles is Wrong,- Islam Does Menace the

³⁴ Stephen Zunes (2017) 'Europe's Refugee Crisis, Terrorism, and Islamophobia' in *Peace Review*, 29:1, pp.1-6

³⁵ Muller, Tobias (2018) 'Constructing cultural borders: depictions of Muslim refugees in British and German media' in *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, March 2018, 12 (1)

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ahmed, Saifuddin and Matthes, Jorg (2016) 'Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A meta-analysis' in *International Communication Gazette*. 27th June 2016

³⁸ Bleich, Nisar, Vazquez (2018) Investigating status hierarchies with media analysis: Muslims, Jews, and Catholics in The New York Times and The Guardian headlines, 1985–2014 (2018)

³⁹ Stephen Zunes (2017) 'Europe's Refugee Crisis, Terrorism, and Islamophobia' in *Peace Review*, 29:1, pp.1-6

⁴⁰ Ahmed, Saifuddin and Matthes, Jorg (2016) 'Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A meta-analysis' in *International Communication Gazette*. 27th June 2016

West', and, at worst 'It is the black heart of Islam, not the black face, to which millions object'. Some newspapers and public figures at the time were seen to hold the view that 'Muslims everywhere behave with equal savagery', and this mindset 'from above' motivated and justified corresponding acts of hatred against Muslim groups, individuals, and institutions. The rhetorical conflation of every Muslim to every other Muslim by a string of religiosity leaves Muslims, who themselves were in no way affiliated with 9/11, vulnerable to extreme forms of hatred.⁴¹

A collective who compiled 'Islamophobia: A British Muslim Perspective' depicted a more varied and detailed range of impacts of Islamophobia on Muslim individuals and communities. For example, victims of hate crimes experienced significant barriers to care resulting from mental health issues and mistrust of public services. They highlight the further effects of isolation, disengagement with politics, and lack of self-confidence.⁴² Khan and Mythen (2018) add that the rise in Islamophobic attacks further pushes Muslim women into marginalisation, and therefore the problems caused by a lack of positive representation of Muslims in political spheres are exacerbated.⁴³ Others have turned to the effects of far-right politics in Europe and the subsequent exacerbation of Islamophobia, and what other parties are doing to tackle this. On this, Kedikli and Akca (2018) conclude with an important point, emphasising that Islamophobia itself (in the forms of discourse and anti-Muslim incidents) erode the same values that Europe is built upon, such as human rights, democracy, plurality, and multiculturalism.⁴⁴

Similarly implicated in discussions of migrants, refugees, citizenship, and national identity, the scope and impact of anti-Muslim hatred have been evaluated alongside the topic of Brexit. For example, Awan and Zempi (2018) wrote of the often 'invisible' impacts of anti-Muslim hate crime on those who are not Muslim but were perceived so by the perpetrator. They analysed this through a post-Brexit lens, observing the rising trends of all forms of xenophobic incidents since the EU referendum, concluding that the vulnerability of those visibly 'othered' in Britain, often Muslims, has increased since.⁴⁵

Paterson, Walters, and Brown (2019) also examined the impacts of Islamophobic hate crimes on wider communities. Like many analyses of the impacts of hate crime, they found that members of a community experience an increase in feeling threatened, angry, and anxious, and are more likely to hold negative attitudes towards their respective government and/or criminal justice services. While they point out that both direct and indirect victimisation can

⁴¹ Morey, P., Yaqin, A., and Forte, A. (2019) 'Contesting Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim Prejudice in Media, Culture and Politics' Bloomsbury

⁴² Hankir A.Z., Ali S., Siddique U., Carrick F.R., Zaman R. (2019) 'Islamophobia: A British Muslim Perspective' in: Moffic H., Peteet J., Hankir A., Awaad R. (eds) *Islamophobia and Psychiatry*. Springer

⁴³ Khan, Fatima and Mythen, Gabe (2018) 'Culture, Media and Everyday Practices: Unveiling and Challenging Islamophobia' in: Bhatia M., Poynting S., Tufail W. (eds) *Media, Crime and Racism*. Palgrave Studies in Crime, Media and Culture. Palgrave Macmillan

⁴⁴ Kedikli, U., & Akça, M. (2018). 'Rising Islamophobic Discourses in Europe and Fight Against Islamophobia on the Basis of International Organizations' in *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 9(1), pp. 9-23

⁴⁵ Awan, I. and Zempi, I. (2018) "'You all look the same': Non-Muslim men who suffer Islamophobic hate crime in the post-Brexit era' in *European Journal of Criminology*. 20th November 2018

also have a positive, mobilising, and uniting effect on the targeted community, they emphasise that,

‘Simply knowing a victim of an Islamophobic hate crime can have emotional and behavioural effects that are comparable with those who have experienced direct forms of victimisation’.

46

Erentzen and Gardner (2018) add important depth to the study of impacts on victims, looking at varying public perceptions of victims. They conducted a test to measure the rates of victim-blaming in different incidents of hate crime. A scenario in which a white man verbally abused and assaulted a Muslim man was put to the participants. Each scenario was the same, but the Muslim victim was changed, being white British in some then South Asian and Muslim in others. The scenarios showed a series of different reactions by the victim; the victim ignored the comments, the victim verbally reacted to the comments, the victim became physically confrontational. The participants then ranked the levels of blame they attributed to either the victim or the perpetrator. They found that ‘As the victim’s behaviour became more aggressive, victim blaming increased and perpetrator blaming decreased, but only for the South Asian Muslim victim.’ Therefore, witness sympathy for the Muslim South Asian victim directly correlated to his ‘good behaviour’. Furthermore, there was greater victim blame and reduced perpetrator blame with a white perpetrator and South Asian Muslim victim than with a white victim. This suggests that the wider public see victims of hate crimes as somewhat deserving of harassment if they stand against it or retaliate.⁴⁷

A common theme throughout the literature points to the ways in which Muslims become more vulnerable to attacks as they become more visible. Hopkins stresses that the most visible Muslims in the UK are Muslim women, who therefore bore the highest levels of anti-Muslim and Islamophobic hatred.⁴⁸ Furthermore, as discussions of Muslims and Islam increase, so does negative and critical focus on individuals. According to Pickel and Yendell (2016), the public interactions with Islam as presented in the media have directly contributed to an ‘increased threat perception’ of Islam and Muslims, manifesting in hatred and attacks.⁴⁹

Experts on hate crime have focused on intersecting narratives such as Brexit, poverty, refugees, and misogyny, as well as the nuanced dynamics of victims, perpetrators, and the impacts of hate crime. Tell MAMA has often drawn attention to the intersection of gendered violence with other axes of difference including race, masculinity and class, and this approach will be upheld within our 2018 report.

⁴⁶ Paterson, J., Walters, M., & Brown, R. (2019). ‘Your pain is my pain: Examining the community impacts of Islamophobic hate crimes’ in I. Zempi, & I. Awan (Eds.), *The Routledge International Handbook of Islamophobia* (First ed., pp. 84-95). Abingdon, Oxon & New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.

⁴⁷ Erentzen C., Schuller R. A., & Gardner R. C. (2018) ‘Model Victims of Hate: Victim Blaming in the Context of Islamophobic Hate Crime’ in *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 12th October 2018

⁴⁸ Hopkins (2016) ‘Gendering Islamophobia, racism and White supremacy: Gendered violence against those who look Muslim’ in *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 22nd July 2016

⁴⁹ Pickel, Gert, and Yendell, Alexander (2016) ‘Islam als Bedrohung? Beschreibung und Erklärung von Einstellungen zum Islam im Ländervergleich’. *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 10, pp. 299

5.3 A PICTURE OF 2018: HIGH-PROFILE EVENTS, PUBLIC DEBATES, AND THE POPULAR VIEW OF ISLAM

In 2018, a number of trending news stories informed anti-Muslim hate in Britain, such as ‘Punish a Muslim Day’, ‘Grooming Gang’ scandals, Boris Johnson’s column, President Trump visiting the UK, and the arrival of new refugees in Europe, while the Windrush deportations, Harry and Meghan’s wedding, and Brexit negotiations continue to call immigration and multiculturalism into public debate.

In online spheres, these debates are intensified. With the transnational nature of the internet and social media, Muslims are vulnerable to critiques based on international relations and foreign affairs, for example, the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, tensions between USA and Iran, and the steady rise in success of far-right parties across Europe and beyond. The ideological underpinnings of some far-right groups and parties are transnational, for example, being pan-European or pan-Slavic. The globalised nature of the news media results in those individuals who are ideologically-inclined toward such groups have the tools to seek out content from around the world to feed anti-Muslim and Islamophobic narratives. For example, transnational notions of a declining nation state, national sovereignty, or cultural identity may originate abroad but relate to their localised daily lives. Although we verify reports of online anti-Muslim hatred to ensure only those based in the UK are recorded in our research, globally trending debates and news stories can motivate and spark trends in anti-Muslim rhetoric. This carries into the offline sphere, where the sources of our news stories and popular culture are increasingly international.

The big stories of the day guide what we talk about online and in person. Whether the depictions are positive or negative, when attention is placed on Muslims, anti-Muslim incidents tend to rise.

In March, some Muslim households and businesses began receiving letters entitled ‘Punish A Muslim Day’, set to happen at the beginning of April. The letters were shocking, and the news rapidly spread across newspapers and social media. While most press coverage was positive and empathetic towards victims, the nation was catapulted into debates around Muslim people, Islamic clothing, mosques and madrasas (educational centres where Muslim children may learn Arabic, holy texts, and fundamental tenets of their faith), and community integration. The effects of this made Muslim individuals and institutions more visible, vulnerable, and anxious about potential attacks.

Throughout the past few years, a variety of cases involving child sexual exploitation by organised criminal groups and networks have hit the headlines, including high-profile cases in Rotherham, Telford, Oxford, and Huddersfield, with the latter attracting a great deal of attention from far-right groups and campaigners who accelerated the discussion. While statistics on the total convictions for sex offences in the UK do not show a higher prevalence of perpetrators from Asian (more specifically Pakistani) or other Muslim backgrounds, there has been a significant public outrage directed toward Muslim perpetrators of child sexual

exploitation.⁵⁰ Sex offences and the role of the perpetrators' communities, alongside the structural failures of authorities to tackle sexual exploitation, raise important and complex questions, such as the ways victims are disbelieved or viewed as 'troublemakers'. However, the reduction of these issues as exclusive to Muslim communities has built problematic stereotypes of innocent Muslim individuals, while de-railing and undermining the gravity of sexual abuse and exploitation. Tufail compares the racialised and non-racialised representations of child sexual exploitation in Britain and deconstructs the disproportionate outrage at Muslim forms of crime. Covering the legacy of colonialism and the subsequent production of the 'dangerous masculinities of Muslim men', Tufail critiques the narrative that Muslim men in Britain are sexually regressive and threatening.⁵¹ Once again, although many commentators offered critiques of this selective outrage toward Asian, Pakistani, and/or Muslim crimes, the prevalence of the debate increased the visibility and targeting of Muslims, and a heightened sensitivity to ideas of 'us' vs. 'them'.

International perceptions of Muslims and Islam have permeated the UK. For example, in early May, President Trump inaugurated the first US embassy in Jerusalem, wherein the following days Muslim and Christian Palestinians faced their largest death tolls in years, exacerbating tensions globally. In July 2018 he visited the UK and was met with huge protests throughout London. Surrounding his visit were his attacks on London Mayor Sadiq Khan, who also faced anti-Muslim abuse from his fellow MPs as a result.⁵² Since his campaign began, Trump set out a clear message to Muslims, banning citizens of several Muslim-majority nations from the US. He has voiced his opinions on British Muslims, accusing the UK of 'trying hard to disguise their massive Muslim problem', and re-tweeted anti-Muslim videos from the far-right group Britain First.⁵³ His views have triggered further harmful debates about Muslims in Britain.

Similarly, in May, Meghan Markle became the first mixed-race and non-British member of the Royal Family, which sparked outrage amongst some groups and individuals. For example, two self-proclaimed neo-Nazi teenagers who plotted to murder Prince Harry for marrying Mrs Markle were jailed for terrorism offences.⁵⁴ The Royal Family have since been called 'tainted'

⁵⁰ Between 2011 and 2016, 8% of convictions for sex offences were of known Asian backgrounds, while 71% were of white backgrounds. The Asian population make up 8% of the UK. During these years, 3011 Asian people were convicted of child sexual exploitation, and 26895 white people were convicted. The total rates of arrest per 1000 people by race/ethnicity are 12/1000 for people of Asian ethnicity, and 93/1000 for non-Asian ethnicities.

Accessed:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/659701/number-convicted-sexual-offenders-by-ethnicity-tables.xlsx

⁵¹ Tufail, Waqas (2015) Rotherham, Rochdale, and the Racialised Threat of the 'Muslim Grooming Gang' in *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy*, 2015 4(3) pp.30-43

⁵² Conservative MP Michael Fabricant responded to the protests against Trump by tweeting a picture depicting Sadiq Khan as a pig. For more information: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/trump-protest-uk-visit-latest-michael-fabricant-islamophobic-tweet-sadiq-khan-pig-a8445456.html>

⁵³ @realDonaldTrump (2015) 'The United Kingdom is trying hard to disguise their massive Muslim problem. Everybody is wise to what is happening, very sad! Be honest.' 10th December 2015

Accessed: <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/674934005725331456?lang=en>

⁵⁴ BBC News (2019) 'Teenage neo-Nazis jailed over terror offences' BBC 18th June 2019
Accessed: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-48672929?fbclid=IwAR1aOgpq7al8sO0FKUzus3otEt9pbzLt-Qpwh6kzpzpfuaMGirEWlOa3povQ>

and 'race traitors', while Harry and Meghan have been directed with death threats and accusations of 'destroying British identity'.⁵⁵

Lastly, in August, the former foreign secretary Boris Johnson published a column in The Sunday Telegraph offering his views on a recent ban on face veils in Denmark. Although he rejected calls for a similar ban in the UK, he wrote that he would feel 'fully entitled' to ask women to remove face coverings when talking to him at his MP surgery, and that schools and universities should be able to take the same approach if somebody comes in 'looking like a bank robber'.

'If you say that it is weird and bullying to expect women to cover their faces, then I totally agree - and I would add that I can find no scriptural authority for the practice in the Koran... I would go further and say that it is absolutely ridiculous that people should choose to go around looking like letter boxes.'

The column quickly attracted huge attention, both from outraged Muslims and non-Muslims, and those who supported the right for Mr Johnson to publish such language.

When journalists questioned Mr Johnson on the dehumanising nature of his comparison of women who wear a face veil (niqab) to 'letterboxes', he claimed he was simply talking in the language that the public wanted to hear, forgetting that Muslim women themselves are part of that public and will be affected by his choice of words.

Tell MAMA has continued to document how Muslim women endure the highest levels of anti-Muslim hatred. We have documented in our Interim Report 2018: Gendered anti-Muslim Hatred and Islamophobia that at a street level women remain the number one victim of anti-Muslim hatred, re-affirming previous findings over the years, that anti-Muslim hate or Islamophobia at a street level is also male on female abuse in addition to anti-Muslim hatred and bigotry. Many commentators have focused on violence towards Muslim women, and this trend represents an important intersection of misogyny and racism. Moreover, such narratives often take Muslim women as culturally alien and utterly voiceless further renders them easy targets. To refer to women as objects is a common tenet of sexism and, combined with the double-vulnerability of being visibly Muslim, such comments target one of the most vulnerable groups in the UK.

In addition, other MPs supported Mr Johnson's comments by insisting that language should not be inhibited for fear of offence, echoing the latter's belief in appealing to the public. This underlines a distressing willingness of some MPs to stir anti-Muslim sentiments because they regard it as a vote-winner.

⁵⁵ Elgot, Jessica (2018) 'UKIP leader urged to quit over girlfriend's 'racist' Meghan Markle remarks' The Guardian, 14th January 2018.
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jan/14/ukip-leader-henry-bolton-girlfriend-jo-marney-suspended-meghan-merkle>

Although many were outraged at these comments, Boris Johnson faced no punitive action from the Conservative party, and many high-profile figures offered their support for his rights to freely speak about Islamic clothing. Some will feel emboldened by the lack of sufficient castigation from the Conservative party towards Mr Johnson and will use it as a pretext to act on their underlying prejudices and racist views. The consequent rise in anti-Muslim attacks focusing on the same victims, and using the same language, shows us that when those with anti-Muslim sentiments feel confident and validated.

5.4 CONCLUSION

In previous years, major debates which occupy social and broadcast media, and the accompanying words and actions of high-profile people, have had considerable knock-on effects in facilitating anti-Muslim attacks and Islamophobia.

Existing literature has conceptualised hate incidents and crimes as ‘micro-manifestations’ of existing national and international relations, connected to and exacerbated by high-profile events and associated discussions.^{56 57} This report will outline the specific ways this impacts Muslims in Britain.

Over the course of 2018, we have identified trends which demonstrate a link between the motives behind hate crime and the politically charged debates at the time. The ‘big questions’ of the day have informed the broader culture of Islamophobia which manifests in acts of anti-Muslim hatred, whereby those harbouring anti-Muslim views may be motivated to act upon them. When politicians, public figures, campaigners, and celebrities are either exposed as privately holding prejudiced sentiments, or proudly and publicly express anti-Muslim hatred, members of the public feel more confident in expressing similar ideas. This report will expand on these ideas and assess the language which influences anti-Muslim attacks.

Where previously we have focused our reports on identity and tolerance (2016), case outcomes (2017), and intersecting prejudices (2018), this report will consider the reflections of political rhetoric and high-profile debates on hate crimes enacted against Muslims, and the ways in which these discussions have inspired and normalised anti-Muslim hatred.

⁵⁶ Curtice, J. (2016) ‘Brexit: behind the Referendum’, in Political Insight 7, no.2 2016 pp. 4-7.

⁵⁷ Mills, C., Freilich, J., Chermak, S. (2015) ‘Extreme Hatred: Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationships to Determine Whether They Are ‘Close Cousins’ or Distant Relatives’, in Crime and Delinquency 2015

6 METHODOLOGY

Tell MAMA is primarily a service for victim support. When we receive a report of anti-Muslim hatred, our caseworkers follow up with the victim and log the case details in our database. Our caseworkers complete a database entry for every reported case and verify all information with the person reporting the incident. Our research team then use these to analyse trends, monitor news coverage, and create reports.

Alongside the quantitative analysis, most of this report is based on a qualitative thematic analysis of case notes including reports from members of the public, referrals from third-party organisations, and occasionally news articles. The case notes of the incidents reported to us during the year were analysed by our research team and used to form this academic study.

There are, however, methodological issues associated with the use of reports or incident data. For one, many incidents go unreported for a variety of reasons, for fear of speaking out, lacking knowledge of support services such as Tell MAMA, or mistrust of public services such as police forces.

Furthermore, we categorise cases by specific categories, such as location, incident type, victim and perpetrator characteristics, key words, and more. However, the availability of some information depends on what the source can disclose, and whether the victims have consented to this information being included in our reports. While this produces some gaps in our data, we work to protect victims and their confidentiality.

It is crucial to the fight against anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia that priority is given to the views and voices of Muslims. Within our analysis, we rely heavily on the testimony of victims or witnesses. All eyewitness testimony is based on the perspective of the person reporting to our service and is redacted where necessary to protect their identities. Our focus, however, is on supporting our service users, making their voice heard, and using first-hand accounts of their experiences to show how low-level prejudice and racism affects their daily lives, ultimately, with the aim of preventing anti-Muslim hatred.

Notes on our categories

How we categorise incidents has altered slightly since Tell MAMA was founded. We review our database criteria regularly and make changes responding to trends in the reports received. For example, toward the latter half of 2017, we introduced a separate category for ‘hate speech’, where previously these incidents would have fallen more broadly within ‘abusive behaviour’ or ‘anti-Muslim literature’. This gives us greater capacity to analyse and compare trends in Islamophobia. The details of our place and incident categories for this reporting period are detailed below.

Definitions of Street-Based (Offline) Anti-Muslim Place Categories

- ‘Public Area’ – An incident that occurs in public, pedestrianised areas, including town centres, parks, or shopping areas.

- ‘Transport Networks’ – An incident that occurs on public transport networks, including railways, buses, coaches, trams, the London Underground and stations more generally.
- ‘Place of Business’ – An incident that occurs in a shop, restaurant or other privately-owned business where the victim does not work.
- ‘Household or Private Property’ – An incident that occurs in or around the victim’s or another person’s domestic dwelling.
- ‘Place of Work’ – An incident that occurs in the victim’s workplace, including public spaces if the victim is a taxi driver or police officer, for example.
- ‘Educational Institution’ – An incident that occurs within a college, school or university that the victim attends.
- ‘Road or Highway’ – An incident involving one or more vehicles on a roadway or car park.
- ‘Muslim Institutions’ – An incident targeting an Islamic institution such as a mosque, cemetery, cultural centre or Islamic school.
- ‘Public Institution’ – An incident that occurs within a public building, such as a job-centre or council office where the victim does not work.
- ‘Hospital’ – An incident that occurs in health service buildings including hospitals, GP surgeries or health clinics.

Clarifications

Tell MAMA has often used “street-based” to refer more broadly to all offline incidents. While this short-hand is useful for observing trends between offline and online spheres, it is important to note that not all “street-based” incidents occur on roads and pavements, but in the multiplicity of places listed above. Furthermore, the place category is chosen based upon the place of work which may also refer to another category, e.g. hospital or educational institution, we record this as a place of work. Incidents occurring in airports, ports, and stations are recorded as transport networks.

Definitions of Street-based (offline) Anti-Muslim Incident Categories

- ‘Abusive Behaviour’ – Verbal and non-verbal abuse including comments or gestures targeting an individual due to their perceived Muslim identity or beliefs.
- ‘Assault’ – A physical attack ranging from unwanted touching, spitting, or throwing objects, to a violent assault against an individual due to their perceived Muslim identity. This has been named as ‘Physical Attack’ in previous reports.
- ‘Threatening Behaviour’ – Direct and indirect threats of physical violence motivated by anti-Muslim prejudice.
- ‘Discrimination’ – Denial of access or unfair treatment in a wide range of settings due to a perception of Muslim identity or beliefs.
- ‘Vandalism’ – Damage or desecration of property motivated by anti-Muslim prejudice which includes anti-Muslim graffiti, damage to property, or the dumping of pork products or alcohol.

- ‘Anti-Muslim Literature’ – Written or visual anti-Muslim content including letters, leaflets, memes or posters publicly displayed or distributed to individuals online or offline.
- ‘Hate Speech’ – Verbal communication delivered to an audience with the purpose of stirring up anti-Muslim prejudice.

Anti-Muslim attacks often include multiple types of abuse. Most commonly, a victim may experience verbal abusive behaviour accompanying threatening behaviour and/or a physical attack (recorded as ‘assault’). In cases involving multiple types of abuse, we would categorise the incident based on the most prominent or most serious component of the attack according to the victim’s testimony. For example, a case reported to us in 2018 involved a supermarket staff member who refused to serve a Muslim woman in a headscarf (hijab), saying ‘F**k you, go away’ before hitting the victim with the till drawer. The staff member then said, ‘Go back to your country, go back to where you came from’. This incident involves discrimination, abusive behaviour, and assault, and so was classified, by the most severe action, as an assault. Although we categorise incidents according to the most serious act by the perpetrator, for the incidents involving a variety of types of abuse we also record the more detailed, ‘specific actions’ faced by victims, such as ‘unfair treatment’, ‘injury’, and ‘damage to property’. Incidents may involve several of these specific actions.

In total, in 2018 over 2000 people contacted Tell MAMA with concerns or anxieties around anti-Muslim prejudice, inquiries on safety measures, or seeking advice. Many of these involved reports of anti-Muslim incidents.

In 2018, Tell MAMA recorded 1,282 incidents, of which, 1,072 were verified. To be ‘verified’, we assess the motivations and nature of the incident, we then verify that the incident took place in the UK, and then check the date of the incident compared with when it was reported, thus some of those reported to us in 2018 occurred in 2017 and are excluded from this analysis. Similarly, some incidents occurring in 2018 may be reported to us in 2019. As a result, the data in this report may differ slightly from previous data published by Tell MAMA.

While the nature of hate crime reporting leaves some details omitted, we do our best to acquire an accurate picture of the timescale of anti-Muslim incidents. The next sections provide a more detailed summary along with our thematic evaluation of these cases.


7 STREET-BASED (OFFLINE) ANTI-MUSLIM INCIDENTS REPORTED TO TELL MAMA IN 2018

7.1 SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

The number of incidents reported to us in 2018 was 1282 and the number of verified reports is 1072. A significant majority of the verified incidents occurred offline (N=745), with the remaining cases occurring online (N=327). In total, in 2018 over 2000 people contacted Tell MAMA with concerns or anxieties around anti-Muslim prejudice, inquiries on safety measures, or seeking advice.

This section of the report will summarise and evaluate Tell MAMA's data from verified offline anti-Muslim incidents between January 1st and December 31st 2018. We will highlight key trends over the 12 months, comparatively discuss this year's findings with previous years, and look closely at statistics regarding victims and perpetrators.

7.1.1 Anti-Muslim Incidents and Locations



Broad trends can be observed in the incident and place categories recorded in 2018.

Abusive behaviour was the most common category (N=400). This can take many forms, defined as 'verbal and non-verbal abuse including comments or gestures' and distinguishable from assault (unwanted physical contact, including pushing and spitting) and threatening behaviour (verbal or symbolic threats of violent behaviour). For example, a case of abusive behaviour reported to us involved a woman repeatedly shouting 'P*** b*****d' at a two-year-old child in a school


playground, then directing verbal abuse and threats toward their mother.

The second most common incident was assault (N=98), which includes a broad range of actions, such as, from being 'shoved' on a bus or train to being chased and physically

attacked. A common instance of assault involves spitting, for example, one perpetrator chased after a Muslim woman and spat on her clothes and headscarf (hijab).

Discrimination was the third most common incident in 2018 (N=87), followed by anti-Muslim literature (N=58), vandalism (N=43), threatening behaviour (N=41), and hate speech (N=18). Although occupying a smaller proportion of our dataset, threatening behaviour can be difficult to challenge, and it can have severe psychological effects on victims. For example, a Muslim family had threatening letters put through their letterbox with statements such as 'We want Muslims out of our community'. This came alongside pork products being left outside their house. In such cases where the perpetrator is unknown, feelings of fear and anxiety are heightened, and criminal justice outcomes are difficult to pursue.

Most commonly, anti-Muslim attacks in 2018 took place in public areas (N=209). This includes high instances of attacks on streets and pavements, either perpetrated by passers-by or people driving past. Other public areas include parks, high streets or shopping areas, and beaches. The proportion and number of incidents in public areas fell between 2017 and 2018. Where previously we recorded 282 incidents, this reporting period demonstrated a 26% reduction in anti-Muslim attacks in public areas since 2017.



However, incidents which took place within, or targeted the victim's household or private property, increased by 11% (N=101 to N=113) rising from 12% of the total incidents in 2017 to 15% in 2018. This may in part be explained by the distribution of Punish a Muslim Day letters which triggered a spike in anti-Muslim literature sent to Muslim households. Many of these cases involve conflict with neighbours and often include ongoing 'low-level' harassment, such as abusive comments, social exclusion, or repeated inconveniences such as parking in front of driveways, emptying bins in front of the victim's house, or playing loud music late at night. These instances regularly escalate to more serious incidents of vandalism, threats, or physical violence. Experiencing abuse in and around their home can have serious


physical and psychological implications for victims as they are often unable to avoid their perpetrators. Victims of incidents at home have felt ‘scared to leave the house’, ‘unwelcome’, and ‘angry’.

Incidents occurring at the victim’s place of work have risen by 8% (N=74 to 80) since the previous year. However, within educational institutions, the number of incidents has fallen slightly from 53 in 2017 to 50 in 2018, although the proportion of the total reports comprised 7% each year.

A total of 37 incidents targeted Muslim institutions. These include attacks on mosques, Islamic schools, and Islamic cultural centres, and often take the form of vandalism, threatening letters, or symbolic attacks using pork products or alcohol. The number of incidents has fallen since 2017 (N=54), while the percentage of the total annual incidents fell by 1%. Similarly, 73 incidents occurred within a place of business, this fell from 77 in the previous year but occupies roughly the same proportion of the total reports (9% in 2017, 10% in 2018). Lastly, anti-Muslim attacks which took place in a transport network – including stations, platforms, trains, and buses – totalled at 86 incidents and comprised 13% of the verified street-based (offline) reports. The percentage equals that of the previous year, although the total number has fallen by 24% (N=107 in 2017).


Roads or highways became the only category which reduced both in numbers (N=40 from 58) and, albeit slightly, in the percentage of the total incidents – from 7% in 2017 to 5% in 2018.

Lastly, 18 incidents took place in public institutions, 13 in hospitals or other health centres, and 26 occurred in locations which were unknown or did not fit within our categories. In 2017, Tell MAMA recorded 17 incidents in public institutions, and 10 in hospitals.



The overall trends in place categories are roughly consistent with previous years.

Analysing both location and incident categories can further help us to evaluate the typologies and motivations behind Islamophobic hate crimes. The most common type of incident took place in a public area and falls under abusive behaviour (N=131), followed by abusive behaviour within a transport network (N=59), and household or private property (N=52). A full breakdown of the distribution of incidents by incident and place category can be seen here.




There is often very little oversight from authority figures within busy public settings. The relative anonymity individuals possess within these types of busy social spaces may strengthen the desire to act on feelings of anger and frustration relating to a situation, the nature of which is then fuelled by existing prejudices. The physical and psychological impact of experiencing abuse in public spaces from strangers can be significant regardless of whether the abuse is physical or verbal. As discussed in our previous reports, victims of anti-Muslim abuse will often report a consequent self-isolation and reduction in public activity to reduce the chance that they will experience further abuse.⁵⁸

Similarly, particularly on roads or highways, transport networks, and places of business, anti-Muslim incidents can arise out of situational conflicts – such as traffic disputes, leading to the surfacing of underlying prejudices. In a similar way, those harbouring anti-Muslim views may rarely interact with Muslim individuals, then, for instance, in public areas, or in hospitals, transport networks, or public institutions, they encounter the people around whom their negative sentiments are based. As a result, their anti-Muslim sentiments emerge in targeted attacks.

⁵⁸ Tell MAMA (2018) 'Beyond the Incident: Outcomes for Victims of Anti-Muslim Prejudice, 2017 Annual Report'

7.1.2 Shifting Patterns of Hate Crime

A comparative look at previous years exposes new trends in anti-Muslim hate crime. In 2016 there were 642 verified offline incidents, and in 2017 there were 839. In 2018 we verified 745 reports of offline anti-Muslim attacks. Looking closer at the patterns in incident categories shows interesting variations between reporting periods. The table below further demonstrates these changes.



In 2017, 52% (N=441) of incidents were marked as abusive behaviour, while 18% (N=149) were physical attack/assault. In 2018, 54% (N=400) were abusive behaviour while 13% (N=98) were categorised as assault. Similarly, instances of threatening behaviour have fallen by 28% (N=57 in 2017 to N=41 in 2018).

While we are relieved to see that incidents of abusive behaviour, threatening behaviour, and assault have reduced, both the rates and proportions of discrimination (N=72 in 2017, N=87 in 2018), hate speech (N=11 in 2017, N=18 in 2018),⁵⁹ and anti-Muslim literature (N=28 in 2017 and N=58 in 2018) have increased. This indicates that 2017 involved higher instances of face-to-face violent and abusive behaviour; however, in 2018, there has been significant growth in the proportion of incidents in the more in-direct categories of discrimination, hate speech, and anti-Muslim literature. Therefore, these categories demand new approaches and our focused attention.

7.1.2.1 Discrimination

The rise in reports of discrimination is a trend Tell MAMA has observed since 2015. The following figures demonstrate a clear rise in the raw numbers of discrimination cases, as well as the percentage of the total reports. Previously, verified reports of discrimination increased by 111.76% in just two years, with 34 verified reports of discrimination in 2015 rising to 72

⁵⁹ It is important to note that we introduced the category for hate speech part-way through 2017, however, this was introduced because our researchers felt that the distinction was becoming important.

reports in 2017. The rates of discrimination continue to grow. In 2018 we recorded a total of 87 verified cases which makes up 12.5% of the total number of incidents, whereas, in 2017 discrimination cases amounted to 8.5% of the total (N=839).

Some instances of discrimination also involve abusive behaviour or assault and would, therefore, be categorised differently. By looking at the specific actions involved in each case, many cases within the victim's place of work or educational institution involved discriminatory or unfair treatment (N=83 in 130). Within the 50 incidents taking place in an educational institution, 18 were categorised as discrimination and 24 as abusive behaviour. Within the specific actions involved, 29 incidents included discriminatory or unfair treatment. Similarly, of the 80 incidents which occurred in the victim's place of work, 37 were categorised as abusive behaviour, and 27 as discrimination. However, 49 incidents involved discriminatory or unfair treatment.

Of the reports categorised as discrimination (N=84), 27 occurred in the victim's place of work. These often involved a series of 'small' incidents, such as not inviting Muslim colleagues to Christmas parties, jokes about Muslims, or comments about terrorism. However, these cases also manifested in incidents such as sneaking bacon into a colleague's lunchbox, stealing Islamic books or clothing, or posting anti-Muslim content online.

In cases of unfair treatment, Muslim employees reported that they were being treated differently to their non-Muslim colleagues. A long-standing case which began in 2017 ended with a black Muslim man taking his employer to a tribunal over racist and anti-Muslim treatment within a 'relentlessly intimidating and hostile working environment'.⁶⁰ In a further example of unfair treatment, a disabled Muslim teacher was refused permission to pray on Fridays, despite offering to take a pay cut for the time spent praying. After handing his notice in as a result of this, he found staff had falsely cited his disability as his reason for leaving.

We received a report of an anti-Muslim incident involving a group chat with the victim's colleagues, including their managers, which contained repeated instances of anti-Muslim language, abusive language, threats, and sexual harassment, such as 'f***ing immigrants', 'postbox', 'terrorist', 'I'll rip her headscarf off', and 'f***ing c**nts, lot of them'.

Similarly, victims of anti-Muslim incidents carried out by customers or members of the public have reported their workplace appealing to the perpetrator rather than supporting the victim. Many victims of work-place discrimination have expressed fears of losing their job or harming their career. Victims of discrimination have felt 'distraught', 'disgusted', 'frustrated', 'isolated', and 'miserable', and have struggled to sleep, find fulfilling work, and regain their confidence.

Within educational institutions, 18 cases of discrimination were reported to Tell MAMA. Discrimination can manifest in anti-Muslim abuse toward school pupils by staff or teachers,

⁶⁰ Deeks, Steve (2018) 'IT worker takes Havant and South Downs College to employment tribunal over racial discrimination and unfair dismissal' The News Portsmouth, 1st November 2018
Accessed: <https://www.portsmouth.co.uk/news/business/it-worker-takes-havant-and-south-downs-college-to-employment-tribunal-over-racial-discrimination-and-unfair-dismissal-1-8689845>

for example, when a Muslim school-boy asked not to be in a class photo, the teacher said 'why, do you have something to hide? You look suspicious.' The teacher later asked if he has an explosive device on him. Similarly, parents and pupils have approached Tell MAMA with concerns that their children had been unfairly referred to safeguarding or Prevent programs, leaving both child and parent with lingering anxieties and detachments from the school.

Adults have also faced anti-Muslim hatred from educational institutions or practitioners. A heavily pregnant Muslim woman was told to stop 'acting like a terrorist sympathiser' by her driving instructor, after requesting to move the geographic location of the lesson due to having previously experienced racism in the area. Rather than accepting the request, the teacher shouted comments on the 'lack' of Muslim integration, suggesting that 'her kind' were lucky to live in the UK, and that she ought to do more to condemn terrorism and 'take on more British values'. He went on to blame her for his Islamophobic rant, insisting that she had 'riled' him up.

Others reported anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia within school policies or felt that schools were not taking complaints of anti-Muslim bullying seriously. For example, a parent lodged a complaint after a school pupil posted 'whenever a bomb goes off it's a Muslim' on social media. The school apologised to the parent but did not follow up with the pupil to discuss the matter. Similarly, Muslim young people faced anti-Muslim incidents from other students within their school or university, for example, a young Muslim girl faced on-going bullying which involved attempts to pull off her headscarf. Her parents approached Tell MAMA after feeling the response from the school was denying the bullying and attempting to 'gloss over' the issue.

Furthermore, several cases involved Muslim parents experiencing abusive behaviour from other parents, for example, after their two children had a minor argument at playgroup, a Muslim woman was threatened by another parent who said 'We don't like people like you' and threatened to 'sort you out'. In a separate but similar case, a Muslim mother was called 'scum' and told to 'go back to Sudan' outside her child's school. Another Muslim parent and her children were shouted at by a fellow parent who, amidst aggressive behaviour and abusive insults, said 'you should be ashamed of your religion'. The mother reported this incident because the children were witnesses, and it made them incredibly upset.

Of the cases involving university staff and students, some have involved abusive behaviour, while others comprise unfair treatment. For example, whilst on campus, a man approached a group of Muslim women and shouted, 'Take that off, you're not British, go back to where you came from'. In an example of unfair treatment, a Muslim student reported that after choosing to research Islam for his dissertation, his tutor privately told other students that he intended to fail the victim, which he did.

Pupils and parents who have faced anti-Muslim incidents within their educational institutions can become disengaged with school life and educational achievements fall. Some pupils felt they needed to change schools, while others took significant time off, putting their studies on hold. Both pupils and parents may experience isolation, anxiety, and a lack of self-confidence.

Like all victims of anti-Muslim discrimination, the effects can be long-lasting, damaging, and far-reaching.

7.1.2.2 Hate Speech

We identify hate speech as that which speaks to an audience and seeks to encourage anti-Muslim hate or spread harmful information about Muslims. Due to the nature of the definition, most examples of hate speech took place in public areas (N=13) or public institutions (N=2). This category was the most recent addition to the incident categories, therefore, for now, we lack sufficient data to compare the rates of hate speech with previous years.

These incidents often involved public speeches or protests. For example, Gareth Bennett AM, leader of UKIP in the Welsh Assembly, publicly commented on face veiling practices (niqabs and burqas), saying 'I think it is part of an alien culture' and 'apparitions of pre-medieval culture'. The former foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, said women wearing these garments look like 'letterboxes' and 'bank robbers' in his column. Such instances count as hate speech, as they are not direct incidents of targeted verbal abuse, but they comprise broader attacks on Muslims, their religious expression, and their daily lives.

7.1.2.3 Anti-Muslim Literature

We verified 51 reports of anti-Muslim literature in 2018. These incidents are targeted attacks via written or printed means, distributed to, or with the intent to cause fear or harm toward individuals and institutions. Such incidents often take the form of letters, most notably in the



Punish a Muslim Day attacks in spring 2018 which were sparked by anti-Muslim literature sent to numerous Muslim households. In total, 23 were sent to households, 12 to Muslim institutions, and 11 to the victim's place of work. We received 5 reports of anti-Muslim literature found in public areas, most commonly streets and parks, which took the form of stickers and posters. Two different stickers from a neo-Nazi group were reported to us. The first read 'We will have our country back', and the second, reported to us a



week later, read 'STOP BUILDING MOSQUES IN BRITAIN'. Another of these stickers was seen by a local Labour councillor, who spoke out against anti-Muslim literature in his ward.

7.1.3 Geographies

The following map depicts the levels of anti-Muslim hate crime reported to Tell MAMA across Britain. The highest numbers were recorded by Tell MAMA within Greater

Stickers photographed on 19/12/2018 and 07/12/2018.

London (N=244), and the second highest were in Greater Manchester (N=61), West Midlands (N=52), South Yorkshire (N=46), and West Yorkshire (N=34). This map shows the


levels of anti-Muslim hate crime across the UK. Due to the nature of our database, the regions are divided according to police force borders, but roughly follow county boundaries.

The geographical locations of anti-Muslim incidents in 2018 show higher frequencies in big cities and urban areas with larger, more prominent Muslim communities. As discussed in our 2015 report, *The Geography of Anti-Muslim Hatred*, there are regional factors to consider when analysing hate crime trends. Most importantly, issues relating to areas of higher population density or high levels of deprivation across the UK greatly affect the potential for social mobility, cultural cohesion, and general happiness and satisfaction. The geographical variations may also be impacted by local policing along with public awareness of Tell MAMA in those locations.


Top 6 UK Cities with Highest Number of Incidents Reported to Tell MAMA 2018



A Map of London Boroughs with Highest Number of Anti-Muslim Incidents Reported to Tell MAMA 2018




A Map of Greater Manchester with Highest Number of Anti-Muslim Incidents Reported to Tell MAMA 2018




7.1.4 Sources

The sources of reports were most often victims themselves (N=530), while a much smaller number of reports were made by witnesses (N=56) or relatives (N=34). Alternative sources included other third-party organisations (N=22), news reports, some sent to Tell MAMA by members of the public (N=87), and police force referrals (N=3). The likelihood of victims to report on their own behalf varies between incident categories. Incidents such as anti-Muslim literature or hate speech, which more often target Islam or Muslims in general, rather than individuals, are reported less by victims. A distinct trend can be seen in parents or other relatives reporting the 'most severe' categories, assault, abusive behaviour, and discrimination, on behalf of their children or relatives.




Discrimination, abusive behaviour, and threatening behaviour are most often reported to us by the victim. This may be due to these cases often requiring the types of support services offered by Tell MAMA. Furthermore, victims of 'more severe' cases such as assault may instead turn to the emergency services, while victims of 'less violent' incidents, such as hate speech and anti-Muslim literature, may not feel so motivated to report them or seek help.



* Incidents reported to the police by Tell MAMA were done so with the victim's prior consent.

7.1.5 Case Outcomes: Police Reporting

Tell MAMA works with various police forces across the UK. When the report includes actions which involve criminal activity, and if the victim would like to pursue police investigation and charges, our caseworkers help them to do so. Tell MAMA caseworkers also challenge, when necessary, decisions to prematurely close cases, and have successfully worked with victims to re-open cases. The proportion of incidents reported to the police vary by the type of incident. The following graph displays the trends for the known reports (N=295), as the details for over half the cases (N=450 out of 745) are unknown or undisclosed.




The highest percentage of incidents reported to the police within each category came under the category of abusive behaviour at 49%, followed up assault at 45% (N=44), threatening behaviour at 34% (N=14), and vandalism at 30% (N=13). Only 24% (N=11) of anti-Muslim literature, 8% (N=7) of discrimination cases, and 0% (N=0) reports of hate speech were followed with police action. Similar trends can be seen in the summary of police data in chapter 9, where fewer instances of discrimination, hate speech, and anti-Muslim literature are reported to and dealt with by the police.

7.2 VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS


In total, we recorded the details of 1244 victims of street-based (offline) attacks, of whom, 721 were female, 453 were male, 62 were an institution or private property, and 8 incidents were non-targeted with no direct victims. 386 are either other, unknown, or left undisclosed for confidentiality.

The victims of anti-Muslim attacks vary between incident categories. In all categories other than anti-Muslim literature and vandalism, the highest proportion of victims were female.



In analysing the ethnic backgrounds of victims, Pakistanis make up the highest proportion (N=307), followed by Bangladeshi (N=113), and Arab Other (N=110). While people from all racial and ethnic backgrounds were victims of anti-Muslim hatred in 2018, including Polish, Caribbean, Somali, and more, those perceived as Pakistani or another Muslim-majority group face particularly racialised versions of anti-Muslim hate, as seen in the prevalence of the word 'P**i' during incidents.


Victims of Anti-Muslim Incidents Reported to Tell MAMA by Race and/or Ethnicity 2018 *



* Our dataset varies according to the descriptions made by the sources themselves. In order to present this in detail, a combination of race, ethnicity, and nationality are included.

Similarly, we have analysed the visibility of victims through expressions of religion. In the process of verifying incidents as anti-Muslim or not, we may deem an un-provoked attack on a visibly Muslim victim as anti-Muslim and/or Islamophobic. We therefore recorded details from 925 victims. From this, we found that 44% of the total victims were wearing a headscarf (hijab) or other veiling practice, not including face covering (N=401), and 6% (N=57) of victims were wearing a face veil (niqab) or other face-covering clothing. Of the 1630 total victims, 37% were known to be visibly Muslim at the time of the incident, while 20% were not identifiably Muslim, and 43% are unknown or undisclosed.

Visibility of Victims of Anti-Muslim Hate Incidents Reported to Tell MAMA 2018



*Hijab – a headscarf covering the head and hair

Abaya – a long, loose garment worn from head/shoulders to toe



Niqab – a veil which covers the head, hair and face

Thobe – a long, loose robe worn primarily by men

Salwar Kameez – a tunic paired with loose trousers


Turban – a fabric wrap covering the head and hair

Meanwhile, the following demonstrates the distinct and disproportionate threat toward visibly Muslim women in Britain.




Approximately half of the victims' ages are either unknown or undisclosed (N=927). The highest proportions of known ages were between 26 to 35 (N=181), 36 to 45 (N=165), and 19 to 25 (N=98). More worryingly, the fourth most common age category for victims is 12 and under (N=87).

Lastly, we asked whether victims had previously faced anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia in incidents separate to their report to Tell MAMA. Of those who answered the question, 119 said yes, they had faced anti-Muslim incidents before, and 89 said no, leaving 1422 unknown.




Perpetrators

We recorded the details of 1196 perpetrators, of whom, 482 were male, 181 were female, and 533 were other or unknown. A high proportion of known perpetrators were white, British males (N=238).



Although 566 perpetrators' ages were unknown, the largest known category was 36 to 45 (N=128), closely followed by 26 to 35 (N=117) and 46 to 55 (N=117).



On average, perpetrators were older than victims. The median known age of perpetrators was higher than victims, falling into the 36 to 45 age category, compared with the median known age of victims being between 26 to 35. There were also fewer perpetrators within the most vulnerable age categories – 15 perpetrators were 12 and younger, compared with 87 victims. However, within other youth categories, the numbers of victims and perpetrators were very consistent. In the category of 13 to 18-year-olds, we recorded 76 perpetrators

and 81 victims, and within 19 to 25-year-olds we recorded 80 perpetrators and 98 victims.

7.3 TELL MAMA AND VICTIMS

Tell MAMA has a team of caseworkers and researchers who manage reports of anti-Muslim hatred and assist victims or witnesses accordingly. Some cases have required more long-term support, particularly in incidents of discrimination, or emotional and re-habilitative support following incidents such as assault, threats, or abuse. This section focuses on two cases supported by Tell MAMA in 2018.

7.3.1 Household Discrimination

A report came to us in late 2017 concerning a refugee who was facing and continues to face abusive behaviour from neighbours during their time in housing association accommodation. The victim was also suffering from various mental health problems, including anxiety and PTSD. The incidents included neighbours banging on their door each day while shouting 'w***er' and 'f***ing Muslim' at him. On one occasion, when the victim attempted to leave his flat a group of his neighbours gathered together and began chasing him, he then had to

run back into his flat. Other incidents included the contents of a refuse bin being dropped in front of the victim's door and hot liquid being thrown at the victim.

The victim reported every incident to the police and their housing association, who each failed to respond promptly. When neighbours became aware that they were being reported, they grouped together and began making false allegations against the victim, which resulted in the victim being arrested, charged and eventually taken to court as a suspect.

The effects of this treatment were severe for the victim. For example, the victim used to wear religious clothing but changed his appearance due to the nature of the harassment he was facing. Since the victim first approached us, throughout the trial and the series of incidents, Tell MAMA acted as the victim's emotional support system, where he could call our helpline and talk through the ongoing traumas he was experiencing. An outreach officer operating in the victim's local area was also there to offer out-of-hours support, such as attending meetings with the police and housing association to highlight the extent of the harassment.

One of the specific concerns with the victim was their limited spoken and written English. Tell MAMA advocated on behalf of the victim and provided supporting statements on behalf of the victim to highlight the impact the harassment had on him, and stress how the police were negligent towards any reports he was making. We liaised with the victim's solicitor by submitting such documents to them and provided a reference as to how the victim was feeling daily. This was then forwarded to the court for the judge to take his circumstances into consideration, where our statement stressed how vulnerable the victim was. Tell MAMA's outreach officer also attended to court with the victim as moral support and to ensure that all the information about the proceedings were collected and understood.

The victim was, at last, found not guilty. During the hearing the solicitor advocated the points made by Tell MAMA and put valid challenges towards the abusive neighbours in court, who could not account for the reports they made against the victim. The judge also challenged the police who had arrested the victim, questioning why there were no attempts to listen to the vulnerable victim when he was in distress and wanted to report an incident.

Victims of anti-Muslim hatred often have intersecting vulnerabilities. In this instance, the victim faced heightened isolation and vulnerability due to his being visibly Muslim, a refugee, not having English as a first language, and facing problems with mental health.

Tell MAMA places great importance on ensuring that victims of anti-Muslim hatred have a network of support around them, as the nature of hate crime can exacerbate feelings of isolation and mental and/or physical health problems. We therefore work with different services and organisations to try and cover as many aspects of a case as possible, for example, we may collaborate with other victim support services such as women's charities, LGBT+ organisations, and refugee advocacy groups, depending on the nature of the victim's situation.

7.3.2 Workplace Discrimination

As discussed earlier, Tell MAMA has witnessed verified reports of discrimination increase by 111.76% in just two years, with 34 verified reports of discrimination in 2015, compared to 72

reports in 2017. In 2018 we recorded a total of 87 verified cases. In our 2016 annual report, we warned about the harmful effects of discrimination,

‘Muslims of all ages are at risk of discrimination in educational institutions, in the workplace, and near their homes when accessing public and private services. This goes beyond being passed over for roles, and often consists of ongoing ‘low-level’ abuse and mistreatment met with ignorance from those in authoritative and managerial roles when grievances were raised.’⁶¹

And, our interim report published in November 2018, highlighted,

‘How discriminatory attitudes and practises hinder the career and educational aspirations of Muslims. Institutional and structural forms of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred are insidious and often unspoken forms of prejudice.’⁶²

Therefore, an intersectional analysis of discrimination demonstrates how ethnic and religious penalties for Muslim women hinder them in the workplace.⁶³ Muslim men are also held back in the workplace due to racism, Islamophobia, and anti-Muslim prejudice.⁶⁴

In one verified incident, a Muslim woman working as a barista at a coffee shop described how she would regularly face derogatory remarks from her co-worker. The victim thoroughly enjoyed working and took pride in being independent and able to earn money, but enduring regular abusive remarks moved her to report these incidents to the police, who then referred her to Tell MAMA.

Incidents would include the co-worker shouting and swearing at her when she attempted to complete tasks,

‘How many times do I have to f***ing tell you? You need to put a f***ing bag in the rubbish bin.’

When our service user challenged the tone used towards her, she would be met with criticism of her religious identity. For example, during Ramadan she wanted to break her fast at work, this was met with abrupt and spiteful comments about religious practices and working surrounded by food. Other comments would include,

‘You don’t have to wear a headscarf, your parents force you to wear it...’

‘...you don’t belong here, you guys are from a third world country.’

⁶¹ See: Tell MAMA (2015) Geographies of Anti-Muslim Hatred, Tell MAMA (2017) Beyond the Incident: Outcomes for Victims of Anti-Muslim Prejudice, and Tell MAMA (2018) Gendered Anti-Muslim Hatred and Islamophobia.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ganesh, Bharath, and Iman Abou Atta. (2016) ‘Forgotten Women: The impact of Islamophobia on Muslim women in the United Kingdom.’ European Network Against Racism (ENAR), 2016. https://www.enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/forgotten_women_report_united_kingdom_-_final.pdf.

⁶⁴ Asthana, Anushka. ‘Islamophobia Holding Back UK Muslims in Workplace, Study Finds.’ The Guardian. Last modified June 26, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/sep/07/islamophobia-holding-back-uk-muslims-in-workplace-study-finds>.

At Tell MAMA, we often assess the multiple identities held by victims and how this influences the way in which they are targeted. In this case, the remarks began with unfair criticism at work, and then moved toward harmful comments about the victim's Muslim identity and her appearance. Hence it is important to remember the power dynamic when victims are targeted, particularly in this case where the abusive co-worker was in a senior position to our service user.

When the victim attempted to resolve matters by informally making management aware of what she was facing, she found her employer responding by reducing her hours at work rather than adjusting the working environment to be more inclusive. Subsequently, a workplace grievance was raised by the victim, however, her grievance was not upheld due to lack of witnesses. Tell MAMA supported the victim emotionally through this time, as often victims of workplace discrimination find themselves isolated, especially where incidents take place in a hidden environment. One of the comments made in her grievance outcome even noted how one witness could not 'confirm nor deny' whether she was targeted, which left the victim in a place of confusion.

Our service user felt she had no choice but to leave as she could no longer tolerate the harassment and lack of support she was facing from management. Tell MAMA wrote to the employer to raise her concerns and challenge the outcome that was provided. However, the employer did not acknowledge the harm caused to the victim.

Respectively, the Tell MAMA team has encouraged the victim to seek further guidance from ACAS who have expertise in employment issues. Following this, the victim decided that she would like to take the matter to a tribunal. Given that the victim had learning difficulties, the Tell MAMA team completed the relevant online documents on their behalf and began the process of building a case against her employer.


This matter significantly impacted the victim, as being out of employment meant she could not afford accommodation and other necessities. Her mental health suffered, and she felt humiliated being out of work and having to seek other means for financial support.

Though the case is still ongoing, Tell MAMA has acted as the official liaison between the victim and the other party as the case is awaiting a formal tribunal hearing. Tell MAMA has submitted further supporting statements for the victim's preliminary hearing for them to consider her circumstances (health problems, personal and financial circumstances and learning difficulties) given that some of her information had been sent late. The court was hence very considerate of the victim and extended deadlines for her and wrote out a list of tasks for her to complete, to make the tribunal process easier for her. Tell MAMA also signposted the victim to Victim Support for assistance. This case highlights how Tell MAMA recognises the multiple strands of vulnerability a victim may have and looks to support them however they can.

7.4 SPIKES AND TRIGGERS

A wide variety of events can trigger a spike in anti-Muslim hate crime. Each year, we have observed that during the summer period the rate of reports is higher than during winter

months, and in 2018, the UK experienced its hottest summer in history. Police data has shown that crime rates rise along with the temperature, regarding hate crime, the rise can be explained by higher volumes of people spending time outdoors in public spaces, changes in opportunities for hate crime, and hot weather affecting people's physical and mental wellbeing.⁶⁵




Nonetheless, in March and August we received sudden increases in reports of anti-Muslim hatred, which can be seen in the significant spikes on the 2018 timeline. These spikes are attributed to the 'Punish a Muslim Day' letters in March and the comments made by the former foreign secretary Boris Johnson, concerning Muslim women and Islamic clothing, the details of which will be covered in the next sections.


7.4.1 Letters

A considerable spike occurred in the spring of 2018, reflecting the events surrounding the Punish a Muslim Day letters that were sent to numerous Muslim households and businesses in March. This was followed by the proposed Punish a Muslim Day taking place on the 3rd of April – the birthdate of the avowed white supremacist and terrorist, Dylann Roof, who hoped to trigger a 'race war' in the United States by murdering nine black churchgoers in Charleston, South Carolina, in June 2015. Then, the second wave of letters entitled 'Punish a Muslim Day 2' were received by several Muslim households in late May. In total, Tell MAMA received reports of 37 street-based (offline) incidents which directly referenced the 'Punish a Muslim Day'. The first letter was reported to have been received by 6 people around the UK on the 9th of March. In total, 15 people reported receiving a copy of the same letter. This alone caused significant spikes in our dataset. The following graph displays the frequency of all reports to Tell MAMA in the weeks surrounding these events.

⁶⁵ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44821796>



The original threats combined with the heightened visibility of Muslims at this time still led to a significant spike in anti-Muslim attacks. Nonetheless, it is important to note that when witnesses and bystanders intervene in support of victims, the psychological effects of hate crime and attacks can be much less severe.⁶⁶ The loud and widespread solidarity shown by non-Muslims is a positive step towards tackling anti-Muslim hatred.




⁶⁶ Tell MAMA (2017) 'A Constructed Threat: Identity, Intolerance and the Impact of Anti-Muslim Hatred, Tell MAMA Annual Report 2016' Tell MAMA, November 2017

7.4.2 Words Have Consequences

On the 5th of August, the former foreign secretary Boris Johnson published a column in The Sunday Telegraph, in which he referred to veiled Muslim women as ‘ridiculous’, ‘letterboxes’, and ‘bank robbers’. In the weeks after, Tell MAMA recorded a spike in anti-Muslim incidents towards Muslim women, with a high proportion making direct references to Johnson’s comments.


In the week before Mr Johnson’s comments, Tell MAMA received 8 reports of street-based (offline) anti-Muslim attacks. However, in the week following his article (6th – 13th of August), this jumped up to 38, an increase of 375%. The next week (14th – 21st of August) this totalled at 11, and then 6 (22nd – 29th of August).



Of the 38 anti-Muslim attacks in the first week following Mr Johnson’s column, 22 were directed at visibly Muslim women who wore the face-veil (niqab) or other veiling practices. We recorded a total of 57 incidents in the three weeks that followed the column’s publication, 32 of which were directed at visibly Muslim women. Within the same weeks, 7 incidents targeted Muslims in general (seen below as ‘N/A’), and 13 incidents targeted both male and female victims, often a family or group of friends.

The nature of the incidents varied, with the majority involving verbal abuse. Within this time, 3 reports came from victims or relatives of victims approaching Tell MAMA for advice due to feeling increased fear and anxiety in the aftermath of this discussion, or to report incidents that had occurred prior to Boris Johnson’s comments which reflected the views he outlined.

Anti-Muslim Incident Categories Between 5th - 29th of August Tell MAMA 2018



Between the 5th and 29th of August, 42% (N=24) of the street-based (offline) incidents reported to Tell MAMA directly referenced Boris Johnson and/or the language used in his column. The details of the street-based (offline) incidents can be seen in the following timeline.

Timeline of Incidents Reported to Tell MAMA Between 30th July and 28th August 2018

11th August 2018

A non-Muslim journalist puts on a burqa to see how she is treated in public. She writes that Muslim women who wear niqabs or burqas are lying about facing abusive behaviour.



5th August 2018
Boris Johnson MP has column published in The Daily Telegraph


8th August 2018

Nadine Dorries MP joins the debate, adding that "Mr Johnson should have gone further and called for a ban on niqabs and burqas."



12th August 2018


UKIP's assembly leader Gareth Bennett said that women wearing burqas are "apparitions of pre-medieval culture" and that it is "part of an alien culture".



Key words are recorded for each incident based on the abusive language used, or the nature of the attack. The following shows the frequency of key words across 2018, with the larger words being the most common.



Although we categorise incidents according to the most serious offence, many incidents of anti-Muslim hatred involve a variety of 'offences'. For example, one incident was categorised as assault, but the victim faced verbal abuse, threats, physical attack, and injury. Of a total of 745 street-based (offline) incidents, Tell MAMA recorded 941 'offences'. Most commonly, victims faced verbal abuse on 424 occasions, followed by 160 instances of discrimination or unfair treatment, and 109 of physical attacks.



Verbal forms of abuse most clearly demonstrate the ideas and motivations behind attacks. This year, trends in verbal language have related to terrorism, paedophilia, broader racist and xenophobic language, and ideologically-driven conspiracies of Islam ‘taking over’.

Terrorism


Since 9/11 and the subsequent War on Terror, the conflation of Muslims and terrorism has accelerated. This has motivated a high proportion of anti-Muslim hatred over the past decades, resulting from the belief that Muslims are inter-connected and, therefore, are judged as collectively responsible for the actions of other Muslims.



Sexual Violence

There has also been a steady increase in the use of language related to paedophilia, ‘grooming gangs’, and rape, directed at Muslim individuals in streets or other public places. While such issues are grave and not to be undermined, harmful stereotypes have emerged in

targeted attacks on Muslim individuals. These stereotypes reflect the imbalanced prevalence of stories in the media which focus on Muslim instances of crime and abuse, and, as discussed in the literature review, are based on and re-enforce a fear of Muslims as threatening to the rest of British culture.




Hatred of Foreigners

Anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia is always enacted under intersecting vulnerabilities such as race, gender, class, and sexuality, and verbal abuse therefore can often contain language that is racist, sexist, classist, and/or homophobic. Implicit in xenophobic themes are notions of Britishness, belonging, and integration. The following quotes highlight the varied intersections of racism and xenophobia toward foreigners in the UK which were uttered during targeted attacks on Muslim individuals.




Blame, Competition, and Scape-Goating

Racism and xenophobia commonly manifest in a feeling of competitiveness with other races, communities, or cultures. The origins of the so-called 'Great Replacement Theory', which has underpinned several waves of xenophobia, are discussed in detail in section 6.6. In the street-based (offline) incidents, verbal abuse directed toward Muslims have referenced money, jobs, homes, and other socio-economic problems in Britain. The following quotes contain implications of competition and blame towards Muslim individuals.



Attacks on Islam

There is a significant trend in abusive behaviour which contains verbal or symbolic attacks on Islam as a religion. This can manifest in attacks on visibly Muslim people, and the verbal abuse reported to us has displayed negative language toward mosques, the Prophet Mohammed, and the Qur'an, or/and insults relating to Islamic clothing and practices.



Although blasphemy, or speaking ill of religious tenets and figures, is not treated as a hate crime, deliberate provocative attacks on religious doctrine, or the prophet Mohammed and Allah (God) can have significant effects and feel like personal attacks.⁶⁷⁶⁸ Verified incidents of anti-Muslim hatred which constitute attacks on Islam as well as Muslim victims are those deemed to be deliberately insulting and offensive for the purposes of harming the victim. The following comments came within instances of anti-Muslim verbal abuse, or alongside physical attacks, damage to property, or threatening behaviour.



⁶⁷ Mahmood, Saba (2009) 'Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?' in Critical Inquiry 35, pp. 836-62

⁶⁸ March, Andrew F. (2011) 'Speaking about Muhammed, Speaking for Muslims' in Critical Inquiry 37, pp. 806-821

Similar comments which specifically targeted Islam as a religion, while alone they would not be counted as an anti-Muslim incident or hate crime, when reported in a combination of abusive behaviour, vandalism, discrimination, and so on, when targeted at Muslim groups, individuals, or institutions, this is treated as an anti-Muslim incident.* For example, remarks such as the following may be used to establish whether a random attack may have anti-Muslim motivations.




Similar themes can be seen in comments made about Islamic clothes and veiling practices. Throughout the year, we have recorded high rates of attacks targeting Muslim women who are wearing Islamic clothing. The following quotes were made during incidents of abusive behaviour, threatening behaviour, discrimination, and vandalism.



Concerns over punishment and retribution

Lastly, many of the attacks and incidents demonstrate the perpetrator's confidence and their sense of immunity to any punishment. This may be symbolically expressed, for example, in the high rates of incidents taking place in areas with high concentrations of witnesses, or overtly stated during attacks.



7.6 CONCLUSION

Following the EU referendum result on 13th of June 2016, the UK saw a 475% rise in attacks against Muslims, as religiously and racially aggravated hate crime rose by 41% in the month following the referendum result.^{69 7071} This showed a worrying development whereby those with Islamophobic, racist, and xenophobic sentiments felt bolstered and motivated by seeing others express anti-Muslim views. The post-referendum spike demonstrated the potential for a rise in anti-Muslim attacks directly resulting from anti-Muslim and anti-migrant rhetoric in the media, politics, and public discourse.

The trigger events documented in our 2017 report⁷² were largely acts of terrorism committed by groups associated with Islam, prompting a subsequent ‘backlash’ in attacks on Muslims. For instance, there was a 700% increase in anti-Muslim attacks recorded in the week following the Manchester Arena terror attack on 22nd of May 2017.

‘In 2017, there was a surge in race or faith hate crime reports following several devastating terror attacks in London and Manchester but not after Finsbury Park, according to provisional data from the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC). [This] revealed a clear rise in reports following the terror attacks in Westminster Bridge (22 March), Manchester (22 May) and London Bridge (3 June).’⁷³

In 2018, we have seen a resurgence of this. Spikes in anti-Muslim hatred are happening in the aftermath of high-profile attacks on Muslims.

Where before, anti-Muslim attacks could be explained (although not justified) as a ‘backlash’ fuelled by perceptions of ‘us vs. them’, ‘Britain vs. Islam’, now we are seeing attacks inspired and influenced by other anti-Muslim attacks.

The year of 2018 has brought more complex headlines, the issues are more nuanced, and debates and discussions on Islam and Muslims have consistently accelerated.

This reporting period has seen a rise in verified reports of discrimination, hate speech, and anti-Muslim literature. While we are relieved to see that incidents of abusive behaviour, threatening behaviour, and assault have reduced in numbers, since 2017 discrimination (N=72 in 2017, N=87 in 2018), hate speech (N=11 in 2017, N=18 in 2018), and anti-Muslim literature (N=28 in 2017 and N=58 in 2018) have risen.

We are, therefore, presented with new challenges in combatting anti-Muslim hatred.

⁶⁹ Ibid. pp.6

⁷⁰ BBC News. ‘Race Hate Crimes Up 41% After EU Vote.’ BBC News. Last modified October 13, 2016. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37640982>

⁷¹ Home Office Statistical Bulletin (2017) ‘Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2015 to 2016’ Home Office. Crown Copyright

<https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2015-to-2016>

⁷² Tell MAMA (2018) ‘Beyond the Incident: Outcomes for Victims of Anti-Muslim Prejudice, 2017 Annual Report’ pp.11-12

⁷³ Ibid. pp.11-12

These cases are much more difficult to tackle and overcome. Firstly, they tend not to be in breach of any laws, therefore, pursuing criminal justice outcomes may not be possible. Secondly, for the same reasons, alongside such incidents being perceived as ‘less severe’, victims are less motivated to report the attacks and pursue further action. Structural or institutional forms of anti-Muslim prejudice and Islamophobia can make positive outcomes harder to achieve if management, or those in positions of authority, participate or tacitly encourage harassment or bullying by failing to address complaints or viewing those who raise grievances as troublemakers. Similarly, the nature of these incidents often leaves the perpetrator unknown, as the incident may not be face-to-face. Lastly, hate speech and anti-Muslim literature often comprise language targeting Islam in general, without specific victims.

Tell MAMA centres the voices of its Muslim service users. For that reason, where the language or actions intend to cause fear, alarm, anxiety, and so on, to a Muslim group, institution, or individual, we will challenge the incident and the motivations behind it. We strongly advise that the feelings of the victims be centred when asking ‘is this anti-Muslim or Islamophobic?’.

In similar trends to the post-Brexit spike in attacks, Tell MAMA has observed an increase in high-profile instances of anti-Muslim hatred motivating further attacks. When Muslim households, businesses, and individuals began receiving the letters advertising ‘Punish a Muslim Day’ there was an increase in reports from victims who had received the letter as well as a rise in other forms of anti-Muslim attacks attributed to the messages sent in the letters. More plainly, the sharp spike in attacks targeted at Muslim women which occurred in the days following former foreign secretary Boris Johnson and other MP’s comments about Muslim women shows the connection between rhetoric of politicians, and how this manifests on the street in targeted attacks on Muslims and other minorities. The thematic nature and language of the attacks were quite plainly inspired and guided by the original comments, shown by the immediate rise in the use of ‘letterbox’, ‘post box’, ‘tents’ and the otherwise direct targeting of Muslim women.

These events have shown that those with anti-Muslim sympathies have increasingly felt emboldened by the electoral successes of other far-right and Islamophobic efforts. Members of the public feel increasingly confident when they witness high-profile figures bravely displaying anti-Muslim hatred and then facing no punishment. And, in the aftermath, perpetrators of anti-Muslim attacks have been outwardly confident, motivated, and do not fear repercussions.⁷⁴

In the street-based (offline) and online examples from 2018 we have highlighted significant trends and spikes attributed to anti-Muslim language and literature directly motivating face-to-face incidents or inspiring people to act upon their prejudices. Seemingly minor instances of offensive or disparaging language often respond to wider, structural trends in Islamophobia. The data recorded by Tell MAMA demonstrates the manifestations of broader anti-Muslim and Islamophobic trends, tropes, and stereotypes. Each incident is connected in upholding cyclical hatred.

⁷⁴ See chapter 5.5.1 in this report.

8 UNDERSTANDING ANTI-MUSLIM ATTACKS ONLINE

8.1 METHODOLOGY

This year's dataset includes 327 verified reports, down 10% from the 2017 figure of 362 verified reports. A clear majority of reported abuse occurred either on Twitter (n=175) or Facebook (n=92), with a small minority having occurred on YouTube (n=8). The 'Other' category (n=52) includes communications sent over email or posted on internet forums.

Verified Online incidents by Online Platform

As with the previous dataset, we categorised 51% online cases as hate speech (n=168) and 29% as abusive behaviour (n=96). Threats accounted for 4% (N=12) reports, while anti-Muslim literature remains present in 15% of cases (n=50).

The raw number of online reports to Tell MAMA in the 2018 reporting cycle was 409, which, after controlling for methodological considerations, drops to 327 reports.

Tell MAMA verified over 50 verified reports in the months of April and August, mirroring the trends found in the offline world, concerning how ideologically-motivated individuals felt emboldened by the terroristic threats of the so-called 'Punish a Muslim Day', and the comments of the former foreign secretary, Boris Johnson, in The Telegraph newspaper.

One explanation for these temporary spikes (covered further in this section) concerns the nature of polarisation – which can manifest in individual or group-based thinking and relate to the 'disinhibition effect' as outlined by Suler (2004),⁷⁵ where views expressed online are exaggerated forms of language individuals are perhaps unlikely to act on a street-level (offline).

Tell MAMA observed a small decline in verified online reports when compared to the previous reporting cycle (of around 10%, n=362), but represents a 5% rise on the 2016 reporting cycle. A drop, however, should be recognised in how Tell MAMA continues to evolve its methodologies when investigating reports of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim abuse online.

More than two-thirds of verified online reports to Tell MAMA came from Twitter (n=175, 53.5%) and Facebook (n=92, 28%). A smaller number of reports (n=52, 16%), occurred on alternative social media platforms, message boards, and newspaper comment sections. Reports sent to Tell MAMA concerning content on the video-sharing platform YouTube remains low (n=8, 2.5%), which may reflect a lack of awareness from members of the public when flagging racist and hateful content on the platform.

In a departure from previous Tell MAMA annual reports, the decision to include a category for hate speech makes thematic sense in 2018, given the focus on the consequence of hateful, harmful, and dehumanising forms of language directed towards Muslims, about Muslims, or about their faith as reported to Tell MAMA throughout that reporting cycle. As

⁷⁵ Suler, John. 'The online disinhibition effect.' *Cyberpsychology & behavior* 7, no. 3 (2004): 321-326.

this section intends to demonstrate, extreme forms of dehumanising language transcend the categorisation of abusive behaviour. And, given the weight of history and the mistreatment of Muslim minorities in China and Burma (Myanmar) where demagogues and politicians had created the conditions for discrimination and group-based violence, it, therefore, remains imperative from a moral standpoint, to offer a different way of understanding how the language of anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia can and does echo such dark sentiments. This shift in methodologies comes at a time when social media platforms like Twitter have taken steps (though not without criticism) in addressing the harmful nature of hate speech on its platform. We hope that our findings continue to influence discussions on this matter and create a counterweight against the normalisation of this rhetoric.

In October 2018, Twitter revised its hateful conduct policy, stating: 'We prohibit targeting individuals with repeated slurs, tropes or other content that intends to dehumanise, degrade or reinforce negative or harmful stereotypes about a protected category'.⁷⁶ Twitter gave an example of where 'animalistic dehumanising speech' had called for the removal of a religious group, referring to the group as maggots. A further example includes the 'targeted misgendering or deadnaming of transgender individuals'.⁷⁷ David Livingstone Smith, professor of philosophy at the University of New England, and director of the Human Nature Project argued in Aeon Magazine, that: 'Dehumanisers do not think of their victims as subhuman in some merely metaphorical or analogical sense. They think of them as actually subhuman'.⁷⁸ This line of thinking, he added: 'Although separated by centuries, these two mindsets – the colonial and the Nazi – are astonishingly similar. Both claim that the human appearance of certain groups belies their true nature'.⁷⁹ Article 19, a human rights organisation, criticised Twitter's policy revision, arguing that dehumanising language risks falling under the broad umbrella term of hate speech, and, therefore, for Twitter to remain compliant with other fundamental rights, including lawful expression, Twitter must demarcate between prohibited forms of hate speech, hate speech that may require limiting, and legal acts of speech. The latter, however, they argue, requires a critical response, given the obvious concerns about discrimination and intolerance.⁸⁰

Furthermore, dehumanising language does, after all, help to engineer the conditions for group-based violence. In Rwanda, for example, the media played a vital function in dehumanising the Tutsi minority as *inyenzi* (cockroaches).⁸¹ As Kennedy Ndahiro, a journalist for The New Times newspaper in Rwanda wrote in 2014: 'No longer were the *inyenzi* a threat

⁷⁶ Twitter. 'Hateful Conduct Policy.' Twitter Help Center. Last modified July 9, 2019. <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy>.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Smith, Prof David Livingstone. 'The essence of evil.' Aeon. Last modified October 24, 2014. <https://aeon.co/essays/why-is-it-so-easy-to-dehumanise-a-victim-of-violence>.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Maogoto, Jackson Nyamuya. 'The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.' ACCORD. Last modified June 25, 2003. <https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/the-international-criminal-tribunal-for-rwanda/>.

from the outside, but the ‘cockroaches’ were everywhere. No one was innocent, the men and women were spies and the children, if not killed, would grow up to be spies’.⁸²

An independent fact-finding mission to Burma (Myanmar) last year observed the ongoing campaign of hate and dehumanisation against the Rohingya minority.⁸³ The 21-page briefing highlighted how dehumanising and stigmatising language against the Rohingya, and Muslims more broadly, has for years been a tool of Buddhist extremists to ‘protect race and religion’.⁸⁴ This language, though somewhat less overt, is mirrored in mainstream politics. Narratives around terrorism, birth rates, and illegal immigration mirror anti-Muslim and Islamophobic tropes that permeate the UK, Europe, and North America.⁸⁵ Moreover, the members of the mission were struck by how deeply ingrained dehumanising and exclusionary rhetoric about the Rohingya was in Burmese society, which was incubated by the military.⁸⁶

Revisions to Twitter’s hateful conduct policy also extend to the use of imagery: from hateful symbols to images that dehumanise individuals or groups to have animalistic features, and imagery associated with genocides or mass violence targeted at those with a protected characteristic. But consistent with previous reports, this section will give examples of where Twitter did and did not remove such content, but again, we caution against further extrapolation when it comes to reports made before this policy revision. In one high-profile example of the policy revision in practice, the far-right agitator Laura Loomer was banned for an anti-Muslim and Islamophobic tweet which accused the Democratic Representative Ilhan Omar of practising a misogynistic and homophobic faith, adding that Omar was ‘anti-Jewish’.⁸⁷

As with previous reports, a clear majority of content reported to Tell MAMA from Facebook would fall under the category of hate speech as outlined in their Community Standards. YouTube does not permit hate speech on its platform, be it against individuals or groups where protected characteristics like race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or caste are some of the examples listed.⁸⁸ YouTube, however, may allow content which is for educational purposes, including documentaries about hate groups. Nor will YouTube always ban account holders. In some notable examples, the video-sharing platform has placed greater restrictions on accounts. Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) was not banned from YouTube but was unable to live stream videos, gain view counts or see likes or

⁸² Ndahiro, Kennedy. ‘Dehumanisation: How Tutsis Were Reduced to Cockroaches, Snakes to Be Killed.’ The New Times. Last modified March 13, 2014. <https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/73836>.

⁸³ OHCHR. ‘Report of Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar (August 2018).’ Last modified August 27, 2018. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/myanmarFFM/Pages/ReportoftheMyanmarFFM.aspx>.

⁸⁴ OHCHR. ‘Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar.’ OHCHR. Last modified September 21, 2018. <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/274/54/PDF/G1827454.pdf>.

⁸⁵ Ibid. 14.

⁸⁶ Ibid. 15.

⁸⁷ Givetash, Linda. ‘Twitter Bans Far-right Activist Laura Loomer.’ NBC News. Last modified November 22, 2018. <https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/laura-loomer-banned-twitter-after-criticizing-ilhan-omar-n939256>.

⁸⁸ YouTube. ‘Hate Speech Policy.’ Google Help. Accessed August 1, 2019. <https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2801939?hl=en-GB>.

comments.⁸⁹ Other restrictions make his content almost undiscoverable on the platform, as users have to click direct links for each video.⁹⁰ In June 2019, YouTube announced that it would ban content which glorified Nazi ideology and promoted Holocaust denial,⁹¹ but history teachers uploading educational materials to warn against the dangers of genocidal fascism, had their content removed.⁹² Furthermore, Tell MAMA is a trusted flagger with the above platforms, which helps bring content which is hateful to their attention at a level higher than the average user. Therefore, we are in a stronger position to highlight the varieties of online hatred directed towards Muslim that fall into the category of hateful conduct.

8.2 ANTI-MUSLIM ATTACKS ONLINE

There is a worrying, common theme to this section: that Islamophobia and anti-Muslim racism, prejudice, and bigotry harms Muslims irrespective of political influence, role in public life, or, as individuals who use social media for everyday matters. Generalised forms of hateful speech serve to dehumanise Muslims by linking them broadly to criminality, sexual violence, and terrorism, by those who apply this maximalist thinking to Islam.

This section will offer examples of how such forms of language, when directed towards the Prophet Muhammad, are intended to cause deep upset and harm to Muslims, given that many seek to emulate his teachings in daily life.

The mainstreaming of such language and tropes carry a deeper risk: that it has the potential to undermine and narrow how we view and interpret the fundamental right of religious practice – from the right to wear religious clothing, the right to speak openly about your beliefs and to partake in religious worship. Many European states have passed legislation to curtail such freedoms when it comes to the face veil,⁹³ imposing arbitrary fines for Muslim women, and in France, has had real, tangible impacts on their economic and employment prospects.⁹⁴ The United Nations Human Rights Committee called on France to compensate two Muslim women who were fined for wearing the face veil (niqab) in public and stated that ‘French law disproportionately harmed the petitioners’ right to manifest their religious beliefs,’ adding that the government had not made sufficient arguments for such

⁸⁹ Di Stefano, Mark. ‘YouTube Is Placing Sweeping New Restrictions On Tommy Robinson’s Channel ? But It’s Not Banning Him.’ BuzzFeed. Last modified April 2, 2019. <https://www.buzzfeed.com/markdistefano/youtube-sweeping-new-restrictions-tommy-robinson>.

⁹⁰ Di Stefano, Mark. ‘YouTube Is Placing Sweeping New Restrictions On Tommy Robinson’s Channel ? But It’s Not Banning Him.’ BuzzFeed. Last modified April 2, 2019. <https://www.buzzfeed.com/markdistefano/youtube-sweeping-new-restrictions-tommy-robinson>.

⁹¹ Waterson, Jim. ‘YouTube Bans Videos Promoting Nazi Ideology.’ The Guardian. Last modified June 5, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jun/05/youtube-bans-videos-promoting-nazi-ideology>.

⁹² Waterson, Jim. ‘YouTube Blocks History Teachers Uploading Archive Videos of Hitler.’ The Guardian. Last modified June 6, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jun/06/youtube-blocks-history-teachers-uploading-archive-videos-of-hitler>.

⁹³ BBC News. ‘The Islamic Veil Across Europe.’ BBC News. Last modified May 31, 2018. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13038095>.

⁹⁴ Zerouala, Faiza. ‘Headscarf Ban Turns France’s Muslim Women Towards Homeworking.’ The Guardian. Last modified February 21, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/03/france-muslim-women-home-working>.

restrictions.⁹⁵ The banning of the headscarf (hijab) for Muslim children in Austria, for example, is another affront to this fundamental right as it singles out Muslims, as no other faith symbol was banned. The bill passed thanks to the support of the governing centre-right People's Party (ÖVP) and the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ).⁹⁶ Tell MAMA has continued to caution against the mainstreaming of far-right talking points in mainstream political and social life. The importance of politicians moderating their language was echoed recently by the Home Secretary Sajid Javid who went on to condemn 'naked populism' in politics.⁹⁷ Freedom of expression is another fundamental right which comes with the added responsibility to not harm the dignity of others or promote hatred, discrimination, or violence.

Politicians of Muslim background and belief were subjected to racist abuse or targeted in the terroristic self-styled 'Punish A Muslim Day' campaign. But in an example of bad faith and partisan politics, Sajid Javid was accused by those on the right and left, of falsifying the 'Punish A Muslim Day' letter sent to his office. In other examples, partisan, pro-Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) blogs smeared prominent Muslim public figures, as we documented several worrying ways in which London's first Muslim mayor, Sadiq Khan, has been subjected to abuse and indirect threats from the far-right, which began online before shifting into an street-based (offline) campaign. The Labour MSP Anas Sarwar described how Labour councillor Davie McLachlan had said to him: 'Scotland wouldn't vote for a brown Muslim P*ki' which the councillor had denied making. Sarwar would later describe Labour's complaints process as 'not fit for purpose' after a panel cleared Cllr McLachlan of any wrongdoing.⁹⁸ Sarwar has since launched the first ever inquiry into Islamophobia and anti-Muslim prejudice in Scotland. Even Muslims with no public platform were targeted, including Police Scotland's first Muslim officer to wear the headscarf (hijab), who subjected to a torrent of hateful and racialised tweets. She did, however, receive an outpouring of support following the abuse.⁹⁹

8.3 CLASSIFYING HATE SPEECH ONLINE

In a departure from previous annual reports, caseworkers and researchers now code online incidents for hate speech, a category which had, in previous reports, focused solely on acts of speech in the offline world. Expanding the category to online cases allows caseworkers and researchers to better understand the varieties and nature of anti-Muslim speech online. In previous reports, the top-category for online cases were disproportionately Abusive Behaviour, with 84% and 80% of cases falling under this category in 2016 and 2017. But to

⁹⁵ Rob Picheta, CNN. 'France's Niqab Ban Violates Human Rights, UN Committee Says.' CNN. Last modified October 23, 2018. <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/23/europe/france-niqab-ban-un-intl/index.html>.

⁹⁶ Deutsche Welle. 'Austria Bans Muslim Headscarf in Primary Schools.' Deutsche Welle. Accessed July 19, 2019. <https://www.dw.com/en/austria-bans-muslim-headscarf-in-primary-schools/a-48756057>.

⁹⁷ BBC News. 'Javid Warns of 'naked Populism' in US.' BBC News. Last modified July 19, 2019. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-49041014>.

⁹⁸ BBC News. 'Sarwar Slams Labour Complaints Process.' BBC News. Last modified April 30, 2019. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-48105247>.

⁹⁹ Marshall, Chris. 'Police Scotland's First Hijab-wearing Officer Targeted by Racist Trolls.' The Scotsman. Last modified May 22, 2018. <https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/police-scotland-s-first-hijab-wearing-officer-targeted-by-racist-trolls-1-4743322>.

better understand this methodological change, however, requires a deeper understanding of what hate speech is, and, most importantly, how it functions. Hate speech has no fixed definition but serves to spread hatred on characteristics like race, faith, and ethnic origin.¹⁰⁰ Others contend that hate speech, which is grounded in and tethered to the promotion of negative stereotypes about minority groups,¹⁰¹ can cause harm to the groups it targets to further hateful ideologies.¹⁰² Judith Butler has argued that injurious and hateful language interpolates leaves individuals interpolated, which causes them to be demeaned and derogated.¹⁰³ Critics of Butler's analysis, however, argue that she fails to address the structural influences in society and the context in which hate speech arises, and, by suggesting that because social contexts continue to shift, therefore, from Butler's perspective, hate speech lacks the authoritative power of political speech to cause harm and injury.¹⁰⁴ Matsuda's (1989) seminal text, articulates how different strains of racism – from individual acts to institutional or political forms of racism, serve to reinforce 'conditions of domination' since less 'egregious' forms of racism morph into more serious forms.¹⁰⁵ Whereas, Delgado (1982), argues that racist language, for example, helps to impart and normalise discriminatory practices and behaviours, which, not only damages the self-regard and personhood of those affected but, if left unchecked, colour public institutions, harming future generations.¹⁰⁶ This process and feeling of stigma which derives from the prejudicial attitudes in wider society can make adapting to a culture sphere which differs from a person's heritage that much harder.¹⁰⁷ Studies have found that a sense of belonging, welded to a geographic location,¹⁰⁸ faith,¹⁰⁹ or ethnic identity can help reduce the essentialising impact the stigma of othering presents. There have been positive examples of how social media has reduced stigma (notably around mental health awareness),¹¹⁰ but, as previous research from Tell MAMA found, the impacts of online anti-Muslim hate resulted in Muslim

¹⁰⁰ Rosenfeld, Michel. 'Hate speech in constitutional jurisprudence: a comparative analysis.' *Cardozo L. Rev.* 24 (2002): 1523.

¹⁰¹ Warner, William, and Julia Hirschberg. 'Detecting hate speech on the world wide web.' In *Proceedings of the second workshop on language in social media*, pp. 19-26. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2012.

¹⁰² Jacobs, James B., and Kimberly Potter. *Hate crimes: Criminal law & identity politics*. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1998.

¹⁰³ Butler, Judith. *Excitable speech: A politics of the performative*. Routledge, 2013.

¹⁰⁴ Schwartzman, Lisa H. 'Hate speech, illocution, and social context: a critique of Judith Butler.' *Journal of Social Philosophy* 33, no. 3 (2002): pp. 4428-4431.

¹⁰⁵ Matsuda, Mari J. 'Public response to racist speech: Considering the victim's story.' In *Words that wound*, pp. 17-51. Routledge, 2018.

¹⁰⁶ Delgado, Richard. 'Words that wound: A tort action for racial insults, epithets, and name-calling.' *Harv. CR-CLL Rev.* 17 (1982): 133.

¹⁰⁷ Kunst, Jonas R., David L. Sam, and Pål Ulleberg. 'Perceived Islamophobia: Scale development and validation.' *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 37, no. 2 (2013): pp.225-237.

¹⁰⁸ Howarth, Caroline. 'Race as stigma: Positioning the stigmatized as agents, not objects.' *Journal of community & applied social psychology* 16, no. 6 (2006): 442-451.

¹⁰⁹ Verkuyten, Maykel, and Ali Aslan Yildiz. 'National (dis) identification and ethnic and religious identity: A study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims.' *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 33, no. 10 (2007): pp.1449.

¹¹⁰ Betton, Victoria, Rohan Borschmann, Mary Docherty, Stephen Coleman, Mark Brown, and Claire Henderson. 'The role of social media in reducing stigma and discrimination.' *The British Journal of Psychiatry* 206, no. 6 (2015): 443-444.

women altering their identity to appear ‘less’ Muslim in public spaces.¹¹¹ According to Katherine Gelber (2012), hate speech ‘would ordinarily act to deter or perhaps even prevent a targeted person or community or their supporters from responding to the hate speech with (unsupported) counterspeech.’¹¹² Academics have questioned the effectiveness of counter-messaging on social media¹¹³ as others favour account bans to limit the reach of far-right extremists.¹¹⁴

It would, therefore, be improper to categorise examples of speech which call for mass violence, the forced removal of Muslims, the denial of fundamental rights, to be classified as abusive behaviour, as with previous Tell MAMA annual reports. This not an argument for legal reform either given the breadth of legal powers available.¹¹⁵ As the examples below demonstrate, one such example called for the internment of Muslims in camps, mirroring the state-sanctioned targeting of the Uighur Muslim-minority in China.

Another example reported to Tell MAMA read: ‘Muslims are quite simply vermin who believe in a vile faith, Islam. Kick them ALL out.’ Twitter removed this dehumanising tweet after Tell MAMA flagged it.

A racist Facebook report was reported to Tell MAMA which began, ‘Fucking p*ki c*nts cooking curry this time of night for eid’. The user added that they hoped the family would leave the gas stove on, resulting in an explosion, and suggested that the family were also building bombs.

Other examples come from accounts which demonstrated overt support (or sympathy towards) far-right ideologies, where the dehumanising language included the terms ‘muzzie’ and ‘musrat (muzrat)’. Examples of such language include statements like ‘I love the videos when you punch f*ck out of Muzzies and scum like this’ and ‘Enough is enough time to fight fire with fire they want to play without rules fine let’s dance back to sh*tholeistan & the dark ages you go muzrat’.

¹¹¹ Awan, Imran, and Irene Zempi. ‘We fear for our lives: Offline and online experiences of anti-Muslim hostility.’ (2015).


¹¹² Gelber, Katharine. ‘Reconceptualizing counterspeech in hate-speech policy (with a focus on Australia).’ Chapter. In *The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses*, edited by Michael Herz and Peter Molnar, 198–216. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

¹¹³ Davey, Jacob, Jonathan Birdwell, and Rebecca Skellett. ‘Counter Conversations: A Model for Direct Engagement with Individuals Showing Signs of Radicalization Online.’ (2018).

¹¹⁴ Ganesh, Bharath. ‘The Ungovernability of Digital Hate Culture.’ *Journal of International Affairs* 71, no. 2 (2018): 30-49. Available at: <https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/ungovernability-digital-hate-culture>.

¹¹⁵ For example, publishing written material intending to stir up racial hatred is a s19 offence of the Public Order Act 1986, sending a grossly offensive message contrary to s127 of the Communications Act 2003, or an offence contrary to s1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988. Or, the use of threatening words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening, if he intends thereby to stir up religious hatred, is a s29B offence of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006.

8.4 EXAMPLES OF HATE SPEECH VERIFIED BY TELL MAMA IN 2018



8.5 THE RISE OF ISLAMOPHOBIC 'INFLUENCERS' AND HYPERPARTISAN 'NEWS' ONLINE

Conspiracy theories about Muslims and Islam were ever-present in this data set. The function of such thinking in a clear majority of comments and online posts were indicative of far-right proclivities or broader forms of nativist hate speech. For example, where accessible, accounts which had avatars for far-right political movements and groups, helped caseworkers to identify one such marker of ideological belief. But as our previous reports have outlined: decentralised movements present a fluidity for members to have their fears, social values, and political ideologies reinforced.¹¹⁶ Ideology, is, after all, a ritualistic act that requires

¹¹⁶ Perry, Barbara, and Patrik Olsson. 'Cyberhate: the globalization of hate.' Information & Communications Technology Law 18, no. 2 (2009): pp.185-199.

constant creation and verification in social life – otherwise, it dies, even if it appears, on the surface, to be embodied in shareable forms.¹¹⁷ The growth of hyperpartisan alternative news platforms, saturated in pro-Tommy Robinson content, gained notable attention in 2018 and 2019, creating a bivouac of ideological content, which, according to investigation in Politico generates more interactions on Facebook than traditional media outlets.¹¹⁸ One website named in the Politico is the unassumingly-named PoliticalUK.co.uk, which has quietly removed its pro-Tommy Robinson content, which was at its most saturated during the ‘#FreeTommy’ campaign¹¹⁹. The official Twitter account of PoliticalUK, however, has not removed its pro-Tommy tweets, which linked readers to the now removed content. For example, on May 28, 2018, @PoliticalNewsUK tweeted ‘The Home Secretary could be in big trouble if anything happens to Tommy’ using the hashtags ‘#FreeTommy’ and ‘#IamTommy’.¹²⁰ The tweet linked users to a now-removed article headlined, ‘Lord warns home secretary that he could face ‘prosecution’ over Tommy Robinson arrest treatment’.¹²¹ Days later, on June 1, the account tweeted ‘Oh Tommy Tommy’¹²² and linked users to an article (since deleted) headlined, ‘Tommy Robinson sends important message to supporters’.¹²³ The website published a racialised attack on the Shadow Home Secretary Diane Abbott which carried the incendiary headline, ‘Diane Abbott wants to BAN WHITE CANDIDATES from standing in certain elections’.¹²⁴ The reality, however, was different, as Abbott spoke of the need to consider all-black shortlists since women-only shortlists had not sufficiently addressed the dearth of women of colour candidates in the Labour Party.¹²⁵ This attack on Diane Abbott echoed the rhetoric of the neo-fascist British National Party.¹²⁶ Research from Amnesty International found that Diane Abbott received almost half the

¹¹⁷ Fields, Karen E., and Barbara Jeanne Fields. *Racecraft: The soul of inequality in American life*. Verso Trade, 2014. 137.

¹¹⁸ McTague, Tom. ‘How Britain Grapples with Nationalist Dark Web.’ POLITICO. Last modified April 18, 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/britain-nationalist-dark-web-populism-tommy-robinson/>.

¹¹⁹ Townsend, Mark. ‘#FreeTommy? the Making of a Far-right English ‘martyr?’ The Guardian. Last modified September 14, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jul/29/tommy-robinson-far-right-resurgence-steve-bannon-us-support>.

¹²⁰ PoliticalUKNews. Twitter Post. May 27, 2017, 4:12 pm. Available at: <https://twitter.com/PoliticalUKNews/status/1000756655183757313> (retrieved 01/07/2019).

¹²¹ ‘LORD WARNS HOME SECRETARY THAT HE COULD FACE ‘PROSECUTION’ OVER TOMMY ROBINSON ARREST TREATMENT.’ Political UK. Accessed July 3, 2019. <https://politicaluk.com/2018/05/lord-warns-home-secretary-that-he-could-face-prosecution-over-tommy-robinson-arrest-treatment/>.

¹²² PoliticalUKNews. Twitter Post. June 1, 2018, 3:55 pm. Available at: <https://twitter.com/PoliticalUKNews/status/1002564174789120001> (retrieved 01/07/2019).

¹²³ ‘Tommy Robinson sends important message to supporters.’ Political UK. Accessed July 3, 2019. <https://politicaluk.com/2018/06/tommy-robinson-sends-important-message-to-supporters/>.

¹²⁴ ‘Diane Abbott wants to BAN WHITE CANDIDATES from standing in certain elections.’ Political UK | UK Political News. Accessed July 3, 2019. <https://politicaluk.com/2018/06/diane-abbott-wants-to-ban-white-candidates-from-standing-in-certain-elections/>.

¹²⁵ Waterson, Jim. ‘Diane Abbott Says All-Women Shortlists Haven’t Helped Black Women.’ BuzzFeed. Last modified September 24, 2017. https://www.buzzfeed.com/jimwaterson/diane-abbott-wants-all-black-shortlists-for-labour?utm_term=.gqX8j7WY7#.npp8QB7xB.

¹²⁶ ‘Diane Abbott ? Ban White People from Standing As MPs.’ British National Party. Last modified October 1, 2017. <https://web.archive.org/web/20190703141350/https://bnp.org.uk/diane-abbott-ban-white-people-standing-mps/>.

abusive tweets sent to all female MPs in the build-up to the 2017 General Election,¹²⁷ is a demonstrative example of how misogynoir is disseminated online, which, according to Bailey (2016), is the merger of 'anti-Black racism and misogyny in popular media and culture that targets Black trans and cis women'.¹²⁸

Amnesty International, however, was criticised for failing to account for the misogynistic and antisemitic abuse directed at Labour MPs like Ruth Smeeth and Luciana Berger.¹²⁹

Another hyperpartisan website identified for its pro-Tommy Robinson and anti-Muslim content by Politico was Politicalite.com, which, according to BuzzFeed News, was banned from Facebook for breaching its policies on hate speech.¹³⁰ Its biggest viral success was an article which plagiarised a Daily Mirror investigation into child sexual exploitation.¹³¹ The article, which first appeared online in March 2018, was headlined, '1,000 girls raped, beaten and some even KILLED in UK's 'worst ever' Muslim grooming scandal' (which was later amended to remove the word Muslim but not from the URL text).¹³² The pro-Tommy nature of the website was more apparent on social media, as between March and October 2018, the official Politicalite Twitter account had used the '#FreeTommy' hashtag almost forty times.¹³³

As mentioned earlier in the report, hate speech and abusive content targets Muslims at all political and social levels, regardless of how large or small their social media presence is.

Another far-right provocateur given a favourable amount of coverage on Politicalite is James Goddard - who became notorious for his viral stunts where he has harassed the author and political commentator Owen Jones, pro-EU activist Femi Oluwole, and Anna Soubry MP.¹³⁴ The social media activity of James Goddard appeared in several verified reports to Tell MAMA in 2018, including comments made on Twitter, and anti-Muslim remarks made in live-streamed videos. One such example included a clip of Goddard debasing the traditional

¹²⁷ Elgot, Jessica. 'Diane Abbott More Abused Than Any Other Female MP During Election.' The Guardian. Last modified November 20, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/05/diane-abbott-more-abused-than-any-other-mps-during-election>.

¹²⁸ Bailey, Moya. 'Misogynoir in Medical Media: On Caster Semenya and R. Kelly.' Catalyst: Feminism, theory, technoscience 2, no. 2 (2016).

¹²⁹ Harpin, Lee. 'Amnesty International Criticised for Not Including Antisemitism in Landmark Abuse Report.' The Jewish Chronicle. Last modified December 18, 2018. <https://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/amnesty-international-criticised-for-not-including-antisemitism-in-report-on-online-abuse-1.474093>.

¹³⁰ Di Stefano, Mark. 'A Hyperpartisan Pro-Tommy Robinson News Website Has Been Permanently Banned From Facebook.' BuzzFeed. Last modified May 2, 2019. <https://www.buzzfeed.com/markdistefano/politicalite-tommy-robinson-facebook>.

¹³¹ Di Stefano, Mark. 'This European News Channel Didn't Realise It Was Helping Fund A Pro-Tommy Robinson Website.' BuzzFeed. Last modified November 30, 2018. <https://www.buzzfeed.com/markdistefano/euronews-right-wing-website-videos>.

¹³² James, Jordan. '1,000 Girls Raped, Beaten and Some Even KILLED in UK's 'worst Ever' Muslim Grooming Scandal.' Politicalite. Last modified May 1, 2018. <https://web.archive.org/web/20180503100755/https://www.politicalite.com/corbyn/labour/labours-watch-1000-girls-raped-beaten-killed-britains-worst-ever-muslim-grooming-scandal/>.

¹³³ This figure is based on internal research of the @politicalite account using Twitter's Advanced search function.

¹³⁴ Townsend, Mark. 'Police Probe Far-right 'yellow Vest' Group That Intimidated Anna Soubry.' The Guardian. Last modified December 23, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/dec/23/police-probe-far-right-yellow-vest-group-anna-soubry>.

greeting of peace and blessings be upon him (Sallallahu 'alayhi wasallam) to insult the Prophet Muhammad with offensive language that referenced bodily fluids instead. Why this is so offensive to Muslims concerns how the epithet is used to denote respect and honour towards a holy person or prophet in Islam, and also appears as the initialism PBUH.¹³⁵ To understand why such language is so hurtful to Muslims, in particular, is to understand that Muslims believe that Muhammad was God's final messenger who gradually revealed the religion of Islam, who, in his lifetime, was an administrator, commander-in-chief, a teacher, and prayer leader for the burgeoning Muslim community. Therefore, ordinary Muslims view him as a model of God's grace and salvation, and the greatest and highest of role models as many strive to emulate his teachings in their daily lives.¹³⁶

In early 2019, Tell MAMA revealed that Goddard had used Facebook and the alternative social media platform Gab, described as a 'haven for the far-right', argued for the banning of Islam in the west, and the 'mass repatriation' of Muslims.¹³⁷ Goddard had also used the term 'globalist' which some have argued has antisemitic connotations. Furthermore, a tweet uncovered by Tell MAMA from James Goddard's account revealed his use of the term 'Cultural Marxism', which academics have argued, derives from, 'American thinkers, most of them white nationalists, to explain the rise of political correctness and anti-racist beliefs as well as the advent of multiculturalism'.¹³⁸ Others have documented how neo-fascist groups like the British National Party used such language and ideas.¹³⁹

Writing in the Huff Post UK, Danny Stone, argued: 'In truth, cultural Marxism' has become a tainted phrase and at worst, feeds the Trumpist tendency to rail against 'the other' through a conspiracy theory tainted by antisemitism'.¹⁴⁰ Anders Breivik, the Norwegian far-right terrorist, responsible for the murder of 77 social democrats, was a firm believer in this conspiracy theory.¹⁴¹¹⁴²

¹³⁵ 'Sala Allah Alayhi wa-Salaam.' In *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam.*, edited by John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2067> (accessed 04-Jul-2019).

¹³⁶ 'Muhammad.' In *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam.*, edited by John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1577> (accessed 12-Jul-2019).

¹³⁷ Tell MAMA. 'James Goddard: Far-right Protester Called for Islam to Be Banned and for 'mass Repatriation'.' TELL MAMA. Last modified January 9, 2019. <https://tellmamauk.org/james-goddard-far-right-protester-called-for-islam-to-be-banned-and-for-mass-repatriation/>.

¹³⁸ Beirich, Heidi. 'Hate across the waters: The role of American extremists in fostering an international white consciousness.' *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse* (2013): 89-102. Available at: <https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/book/right-wing-populism-in-europe-politics-and-discourse/ch6-hate-across-the-waters>.

¹³⁹ Richardson, John E. "'Cultural Marxism' and the British National Party: A transnational discourse.' In *Cultures of Post-War British Fascism*, pp. 202-226. Routledge, 2015.

¹⁴⁰ Stone, Danny. 'Politicians Who Use Anti-Semitic Phrases Like 'Cultural Marxism' Have A Duty To Explain Why.' HuffPost UK. Last modified March 29, 2019. https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/cultural-marxism-suella-braverman_uk_5c9e0d26e4b0474c08cd18cf.

¹⁴¹ Wilson, Jason. "'Cultural Marxism': a Uniting Theory for Rightwingers Who Love to Play the Victim | Jason Wilson.' *The Guardian*. Last modified March 13, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/19/cultural-marxism-a-uniting-theory-for-rightwingers-who-love-to-play-the-victim>.

¹⁴² Archer, Toby. 'Breivik's Mindset: The Counterjihad and the New Transatlantic Anti-Muslim Right.' *Extreme Right-Wing Political Violence and Terrorism* (2013): 169-86.

Goddard is one of several far-right agitators who have rebranded themselves as self-styled Islamophobic ‘influencers’ and citizen or gonzo ‘journalists’ on social media, until almost all major platforms, including PayPal, banned him. James Goddard retains his YouTube account and uses the messaging app Telegram to reach just over two-thousand subscribers. Goddard uploaded his first YouTube video in January 2018, gaining 432 views, but now boasts more than 11,000 active subscribers, and of the 114 videos uploaded, he has gained 803k views, according to TubeBuddy analytics, an official YouTube partner. Crowdfunding is crucial to their online campaigning, which, due to the low cost of and proliferation of various social media platforms, increases their audience potential to further their ideological aims. It is within this careful rebranding where some seek to portray themselves as radical or alternative journalists, when they invert the traditional function of journalism, to sow bigotry, racism, hatred, which has the potential to incite or promote violence. Goddard and others have arguably tapped into what some academics describe as ‘entrepreneurial populism’, which, exists in a paradox: where a person running in opposition to the establishment, does not need to be trustworthy, or even demonstrate a strong moral core, due to the apparent ‘corruption’ of their political opposition, and, therefore, gains a measure of trust and support.¹⁴³

The term ‘fake news’ became the synecdoche to explain the hyperpartisan distrust of traditional media and journalism, something Trump was able to tap into before and after his electoral success in November 2016 (though trust in mainstream media outlets has slowly risen from its 2016 low).¹⁴⁴ But years earlier, scholars had a different conception of what constituted ‘fake news’:¹⁴⁵ the role of satirical news shows like *The Daily Show* and *The Colbert Report* used traditional media functions to mock and point out the idiosyncrasies of mainstream politics.¹⁴⁶ Underneath its cynical and absurd output was a sincere effort to better engage the public about their rights and obligations for civic participation – not to generate outright falsehoods or distortions.

Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) was permanently banned from Twitter in March 2018 following several brief suspensions, for breaching the platform’s ‘hateful conduct’ policies.¹⁴⁷ Yaxley-Lennon launched his own hyperpartisan ‘news’ website called TR News in early 2019, which had to later rely on reader donations following the successful

¹⁴³ Fieschi, Catherine, and Paul Heywood. ‘Trust, cynicism and populist anti-politics.’ *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9, no. 3 (2004): 289-309.

¹⁴⁴ Gallup. ‘U.S. Media Trust Continues to Recover From 2016 Low.’ Gallup.com. Last modified October 12, 2018. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/243665/media-trust-continues-recover-2016-low.aspx>.

¹⁴⁵ Holbert, R. L. A typology for the study of entertainment television politics. *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 49, (2005a): pp.436-453.


¹⁴⁶ Hess, V. The role of political comedy in 2000 election campaign: Examining content and third-person effects. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA (2001, August 30-September 2).

¹⁴⁷ Rawlinson, Kevin. ‘Tommy Robinson Permanently Banned by Twitter.’ *The Guardian*. Last modified October 3, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/28/tommy-robinson-permanently-banned-twitter-violating-rules-hateful-conduct>.

lobbying of groups like Stop Funding Fake News,¹⁴⁸ was a product of social media platforms banning (or placing heavy restrictions) on Yaxley-Lennon from their respective platforms.¹⁴⁹

This online ecosystem is sustained in part by what Kellner (2009) argues is the 'spectacle' of the ordinary, everyday news event, and its dramatic repurposing, to celebrate and reinforce the highest of societal values.¹⁵⁰ In the internet age, however, Kellner states that media spectacles are more diffuse, destabilising, and unpredictable.¹⁵¹ An important quality for such spectacles in online spaces concerns how interested groups can sustain and create fresh content for their media spectacles with little help from mainstream media outlets - creating an ideological schism that exists beyond the framework of traditional media.¹⁵² The emergence (and, therefore, the survival) of any spectacle requires the creation of content, in written or visual forms, must adhere to group values, aims, and, what Jenkins et al., describe as 'shared cultural attributes'.¹⁵³

The 'memeification' of anti-Muslim content allowed users to repurpose content from popular culture. One such example reported to Tell MAMA in September mocked the burning of a mosque with a still image from the popular children's television show Fireman Sam (which Twitter failed to remove following a report from Tell MAMA).



A private-for-hire taxi driver had their account suspended after harassing a Muslim user on Twitter. The tweet, seen and verified by Tell MAMA team, linked Islam with rape, linking it to

¹⁴⁸ Stop Funding Fake News. 'Our Fight Against Fake News is Starting to Turn the Tide.' Politics.co.uk. Last modified August 7, 2019. <https://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2019/08/07/our-fight-against-fake-news-is-starting-to-turn-the-tide>.

¹⁴⁹ Davidson, Tom. 'Tommy Robinson BANNED from Snapchat a month after being kicked off Facebook.' Mirror Online. Last modified April 5, 2019. <https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/breaking-tommy-robinson-banned-snapchat-14238721>.

¹⁵⁰ Kellner, Douglas. 'Media spectacle and media events: Some critical reflections.' In Media events in a global age, pp. 87-102. Routledge, 2009.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Mihailidis, Paul, and Samantha Viotty. 'Spreadable spectacle in digital culture: Civic expression, fake news, and the role of media literacies in 'post-fact' society.' American Behavioral Scientist 61, no. 4 (2017): 441-454.

¹⁵³ Jenkins, Henry, Sam Ford, and Joshua Green. Spreadable media: Creating value and meaning in a networked culture. Vol. 15. NYU press, 2018.

the term ‘religion of peace’ which is often (though not exclusively) a common phraseology among far-right social media users, but in this example, the ideological curve was clear upon further analysis of the tweet in its entirety. Key indicators included how the user suggested that the individual was married to a child (for no other reason than presumed religiosity). Furthermore, it must be stressed that the user targeted had no avatar on their profile, and, therefore, a racialised assumption that a name denotes a Muslim identity.


Whereas a suspended Twitter user had sought to justify the reasoning for a far-right rally held by the Democratic Football Lads Alliance because it was ‘about time people of england stood up against the filth from muslims that they are trying to inflict on us’.

8.6 FAR-RIGHT CONSPIRACIES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE GREAT REPLACEMENT THEORY

The conspiracism found within anti-Muslim and Islamophobic ecosystems online is welded to an inherent fatalism, an acceptance of perceived victimhood and oppression (from state or non-state actors). The language of violence serves an ideological function: to strike from a position of perceived weakness to reassert societal dominance. This fatalism and pessimism about a Europe embracing or sleepwalking into its own cultural ‘downfall’ is not a fringe theory. As Carr (2006) points out: the so-called ‘Islamisation’ of Europe is given credence amongst popular historians, ‘hard liberals’ like Melanie Phillips, and US-based think tanks that provided the ideological framework which helped to shape the ‘War on Terror’.¹⁵⁴ Such cataclysmic rhetoric and talk of impending civil war underpin such ideological arguments against immigration and the acceptance of refugees fleeing conflict zones or the ongoing civil war in Syria.

The fantasists and conspiracists behind Eurabia fixate on declining populations in Europe amid a backdrop of increasing Muslim birth rates (among Muslims in Europe and abroad) despite the science of demographics being complex and sometimes imprecise. In two examples of removed social media content reported to Tell MAMA, one couched this conspiracy in the language of an ‘Islamic time bomb’ which linked to a known anti-Muslim hate site and included the hashtags ‘#EthnicCleansing’ and ‘#PopulationReplacement’. In contrast, the second example from a far-right Twitter account began: ‘the indigenous are in suffocation’ and ended in the belief that the authorities were turning a ‘blind eye’ to the actions of Muslims, despite Muslims accounting for ‘7% of the population’ – the figure is closer to 5%. Such over-estimation, however, is not isolated to those on the far-right.

¹⁵⁴ Carr, Matt. ‘You are now entering Eurabia.’ *Race & Class* 48, no. 1 (2006): 1-22.



The intellectual ideas that underpin Eurabia are nothing new and have existed in various forms: from the Reconquista in fifteenth-century Spain¹⁵⁵ to the genocide of Muslims in the Balkans in the early 1990s. Reflecting on his 1993 meeting with the Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic, the 'Butcher of Bosnia', Paul Koring, recalled how the convicted war criminal sought to justify their genocidal violence as a pre-emptive measure to protect Europe from Muslims.¹⁵⁶ Mladic told Koring: 'The Islamic world does not have the atomic bomb, but it has the demographic bomb,' which Koring admits, with hindsight, that Mladic's statements were the 'harbinger' of the 'clash of civilisations' debate years later.¹⁵⁷ It was during this time that the academic Darko Tanaskovic had warned of an 'economic, diplomatic, and especially a demographic jihad'¹⁵⁸ and gave an interview to a Serbian newspaper in September 1993 which used the headline, 'Europe will not avoid the demographic jihad'.¹⁵⁹ Such arguments allowed ethnonationalists to view Bosnian Muslims as not just inferior, but a violent, existential threat.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ Elliott van Liere, Katherine. 'The Missionary and the Moorslayer: James the Apostle in Spanish Historiography from Isidore of Seville to Ambrosio de Morales.' *Viator* 37 (2006): 519-543.

¹⁵⁶ Koring, Paul. 'A Globe Correspondent's Dinner with the Butcher of Srebrenica.' *The Globe and Mail*. Last modified May 1, 2018. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/a-globe-correspondents-dinner-with-the-butcher-of-srebrenica/article581137/>.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Cigar, Norman L., and Stjepan Meštrović. *Genocide in Bosnia: the policy of 'ethnic cleansing'*. No. 1. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1995. 69.

¹⁵⁹ Karcic, Fikret. 'The Other European Muslims: A Bosnian Experience.' Sarajevo: Centar za napredne studije (2015). 189.

¹⁶⁰ Eller, Jack David. *From culture to ethnicity to conflict: An anthropological perspective on international ethnic conflict*. University of Michigan Press, 1999. 287.



The above tweet reported to Tell MAMA in late December (which Twitter did not remove) repeats the conspiracy theory of the great, or grand replacement – which was popularised by the 2012 book, *Le Grand Remplacement*, by the French philosopher and author Renaud Camus. There was a renewed interest in the replacement conspiracy following the terror attack in Christchurch, New Zealand which left 51 Muslims dead on March 15, 2019. The alleged manifesto of the suspect Brenton Tarrant made explicit reference to this theory.¹⁶¹

This racialised conspiracy, like Eurabia, also obsesses over fertility and birth rates among white women in Europe, and catastrophises that a decline will propel Europe towards a cultural reckoning.¹⁶² Others describe Camus as the ‘living symbol of a profound cultural shift in which Europe has abandoned its postwar creed of tolerance for identitarian anger’.¹⁶³ Camus avoided prison (on appeal) in 2015 for his incendiary comments about Muslims,¹⁶⁴ and is known for his support of the French far-right, nor is he the only French intellectual who promotes such racialised conspiracy theories.¹⁶⁵ Renaud Camus was a product of the *Nouvelle Droite* or the New Right movement in France. This racialised paranoia about Muslims in France is nothing new, however. Charles de Gaulle, who oversaw the end of oppressive and violent French colonial rule in Algeria, confided in 1959, that withdrawal from Algeria was better than offering full citizenship, as it would turn France into an ‘Islamic’ country, concluding: ‘My village would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, but

¹⁶¹ Tell MAMA. ‘Brenton Tarrant: How the Media Helped Turn the ‘shitposting’ Terrorist into a Meme.’ TELL MAMA. Last modified March 19, 2019. <https://tellmamauk.org/brenton-tarrant-how-the-media-helped-turn-the-shitposting-terrorist-into-a-meme/>.

¹⁶² Bowles, Nellie. ‘Replacement Theory? a Racist, Sexist Doctrine, Spreads in Far-Right Circles.’ The New York Times. Last modified March 20, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/technology/replacement-theory.html?module=inline>.

¹⁶³ McAuley, James. ‘How Gay Icon Renaud Camus Became the Ideologue of White Supremacy.’ The Nation. Last modified June 14, 2019. <https://www.thenation.com/article/renaud-camus-great-replacement-brenton-tarrant/>.

¹⁶⁴ B., H. ‘La Licra Saisit La Justice Après Un Tweet Raciste De Renaud Camus.’ 20 Minutes. Last modified April 27, 2019. <https://www.20minutes.fr/high-tech/2505771-20190427-licra-saisit-justice-apres-tweet-raciste-poste-renaud-camus-chantre-grand-remplacement>.

¹⁶⁵ Chrisafis, Angelique. ‘Right-wing ‘new Reactionaries’ Stir Up Trouble Among French Intellectuals.’ The Guardian. Last modified November 29, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/right-wing-new-reactionaries-stir-up-trouble-among-french-intellectuals>.

Colombey-les-deux-Mosquées!'.¹⁶⁶ Identitarianism is a revival of these ideas which rejects revolutionary and parliamentary politics in favour of a 'mediatised form of intellectual activism aimed at shaping ideas through media, expressive culture, and online propaganda'.¹⁶⁷ Identitarians speak in dulcet tones when it comes to their ideology, with a heavy emphasis on ethnopluralism – a racialised belief in the separation of cultures, which in reality, however, is different, as ethnopluralism is the New Right's counterpoint to pluralism and multiculturalism, which argues instead, for the enforced segregation of cultures and ethnicities, to avoid cultural genocide.¹⁶⁸ The influence of ethnopluralism, the Italian and French New Right, has been a blueprint for various extreme right-wing movements in Europe, and have been a great influence on the Russian ethnonationalist ideologue and philosopher Aleksandr Dugin.¹⁶⁹ Dugin is the modern forefather of Eurasianism, living in various European capitals following the Russian Revolution sought to merge radical, fascistic nationalism with conservative politics that offered a middle (or third-way) ground between capitalism and communism.¹⁷¹ As the academic and author Anton Shekhovtsov argues, Dugin's neo-Eurasianist ideology is a revolutionary form of fascism which hopes create a Russian-dominated empire that will defeat liberalism and democracy, represented by the United States, and allies like the United Kingdom and replace it with a new form of ethnonationalist illiberalism.¹⁷² As Marlene Laurelle notes, this ideology exists in an uncertain bind, which simultaneously yearns for empire and fears diversity.¹⁷³ Generation Identity praised Dugin's politics in a blog post dated December 2018.¹⁷⁴ Whereas, the UK branch of Generation Identity has appeared in Tell MAMA's street-based (offline) and online data set for 2018. The then co-leader of the UK chapter, Alex Dupré, 23, speculated that Nazir Afzal, former chief prosecutor for the Crown Prosecution Service in the North West, had forged a 'Punish A Muslim Day' letter. Dupré would leave the far-right group months later after the Observer had exposed the violent neo-Nazi links of a senior member of the pan-European movement.¹⁷⁵ The Generation Identity account which covers mainland Ireland and Northern Ireland replied to Dupré's tweet, suggesting that it was 'pure coincidence' that anti-Muslim

¹⁶⁶ Shatz, Adam. 'Colombey-les-deux-Mosquées.' London Review of Books. Last modified April 9, 2015.

<https://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n07/adam-shatz/colombey-les-deux-mosquees>.

¹⁶⁷ Castelli Gattinara, Pietro, and Andrea LP Pirro. 'The far right as social movement.' *European Societies* (2018): 1-16.

¹⁶⁸ Melzer, Ralf, and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Forum Berlin. Right-wing extremism in Europe: country analyses, counter-strategies and labor-market oriented exit strategies. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2013. 19.

¹⁶⁹ Chatterton Williams, Thomas. 'The French Origins of 'You Will Not Replace Us?'' *The New Yorker*. Accessed July 8, 2019. <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/04/the-french-origins-of-you-will-not-replace-us>.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. 192.

¹⁷¹ Akçali, Emel, Jean-Yves Camus, Vügar İmanbeyli, Umut Korkut, Vadim Rossman, Giovanni Savino, Anton Shekhovtsov, David C. Speedie, and Sofia Tipaldou. *Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Europe–Russia Relationship*. Lexington Books, 2015.

¹⁷² Shekhovtsov, Anton. *Russia and the Western far right: Tango Noir*. Routledge, 2017. 43.

¹⁷³ Bassin, Mark, Sergey Glebov, and Marlene Laruelle, eds. *Between Europe and Asia: The origins, theories, and legacies of Russian eurasianism*. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015. 192.

¹⁷⁴ Generation Identity. 'Alexander Dugin and the Fourth Political Theory.' Wayback Machine. Accessed July 8, 2019. <https://web.archive.org/web/20190708113825/https://www.generation-identity.co/alexander-dugin-and-the-fourth-political-theory/>.

¹⁷⁵ Townsend, Mark. 'Senior Member of European Far-right Group Quits over Neo-Nazi Link.' *The Guardian*. Last modified August 11, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/11/generation-identity-leader-quits-neo-nazi-links>.

graffiti appeared in Tallaght, in south Dublin, when hate crime legislation was due to be discussed in the Irish parliament. The incident, however, took place a year earlier, and Ireland remains one of the few EU countries that have no existing hate crime laws, despite the country having some of the highest levels of hate crimes against black and trans communities in Europe.¹⁷⁶

Conversely, the left-wing website Skwawkbox called on the Communities Secretary Sajid Javid to apologise or resign, after posting a duplicate photograph of the original ‘Punish A Muslim Day’ letter.¹⁷⁷ Javid explained on Twitter in an exchange with Raheem Kassam (the former editor-in-chief of Breitbart News London) that he avoided posting the original letter to avoid compromising the ongoing police investigation. Not content with this explanation, Skwawkbox again questioned if Javid had indeed received a copy of the terroristic and Islamophobic letter.¹⁷⁸ This example is not proof of the horseshoe theory in effect, but rather, ‘group polarisation’ (Sunstein, 2009),¹⁷⁹ as Skwawkbox did not question the veracity of the letters sent to four Muslim MPs in the Labour party. Furthermore, group-based polarisation is an everyday event, but in extreme forms, can result in individuals adopting maximalist forms of their previously-held beliefs, practise self-segregation, hold a suspicion of others, or increase their potential for violence.¹⁸⁰



To return to Generation Identity, Twitter proved fertile ground for their propaganda until its permanent ban for breaching policies on hateful conduct. Tell MAMA verified examples of Generation Identity using social media to promote or showcase offline forms of antagonism, with the @GID_UKIRE and @GenIdentEngland Twitter accounts. Concerning the former, Generation Identity placed face veils on statues of famous women across England, Scotland,

¹⁷⁶ Fitzgerald, Cormac. ‘Ireland Has the Highest Rates of Some Hate Crimes in the EU, but No Proper Laws to Address It.’ TheJournal.ie. Last modified July 8, 2019. <https://www.thejournal.ie/hate-crime-4105605-Jul2018/>.

¹⁷⁷ SKWAWKBOX. ‘Cabinet Minister Javid Tweets Hate-mail ‘sent to Him’ That Was Sent to a Family Last Week.’ The SKWAWKBOX. Last modified March 17, 2018. <https://skwawkbox.org/2018/03/17/cabinet-minister-javid-tweets-hate-mail-sent-to-him-that-it-appears-was-been-sent-to-a-family-last-week/>.

¹⁷⁸ SKWAWKBOX. ‘Excl: Javid Claims ‘Punish Muslim’ Letter but Doesn’t Mention 2 Staff Hospitalised.’ The SKWAWKBOX. Last modified March 19, 2018. <https://skwawkbox.org/2018/03/19/excl-javid-claims-punish-muslim-letter-but-doesnt-mention-2-staff-hospitalised/>.

¹⁷⁹ Sunstein, Cass R. *Going to extremes: How like minds unite and divide* (Oxford University Press, 2009). 3.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

Northern and mainland Ireland. The far-right group had also used the petitions website Change.org to call for a ban on the burqa, as the tweet promoting the campaign, posted on June 24, had gained over 400 retweets and over 700 likes when Tell MAMA covered the anti-Muslim and Islamophobic incident on its news section in June.¹⁸¹ Days earlier, Facebook had banned every Generation Identity page from its platform, citing policies around extremism and hate groups.¹⁸² Arguably, the anti-burqa campaign would have had a smaller reach had Twitter banned the group earlier. The @GID_England account, however, which promoted the targeted campaign against Didsbury Mosque, remains active on Twitter despite calling for the violent removal of Muslims in Spain in 2017. The tweet read: 'Islam rears it's ugly head in Barcelona, many innocents injured or dead. Reconquista now more important than ever.'¹⁸³ Other regional Generation Identity accounts remain active on Twitter – including regional pages for Scotland, Wales, and Ireland. Accounts of regional Generation Identity in parts of mainland Europe remain active on Twitter, including Martin Sellner, who remains banned from entering the UK on security grounds.¹⁸⁴

This radical form of racialised othering (Meer and Modood 2012)¹⁸⁵ serves a distinct political function for radical, populist, and far-right parties in Europe, and those with broader anti-Muslim and Islamophobic ideologies, but is not without historical parallels. Wodak and Forchtner (2014) found that the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in a 2010 election attempted to fuse historical memory by drawing parallels between the Battle of Vienna (1683) with Turkey's pursuit of EU membership, which they argue, was a chauvinistic form of identity politics that tapped into 'group-specific memories' that is spoken of but never fully addressed.¹⁸⁶ Whereas, Konrad (2014), identifies the historical pattern 'othering' of Muslims as culturally inferior, which helped to reassert European identity, and would endure and fuse with the racial pseudo-science of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to further justify colonialism.¹⁸⁷

Conspiracy theories, after all, endure because they 'reduce highly complex phenomena to simple causes'.¹⁸⁸ Consistent with previous Tell MAMA research, there were several accounts which used conspiracy theories and conspiratorial language to target Muslims. One example also invoked traditional antisemitic canards. A tweet made on September 8, 2018, read:

¹⁸¹ Tell MAMA. 'Far-right Group Targets Famous Statues in 'ban the Burqa' Protest.' TELL MAMA. Last modified June 26, 2018. <https://tellmamauk.org/far-right-group-targets-famous-statues-in-ban-the-burqa-protest/>.

¹⁸² Bailey, Luke. 'Far-right Group Generation Identity Have Been Banned from Facebook Across Europe.' Inews.co.uk. Last modified June 21, 2018. <https://inews.co.uk/news/generation-identity-banned-facebook/>.

¹⁸³ Generation Identity England. Twitter Post. August 18, 2017, 6:37 pm. Available at: https://twitter.com/GID_England/status/898599636335644673 retrieved 08/07/2019).

¹⁸⁴ Wilson, Jason. 'Anti-Islamic Extremist Permanently Excluded from Entering UK.' The Guardian. Last modified June 26, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/26/anti-muslim-extremist-martin-sellner-permanently-excluded-from-entering-uk>.

¹⁸⁵ Nasar Meer, and Tariq Modood. 'For 'Jewish' Read 'Muslim'? Islamophobia as a Form of Racialisation of Ethno-Religious Groups in Britain Today.' *Islamophobia Studies Journal* 1, no. 1 (2012): 34-53.

¹⁸⁶ Wodak, Ruth, and Bernhard Forchtner. 'Embattled Vienna 1683/2010: Right-wing populism, collective memory and the fictionalisation of politics.' *Visual Communication* 13, no. 2 (2014): p.244.

¹⁸⁷ Konrad, Felix. 'From the 'Turkish Menace' to Exoticism and Orientalism: Islam as Antithesis of Europe (1453–1914).' *European History Online* (2011).

¹⁸⁸ Barkun, Michael. *A culture of conspiracy: Apocalyptic visions in contemporary America*. Vol. 15. Univ of California Press, 2013. 8.

‘Islam is the price the world has agreed to pay the globalists for a new world order.’ The term itself is not intrinsically antisemitic, according to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL)¹⁸⁹ but, for far-right extremists, it is proof of a deliberate policy to destroy their cultures, traditions, and values,¹⁹⁰ echoing the racialised paranoia of the replacement theory. The term globalism is not intrinsically antisemitic but, for far-right extremists, it is proof of a deliberate policy to destroy their cultures, traditions, and values, echoing the racialised paranoia of the replacement theory. Aryeh Tuchman, however, who oversees the ADL’s Center on Extremism, made clear that directing the term at a Jewish person reinforces associations that cannot be disentangled from the history of antisemitism, in an interview with the Washington Post last year.¹⁹¹ With that in mind, it should not come as a surprise to learn that the author of the aforementioned Islamophobic tweet had made this antisemitic remark, ‘Who are these Jew paymasters Alan? Are you refering to ther New world order people?’ in 2014, demonstrating the importance of Muslim and Jewish solidarity in response to the far-right.

The Twitter account of Katie Hopkins made several appearances in our verified list of reports in this dataset. One example concerns her inflammatory and racialised language when linking a gas explosion in the Leicester area to terrorism. She wrote: ‘Gas explosion. Right up there with lone wolf. And ‘from former Yugoslavia’ #Leicester’. The tweet was later removed, not for breaching Twitter’s hateful conduct policy, but over a copyright claim from a journalist whose photo of the explosion Hopkins had used without citation.¹⁹² Hopkins and the disgraced former leader of the neo-fascist British National Party, Nick Griffin, gained wide public condemnation for their Islamophobic tweets that linked the explosion to Muslims.¹⁹³ Three men were later given life sentences for the murder of five people in a failed £300,000 insurance scam in January 2019.¹⁹⁴

A tweet from Hopkins which suggested that Islam oppresses Muslim women was reported to Tell MAMA a month earlier. As with the above example, Hopkins took a popular hashtag to make an inflammatory point. The ‘#WhyWeWearBlack’ hashtag was part of a wider discussion and act of solidarity to highlight sexual misconduct and gender inequality in

¹⁸⁹ Anti-Defamation League. ‘Quantifying Hate: A Year of Anti-Semitism on Twitter.’ Anti-Defamation League. Accessed July 10, 2019. <https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/quantifying-hate-a-year-of-anti-semitism-on-twitter#globalist-as-code-word-for-jew>.

¹⁹⁰ Grumke, Thomas. ‘Globalized anti-globalists: The ideological basis of the internationalization of right-wing extremism.’ In *Right-Wing Radicalism Today*, pp. 27-35. Routledge, 2013.

¹⁹¹ Rosenberg, Eli. ‘Trump called Gary Cohn a ‘globalist.’ Here’s why some people find that offensive.’ The Washington Post. Last modified March 9, 2018. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/03/09/trump-called-gary-cohn-a-globalist-heres-why-some-people-find-that-offensive>.

¹⁹² Jarvis, Jacob. ‘Katie Hopkins deletes tweet linking Leicester explosion to terrorism.’ Leicester Mercury. Last modified March 2, 2018. <https://www.leicestermercury.co.uk/news/leicester-news/katie-hopkins-leicester-explosion-1276080>.

¹⁹³ Evans, Sophie, and Jacob Jarvis. ‘Katie Hopkins and Nick Griffin slammed for ‘disgusting’ tweets linking horrific Leicester explosion that killed five to terrorism.’ Mirror Online. Last modified February 27, 2018. <https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/katie-hopkins-nick-griffin-slammed-12094709>.

¹⁹⁴ BBC News. ‘Three Men Jailed over Shop Blast Murders.’ BBC News. Last modified January 18, 2019. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leicestershire-46865455>.

Hollywood.¹⁹⁵ For Hopkins, however, she wrote: 'Because Islam oppresses women' and included a low-quality image of a group of women wearing the face veil (niqab). Nor was this the first time that Hopkins had used this image.¹⁹⁶ The constant recycling of imagery of Muslim women in face veils or other identifiable forms of Islamic religiosity, which are, often confused or mislabeled, is also a wider issue that some media outlets have failed to address fully. The media reliance on stock imagery is something Tell MAMA has long challenged. For example, on August 8, Tell MAMA tweeted, in response to an online poll about Boris Johnson's comments: 'Here's @SkyNews using a stock image of a Muslim woman who's not even wearing a burqa. Accuracy matters'.¹⁹⁷

Hopkins falsely claimed that London Mayor Sadiq Khan would have been fired from his role had it not been for his faith due to an apparent rise in the capital's murder rate. Nor is the far-right obsession with Sadiq Khan limited to just ideologues like Katie Hopkins.¹⁹⁸ Researchers have also debunked the claim that the murder rate in London is higher than in New York City.¹⁹⁹ Hopkins would continue to attack Khan on Twitter in a similar fashion in the months ahead, and, in the early half of 2019, Donald Trump drew wide condemnation for sharing a tweet from Hopkins which included the term 'Khan's Londonistan'.²⁰⁰ The term 'Londonistan' was born from the scornful slang of the French security services, who were concerned, as the BBC security correspondent Frank Gardner noted in 2014, the 'plethora of Middle Eastern and North African dissidents plotting the downfall of secular governments in countries like Egypt, Yemen and Algeria'. Gardner adds that 'Most were peaceful, but some were radical extremists with links to violent groups overseas'. The term gained popular attention following the release of the book *Londonistan: How Britain Created a Terror State* by Melanie Phillips in 2006. Writing in the *Financial Times* in 2007, Simon Kuper placed this book in the wider conspiratorial genre of *Eurabia* (which had largely occupied the North American market) and argued that, 'the imagined 'Eurabia'', the Muslims are taking over. Europeans aren't resisting'. Pessimism is the intrinsic thread that connects such ideological thinking, as Kuper concluded that the genre was less fact-driven, more emotionally appealing, as: 'It also has a political message: if the Europeans, America's traditional allies, have folded before Islam, then the US must go it alone'. The author Kenan Malik, writing in *The Independent*, noted in his review of Phillips's book: 'The pursuit of 'human rights

¹⁹⁵ Rearick, Lauren. 'People on Social Media Are Wearing Black to Support the Protest at the Golden Globes.' *Teen Vogue*. Last modified January 7, 2018. <https://www.teenvogue.com/story/whywewearblack-trends-as-response-to-golden-globes-2018-black-dress-protest>.

¹⁹⁶ Okey, Regan. 'Katie Hopkins Targets Muslim Women with Cutting Burka Jibe.' *Dailystar.co.uk*. Last modified September 14, 2017. <https://www.dailystar.co.uk/showbiz/644806/Katie-Hopkins-Twitter-iPhone-X-Muslim-women-backlash>.

¹⁹⁷ Tell MAMA. Twitter Post. August 8, 2018, 3:35 pm. <https://twitter.com/TellMamaUK/status/1027201634147999746>.

¹⁹⁸ Tell MAMA. 'Who Are the White Pendragons?' TELL MAMA. Last modified January 15, 2018. <https://tellmamauk.org/who-are-the-white-pendragons/>.

¹⁹⁹ Kaszeta, Dan. 'Lies, Damned Lies, And Statistics: Why London's Murder Rate Is Not Higher Than NYC's.' *Bellingcat*. Last modified July 9, 2019. <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/03/20/lies-damned-lies-and-statistics-why-londons-murder-rate-is-not-higher-than-nycs/>.

²⁰⁰ Perraudin, Frances. 'Donald Trump Criticised for Quoting Katie Hopkins in Attack on Sadiq Khan.' *The Guardian*. Last modified June 16, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jun/16/trump-attacks-sadiq-khan-over-uptake-in-london-violence>.

doctrine' has become 'the principal cultural weapon to undermine the fundamental values of Western society'. Why settle for rational argument when a paranoid rant will do, seems to be the attitude'. Justin Vaïsse noted that many titles in the Eurabia genre 'offer a variation on the conservative Cold War vision of Europe as vulnerable to the spread of communism — only now, Muslims have replaced Soviets and Euro-communists as the enemies'. Phillips would later reference the title of her book in a 2019 blog, adding that the term describes the so-called 'capitulation of the British establishment to Islamization — of which the campaign to silence debate as 'Islamophobic' is a prime example.' Other scaremongering examples of the rhetoric appeared in a 2017 blog authored by Giulio Meotti, for the Gatestone Institute, a think tank which continues to deny its anti-Muslim label, was headlined: 'Londonistan: 423 New Mosques; 500 Closed Churches'. The online fact-checker Snopes dismissed this claim as false and criticised, their 'extremist language to describe an alleged Muslim takeover of London' in a piece which 'offered shoddy research and cherry-picked data'. Writing in the New Statesman, Julia Rampen noted in 2017, that the concept of 'Londonistan (capital of Eurabia) exists primarily as a city on social media'. And, 'Its news is reported by the right-wing blogs of the United States, UK, France and Hindu nationalists in India'.²⁰¹

On August 4, 2018, Tell MAMA received reports concerning a tweet made from Katie Hopkins that read: 'This is a funeral for four men killed in a car crash following a police chase in England. I repeat. England.' The racialised statement drew wide condemnation on social media. The tweet also ignored the reality that 'Muslims are encouraged to attend any Muslim's funeral due to the profound personal, social and spiritual significance of such an event', according to the Muslim Burial Council of Leicester.²⁰² The MP for Bradford East Imran Hussain said that 'People have turned up in their thousands to stand with the families.'²⁰³

Katie Hopkins was one of several far-right guests to attend the Traditional Britain Group's annual dinner in 2018, including a Swedish author who engaged in Holocaust denial.²⁰⁴ The vice president of the Traditional Britain Group is Gregory Lauder-Frost, who once called for the repatriation of those of 'non-European stock',²⁰⁵ and in 1992, spoke at a conference alongside notorious Holocaust deniers, Ernst Zundel and David Irving.²⁰⁶ Gregory Lauder-Frost is head of Arktos UK — a far-right publishing outlet which stocks the works of fascist

²⁰¹ Rampen, Julia. 'Londonistan: Why is the Alt-right So Obsessed with a Fictional City?' America's Current Affairs & Politics Magazine. Last modified June 5, 2017.

<https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/06/londonistan-why-alt-right-so-obsessed-fictional-city>.

²⁰² Muslim Burial Council of Leicester. 'Attending a Muslim Funeral - A Guide For Non-Muslims.' MBCOL. Last modified January 22, 2015. <http://www.mbc.org.uk/funeral-procedure/attending-a-muslim-funeral-a-guide-for-non-muslims/>.

²⁰³ BBC News. 'Funerals Held for Police Chase Crash Men.' BBC News. Last modified August 4, 2018.

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-leeds-45069242>.

²⁰⁴ Townsend, Mark. 'Katie Hopkins to Speak at Far-right Rally with Holocaust Denier.' The Guardian. Last modified September 23, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/sep/23/katie-hopkins-speak-far-right-for-britain-islamophobe-holocaust-denier>.

²⁰⁵ McSmith, Andy. 'Gregory Lauder-Frost Exposed: The Tory Fringe Group Leader with Nazi.' The Independent. Last modified November 5, 2013. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/gregory-lauder-frost-exposed-the-tory-fringe-group-leader-with-nazi-sympathies-8755093.html>.

²⁰⁶ 'Ernst Zundel and David Irving in London 1992 : Hidden Truths : Internet Archive.' Internet Archive. September 9, 2017. <https://archive.org/details/youtube-7U2L7BMTr6U>.

thinkers like Julius Evola and Aleksandr Dugin. The racist and Islamophobic French thinker Guillaume Fay, who has called for a 'reconquest' of Europe from Muslims,²⁰⁷ has books stocked on the Arktos UK.

In her speech to the Traditional Britain Group, Hopkins qualified that the Grenfell Tower fire was indeed a tragedy but 'Good lord, have we not heard enough about Grenfell Tower! Could we hear any more about Grenfell Tower?! Channel 4 News cannot get enough of it'. She speculated further, hinting at a cover-up, that there was evidence to suggest more than 72 people died due to overcrowding and illegal sub-letting, with more people in the block due to Ramadan. To which, she added, 'I mean, who knows what started a fire with open oil fires at Ramadan, who could say?'.²⁰⁸

8.7 EMBOLDENED BY POLITICS: 'LETTERBOX' MEMES AND THE HARASSMENT OF MUSLIM WOMEN ONLINE

Between August 5 (the date when Boris Johnson's column where comments which compared Muslim women in face veils to 'bank robbers' and 'letterboxes' appeared online) and August 28, Tell MAMA verified 14 online reports that echoed the remarks in written and meme form, or exploited broader discussions around the comments to exhibit and share broader lanti-Muslim attitudes. Both outcomes show how individuals felt emboldened by the political discourse to share such dehumanising sentiments about Muslim women. In one example, a Muslim woman reported that a man had shared a meme which compared Muslim women in the face veil (niqab) to a set of patio umbrellas in a WhatsApp group. Days later, on August 8, Tell MAMA was alerted to a meme which disparaged the former Conservative chair Sayeeda Warsi, as crude text posted on the photograph read: 'It's a pity Sayeeda headscarf (hijab) & fellow politicians can't show the same passion & courage about white working-class girls being groomed & raped as they're about Boris Johnson's comments'. The meme also relies upon using a photo of Lady Warsi wearing the headscarf (hijab), in a photo which is from 2012, during a visit to a mosque in Indonesia.²⁰⁹ This example further demonstrates how the headscarf (hijab) has become the essentialised way to see 'Muslimness'²¹⁰ which, in turns, serves to 'other' Muslim women, as they become the embodiment of all the problematic and threatening stereotypes about Islam and Muslims some individuals hold. The Conservative

²⁰⁷ Lester Feder, J., and Pierre Buet. 'They Wanted To Be A Better Class Of White Nationalists. They Claimed This Man As Their Father.' BuzzFeed News. December 26, 2017. <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/lesterfeder/the-man-who-gave-white-nationalism-a-new-life>.

²⁰⁸ Traditional Britain Group. 'Katie Hopkins, Traditional Britain Conference 2018.' YouTube. October 31, 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oyony2N8del>.

²⁰⁹ Preece, Rob. 'Packing Up Her Troubles, Baroness Warsi Flies off to Visit Indonesia (and Forgets About That Expenses Scandal).' Mail Online. Last modified June 1, 2012. <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2152994/Baroness-Warsi-visits-Indonesia.html>.

²¹⁰ Allen, Chris. 'Exploring the impact of Islamophobia on visible Muslim women victims: A British case study.' *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 3, no. 2 (2014): 137-159.

party would later suspend fourteen party members for anti-Muslim comments which appeared in the same closed Facebook group.²¹¹

Christine Hamilton, the broadcaster and wife of UKIP Welsh Assembly member Neil Hamilton, was fired as an ambassador for the Muscular Dystrophy UK charity on August 11, after her tweet which compared the burqa to the hoods of the Ku Klux Klan went viral a day earlier.²¹²



Writing in the Spectator on August 11, the columnist Rod Liddle suggested, that in his opinion, 'that there is not nearly enough Islamophobia within the Tory party'.²¹³ Adding, that Muslim women in face veils were more akin to Darth Vader than letterboxes or bank robbers. Liddle concluded that he was no longer against a public ban on the burqa but refused to commit to a position on the issue.²¹⁴ The writings of Rod Liddle appeared again in our data set after his comments in The Sunday Times suggested that extremists should blow themselves up in the London borough of Tower Hamlets which is 'decent distance from where the rest of us live'. Tell MAMA publicly condemned the anti-Muslim and Islamophobic comments from Liddle, sending complaints to both The Sunday Times and the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO).²¹⁵

The Conservative Councillor John Pollock, who represents the ward of Tenbury on Worcestershire County Council, tweeted: 'I am Spartacus! Women wearing the face veil (niqab) look like letter boxes. Bank robbers would find the burka a good disguise' on August

²¹¹ Khan, Shehab. 'Tory Party Suspends 14 Members for Posting Islamophobic or Racist Comments Online.' The Independent. Last modified March 6, 2019. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/tory-islamophobia-racism-suspended-member-conservatives-a8808571.html>.

²¹² BBC News. 'Hamilton Axed from Charity over Burka Tweet.' BBC News. Last modified August 12, 2018. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-45160466>.

²¹³ Liddle, Rod. 'Why Boris is Wrong About Burkas.' The Spectator. Last modified September 20, 2018. <https://www.spectator.co.uk/2018/08/why-boris-is-wrong-about-burkas/>.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Sandhu, Serina. 'Rod Liddle Condemned over Sunday Times Column Encouraging British Islamists to 'blow Themselves Up' in London.' Inews.co.uk. Last modified December 7, 2018. <https://inews.co.uk/news/media/rod-liddle-sunday-times-column-tower-hamlets-london-islamists-blow-themselves-up/>.

9. He clarified one minute later that, 'I don't think Muslim modes of dress should be made illegal.' The initial tweet, however, resulted in a council investigation and, in September, cleared him of any wrongdoing.²¹⁶ The Daily Record newspaper revealed that Ron McKail, a Conservative councillor in Aberdeen, has shared a Facebook meme comparing Muslim women in the face veil (niqab) to patio umbrellas, and later apologised and stated that he did not agree with Johnson's remarks.²¹⁷

The targeting of Muslim women occurred online as a woman, who wears the face veil, told Iain Dale on LBC radio that numerous individuals had sent her Twitter messages containing the word letterbox.²¹⁸ She lamented: 'He's started a new trend, there's now a new name they can call me and mock me with'.²¹⁹

A noteworthy far-right account was reported to Tell MAMA during this period after writing that, 'Boris Johnson's generalisations about the burqa are inaccurate' and 'if he were to bother to sit down with a Muslim he'd see that under that garment there is a human being inside who despises the west & wants homosexuals dead'. This tweet gained greater saturation after the hard-right American commentator Anne Coulter, who boasts 2 million followers, helped this tweet gain over 500 retweets.

The fallout from Johnson's comments saw anti-Muslim abuse sent to high-profile Muslim politicians like Lord Sheikh, who had called for his removal from the Conservative party, told the BBC, 'Out of 75 emails he had since received about the issue, 15 were complimentary while the rest included 'offensive language' and 'horrible things, obscene things, about the Prophet Muhammad'.²²⁰

It took Tell MAMA almost a week to receive and verify reports of anti-Muslim memes which depicted Muslim women as letterboxes. In one example, someone had circulated a doctored stock image of a woman in a face veil (niqab) which was recoloured in red, and captioned 'New Royal Mail uniform for Muslim workers'. This image was then recirculated on Twitter by a user who said: 'Fantastic tweet and how true'. A second example included a doctored image of a Muslim woman wearing the face veil (niqab) when out shopping, someone had added elements of a post box to her clothing. More than a week after the initial comments, individuals were still sharing Islamophobic memes about Muslim women and letterboxes, including a meme which originated back in 2010 and depicts an old man placing a letter in the face of a Muslim woman's face veil (niqab), with the 'punchline' being 'Should have gone to Specsavers'. Variations of this crude meme circulating back in 2010 did not include the

²¹⁶ Bromsgrove Advertiser. 'Councillor Cleared Following 'I Am Spartacus? Burqa Storm.' Bromsgrove Advertiser. Last modified September 2, 2018. <https://www.bromsgroveadvertiser.co.uk/news/16611959.worcestershire-county-council-councillor-ken-pollock-cleared-of-wrongdoing-following-i-am-spartacus-burqa-tweets/>.

²¹⁷ Clegg, David. 'Scottish Tory councillor blasted after comparing Muslim women in burkas to PATIO UMBRELLAS.' The Scottish Daily Record. Last modified August 10, 2018.

<https://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/scottish-tory-councillor-blasted-after-13059308>.

²¹⁸ LBC. 'Muslim Woman Targeted By Online Trolls After Boris? Burka Remarks.' LBC. Last modified August 10, 2018. <https://www.lbc.co.uk/radio/presenters/iain-dale/muslim-woman-targeted-by-online-trolls-boris-burka/>.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ BBC News. 'Watchdog Criticises Johnson's Burka Comments.' BBC News. Last modified August 10, 2018. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45139084>.

reference to the high-street opticians. Tell MAMA has documented other dehumanising memes which target Muslim women in face veils, including examples which have compared them to rubbish bags or as robots.

Public and media discourses which frame Muslims through the lens of securitisation²²¹²²² may help us understand the prevalence of online reports which refer to Muslims as violent, terroristic threats. Schuurman (2019) found a preoccupation with al-Qaeda and ISIS-inspired attacks among terrorism researchers, with little attention given to state terrorism, right-wing extremist terrorism, and militia-based terrorism as found by Iranian-backed groups in Iraq or unionist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland.²²³ This preoccupation, experts argue, has blinded the public to the reality that in western democracies, including the United States, deadly attacks from the far-right is much higher. Part of this issue concerns the methodological limitations in recording far-right terroristic violence in terrorism databases which the media often rely upon for their analysis.²²⁴ Others point to the distortions in US media outlets which place a disproportionate emphasis on terror attacks carried out by those of Muslim background, which, on average, gain 4 ½ times the coverage (despite those of Muslim background being responsible for 12.4% of domestic terror attacks in the United States between 2011 and 2015).²²⁵ There remain other concerns in how terror attack abroad generate fewer headlines for western audiences.²²⁶ Media framing, according to McCombs (2003), does, after all, help set the tone for issues and how audiences discuss them.²²⁷

Comments that link Islam to violence are sometimes made towards Muslims in personalised ways – over email, instant messages, or social media posts, where the language is directed at the individual or attacks their faith more broadly. In an example of a hateful email, the perpetrator began, ‘Only Islam, the only religion invented by a mass-murdering war-monger’ would, in their words, ‘go on about peace, every time everyone meets’. Other Islamophobic emails reported to Tell MAMA included text like, ‘Vastly more to the point is that Islam has a terrorism problem, a jihad problem, and a pedophile rape gangs problem’. A Muslim man described how they were racially abused over email and called a ‘sand n*****’ and a ‘f*cking terrorist c*nt’. Another Muslim person who contacted Tell MAMA described how someone had written that their faith was not a religion but was a ‘death cult, a lie, and a sect of Satan’.

²²¹ Malmvig, Helle. ‘Security through intercultural dialogue? Implications of the securitization of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue between cultures.’ *Mediterranean Politics* 10, no. 3 (2005): 349-364.

²²² Brown, Katherine. ‘The promise and perils of women’s participation in UK mosques: The impact of securitisation agendas on identity, gender and community.’ *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 10, no. 3 (2008): 472-491.

²²³ Schuurman, Bart. ‘Topics in terrorism research: reviewing trends and gaps, 2007-2016.’ *Critical Studies on Terrorism* (2019): 1-18.

²²⁴ Ravndal, Jacob Aasland. ‘Right-wing terrorism and violence may actually have declined.’ *The Washington Post*. Last modified April 2, 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/02/is-right-wing-terrorism-violence-rise/>.

²²⁵ Kearns, Erin M., Allison E. Betus, and Anthony F. Lemieux. ‘Why do some terrorist attacks receive more media attention than others?’ *Justice Quarterly* (2019): 1-24.

²²⁶ Mike Wendling. ‘Do terror attacks in the Western world get more attention than others?’. *BBC News*. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-35886051> (retrieved 21/06/2019).

²²⁷ McCombs, M. (2003). *The Agenda-Setting Role of the Mass Media in the Shaping of Public Opinion*. In *Mass Media Economics Conference*, London School of Economics.

As mentioned earlier, to cause maximum harm in their words, some perpetrators would make hateful and disparaging remarks about the Prophet Muhammad, knowing the reverence and importance he remains in the daily lives of Muslims.

Other examples of anti-Muslim and Islamophobic and racist hate speech included the Facebook user who claimed that 'Allah is a nonce', that white people are being 'replaced', and n***** should return to Africa.

8.8 MYTHOLOGISING THE 'DANGEROUS MASCULINITY' OF ALL MUSLIM MEN

Tell MAMA has documented how online discussions around the criminal activity related to child sexual exploitation (CSE) and child sexual abuse (CSA) have been hijacked by the far-right on social media. The examples listed below demonstrate how the language of some attempts to link such crimes to the religion of Islam itself. There are also real-world, violent consequences to such inflammatory rhetoric, where ordinary Muslims have faced abuse or violence. This report comes weeks after the fourth anniversary of the racist murder of 81-year-old grandfather Mushin Ahmed, who, when on his way to morning prayers, was subjected to an unprovoked violent assault by two men, one of his attackers, Dale Jones, falsely accused Ahmed of being a 'groomer'.²²⁸ Prosecutor Andrew Robertson QC made clear that Jones targeted him 'for no better reason than Mr Ahmed was Asian'.²²⁹ Jones was later given a life sentence for the racist murder, and his accomplice, Damien Hunt, was jailed for 14 years for manslaughter in February 2016.²³⁰ A Muslim man, who contacted Tell MAMA on 3 October 2018, was almost run over by a man who then accused him of being a p**dophile. Comments directed towards the Muslim man included, 'your beard, you look like a p**dophile' and 'you must be happy there's a school up the road'.²³¹ The perpetrator was later found guilty of common assault and ordered to pay a fine.²³² Other examples reported to Tell MAMA in recent years include a case in 2016 when a Muslim man was targeted in the street and called 'beardo p**do' and a 'P*ki b*stard'.²³³

Twitter suspended the account of a user who wrote: 'Men over here don't follow a book that states use Amy kuffar as sex slaves, men over here don't join up in hundreds to only abuse white children', after a member of the public reported it to Tell MAMA.

²²⁸ BBC News. 'Two Jailed over Rotherham Race Killing.' BBC News. Last modified February 29, 2016. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-south-yorkshire-35688543>.


²²⁹ ITV News. 'Two Jailed for Racially-motivated Killing of Rotherham Grandfather.' ITV News. Last modified February 29, 2016. <https://www.itv.com/news/calendar/2016-02-29/two-jailed-for-racially-motivated-killing-of-rotherham-grandfather/>.

²³⁰ Sims, Alexandra. 'Rotherham Pair Who Kicked Muslim Grandfather to Death Jailed for 46 Years.' The Independent. Last modified February 29, 2016. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/rotherham-pair-who-kicked-muslim-grandfather-to-death-while-calling-him-a-groomer-jailed-for-46-a6904291.html>.

²³¹ Tell MAMA. 'GUILTY: Van Driver Who Mocked and Threatened Muslim Man After Attempting to Run Him over.' TELL MAMA. Last modified March 20, 2019. <https://tellmamauk.org/van-driver-mocked-and-threatened-muslim-man-after-attempting-to-run-him-over/>.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Tell MAMA (2017) 'A Constructed Threat: Identity, Tolerance and the Impact of Anti-Muslim Hatred - Tell MAMA Annual Report 2016'.



A tweet reported and verified by Tell MAMA was a racialised parody of an Enid Blyton novel. The image depicted children near a kebab shop with the Arabic script for halal visible on the sign, the text above reads, 'Five Get Groomed'. The origins of the image, however, bring up several possibilities: obscure internet forums who distribute a plethora of anti-Muslim and Islamophobic memes; to a t-shirt seller who listed the image on their website. Furthermore, this individual had produced a t-shirt in support of Tommy Robinson during the height of the '#FreeTommy' campaign, and its social media pages contained numerous examples of anti-Muslim content. An example from Twitter read: 'Let's stop making excuses for Islam's medieval practises. These f*ckers are deranged' and linked to a report on 'Muslim grooming gangs' published by the controversial think tank the Gatestone Institute, which has also published a series of articles in support of Tommy Robinson's cause, according to a wide-ranging investigation by the Guardian newspaper.²³⁴

This cartoon taps into what Weaver (2010) posits is 'liquid racism', which is concerned with the racism of ambiguous signs and images that 'encourages the development of entrenched socio-discursive positioning when reading these signs'.²³⁵ Moreover, this ambiguity is due to the combination of old racism with socio-political issues which are not intrinsically racist which, in turn, demonstrate how the liquidity of racism operates: through the complex interactions between societal racism, ethnicity, and population movements.²³⁶

The Royal Mint blocked the release of a commemorative coin featuring Enid Blyton in 2016 after meeting minutes, obtained by The Mail on Sunday via a Freedom of Information Request, stated that she 'is known to have been a racist, sexist, homophobe and not a very well-regarded writer'.²³⁷

²³⁴ Beckett, Lois, and Josh Halliday. 'Revealed: the Hidden Global Network Behind Tommy Robinson.' The Guardian. Last modified December 8, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/07/tommy-robinson-global-support-brexit-march>.

²³⁵ Weaver, Simon. 'Liquid racism and the Danish Prophet Muhammad cartoons.' Current Sociology 58, no. 5 (2010): 675-692.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Hastings, Chris. 'Royal Mint Blocks Enid Blyton Coin After Bosses Brand Her 'racist'.' Mail Online. Last modified August 26, 2019. <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7391487/Royal-Mint-blocks-Enid-Blyton-commemorative-coin-bosses-brand-racist-anti-gay.html>.

The framing of child sexual exploitation that broadly blames Muslim men, and by extension, their religion, is not just reflected in the views of social media users who display far-right ideologies, sympathies, or proclivities, and gained more mainstream credibility in 2018. One tweet verified by Tell MAMA falsely claimed: ‘Muslim men in the UK make up to 3% of the population but commit close to 90% of the total grooming gang rape convictions’. There are ongoing debates around the ethnicity of perpetrators of group-based CSE, of over-representation, ‘shoddy’ research, and data collection methods.²³⁸

The Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) published two major reports on CSE in 2011 and 2013. Regarding the former, the over-representation of Asian offenders appears clear, in group-led street grooming and CSE, but CEOP caveated the limited data collection methods in both reports.²³⁹²⁴⁰ Experts have also criticised these methodological shortcomings, lamenting ‘a missed opportunity to reduce confusion, alleviate claims of institutional cover-ups and ultimately make a meaningful contribution to the race debate’.²⁴¹

Attention given to girls (or boys) from minority ethnic backgrounds who face the trauma of CSE are often, sadly, underrepresented in the media. Researchers interviewed young South Asian victims of CSE and found that:

Young South Asian women – like many other young people from different backgrounds – are unfortunately targeted for exploitation by those within and outside of their communities. However, their presenting rates are likely to be even lower due to a range of barriers to disclosure and reporting.²⁴²

A major barrier to disclosing abuse was the burden of silence to protect bodily and family honour which put further strains on the mental health of South Asian victims of CSE, outside of the traumas they experienced when abused.²⁴³

8.9 MUSLIM VOTERS, THE LABOUR PARTY, AND ANTISEMITISM

A meme which permeated in a small number of reports claimed that Muslims were driving reports of antisemitism and that the failure to deal with antisemitism in the Labour party, was the desire of its leadership to appeal to Muslim voters as a heterogeneous bloc. The latter gained mainstream appeal and was referenced by Lord Sugar, who tweeted: ‘Hi Tossers Has it ever occurred to you that @jerymycorbyn has been associated with alleged anti-Semitism and refuses to clarify it. I wonder why he is not associated with anti-Muslim or

²³⁸ Malik, Kenan. ‘We’re Told 84% of Grooming Gangs Are Asian. But Where’s the Evidence? | Kenan Malik.’ The Guardian. Last modified November 11, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/11/84-per-cent-of-grooming-gangs-are-asians-we-dont-know-if-that-figure-is-right>.

²³⁹ ‘Majority of Grooming Gangs Are Asian, Says Report.’ Channel 4 News. Last modified June 29, 2011. <https://www.channel4.com/news/ceop-warns-against-focus-on-race-after-major-grooming-study>.

²⁴⁰ Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre. ‘Threat assessment of child sexual exploitation and abuse.’ (2013).

²⁴¹ Cockbain, Ella. ‘Grooming and the ‘Asian sex gang predator’: the construction of a racial crime threat.’ *Race & Class* 54, no. 4 (2013): 22-32.

²⁴² O’Neill Gutierrez, Dr. Caitlin, and Simran Chawla. *The child sexual exploitation of young South Asian women in Birmingham and Coventry*. London: The Children’s Society, 2017.

²⁴³ Ibid. 34.

Asians. Is it perhaps that those communities count for at least 5 million potential votes.’²⁴⁴ The Leave.EU campaign drew wide criticism after tweeting: ‘Is it any wonder that Labour can't be bothered to deal with the disgusting antisemitism in their party when they are so reliant on the votes of Britain's exploding Muslim population?’. The accompanying image depicted a see-saw which compared the supposed weight of Muslim and Jewish voters in political blocs and was captioned: ‘Turkey’s don’t vote for Christmas’. Damian Green, the Conservative former first secretary of state, said that it was the ‘worst kind of dog whistle’, and David Lammy MP, reported the tweet to the Metropolitan Police.²⁴⁵ The Board of Deputies of British Jews condemned the tweet and called for its deletion, and wrote: ‘Some of the best allies we have in the struggle against antisemitism are Muslims, Sadiq Khan, TellMama and more’. Adding, ‘This is not the way to challenge antisemitism’.²⁴⁶

Tell MAMA verified a tweet, written in August that read: ‘Labour want to keep the Muslim vote so everybody else can go get f*cked’. The user had quote tweeted an article which had highlighted concerns about antisemitism in the Labour party. The Leave.EU group has faced several accusations of spreading antisemitism online after images of the Hungarian-Jewish philanthropist George Soros, echoed traditional antisemitic canards of disproportionate Jewish influence in political and public life.²⁴⁷

Moreover, academics have found little evidence of a Muslim voting bloc in the UK, noting: ‘that most constituencies with a relatively large Muslim population are already safe Labour seats’.²⁴⁸ A BuzzFeed News investigation in 2015 found no evidence of a Muslim voting bloc – and even if the bloc did exist, its potential influence was marginal, given that Muslims did not vote as a religious bloc.²⁴⁹ An academic analysis of Muslims in France found that: ‘Muslim voters’ behaviour cannot be explained by the religious factor’, as like the broader voting behaviour of French voters was equally applicable to Muslim voters, noting that an ‘ethnic vote’ was, at best, a localised issue.²⁵⁰

Stephen Bush, the political editor of the New Statesman, disputed the claim that Muslims were driving antisemitism in the Labour party, arguing that ‘If every British Muslim who holds

²⁴⁴ Sugar, Lord. Twitter Post. April 8, 2018, 8:15 PM.

https://twitter.com/Lord_Sugar/status/983060892727300097.

²⁴⁵ Perkins, Anne. ‘MPs Condemn Leave.EU Tweet on Labour Antisemitism.’ The Guardian. February 23, 2019.

<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/29/mps-condemn-leaveeu-tweet-on-labour-antisemitism>

²⁴⁶ Kentish, Benjamin. ‘“Absolutely Disgusting” Leave.EU Tweet Linking Antisemitism to Muslim Voters Reported to Police.’ The Independent. Last modified March 29, 2018.

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/leave-eu-ukip-antisemitism-muslim-islam-tweet-brexite-jewish-message-police-a8280506.html>.

²⁴⁷ Butterworth, Benjamin. ‘Leave.EU Accused of Anti-Semitism After Showing Shadowy Image of George Soros Next to Text About the ‘powerful Elite’.’ Inews.co.uk. Last modified December 5, 2018.

<https://inews.co.uk/news/brexit/leave-eu-accused-of-anti-semitism-george-soros/>.

²⁴⁸ Curtice, Prof Sir John, Prof Rob Ford, Prof Stephen Fisher, and Patrick English. ‘How the Anti-Semitism Row Affected Labour's Support.’ BBC News. Last modified September 28, 2018. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-45602536>.

²⁴⁹ Kesvani, Hussein. ‘Is The British Muslim Vote Actually A Thing?’ BuzzFeed. Last modified April 8, 2015.

<https://www.buzzfeed.com/husseinkesvani/is-the-british-muslim-vote-actually-a-thing>.

²⁵⁰ Ajala, Imene. ‘The Muslim vote and Muslim lobby in France: Myths and realities.’ Journal of Islamic Law and Culture 12, no. 2 (2010): 77-91.

‘multiple and intense’ anti-Semitic views were to vanish from the United Kingdom, the percentage of British people holding multiple and intense anti-Semitic views would drop from 3.6 to 3.0 per cent’.²⁵¹

8.10 CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES FOR ONLINE HATE

The examples presented in this section are not intended to be exhaustive but illustrative of tangible outcomes. The first example concerns John Hanson, 61, from Yorkshire, who was given a suspended prison sentence after his Facebook posts from 2016 suggested that Muslims were responsible for wars and attacks abroad. He pleaded guilty in February 2018 to three counts of publishing material intending to stir up religious hatred, contrary to section 29C Public Order Act 1986.²⁵² A supply teacher shared racist memes about Muslims and made derogatory remarks about his pupils, was banned from teaching for life after a professional conduct panel upheld the complaints against him. Kevin Regester, writing the pseudonym ‘Kev Raven’, had referred to his students as ‘c*nts’ and shared two Islamophobic memes, which included an image of Muslim men holding signs which were photoshopped to read, ‘F*** it! I want a ham sandwich’, ‘I love pork pies’ and ‘Bum sex is very naughty.’²⁵³ The panel upheld the complaint that this content was racist which, in their interpretation, such religious ‘could only be reasonably determined as racist considering their content’. Nor did Mr Regester offer an apology or attempt to ‘remediate’ his behaviour. A far-right sympathiser who called for the revival of Hitler to exterminate Muslims was fined £1,000 in March, after posting their comments on Facebook months earlier.²⁵⁴ The Conservative party suspended a prospective council candidate in April after historic Islamophobic tweets surfaced. Adam Sedin, a former Ukip candidate, had tweeted that ‘Mohammed is a f***** paedophile’ and that ‘Allah is a c*nt’.²⁵⁵ Ian Robinson, a former councillor and prospective local candidate was also suspended from the Conservative party after it emerged that he had shared content from the far-right group Britain First on Facebook but maintained that he had been ‘hacked’, and later resigned from the party in protest at their fisheries policy.²⁵⁶ That same month, the Hackney Citizen revealed that Alexander van Terheyden, a prospective Conservative councillor in Hoxton, was suspended by the party for comparing Islam to ‘violent political

²⁵¹ Bush, Stephen. ‘No, Labour’s Anti-Semitism Crisis Isn’t the Fault of Britain’s Muslims.’ *America’s Current Affairs & Politics Magazine*. Last modified August 6, 2018. <https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2018/08/no-labour-s-anti-semitism-crisis-isn-t-fault-britain-s-muslims>.

²⁵² The Crown Prosecution Service. ‘Man Sentenced for Stirring Up Hatred Against Muslims on Facebook.’ The Crown Prosecution Service. Last modified February 7, 2018. <https://www.cps.gov.uk/cps/news/man-sentenced-stirring-hatred-against-muslims-facebook>.


²⁵³ Tell MAMA. ‘Teacher Given Lifetime Ban over Anti-Muslim and Offensive Facebook Posts.’ TELL MAMA. Last modified August 20, 2018. <https://tellmamauk.org/teacher-given-lifetime-ban-over-anti-muslim-and-offensive-facebook-posts/>.

²⁵⁴ Reoch, Paul. ‘Sheriff Slams Perthshire Man Who Made ‘Hitler’ Remark About Muslims.’ *The Courier*. Last modified March 21, 2018. <https://www.thecourier.co.uk/fp/news/local/perth-kinross/622245/sheriff-slams-perthshire-man-who-made-hitler-remark-about-muslims/>.

²⁵⁵ Johnson, Ian. ‘Tory candidate suspended over tweets calling prophet Mohammed a ‘paedophile’.’ *Chronicle Live*. Last modified April 27, 2018. <https://www.chroniclelive.co.uk/news/north-east-news/tory-candidate-suspended-over-tweets-14584463>.

²⁵⁶ Gee, Chris. ‘Former Tory candidate ‘suspended’ pending investigation.’ *LancsLive*. Last modified April 6, 2018. <https://www.lancs.live/news/former-tory-candidate-suspended-pending-14494953>.

ideology' and attending a rally organised by Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson).²⁵⁷ In June, Sean McGuire, 49, was given a suspended prison sentence after admitting to writing 'Kill all Muslims' and 'What will it take before we say enough is enough if the Muslim community can't live here in peace f***ing kill them all' on Facebook following the Westminster Bridge terror attack.²⁵⁸ A retired police officer who was reported by his former colleagues for his anti-Muslim remarks on Facebook walked free from court. Gordon McLeod, 62, wrote: 'I think terrorists are scum and just now they are all Muslims. Get real.' Bushra Sitar, herself Muslim, replied: 'Them? As in me? I'm Muslim too and proud to be so'.²⁵⁹ But McLeod replied to her comment below and wrote: 'Scum'. He would later apologise and claim to have had no recollection of making such comments, The Times reported in April.²⁶⁰



²⁵⁷ Barnett, Adam. 'Tory Candidate in Hoxton Suspended for Anti-Islam Posts on Social Media.' Hackney Citizen. Last modified June 18, 2019. <https://www.hackneycitizen.co.uk/2018/04/17/tory-candidate-hoxton-suspended-muslim-social-media/>.

²⁵⁸ Crump, Eryl. 'Man sentenced for 'kill all Muslims' Facebook post after London terror attack.' North Wales Live. Last modified June 14, 2018. <https://www.dailypost.co.uk/news/man-sentenced-kill-muslims-facebook-14784239>.

²⁵⁹ Meikle, David. 'Retired Police Officer Who Ranted Online About Muslims is Freed.' The Times & The Sunday Times. Last modified April 27, 2018. <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/retired-police-officer-who-ranted-online-about-muslims-is-freed-q5hs3mpxr>.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

9 RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

- Anti-Muslim and Islamophobic language should be challenged. Statements alone should be treated seriously, as they can demonstrate the root of attacks, threats, discrimination, and more. Anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia – at all levels – should not be normalised.
- Anti-Muslim incidents frequently occur in busy public spaces. These include shopping areas, in and around public transport networks, roads or highways, and restaurants. Perpetrators are more likely to act in spaces where they feel they can act with impunity. Therefore, existing preventative measures, where appropriate, should be utilised, and where such measures are lacking or absent, steps should be taken to address such inadequacies.
- Perpetrators often target victims who are in a vulnerable position relative to themselves, whether that be physically or socially. This may be related to age, gender, disability, class, and racial or religious identity. Muslim women remain the main victims of anti-Muslim hatred. Intersectional approaches to tackling hate-crime should always be observed.
- Individuals with vulnerabilities may need additional support and therefore resources need to be allocated within institutions, organisations and private companies to train staff accordingly. Cultivating a better institutional knowledge of the situations in which such individuals can be scapegoated for broader social ills, and ultimately marginalised, would enable this.
- In addition to formal criminal justice and civil outcomes, informal responses to incidents are also important. Victims appreciate frequent and accurate updates from the police. However, victims are often not aware of the process for reporting to the police and what to expect. Many victims reported to Tell MAMA to share their negative (though sometimes positive) experiences of interacting with the police. An initial lack of communication is frequently compounded by unsupportive comments from officers along with lack of follow-up.
- Those in authority, including representatives of law enforcement agencies, and civil authorities such as teachers, council officials and employers, should be aware of any potential power imbalance when responding to a report of identity-based abuse or discrimination. Those in a privileged position due to their social status will invariably have an advantage when it comes to negotiating their case with the appropriate agencies.
- Police forces and the emergency services should continue to lead on educating vulnerable communities on the processes involved in reporting hate crimes, building trust, and cultivating awareness. Within their own forces, we recommend that all staff, from call handlers to prosecutors, should work to improve religious literacy, community engagement, and knowledge of services such as Tell MAMA.

- Police and prosecution services should treat the racially and/or religiously aggravated nature of crimes more seriously and include this in charges.
- Members of the public should not underestimate their role in challenging anti-Muslim hatred and showing support for victims. If individuals can safely show solidarity with victims during or following an incident, this can create an environment in which abuse and identity-based discrimination are unacceptable.
- Similarly, we should not underestimate the power of public statements condemning and combating anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia within the media.
- Councils and local authorities should work with third-party and statutory agencies such as Tell MAMA to streamline support for residents when reporting graffiti or anti-social behaviour which is verifiably anti-Muslim in nature.
- A broad range of studies found Muslims to have been portrayed negatively in the media. We therefore recommend that media platforms, particularly news media, should monitor the overall portrayal of minority groups within the UK and set clear targets to provide more balanced coverage.
- High-profile events, along with associated media coverage, stimulate public discourse on issues such as terrorism, religious expression and immigration, and can legitimise racist, xenophobic and anti-Muslim prejudice. Individuals with underlying prejudice may feel emboldened to victimise those they feel to be deserving of abuse to defend the status of the dominant 'in-group'. Media outlets must consider how their choice of language influences wider public discourse.
- We must not underestimate the far-reaching impact that anti-Muslim prejudice and Islamophobia has on individuals. Low-level ongoing abuse can escalate with serious consequences. Guaranteeing the safety and happiness of individuals is of paramount importance.

9.2 EMPLOYERS AND BUSINESSES

Structural discrimination, often including intersectional axes of prejudice such as sexism and classism, has impacted communities in a broader way. Institutional and structural forms of anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia are insidious and often unspoken forms of prejudice. An intersectional analysis of discrimination demonstrates how there are ethnic and religious penalties for Muslim women of various backgrounds in the workplace.²⁶¹ Muslim men are also held back in the workplace due to racism, Islamophobia, and anti-Muslim prejudice.²⁶² For example, Muslims in Britain, particularly women, often take up roles in self-employment or Muslim-owned businesses due to fear of discrimination, thus contributing to segregation

²⁶¹ Ganesh, Bharath and Atta, Iman (2016) 'Forgotten Women: The impact of Islamophobia on Muslim women in the United Kingdom.' European Network Against Racism (ENAR), 2016.

Accessed: https://www.enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/forgotten_women_report_united_kingdom_-_final.pdf

²⁶² Asthana, Anushka (2018) 'Islamophobia Holding Back UK Muslims in Workplace, Study Finds.' The Guardian. Last modified June 26, 2018.

Accessed: <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/sep/07/islamophobia-holding-back-uk-muslims-in-workplace-study-finds>

between Muslims and non-Muslims.²⁶³ Furthermore, this creates career-based stereotypes and assumptions, for example, taxi drivers, shop keepers, and takeaway workers have consistently faced anti-Muslim hatred, some of whom were not Muslim, but were perceived as being so due to their race and job.

Moreover, approximately half of British Muslim households are living below the poverty threshold, meaning the household income is 60% or less of the national 'Median Income'. Compared with the rest of the UK, of whom around 20% are living below the threshold, Muslim communities are facing above average rates of poverty. There are geographical concerns here too; of the Muslim population in England, approximately 46% (1.22 million) live in the 10% most deprived Local Authority Districts.²⁶⁴ The roots of these issues lie in education and employment opportunities.

Our recommendations include:

- The work-force should represent the diversity of Britain. Employers are encouraged to commit to diversity-led work environment and recruitment, implementing policies such as blind recruitment, outreach and training courses, and appropriate representation at all levels of management.
- Pay gaps should be investigated and overcome. While the gender pay gap still leaves women at consistently lower pay, workers of Pakistani or Bangladeshi heritage also have the lowest median hourly pay of any ethnic group, in the latter case earning 20.1% less than white British workers.²⁶⁵
- Employers may recognise the benefits of a workforce who feel comfortable being themselves and expressing their beliefs and practices. A study recently found that employees who can be open with their religious identities at work are more motivated and effective in their jobs, bringing an overall benefit to the company.²⁶⁶
- Employers also have a moral obligation to ensure that all employees feel respected and that differences in belief, religious or otherwise, are welcomed and respected. Encouraging staff to embrace diversity and to learn about each other's backgrounds can help encourage empathy, which may discourage the normalisation of anti-Muslim and Islamophobic attitudes and cultural stereotypes that are perceived to be negative.
- Employers and all members of staff should be reminded of their liability for acts of unlawful discrimination, bullying, harassment, and victimisation of their fellow employees, members of the public, or customers. Such a reminder may help to

²⁶³ Women and Equalities Committee (2016) 'Employment Opportunities for Muslims in the UK: Second Report of Session 2016-17' House of Commons. Crown Copyright
Accessed: <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmwomeq/89/89.pdf>

²⁶⁴ Muslim Council of Britain (2016) 'British Muslims in Numbers: Briefing' January 2016. Accessed: https://mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/BMINBriefing7_Jan16.pdf

²⁶⁵ Office for National Statistics (2019) 'Ethnicity pay gaps in Great Britain: 2018' 9th July 2019, ONS Accessed: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/articles/ethnicitypaygapsingreatbritain/2018>

²⁶⁶ Héliot, YF., Gleibs, IH., Coyle, A., Rousseau, DM., and Rojon, C. (2019) 'Religious identity in the workplace: A systematic review, research agenda, and practical implications' *Hum Resour Manage.* 2019; 1– 21.

address issues concerning structural or institutional forms of Islamophobia, where the life chances of Muslims are harmed at the recruitment or career advancement stages.

- Employers should take complaints from staff seriously and create an environment where people are aware of internal grievance processes. Moreover, HR officers who are independent and, therefore, neutral about any underlying and systemic prejudicial attitudes, should be made available to employees who have grievances against other employees or management.
- Reminding staff that acts of victimisation may amount to gross misconduct and incur subsequent automatic dismissal may encourage others to come forward and report abuse and/or bullying.
- Employers should educate all staff about their rights under the Equality Act 2010 and make greater efforts to foster an environment of religious and cultural tolerance which would include reasonable adjustments to, for example, allow staff the time to pray in a multi-faith prayer room or space during work hours.
- Informing employees of their legal rights pertaining to workplace discrimination should be considered a priority, and information regarding such rights should be made more readily available, whether that be through third-party agencies or specialised services which can advocate on behalf of victims and signpost them where necessary.
- Employers should be encouraged to refer their staff who are experiencing bullying or harassment to specialised services such as Tell MAMA, which may help to reduce absenteeism or presenteeism, and improve staff retention rates.

9.3 EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

In 2018, 6% of incidents took place in an educational institution (N=50). Within educational institutions, 17 cases of discrimination were perpetrated by teachers, staff, fellow pupils, or other parents at the school. This year we have also seen victims and perpetrators as young as twelve.

Our recommendations include:

- Promoting religious education is paramount to the growth of a peaceful and tolerant society. We recommend facilitating positive dialogue and productive critique of religions, and teaching pupils about anti-Muslim hate and antisemitism to ensure they are equipped to recognise religion-based hatred.
- Similarly, promoting religious literacy outside formal lessons, for example, visiting faith institutions, would promote a more open-minded approach to religious people and practices.
- It remains concerning that some parents abuse existing legislation to withdraw their children from Religious Education due to underlying anti-Muslim prejudices. Teachers should encourage parents to engage with the curriculum before requests to withdraw are made, and teachers should make clear the benefits of such study visits, and how

learning about other faiths, including Islam, is a way to build empathy and an understanding of others, which will benefit their overall education.²⁶⁷

- Teachers can also set an example by reminding students that bullying, racism, and other forms of hatred will not be tolerated; such statements may help victims to feel less isolated.
- Schools should do more to accommodate more Muslim role models and foster a teaching environment where students should not fear going to staff for advice and support.
- Proactive strategies tackling discrimination and ‘casual’ abuse in educational environments require input from specialist third parties and external institutions equipped with the knowledge to educate both pupils and staff.
- Parents often mention that their complaints are undermined or dismissed. Teachers and senior members of staff should be reminded of their legal obligations to handle complaints sensitively and should do more to ensure transparency about their formal and informal complaints procedures, especially if complaints are made against staff.
- Considerable efforts should be made to boost the engagement of Muslim parents in school activities.
- Schools and educational institutions should provide training to their staff or seek expert advice on how to deal with issues of identity-based victimisation or discrimination.
- Educational institutions must do more to ensure that safeguarding referrals to the police or other agencies are proportional and not misused. This would build trust and help to ensure that individuals do not feel targeted because of their religious identity.
- The Department for Education (DfE) should engage with specialist support agencies such as Tell MAMA to better understand issues around anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia in educational institutions.
- The Office for Students (OfS) funded eleven universities to tackle religious hate crime and improve religious literacy, to the sum of £480,000 in April 2018 which, moving forward, should be encouraged, and developed with more universities.²⁶⁸

9.4 POLITICAL PARTIES, CAMPAIGN GROUPS, AND PARTY MEMBERS

Public figures have not held back on debates concerning Islam and Muslims, and this year (2019) is no exception. The Conservative party leadership contest has been occupied with two major questions regarding Brexit and Islamophobia and the two major political parties, Labour and the governing Conservatives, are faced with inquiries into antisemitism and

²⁶⁷ Busby, Eleanor. ‘Parents Who Take Children out of RE Classes over Lessons on Islam Should Be Stopped, Teachers Say.’ The Independent. Last modified June 27, 2019.
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/parents-religious-education-islam-headteachers-liverpool-hope-university-study-a8976366.html>.

²⁶⁸ Office for Students (2018) ‘Universities receive £480,000 to tackle religion-based hate crime and harassment’. Office for Students.
Available at: <https://www.officeforstudents.org.uk/news-blog-and-events/news-and-blog/universities-receive-480-000-to-tackle-religion-based-hate-crime-and-harassment/>

Islamophobia. Far-right politics and populism are on a steady rise across the English-speaking world and beyond, and Islam has been a key focus. Hope Not Hate and YouGov recently investigated the views of Conservative party members on Islam and Muslims, finding, for example, that 40% believe we should lower the number of Muslims entering Britain, as opposed to just 5% who want to see fewer Christians or Jewish people enter the country. Recent polls similarly found:

‘60% of Tory members believe Islam ‘is generally a threat to western civilisation’, 54% hold it to be ‘generally a threat to the British way of life’, and 43% do not want a Muslim as prime minister. Two-thirds believe the lie that parts of Britain are under sharia law; another 45% believe in the racist nonsense that there are no-go areas for non-Muslims; and 40% want to limit Britain’s Muslim population. Among the most chilling findings was that 42% believe ‘having people from a wide variety of racial and cultural backgrounds’ has damaged British society, with just 39% dissenting.²⁶⁹²⁷⁰

From general polling of the electorate, it was found that 44% of Conservative voters see Islam as a threat, with only half that amount (22%) saying it is compatible.²⁷¹

Our data this year has shown the potential for the general public to be influenced and emboldened by political discourse and the language of our politicians. Therefore, where previously we have advised members of the public, social media platforms, and business owners on remaining aware and vigilant against anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia, the trends observed in 2018 call for our recommendations to extend to high-profile political figures. We would extend our support for those calling for investigations into anti-Muslim hatred and Islamophobia within political parties and taking pro-active steps towards challenging it.

- A formal procedure for dealing with anti-Muslim and Islamophobic behaviour from group or party members should be established. Parties may wish to work with external organisations, such as Tell MAMA, to develop these procedures.
- Anti-Muslim and Islamophobic language at all party levels should be taken seriously. Cases should be investigated and members should face being, at least, suspended and, ideally, expelled from parties.
- Like many of our values and phobias, anti-Muslim hate is becoming more normalised and legitimised by high-profile members of society. We recommend an independent inquiry, into anti-Muslim and Islamophobic sentiments within all political party members and elected officials.
- Pro-active measures should be taken to ensure proportional representation within parties, to more appropriately reflect the electorate, including boosting Muslim

²⁶⁹ Hope Not Hate (2019) ‘The Conservative Crisis Over Islamophobia’

Available at: <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/2019/06/21/conservative-crisis-islamophobia/>

²⁷⁰ Carter, Rosie (2019) ‘New statistics confirm what we already knew – Islamophobia is thriving in all parts of British society’ Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/islamophobia-new-statistics-hope-but-hate-british-muslims-society-a9006516.html?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1563272247

²⁷¹ Bartlett, Nicola (2018) ‘Islamophobia ‘going mainstream’ as poll finds 31% think religion poses a threat’ Accessed: <https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/islamophobia-going-mainstream-poll-finds-18211718>

representation and participation in all parties. For example, tried and tested positive discrimination practices such as shortlisting or guaranteed interviews may be helpful.

- Parties should formally recognise that tackling prejudice is more important than the public image of the party and agree to transparency in all disciplinary procedures.
- Policies should be established and published for supporting victims when instances of anti-Muslim hatred are faced by Muslim politicians, councillors, members, and other staff.
- Perpetrators of anti-Muslim hatred have been inspired and motivated by seeing political figures facing no negative consequences for their prejudicial or dehumanising language. Transparency to the complaints process should be adopted by all political parties, especially when complaints concern the conduct of those who have made comments against minority communities.

9.5 SOCIAL MEDIA AND INTERNET PLATFORMS

Tell MAMA coded online reports for hate speech for the first time to demonstrate how the language that seeks to harm, dehumanise, and in rarer cases, advocates for the removal of religious rights can morph, in rarer cases, to calls for mass internment or violence. Such language will not always satisfy the threshold for criminal language, but dehumanising language can result in violence or hate crime. The fundamental risk posed by normalising hate speech is how it becomes reconfigured, reconstructed, and redefined as ‘uncivil’ within an elasticated framework of civility in public and political discourses. When politicians or newspapers evoke dehumanising language, during major campaigns or in opinion columns, or on social media, it risks normalising language which, in turn, seeps further into everyday discussions. This drip effect has a damaging impact when minorities are targeted with bigoted, hateful, and racist forms of speech in direct or indirect forms online. Ethnoviolence, according to Perry (2002), emerges from the structural connections that reproduce racialised hierarchies situated within a network of behaviours, assumptions, behaviours, and institutional arrangements. Structural exclusion and forms of cultural imaging put minorities at risk of systemic violence. It is, therefore, crucial, that online spaces are ones where minority groups can resist oppressive and dehumanising narratives, supported by other communities, who understand the broader harms hatred poses at all levels – be it miso, micro, or macro. Creating an intersectional framework of analysis can further empower individuals to identify and challenge corrosive, hateful, and dehumanising speech, and help ensure that others feel supported before or when hate crimes or discriminatory practises are reported online.

Trolling or other patterns of abusive language are not new online, but as Suler (2004)²⁷² argues the online disinhibition effect allows motivated individuals the cloak of anonymity to subvert direct forms of social interactions, allowing some to act out their aggressive impulses they would, in most circumstances, have been socialised to not exhibit in public. Other forms of online socialisation, through narrow interpretative echo chambers or feedback loops, creates solipsistic introjection, where the words of an online companion, real or self-

²⁷² Suler, John. (2004) ‘The online disinhibition effect.’ *Cyberpsychology & behavior* 7, no. 3 (2004): 321-326.

designed, becomes a voice in the mind of that person. As Suler contends, such forms of solipsism serve as a form of theatre for individuals to express their hatreds – from their employer to racial, religious, or other minority groups. But there are consequences for such speech, including mainstream figures losing ambassadorships with major charities to criminal convictions. The disparity, however, is in how we collectively challenge such language at the highest levels of society. Part of this challenge is ensuring that social media companies continue to enact their policies on hateful conduct in proportional terms, where inconsistencies around how some notable figures from the far-right are banned for policy breaches when others are not. The other challenge concerns how we educate communities and young people to resist such narratives and counter hateful language, and to better help them understand how they can report hateful, anti-Muslim, racist, bigoted and other forms of speech to platforms, third-party organisations, and the police.

Therefore, our online recommendations include:

- Google should de-list the far-right websites identified in this report who benefit from being listed on Google News. As we warned in our 2016 annual report: ‘A higher ranking not only increases their legitimacy but may draw vulnerable individuals into extreme echo chambers’.
- Platforms like Twitter and Facebook have taken proactive and welcome steps to eventually ban various far-right accounts, including that of Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson). But other ideologues, like Katie Hopkins, continue to benefit from a verified account despite numerous policy breaches on hateful conduct. Therefore, we call for a more robust approach to such account holders which, we hope, will become clearer under updated guidelines on dehumanising language.
- Extremist far-right accounts linked to the ethnonationalist Identarian network of Generation Identity still have Twitter accounts, including Generation Identity England (@GID_England), which has continued to disseminate propaganda, despite calling for the violent mass removal of Muslims in Spain following the Barcelona terror attack in 2017.
- Facebook should extend its trusted flagger privileges to partners when dealing with Facebook-owned platforms like Instagram, to help remove hateful content from the platform.
- We call on Snapchat to work with Tell MAMA and other agencies to develop tool kits and reporting mechanisms to help young people report hate crimes, abuse, and hate speech on the platform.
- We encourage other online platforms like PayPal to undertake our tailored training on anti-Muslim prejudice and Islamophobia, to ensure that there are ways to report account holders who use the platform to spread hatred, violence, and discriminatory practises.
- Bespoke training sessions for teachers and educational practitioners from Tell MAMA remain available, and we encourage others to inquire about countering anti-Muslim hate and racism in schools.

10 APPENDIX I: POLICE DATA ON ANTI-MUSLIM HATE CRIME

Tell MAMA is in a unique place to have a Data Sharing Agreement with the National Police Chief's Council (NPCC) and in 2018 we have received data from 20 police forces in the UK:


-
- | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| • British Transport Police | • Merseyside |
| • Cheshire | • Metropolitan Police Service |
| • City of London | • Northamptonshire |
| • Derbyshire | • Northern Ireland |
| • Dorset | • Staffordshire |
| • Greater Manchester | • Surrey |
| • Hampshire | • South Yorkshire |
| • Humberside | • Warwickshire |
| • Kent | • West Mercia |
| • Lancashire | • West Yorkshire |
-

Through these partnerships, we have an invaluable opportunity to raise awareness of a broader scope of anti-Muslim hate crime throughout the UK, as we continue to support victims of anti-Muslim hatred. In addition to that, we also can advocate for policy change and protect the rights of victims. We can also comparatively analyse the data for anti-Muslim hate crimes to add a further dimension to our evaluation and understand further where these crimes are taking place.


Where possible, we received details about each individual case. While details have been omitted, we have analysed the data to the best of our ability.

20 Police forces collectively recorded 1891 anti-Muslim incidents. Of the total hate crimes reported to the police, we identified a 70% majority occurring street-based (N=1329), with 5% occurring online (N=89), 0.1% fitting both categories (N=2), and 25% (N=471) left unknown.


This is interesting, as the dispersal of incidents occurring street-based (offline) or online reported to Tell MAMA shows a similar trend.




The incident categories vary slightly from our data. The largest category of both street-based and online incidents recorded by the police was assault (N=799), followed by abusive behaviour (N=730), and vandalism (N=139). Abusive behaviour here includes verbal abuse and harassment which police forces have deemed to be anti-Muslim or Islamophobic in nature, and vandalism also includes robbery, arson, and attacks on the victim’s private property. Our results, for street-based incidents only, showed abusive behaviour as the most common incident category, followed by assault, discrimination, anti-Muslim literature, and threatening behaviour. Tell MAMA platform is primarily a victim support agency, so we more often deal with cases of discrimination, hate speech, and anti-Muslim literature than the police, as these may not warrant criminal convictions.



We received details of locations for 846 out of 1891 cases. Due to the nature of the details disclosed to us by Police forces, these categories were assigned by location only, disregarding the relationship of the location to the victim. For example, in our own database, an incident which occurred in a restaurant at which the victim worked would be recorded as a “place of work”. Here, all incidents occurring in a restaurant, shop, or other business would be recorded as place of business. The distribution of the place categories can be seen below, excluding the 1044 unknown or undisclosed locations so that this may roughly represent the trends for the total number of cases.



Of the street-based incidents for which we have the location data, one third (N=286 in 846 cases) occurred in a place of business, including shops, malls, restaurants, cafes, and more. Around 24% (N=200) occurred in a public area or building, here including institutions such as museums and galleries, and 18% (N=156) took place in public transport networks, including trains, buses, stations, and airports.



The annual timeline for anti-Muslim incidents reported to our police partners in 2018 shows minor spikes in March and August and a significant spike around April and May. In March, the total number of incidents rose by 32% (from N=130 in February to N=171), and between April and May the incidents soared by 81% (N=134 to N=243). These spring-time spikes match those recorded by Tell MAMA, and can be attributed to Punish a Muslim Day, along with Ramadan taking place (roughly) between 16th of May and 14th of June, and the first heat wave of the year which hit the UK in the month of May. There was a slight increase in August, rising by 10% since July, which we tend to see during the summer period.



The background of the entire page is a dark purple color. Overlaid on this background is a repeating pattern of white line-art illustrations of various people. These figures are depicted in different poses and activities: some are walking, some are standing, some are pushing a stroller, some are riding a bicycle, and some are holding a bag or a briefcase. The figures are scattered across the page, creating a sense of a busy, diverse crowd.

NORMALISING HATRED

Tell MAMA Annual Report 2018

A white teardrop-shaped icon containing the letters 'TM' in a bold, black, sans-serif font.

TM